Archive for the ‘ A New Framework for Growth and Equity ’ Category

Will There Be a “Volcker Plan” for Corporate Tax Cuts?

Tuesday, August 31st, 2010
Scott Thomasson



Scott Thomasson is the domestic policy director for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Scott Thomasson

On Friday, I wrote about the current tax debate and bemoaned the failure of Democrats to frame the debate around a more comprehensive proposal of their own, instead of just talking about a more progressive version of the Bush tax cuts.  I concluded with my hope that President Obama will put forward his own package of broad, pro-growth reforms to do just that.

Since then, I have two new reasons for hope.  First, on Friday afternoon, the President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board (PERAB), chaired by Paul Volcker, released a long-overdue report on tax reform proposals.  Then President Obama said Monday that his team is weighing “additional measures” to move the economy forward, including both extension of expiring middle-class tax and “further tax cuts to encourage businesses to put their capital to work creating jobs here in the United States.”  It’s not much to go on, but the president promised more details on these “proposals” in the days and weeks to come.

Looking at these two news items together, are there clues in Friday’s report to what the president is planning?  I think there are.  Obama chose to mention putting capital to work, which is different than simply talking about putting people to work.  I may be reading too much into it (no doubt from watching too much Rubicon), but the president’s choice of words suggests to me that he’s chosen an approach based on corporate income tax incentives, rather than alternatives like payroll tax cuts to boost hiring, which has been suggested at various times by Republicans, Democrats, and both.  The corporate income approach would be consistent with options laid out in Friday’s report, which looks at the benefits of corporate income tax changes and treatment of corporate operations overseas, but not other things like payroll taxes.

Drawing from the Volcker report, my best guess is that the president will offer a version of the “direct expensing” proposal to increase incentives for new capital investments.  This seems like an easy choice to argue for stimulating demand and getting larger companies to spend the piles of cash they have been sitting on.  Plus, it complements the administration’s push for more spending on clean energy and infrastructure, two priorities the president also mentioned as additional measures on Monday.  But the real reason I’m betting on this option is the marketing.  As the report acknowledges, “direct expensing” is really just “accelerated depreciation” on steroids (insert Rocket joke of the day here), but giving it a new-ish name and taking it to a new extreme are classic markings of the kind of political repackaging Obama may be looking for right now.

If I let my optimism go completely unchecked, I can also interpret the president’s sentence fragment as a sign he’s prepared for more comprehensive corporate tax reform—taking up the Volcker report’s suggestions for simplifying and reducing corporate rates to incentivize investment and make U.S. more globally competitive.  Unlikely, I admit.  However, the tone and substance of the report’s chapters on corporate tax reform do match up in many respects to Obama’s rhetoric about “putting capital to work” and “creating jobs here in the United States.”  These two themes apply to the predicted benefits of several options included in the report:

  • Lowering marginal corporate rates will make the U.S. more competitive relative to other developed nations (we currently have the second-highest rates in the world).
  • Lowering marginal rates will encourage companies to build and create jobs by reducing the cost of capital for new investment and reduces incentives to use debt to finance new spending.
  • Lost revenues from lower rates can be replaced by eliminating special-interest giveaways and tax expenditures, thereby broadening the base and reducing inefficient corporate subsidies and market distortions.
  • With lower marginal rates, it will be possible to deal rationally with income earned by U.S. corporations overseas and end the nonsense system of deferring repatriation of earnings to avoid high U.S. taxes.

It’s true that the report is short on specifics and estimates for the options it proposes, which has prompted some to pronounce the entire effort as a missed opportunity for comprehensive reform.  This might be true in the sense that Volcker and company could have provided more concrete numbers for the president to cite (and for his opponents to distort), and they could have taken it upon themselves to go beyond what was asked of them and issue an urgent call to arms for overhauling the tax code.  They didn’t do either of those things.  Instead, they did what they were supposed to do: create an opportunity for the president to do whatever he wants with the report.

That the report is so non-committal doesn’t mean it isn’t part of a larger strategy. Thinking big without announcing a hard-and-fast position to fight for from the outset is classic Obama (can I already say “classic” less than two years into his presidency?).  When Obama actually comes out in favor of specific proposals, he frequently likes to do it without telegraphing his punch, as was the case the last time he teamed up with Paul Volcker to endorse the Volcker Rule.  So it’s conceivable that both the timing and the tone of this report were planned by the White House—not simply to be ignored and forgotten in the doldrums of August, but to quietly lay the groundwork to support a new tax proposal this fall.

Most of the smart money has been on Congress waiting until after the elections to take up taxes, but that leaves a lot of time for Republicans to pound away at the president’s tax plan and for Democrats to splinter off from the administration’s plan to partially extend the Bush tax cuts.  The next couple weeks seems like as good a time as any for Obama to stand with Paul Volcker in a Rose Garden press conference to announce the new “Volcker Plan” for corporate tax cuts.  You heard it here first.

Beware of Partisan Tax Zombies

Friday, August 27th, 2010
Scott Thomasson



Scott Thomasson is the domestic policy director for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Scott Thomasson

There has been growing chatter this week in response to James Surowiecki’s recent piece in The New Yorker suggesting we create a new, higher-rate tax bracket for the “super rich.”  It’s the kind of side story I should expect to see and not take too seriously when major tax changes are on the political agenda.  But I can’t just ignore this one, because it keeps getting more traction, and I think it baits extremists on both sides into all-too-familiar class warfare arguments, which are exactly the kind of discussions we should not be having right now.

As a Democrat, I am strongly in favor of a progressive tax system.  It’s one of the widely held values that defines us as a party, and it’s something we should not shrink from fighting for.  But there comes a point when the zeal for progressivity can overtake reasonable concerns about encouraging economic growth, and this year is not the time to let that happen.  Questions of distributional justice are important, and the Bush tax cuts did a lot to worsen inequality in our country that need to be remedied, but let’s keep the bigger picture in mind here.

The proposed “super rich” bracket is a supercharged example of how progressives are misdirecting our energies in the tax debate.  While there’s not much chance that it will make the jump to becoming an actual legislative proposal, the idea has struck a nerve on the left, which is already twitchy over the debate over whether to extend the Bush tax cuts for the top tax brackets, as Paul Krugman dutifully showed in his Times op-ed on Monday.   CNBC was quick to give the story more legs by bringing on Michael Linden from the Center for American Progress to endorse the idea in a segment on Monday.  Then they came back to it with another segment Wednesday night with Matt Miller (also from CAP) facing off with Stephen Moore from the Wall Street Journal.

For someone who has written about the Tyranny of Dead Ideas, Miller really let himself go a little zombie on this one, sounding too much like the “talking dead” with the old-school liberal argument for steep progressivity in the tax code and a deaf ear to the concerns about economic growth.  I’m not criticizing him personally as much I am CNBC for painting him that way, since Miller has repeatedly weighed in with very good thoughts about cuts for payroll and corporate taxes, but I think volunteering to step into the scripted left-wing role for this segment was a step backward from his earlier calls for a more radical centrism.

Is this really the kind of debate we are going to get dragged into this year?  With the country still languishing in recession, people in every tax bracket are looking to Washington to do what needs to be done to get the economy going again.  Do we really have to listen to the same broken records from both sides this time around (and they really are records, because these arguments haven’t changed much since the days of vinyl)?    This is the type of discussion that will drag the current tax debate into a predictable and unproductive battle of liberal and conservative clichés, which all but ensures that Congress will spend the fall in a tug-of-war over marginal tweaks to the Bush tax cuts and ignore other proposals for reform and stimulus.

We Democrats should not paint themselves into our usual corner in the tax debate by limiting our ideas to line-drawing, whether it’s the Administration’s line for the richest two percent or a new line for the “Ultrarich” in the top 0.1 percent.  Letting this happen would be a mistake for two reasons:

First, it obscures and marginalizes better policy questions at a time when sustainable economic growth should be our top priority.  Putting aside broader reform proposals, even the Bush tax cuts may not deserve to be lumped together and simply cleaved in two at the $250,000 line.  For example, rates on dividend income for the top brackets could jump from 15% to 39% in 2011, while capital gains income will stay at a lower 20% rate.  There is a good case to be made that the dividend rate should be kept in line with the capital gains rate, regardless of what happens to marginal rates, because having a disparity between these two taxes on investment negatively affects the cost of capital for utilities and other companies paying high dividends, which discourages spending on new capital and infrastructure.  But we likely won’t have that debate, because the distributional effects of playing with the dividend rate fall mostly within the top brackets, so they are on the wrong side of the dividing line Obama has drawn.

Second, Republicans usually do a much better job delivering their zombie rhetoric than Democrats.  As John Boehner so frequently demonstrates, the Republican response for talking about the top brackets is to use “small business” as a euphemism for rich people.  They have shaky new statistics every week about how the Democrats are raising taxes on small business.  But trying to explain away all the false numbers tends to put Democrats on the defensive, when they should be making an affirmative case for promoting economic growth.   And so far, Boehner and company are getting away with doing just that, because the President and congressional leaders are following our party’s tradition of being reactive on taxes instead of laying out a real vision.  So right now the public thinks the “Democrats’ plan” is pretty much whatever John Boehner and the tax zombies say it is.

Progressives’ top priority right now needs to be reviving economic growth and broad-based prosperity.  We can’t have a meaningful debate about economic inequality until we get our economy growing again.  Jobs and growth—not punishing the rich—are what Americans are interested in, and what we should be talking about.  Instead, progressives are limiting their talking points to justifying the dividing line between those who deserve tax cuts and those who don’t—the helps and the help-nots—and we’re letting Republicans own the growth side of the debate.

Democrats need to have something more than tired old thinking that says the Bush tax cuts are mostly OK for now, as long as we give them a quick liberal haircut—just a little off the top.  Instead of trying to repackage Bush’s mistakes, we should be framing the debate around the pro-growth virtues of a free-standing package of “Obama tax cuts.”  All we need now is for Obama to actually propose one.  I hope the zombies didn’t get to him too.

Photo credit: JamesCalder’s photostream

The Economist’s Strange Attack on Industrial Policy

Wednesday, August 25th, 2010
Stephen Ezell



Stephen Ezell is a senior analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.

by Stephen Ezell

Last week’s The Economist leader and cover story, “Picking winners, saving losers”, painted an insidious picture of governments’ increasing intervention in market economies, arguing that the hideous Leviathan of the state was gobbling up one sector after another and warning that “picking industrial winners nearly always fails.” Now, put aside the fact that the government was forced into some sectors—such as automobiles and financial services—only after mammoth market failures and pleas for rescues from capitalism’s chieftains.  The more important fact is that the article feeds a Socialism-is-coming hysteria and ignores how picking winners—within limits—has worked in the past for the United States (and Japan, South Korea, etc.) and is needed more than ever to bolster our long-term competitiveness.

Of course, the debate about the appropriate role between the state and the private sector in market economies has raged for centuries. The debate is marred in part by vague terminology, and The Economist perpetuates this problem by throwing around a slew of terms—“picking winners”, “industrial policy”, “innovation policy”—without adequately distinguishing between them but while uniformly indicting them as inappropriate manifestations of government economic intervention.

It would be more constructive to envision a continuum of government-market engagement, increasing from left to right in four steps from a “laissez faire, leave it to the market” approach to “supporting factor conditions for innovation (such as education)” (which The Economist endorses, as, certainly, does ITIF) to going further by “supporting key technologies/industries” to at the most extreme “picking specific national champion companies”, that is, “picking winners.”  And while it is generally inadvisable for governments to intervene in markets to support specific national champion companies, ITIF believes there is an appropriate role for government in placing strategic bets to support potentially breakthrough nascent technologies and industries.

Ironically, The Economist asserts that, “Industrial policy may be designed to support or restructure old struggling sectors, such as steel or textiles, or to try to construct new industries, such as robotics or nanotechnology. Neither track has met with much success. Governments rarely evaluate the costs and benefits properly.” Yet, seconds later, the authors admit, “America can claim the most important industrial-policy successes, in the early development of the internet and Silicon Valley.” In one sentence, the article glosses over the point that the government, in this case the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), “supported creation of ARPANET, the predecessor of the Internet, despite a lack of interest from the private sector.” (Italics mine.) But this point, as economists are wont to say, is “non-trivial.” In fact, it is the precisely the point.

Early on, companies were reticent to invest in the nascent field of computer networking because the sums required were enormous and the technology was so far from potential commercialization that companies were unable to foresee how to monetize potential investments. Moreover, such basic research often results in knowledge spillovers, meaning the company cannot capture all the benefits of its R&D investment (in economist’s terms, the social rate of return from R&D is higher than the private rate of return), and thus companies tend to underinvest in R&D to societally optimal levels. Of course, this dynamic pertained not just to the Internet, but applies today to a range of emerging infrastructure  technologies such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, robotics, etc. As Greg Tassey, Senior Economist at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), explains it, “the complex multidisciplinary basis for new technologies demands the availability of technology “platforms” before efficient applied R&D leading to commercial innovation can occur.” In other words, the levels of investment required to research and develop emerging technologies is so great that the private sector cannot support it alone, and thus, “government must increasingly assume the role of partner with industry in managing technology research projects.”

Such was the case with the initial development of the Internet, as government stepped in and provided initial R&D funding, helped coordinate research between the military, universities, and industry, and thus seeded development of a breakthrough digital infrastructure platform, making the Internet a reality decades before the free market ever would have (if ever) if left to its own devices. And this admittedly-successful industrial policy has indeed been a spectacular success. As ITIF documented in a recent report, The Internet Economy 25 Years After.com, the commercial Internet now adds $1.5 trillion to the global economy each year—that’s the equivalent of adding  South Korea’s entire economy annually.

Moreover, the list of technologies in which government funding or performance of research and development (R&D) has played a fundamental role in bringing the technology to realization is long and compelling. It includes: the cotton gin, the manufacturing assembly line, the microwave, the calculator, the transistor and semiconductor, the relational database, the laser beam, the graphical user interface, and the global positioning system (GPS), amongst many others. The National Institute of Health (NIH) practically created the biotechnology industry in this country. And yes, even Google, the Web search darling, isn’t a pure-bred creature of the free market; the search algorithm it uses was developed as part of the National Science Foundation (NSF)-funded Digital Library Initiative. (But Google hasn’t done much to spur economic growth!) The point is that companies like IBM, Google, Oracle, Akamai, Hewlett-Packard, and many others may not have even come into existence─and certainly would not have prospered to the extent they have─if the U.S. government was not either an early funder of R&D for the technologies they were developing or a leading procurer of the products they were producing. And if you don’t get Intel developing the semiconductors, or Cisco building out the Internet, or Akamai securing it, or Google making it accessible, then you don’t get the downstream companies like the Amazons or eBays, the latter of which 724,000 Americans rely on as their primary or secondary source of income.

Thus, while governments shouldn’t be creating and running such companies itself—that is for the free market to do—the government has a role to play in thoughtfully, strategically, and intentionally placing strategic bets on nascent and emerging technologies—as the United States did with information and communications technologies in the 1960s and 1970s—that have the potential to turn into the industries, companies, and jobs that drive an economy two to three decades hence. We call this innovation policy, as opposed to industrial policy. Today, this augurs the need for smart policies and investments in industries such as robotics, nanotechnology, clean energy, biotechnology, synthetic biology, high-performance computing, and digital platforms such as the smart grid, intelligent transportation systems, broadband, and Health IT. Explicit in this approach is a recognition that some technologies and industries are in fact more important than others in driving economic growth—that “$100 of potato chips does not equal $100 of computer chips.” Indeed, they are not because some industries, such as semiconductor microprocessors (computer chips) experience very rapid growth and reductions in cost, spark the development of subsequent industries, and increase the productivity of other sectors of the economy—not to mention support higher wage jobs.

Yet The Economist frets that governments aren’t very good at identifying and investing in strategic emerging technologies. In impugning governments’ ability to pick winning technologies, the article cites failures such as France’s Minitel (a case of a country picking a national champion company) and argues that “Even supposed masters of industrial policy {like Japan’s MITI, or Ministry of International Trade and Industry} have made embarrassing mistakes.” But this would be tantamount to pointing to the spectacular failure of Apple’s Newton and arguing that Apple’s no good at innovation. The Economist seems to suggest that if governments failed 80-90% of the time in picking technology winners (and ITIF actually thinks their success rates are much higher), then they must be pretty incompetent at the effort and should stop trying altogether.

But if private corporations followed that advice, then we would have no innovation whatsoever. Indeed, research by Larry Keeley of Doblin, Inc. finds that, in the corporate world, only 4 percent of innovation initiatives meet their internally defined success criteria. More than ninety percent of products fail in the first two years. Other research has found that only 8 percent of innovation projects exceed their expected return on investment, and only 12 percent their cost of capital. Yet companies have to continue to try to innovate, even in the face of these long odds, because research finds that firms that don’t replace at least 10 percent of their revenue stream annually are likely to be out of business within five years. The point is that just because innovation is difficult and success rates are low, this does not mean that corporations, or governments, should quit trying—or that their successes, like the Internet, can’t be spectacularly successful and have a profound impact on driving economic growth.

But The Economist laments that industrial or innovation policies are subject to capture by industries. What this neglects is that all countries, including the United States, already have de facto industrial policies that favor some industries over others. In the United States, for example, our regulatory and tax system favors agribusiness through farm subsidies, the oil industry through oil subsidies, airlines and highways at the expense of rail, and mortgage and financial industries. In fact, it is precisely because the United States has historically lacked an ability, or willingness, to have a clearly defined innovation strategy and an open dialogue about “making strategic decisions about strategic industries” that we’ve ended up with a de facto industrial policy ill-suited to supporting industries that will drive economic growth in the future. The Economist notes that “there is no accepted framework for “vertical” policy, favoring specific sectors or companies.” True. So let’s make one.

Finally, while The Economist criticizes President Obama’s new Strategy for American Innovation (released in 2009), it fails to come up with compelling evidence that breakthroughs such as mapping the human genome, unlocking nanotechnology’s potential, or achieving the technology-enabled transformations that need to occur in sectors from energy to transportation will occur solely because of the market’s ability to allocate capital efficiently. In this, it discounts the need for effective, intentional public-private partnerships to invest in and collaborate in the development and diffusion of these industries and technologies.

This critique is not meant to pick on The Economist, which is usually chock full of solid reporting and informed commentary. Rather it is take on the myth of America’s purely free market capitalist system and make the case for an informed innovation policy. It is also to note that countries (like the United States) find themselves desperately turning to industrial policy in a last ditch effort to save stumbling sectors such as automobiles because they have failed to make adequate investments in innovation policies that would support science and technology, R&D, and the development and diffusion of innovative processes and technologies that could have helped keep old sectors like automobiles at the technology frontier while supporting the development of new sectors to drive the economy forward.

Finally, it seeks to rebut the ideological and highly politicized assault on the idea the governments cannot make prudent, targeted bets on the industries of tomorrow. As Greg Tassey has noted, competition among governments has become a critical factor in determining global market share among nations. Indeed, the role of government is now a critical factor in determining which economies win and which lose in the increasingly intense process of creative destruction.

There are appropriate and inappropriate roles for governments to play in this competition. Supporting education, removing barriers to competition, supporting free and fair global trade, opening countries to high-skill immigration, and targeting strategic R&D investments towards the technologies and industries of the future are appropriate roles for governments to play in this competition. Other government policies, such as mercantilist ones which deny foreign countries’ corporations access to domestic markets, pilfer intellectual property by stealing it outright or making it a condition of market access, creating indigenous or proprietary IT standards, failing to adhere to trade agreements, or directly subsidizing domestic companies or their exports, are illegitimate forms of global economic competition. The United States—and The Economist—must abandon its fanciful, stylized neoclassical notion of a purely free global economic marketplace unfettered by any form of government intervention whatsoever, and recognize that governments play a legitimate and crucial role in shaping the innovation capabilities of national economies. As between corporations, it’s a competition; and, as with companies, the ones that develop the best strategies and skills at fostering, developing, and delivering innovation are the ones most likely to win.

Photo credit: chrismear’s photo stream

Inequality and Government

Tuesday, August 24th, 2010
Ed Kilgore



Ed Kilgore is a PPI senior fellow, as well as managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, an online forum.

by Ed Kilgore

It’s one of the great ironies of this political era of discontent that some of the most exceptional indicia of economic inequality in recent American history are being accompanied by a populist backlash against income redistribution, even in its most time-honored forms.

Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, who wrote an important analysis of latter-day conservatism and it impact on political discourse in Off Center, have returned with a book on the politics of inequality: Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer–And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class.

I’ve done a full review of this book for the Washington Monthly, and you can check that out at your leisure. But the book is useful in two major respects: (1) It focuses not just on the ever-growing divide in wealth and income between the top and everyone else, but between the top-of-the-top and everyone else, a process that has been largely immune to the economic vicissitudes of the last decade. (2) It makes a very strong case against the assumption that this sort of inequality is the “natural” product of market forces, rather than the artificial results of government policies deliberately promoted for that purpose.

I tend to think that Hacker and Pierson underestimate the deep-seated, non-contrived extent of anti-government sentiments among Americans, and the contributions of poor public-sector performance in abetting them, but all in all, their book is a very valuable contribution to our understanding of the politics of the economy today and yesterday. It’s a book that will probably make you mad–but in a constructive way. It’s certainly an appropriate read for the upcoming Labor Day weekend.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

The case for “smart regulation”

Monday, August 23rd, 2010
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

Michael Mandel has an op-ed explaining his plan for “smart regulation” up over at CNN.com today.

Mandel starts by noting that the one sector of the economy where there has been real growth of late is the digital communications sector. And given how hard new jobs are to come by in this current economy, Mandel figures we ought to keep growth going where we can by limiting the temptation to write too many new rules in the telecom sector:

What’s needed from regulators now is some creativity and humility – in the form of “countercyclical regulatory policy.” This gives innovators a bit of breathing space at the start of an economic recovery, but sets the stage to tighten regulations later on if excesses develop.

For example, Mandel argues that now is not the time for any new net neutrality rules:

For that reason, I suggest a two-year pause in new broadband regulation, keeping the current balance among the different players, which seems to be generating growth. At the same time, the knowledge that the regulator remains on duty, ready to intervene, would provide an essential check.

However, Mandel is clear that counter-cyclical regulation is not the equivalent of no regulation:

This approach does not mean regulators can go to sleep nor does it mean they can raise the flag of laissez-faire. What’s needed is the nuanced judgment of sentries posted at a tense border spot. With watchful eyes, regulators must practice thoughtful restraint that allows space for job leaders to innovate and hire, while remaining ready to aggressively confront violations of law or abuses of consumer rights if they take place.

It’s a compelling argument, and if you still want to learn more after reading the op-ed, you’ll definitely want to read Mandel’s recently released PPI Policy Memo, “The Coming Communications Boom? Jobs, Innovation and Countercyclical Regulatory Policy.”

More Clarity on Uncertainty

Wednesday, August 18th, 2010
Scott Thomasson



Scott Thomasson is the domestic policy director for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Scott Thomasson

I wrote last week about the political rhetoric of “uncertainty,” both real and imagined.  My thinking was that Republicans should be called out for their recent talking points that attribute our continued economic woes to fears and uncertainties created by the Democrats’  agenda, but that we should be careful not to dismiss legitimate problems of uncertainty that actually do exist in the economy.

In the Times today, Tom Friedman makes a more eloquent case for the need to recognize the real uncertainties we face.  His analysis is from a higher altitude, as one might expect, and it is dead right.  Friedman attributes broad economic uncertainties to three structural problems: (1) a decade of U.S. growth fueled by deficits and borrowing rather than investment and innovation, (2) a wave of new technology that is destroying lower-skilled jobs in favor of those requiring more education and training, and (3) the “existential crisis” of the European Union as German discipline is exported to Greece and elsewhere.   But these real uncertainties are not on anyone’s political agenda:

America’s two big parties still cling to their core religious beliefs as if nothing has changed. Republicans try to undermine the president at every turn and offer their nostrum of tax-cuts-will-solve-everything — without ever specifying what services they’ll give up to pay for them. Mr. Obama gave us expanded health care before expanding the economic pie to sustain it.

Friedman does not get very deep into specifics for structural solutions, but he doesn’t need to.  As is often true of Friedman’s perspective, the real value of today’s piece lies in the diagnosis.  We are facing real economic uncertainties, and the fact that Republicans are mischaracterizing them so shamelessly does not relieve the president and Democrats from the obligation to show more leadership.  As I wrote last week, Democrats need to stop sticking their fingers in the dike and come up with a more comprehensive plan built on a long-term vision of investment and sustainable growth.  Or as Friedman puts it:

The president needs to take America’s labor, business and Congressional leadership up to Camp David and not come back without a grand bargain for taxes, trade promotion, energy, stimulus and budget cutting that offers the market some certainty that we are moving together — not just on a bailout but on an economic rebirth for the 21st century.

I couldn’t agree more.

Kabuki Conference Buys Time on Fannie and Freddie

Tuesday, August 17th, 2010
Scott Thomasson



Scott Thomasson is the domestic policy director for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Scott Thomasson

The GSE conference at Treasury today included plenty of big names and good thoughts about the lingering question of how to restructure Fannie and Freddie before releasing them back into the wild.  But one thing missing from the agenda was a sense of urgency.  The conference wasn’t intended to move GSEs up on the agenda right now; it was simply a bit of theater to defuse the issue for a few more months, giving the Administration more time to kick some hard choices down the road.

Everyone knows we still need to do something about Fannie and Freddie.  The problem for Geithner is that everyone keeps talking about it.  The editorial chatter about GSEs is gaining momentum (after all, there’s only so much Steven Slater coverage even August can handle).  The New York Times ran two op-eds last weekend (good and not-so-good), former Treasury Secretary Paulson weighed in on the Post’s opinion page, and think-tank proposals are popping up all over, especially from folks like Don Marron who want to shrink or privatize the role of Fannie and Freddie in lending markets.

So Secretary Geithner did what any good politician would do. He co-opted the debate to keep it from growing beyond his control.  By inviting differing voices to vent their opinions in front of the cameras, Geithner got to look like he was on top of the situation and neutralize the situation for now with a concluding pleasantry that “it’s safe to say there’s no clear consensus yet on how best to design a new system.”  Thanks for that, Tim.  I guess we shouldn’t hold our breaths for “consensus” anytime soon, huh?

With elections weeks away and the crippled housing market still relying on the dual crutches of Fannie and Freddie to move forward at all, it’s no surprise the Administration and Congress are not falling over themselves to begin the fight for a specific reform plan.  Geithner has said the Administration plans to release and administration proposal in January (well after the elections), and the tone of today’s conference was consistent with that schedule.  For anyone who bothered to tune in today (and managed to stay awake), the message from the Administration was this: we know it’s important, and we’ll get around to it eventually . . . maybe once we get back from that Gulf-coast beach trip the President wants us all to take.

Why Progressives Must Embrace the Robust Optimism of “American Exceptionalism”

Friday, August 13th, 2010
Jeff Bloodworth



Jeff Bloodworth is an assistant professor of history at Gannon University in Erie, Pennsylvania.

by Jeff Bloodworth

The Hacketts Gospel Singing Shed

The Shed -- Dermott, Arkansas

Alexis de Tocqueville would understand “The Hacketts Gospel Singing Shed.”

Located in Dermott, Arkansas on the edge of a small cotton farm, “The Shed,” as locals call it, is a venue for gospel singers and fans to gather for song, worship, and fellowship. In the 1830s, Tocqueville toured America and witnessed the very sort of religiosity and voluntarism that motivated the Hackett family to transform a tractor shed into what has become a local community hub. The young Frenchman’s resulting sociological masterpiece, Democracy in America, explains “The Shed” and offers some timeless lessons about America’s uniquely ambitious political culture –
lessons Democrats looking for keys to ending the Great Recession ought to consider.

During his travels, Tocqueville recognized how republican ideals and cheap plentiful land had produced a profoundly optimistic, democratic, individualistic, entrepreneurial, and decidedly populist people. His shorthand for the differences between the U.S. and Western European political cultures – “American Exceptionalism”— remains a handy and useful concept progressives should both heed and employ.

“Exceptionalism” is not a Limbagh-esqe a priori verification of America’s supreme awesomeness. Rather, exceptionalism cuts both ways. The very populist impulses both bred the civil rights movement and spawned the Tea Party.

In the same way, American individualism is responsible for both a vibrant economic growth, a broad middle class, technological innovation, AND an anemic welfare state, concomitant high poverty and comparatively crime rates.

In sum, exceptionalism is not chest-thumpin’ We-Will-Rock-You, rah-rah USA cornpone; Tocqueville would recognize “The Hacketts Gospel Singing Shed” by echoing Denny Green’s infamous postgame rant, “They are who we thought they were!”

American Exceptionalism not only explains “The Shed.” It should also inform Democratic policy responses, both in substance and style, to the Great Recession.

Progressives understandably shy away from a term that seemingly reeks of parochialism and sounds like a potential first and middle name for one of Sarah Palin’s children. Instead of “exceptional” substitute “difference” and then wonder how and why Germans accept 8 percent unemployment as normal, middle class Danes ride bikes to work instead of drive cars, or Canadian cities are so neat-and-tidy. For better or for worse, the American “difference” is real.

Economic recoveries are like snowflakes—no two are ever the same. This should remind us that the “dismal science” is no hard science at all. To hear Paul Krugman or the Cato Institute’s certitude, however, one would hardly realize economists are making little more than highly educated guesses.

Ironically, even as partisan economists claim all-knowing prescience their field is thankfully moving away from technocratic certainty and toward ambiguity. While it is humbling (and quite a bit scary) to accept mysterious, unpredictable, and ultimately unknowable economic forces control our material fates, this is exactly why the American difference matters.

Modern progressive economic policy should combine short-term fiscal stimulus and long-term deficit reduction with rhetorical and policy faith in the American character. While sound policy matters, more and more economists realize that intangibles and emotions often spell the difference between recovery and double dip recessions.

The American difference really matters. Four hundred years of history (including the colonial era) proves that American optimism, individualism, entrepreneurial spirit, and waves of eager immigrants will eventually lead to robust economic recovery. Talk of decline, power moving east, and a new “normal” are reminiscent of the early 1990s when observers claimed Japan and Germany would overtake American economic leadership. If memory serves, the 1990s were fairly good economic times.

President Obama has provided such leadership. Time and again he has extolled the American work ethic and unique character; it is Congressional leaders and the liberal punditocracy, however, who are out of tune with the great resilience of the American tradition., Congressional leaders – who too often dwell myopically on technocratic details, medium versus big stimulus or extending unemployment benefits – fail to convey the most important ingredient for economic policy success: sunny optimism and a profound belief in an American difference.

All peoples in all lands hope, innovate, and work for a better future. Americans do so in their own unique, different, and yes even “exceptional” way. The route of this mess takes good policy but requires bold, optimistic, and a quintessentially American leadership. It is the sort of simple yet profound wisdom that a Frenchman; the folks of Dermott, Arkansas; and skinny kid with big ears and a funny name all know in their bones.

photo credit: Jeff Bloodworth

The Three Little Dutch Boys

Thursday, August 12th, 2010
Scott Thomasson



Scott Thomasson is the domestic policy director for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Scott Thomasson

The economic news out of Washington this week has an eerie ring of déjà vu: Congress just passed an emergency spending bill, the Fed is buying debt securities to keep the economy from sliding toward collapse, and the Administration announced it is committing billions of dollars to mortgage relief for homeowners facing foreclosure. To be sure, none of these actions has the scale or urgency of the initial responses to the financial crisis, but they are perfect examples of the policy philosophy that has dominated both economic policy since the crisis: a focus on playing defense, rather than offense.

What we saw this week were Congress, the Administration, and the Federal Reserve continuing their roles as the three little Dutch boys of the American economy, sticking fingers in the dyke to save the country from disaster. The rhetoric of stimulus is oversold and misplaced: Washington’s fiscal and monetary policies have essentially all been economic tourniquets that are better characterized as containment measures than stimulus. The Fed is shifting into quantitative easing, but only as much as necessary to fight off deflation. Congress is sending aid to the states, but only enough to keep them from having to lay off teachers. Treasury and HUD are providing assistance to the housing market, but only enough to keep people from being kicked out of their houses.

Over and over since the crisis, policy makers in both parties have remained optimistic that the U.S. economy was inherently dynamic and resilient enough that we could rely on growth to materialize from somewhere, as long as we put a solid floor underneath to contain the damage and prevent more negative shocks to the economy. Given the huge amounts being spent and our country’s history from past recessions, this was not an unreasonable approach at the time, especially for those with any concern for fiscal responsibility.

So far, the containment strategy has proved extremely successful in keeping us from sinking into a full-blown depression. However, at this point, we still have farther to go on the path to a sustainable recovery than most economists and politicians had hoped. This morning we got the new jobless numbers, and they aren’t good.  Wall Street was hoping for better news, and the markets’ negative reaction only compounds the growing anxiety (even allowing for the low volume in August, when stocks historically are more vulnerable to bad news). The extended string of bad economic news, coupled with a lack of credible cheerleading from Washington, is creating a palpable crisis of confidence in our economy and our leadership.

While the Fed is signaling between the lines that it may be prepared for stronger action, Congress and the President seem to be headed in the other direction. Campaign politics have lawmakers talking more about contractionary fiscal discipline than taking any new actions to boost the economy. Even in the debate about extending the Bush tax cuts, the options being considered do not include anything stimulative compared to the status quo. Congress has painted itself into a corner by waiting until taxes are automatically set to go up if it fails to act, and now it will likely be forced to extend most or all of them simply to avoid a contractionary fiscal outcome. Again, playing economic defense.

It’s time we think seriously about shifting gears and talking about reasonable stimulus again, instead of waiting for the next hole to plug. As Will Marshall has argued here, keeping public spending and debt under control is critically important, and Democrats need to talk openly about how we prepare for the day of reckoning when the spending claw-backs kick in, since Republicans have lost all credibility on fiscal discipline. However, growth is still the most urgent concern; the signals from bond-market vigilantes are telling us that, as Stan Collander argues well today.

There is a still a place in the debate for looking into additional stimulus, both on the tax side and with additional cost-effective spending. For example, public investment in infrastructure can be used to leverage private capital off the sidelines as well by making the private sector an active partner in stimulus efforts. Instead of continuing to put fingers in the dyke, we need to be more proactive in finding the companies in the private sector who want to rebuild the dyke, and put people and money to work again.

Photo Credit: OliBac’s Photostream

Spur Job Growth By Making Business Registration Easier

Thursday, August 12th, 2010
Stephen Ezell



Stephen Ezell is a senior analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.

by Stephen Ezell

Americans love small businesses and admire the job-creating doggedness and independence of entrepreneurs and dreamers.  Then why aren’t we making it easier to start a business?  Aspiring business owners face a daunting amount of red tape and hassle.  With job creation at the top of the national agenda, the time has come to do better in making it easier to start a business

The OECD, which measures barriers to entrepreneurship (including administrative burdens to open a business, legal barriers to entry, bankruptcy laws, property rights protection, investor protection, and labor market regulations), ranks the U.S just 14th of 29 OECD countries.

We know that small businesses are the engine of job growth in the United States, accounting for 2/3 of new jobs over the past 15 years, according to the Small Business Administration. That’s why one way to spur desperately needed job creation in the United States would be to make the business registration process faster, more comprehensive and thoughtful about the needs of small businesses, and thoroughly integrated with the state business registration process.

We propose the Administration task the Federal CIO, Vivek Kundra, with redesigning business.gov and undertaking a strategic design review of the federal and state small business registration process, redesigning it to create an integrated business registration website encompassing both federal and state requirements and contemplating the entire lifecycle of needs for small business start-ups, thus creating a one-stop shop for business registration in the United States.

The portal would incorporate all states’ business registration requirements into an integrated one-stop system. The registrant would need to only visit a single website to register his or her business both with the Federal government and the relevant state government. (This would have to be done with federal leadership, with the federal government providing a framework and platform to let states add their requirements to it.)

The website would have interactive components, modeled along the lines of TurboTax, with wizards/dialogue boxes, and with the registration process asking questions, demonstrating intelligence, and providing constructive guidance and advice. It should be smart enough to recognize, “You’re registering an electricians business in Arkansas with 10 employees. We recommend a sole proprietorship as the corporate form of governance.” That is, it wouldn’t have just a bunch of links where one can learn more about different corporate forms. It could give advice based upon the information the registrant is entering—in part by tapping into a database with insights on how other similar businesses are structured.

The redesigned business registration process would also contemplate the entire lifecycle of needs and concerns for the small businesses. For example, it would bring information forward to the registrant about whether there are loan programs the business is eligible for, such as relevant Small Business Administration (SBA) or Economic Development Agency (EDA) loans, or information about lines of credit from local commercial lenders. (And the system should actually go in and automatically use the already-entered data to populate the information on that loan form – almost getting to the point where all the registrant needs to do is click “Submit.” Indeed, the system architecture would have a principle that the registrant never needs to enter the same information more than once.)

If the entrepreneur signals the company will be in the business of making products, the website should proactively present any export promotion programs the company might engage with through the Department of Commerce. Again, not just providing links to the Department of Commerce website, but recognizing, “You’re producing custom machine tools and the Department of Commerce has Program X to support it.” Thus, the business registration process would directly support the Administration’s goal to double U.S. exports in five years.

Also, the system should tie directly into the country’s statistical agencies so they can recognize, “We have a small business that just registered,” and that data should go directly and immediately to Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Census Bureau so that we get a much more real-time view of the state of the economy. Of course, implicit in this vision is the need to connect disparate and siloed federal and state databases and information technology systems so that they communicate with one another and bring to bear information in real time to support the small business.

Finally, the small business registration process should be made on an open application platform, in such a way that it could allow competition in the marketplace. So a Citibank or Bank of America, for example, could co-brand it as a “Small Business Starter Kit.” Thus, if an entrepreneur goes into a BofA location to apply for a line of credit, BofA could say, “We’ve got everything you need to start your business right here. Get set up online here now.” The point is the government should make the web interfaces to the registration process open and accessible, so other companies can integrate them with other value-added services they provide to small businesses.

One model is Portugal, where the new “Firm Online” program has completely digitalized the process of registering a business, streamlining the process from it taking 20 different forms and roughly 80 days to launch a business to creating a single website through which new businesses can register in as little as 45 minutes. Within months of launching the new service, more than 70,000 new businesses registered. Portugal’s system uses electronic (digital) signatures (which the U.S. system does not) when authentication is required. It is also responsive to the life cycle needs of a start-up business, providing suggestions for sources of capital, talent, etc. Portugal now ranks 2nd of the 30 OECD countries in online business sophistication. Other countries like South Korea enable entrepreneurs to create firms through their mobile devices.

The modern economy is marked by incredibly intense competition, both globally and domestically. American businesses need every single advantage they can get—and making the process of new business registration in the United States the very best in the world would be an excellent place to start.

Photo Credit: Muffet’s Photostream

A More Productive Path than Self-Immolation

Wednesday, August 4th, 2010
Scott Winship



Scott Winship is research manager of the Pew Economic Mobility Project and a recent graduate of Harvard's doctoral program in social policy. The views he expresses do not represent those of Pew.

by Scott Winship

Everyone’s approvingly linking to this Edward Luce piece on “the crisis of middle-class America.” I want to set myself on fire.

Seriously, it’s discouraging to see so many people who should know better (because they’ve argued these points with me before) promoting this article.  I can’t think of another piece in the doomsday genre—and there are many—that gets it so consistently wrong. I’ll stipulate that none of the criticisms below are intended to minimize the struggles that many people are facing.  But it’s important to get this stuff right. Let me dive in, with Luce’s words in italics and my responses following:

Yet somehow things don’t feel so good any more. Last year the bank tried to repossess the Freemans’ home even though they were only three months in arrears.

The share of mortgages either in foreclosure or 3 or more months delinquent is 11.4 percent, which, because 30 percent of homeowners have paid off their mortgage, translates into 8 percent of homes. So the Freemans’ situation is typical of about one in twelve homeowners, or not quite 3 percent of households (since one-third rent).

Their son, Andy, was recently knocked off his mother’s health insurance and only painfully reinstated for a large fee.

Luce is arguing that there’s a new crisis facing the current generation. About 30 percent of those age 18 to 24 were uninsured in 2008 when the National Health Interview Survey contacted them.  I don’t have trends for that age group, but the share of Americans under age 65 without health insurance coverage was 14.7 percent in 2008, up from…14.5 percent in 1984.

And, much like the boarded-up houses that signal America’s epidemic of foreclosures, the drug dealings and shootings that were once remote from their neighbourhood are edging ever closer, a block at a time.

Well, the violent crime rate in 2008 was 19.3 per 1,000 people age 12 and up, down from 27.4 in 2000 and 45.2 in 1985.

Once upon a time this was called the American Dream. Nowadays it might be called America’s Fitful Reverie. Indeed, Mark spends large monthly sums renting a machine to treat his sleep apnea, which gives him insomnia. “If we lost our jobs, we would have about three weeks of savings to draw on before we hit the bone,” says Mark, who is sitting on his patio keeping an eye on the street and swigging from a bottle of Miller Lite. “We work day and night and try to save for our retirement. But we are never more than a pay check or two from the streets.”

The key question is, again, Is this worse than in the past? The risk of a large drop in household income has risen modestly, but people experiencing a drop end up much better off than in the past. For example, the risk of a 25 percent drop in income over 2 years has risen from 7 percent among married couples in the late 1960s to 14 percent in the mid-2000s (based on my computations from Panel Study of Income Dynamics data). But if you look at the average income of married-couple families after their 25 percent drop, it rose from $40,000 to $63,000 (in constant 2009 dollars).

Solid Democratic voters, the Freemans are evidently phlegmatic in their outlook. The visitor’s gaze is drawn to their fridge door, which is festooned with humorous magnets. One says: “I am sorry I missed Church, I was busy practicing witchcraft and becoming a lesbian.” Another says: “I would tell you to go to Hell but I work there and I don’t want to see you every day.” A third, “Jesus loves you but I think you’re an asshole.” Mark chuckles: “Laughter is the best medicine.”

Hmmm…just a typical American household…

The slow economic strangulation of the Freemans and millions of other middle-class Americans started long before the Great Recession, which merely exacerbated the “personal recession” that ordinary Americans had been suffering for years. Dubbed “median wage stagnation” by economists, the annual incomes of the bottom 90 per cent of US families have been essentially flat since 1973 – having risen by only 10 per cent in real terms over the past 37 years. That means most Americans have been treading water for more than a generation. Over the same period the incomes of the top 1 per cent have tripled. In 1973, chief executives were on average paid 26 times the median income. Now the multiple is above 300.

Adjusting for household size and using the PCE deflator to adjust for inflation, median household income in the Current Population Survey rose from $29,800 in 1973 to $40,500 in 2008 (in 2009 dollars, again based on my compuatations).  Factoring in employer and government noncash benefits would show even more impressive growth.

In the last expansion, which started in January 2002 and ended in December 2007, the median US household income dropped by $2,000 – the first ever instance where most Americans were worse off at the end of a cycle than at the start.

This is entirely a function of changes in the population composition (more Latinos) and in the share of employee compensation going to health insurance and retirement plans.

Worse is that the long era of stagnating incomes has been accompanied by something profoundly un-American: declining income mobility.

Nope. The evidence is ambiguous, but the best studies imply that intergenerational economic mobility hasn’t changed that much in the past few decades. Intra-generational earnings mobility has increased since the 1950s, though it has declined among men.

Alexis de Tocqueville, the great French chronicler of early America, was once misquoted as having said: “America is the best country in the world to be poor.” That is no longer the case. Nowadays in America, you have a smaller chance of swapping your lower income bracket for a higher one than in almost any other developed economy – even Britain on some measures. To invert the classic Horatio Alger stories, in today’s America if you are born in rags, you are likelier to stay in rags than in almost any corner of old Europe.

Tim Smeeding’s research based on the Luxembourg Income Study shows that in general Americans have higher incomes than their European counterparts as long as they are in the top 80 to 90 percent of the income distribution.  Below that, incomes are more comparable across countries, and the living standards of Americans look less impressive.  The US has comparable intergenerational earnings mobility to Europe, according to Markus Jantti’s research, except among men (but not women) who start out at the bottom.  In terms of occupational mobility, David Grusky’s research shows we’re as good or better as anywhere else, but this doesn’t translate into earnings mobility because we let people get rich or poor to a greater extent than other countries do. Jantti and Anders Bjorklund have estimated that Sweden would have the same mobility as the U.S. if the return to skill was as high there as it is here.  Finally, employer benefits further complicate how “bad” we look.

Combine those two deep-seated trends with a third – steeply rising inequality – and you get the slow-burning crisis of American capitalism. It is one thing to suffer grinding income stagnation. It is another to realise that you have a diminishing likelihood of escaping it – particularly when the fortunate few living across the proverbial tracks seem more pampered each time you catch a glimpse. “Who killed the ­American Dream?” say the banners at leftwing protest marches. “Take America back,” shout the rightwing Tea Party demonstrators.

The rise in income inequality is mostly about the top 5 percent of the top 1 percent pulling away from everyone else, and existing estimates overstate inequality and its growth by ignoring employer and government noncash benefits and possibly by ignoring different rates of inflation in different parts of the income distribution.

Unsurprisingly, a growing majority of Americans have been telling pollsters that they expect their children to be worse off than they are.

Totally wrong.  The key here is to only look at polling questions that ask people about their own kids, not kids in general.  Here are the relevant survey results I could find:

General Social Survey (1994)—45 percent said their children’s standard of living will be better (vs. 20 percent worse)
General Social Survey (1996)—47 percent
General Social Survey (1998)—55 percent
General Social Survey (2000)—59 percent
General Social Survey (2002)—61 percent said their children’s standard of living will be better (vs. 10% worse)
General Social Survey (2004)—53 percent
General Social Survey (2006)—57 percent
General Social Survey (2008)—53 percent
Economic Mobility Project (2009)—62 percent said their children’s standard of living will be better (vs. 10 percent worse)    (unlike GSS and PRC, asked only of those with kids under 18)
Pew Research Center (2010)—45 percent said their children’s standard of living will be better (vs. 26 percent worse)

BusinessWeek (1989)—59 percent said their children will have a better life than they had (and 25 percent said about as good)
BusinessWeek (1992)—34 percent said their children will have a better life than they had (and 33 percent said about as good)
BusinessWeek (1995)—46 percent said their children will have a better life than they have had (and 27 percent said about as good)
BusinessWeek (1996)—50 percent expected their children would have a better life than they have had (and 26 percent said about as good)
Harris Poll (2002)—41 percent expected children will have a better life than they have had (and 29 percent said about as good)

Harris Poll (1997)—48 percent felt good about their children’s future
Harris Poll (1998)—65 percent felt good about their children’s future (17 percent N.A.)
Harris Poll (1999)—60 percent felt good about their children’s future (15 percent N.A.)
Harris Poll (2000)—63 percent felt good about their children’s future (17 percent N.A.)
Harris Poll (2001)—56 percent felt good about their children’s future
Harris Poll (2002)—59 percent felt good about their children’s future
Harris Poll (2003)—59 percent felt good about their children’s future
Harris Poll (2004)—63 percent felt good about their children’s future

Pew Research Center (1997)—51 percent said their children will be better off than them when they grow up
Pew Research Center (1999)—67 percent said their children will be better off than them when they grow up

Bendixen & Schroth (1989)—68 percent said their children will be better off than they are
Princeton Religion Research Center (1997)—62 percent of men said their sons will have a better chance of succeeding than they did; 85 percent of women said their daughters will have a better chance
Angus Reid Group (1998)—78 percent said children will be better off than them
Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard (2000)—46 percent said they were confident that life for their children will be better than it has been for them
Economic Mobility Project (2009)—43 percent said it would be easier for their children to move up the income ladder
Economic Mobility Project (2009)—45 percent said it would be easier for their children to attain the American Dream

Also, polls consistently show that Americans say they have higher living standards than their parents.

And although the golden years were driven by the rise of mass higher education, you did not need to have graduated from high school to make ends meet. Like her husband, Connie Freeman was raised in a “working-class” home in the Iron Range of northern Minnesota near the Canadian border. Her father, who left school aged 14 following the Great Depression of the 1930s, worked in the iron mines all his life. Towards the end of his working life he was earning $15 an hour – more than $40 in today’s prices.

Thirty years later, Connie, who is far better qualified than her father, having graduated from high school and done one year of further education, makes $17 an hour.

It’s not valid to compare her pay mid-career to her father’s at the end of his career—and also, how much work experience does she have relative to him?  Did she take time off to raise kids?

The pace of life has also changed: “We used to sit around the dinner table every evening when I was growing up,” says Connie, who speaks with prolonged vowels of the Midwest. “Nowadays that’s sooooo rare.”

Time-use surveys show that while parents spend more time working (because of mothers) than in the past, they do not spend less time with children.  They spend less time doing things by themselves.

Then there are those, such as Paul Krugman, The New York Times columnist and Nobel prize winner, who blame it on politics, notably the conservative backlash which began when Ronald Reagan came to power in 1980, and which sped up the decline of unions and reversed the most progressive features of the US tax system.

Fewer than a tenth of American private sector workers now belong to a union. People in Europe and Canada are subjected to the same forces of globalization and technology. But they belong to unions in larger numbers and their health care is publicly funded.

Though unionization has declined markedly in most of these countries, and their health care policies are increasingly becoming too costly.  Also, most of the decline in unionization in the U.S. occurred before Reagan took office.

More than half of household bankruptcies in the US are caused by a serious illness or accident.

This is bad Elizabeth Warren research—she counts a bankruptcy as being “caused” by illness or accident if one was reported, but the household could have been in serious debt before these occurred.  At any rate, bankruptcies are exceedingly rare (under 1 percent of households—see Figure 13).

Pride of place in Shareen Miller’s home goes to a grainy photograph of her chatting with Barack Obama at a White House ceremony last year to inaugurate a new law that mandates equal pay for women.

As an organizer for Virginia’s 8,000 personal care assistants – people who look after the old and disabled in their own homes – Shareen, 42, was invited along with several dozen others to witness the signing.

Ah…another representative household…

More and more young Americans are put off by the thought of long-term debt.

Evidence?

Had enough?  I have speculated that to the extent economic insecurity has increased, it reflects the impact of a negativistic media (amplified by gloom-and-doom liberalism).

Picture
Pieces like Luce’s—and the blog posts it generates—affect consumer sentiment. Ben Bernanke and Tim Geithner aren’t the only people who can inadvertently talk down the economy.

This item is cross-posted at ScottWinshipWeb.

The Coming Communications Boom? Jobs, Innovation and Countercyclical Regulatory Policy

Tuesday, July 20th, 2010
Michael Mandel



Michael Mandel, formerly chief economist at BusinessWeek, writes on innovation and growth at www.southmountaineconomics.com.

by Michael Mandel

Download the entire memo.

This policy memo brings together three important strands of current policy debate: jobs, innovation, and regulatory policy. Everyone these days is concerned about the slow pace of job creation coming out of the Great Meltdown. Over the past six months, the economy has generated less than 600,000 net new private sector jobs—hardly enough to make a dent in the 14.6 million unemployed.

A bigger issue, though, is that the job drought actually started well before the meltdown. In the last business cycle—running from 2000 to 2007—the private sector created 4.4 million net new jobs. But out of those, fully 74 percent were in the health/education sector. That is, most of the private-sector jobs were being created in places like hospitals, nursing homes, and universities that are heavily government-funded. In effect, the public sector has been keeping the job market afloat since the beginning of the decade.

Most distressingly, America’s great strength—its innovative sector—actually lost jobs during the 2000-2007 business cycle. This sector includes everything from aerospace to pharmaceuticals to telecommunications to software (see Table 1). Some individual industries added employees, but collectively the innovative sector lost almost
700,000 jobs from 2000 to 2007, before the bust hit.

That performance was far worse than anyone expected: In 2001, the Bureau of Labor Statistics published projections implying that the innovative sector would create 1.7 million net new jobs by 2007. In other words, the innovative sector had a shortfall of 2.4 million jobs relative to expectations, even before the bust.

There are promising signs, however, of a rebound in one part of the innovation sector: communications. Internet companies, along with firms engaged in wireless telecom and computer systems design, seem to be emerging as “job leaders” in the next economic expansion. Unfortunately, these companies are also embroiled in struggles with federal agencies – and among themselves – over whether more regulation is required to police competition in communications.

Download the entire memo.