Archive for the ‘ Fiscal Responsibility ’ Category

Why Progressives Must Embrace the Robust Optimism of “American Exceptionalism”

Friday, August 13th, 2010
Jeff Bloodworth



Jeff Bloodworth is an assistant professor of history at Gannon University in Erie, Pennsylvania.

by Jeff Bloodworth

The Hacketts Gospel Singing Shed

The Shed -- Dermott, Arkansas

Alexis de Tocqueville would understand “The Hacketts Gospel Singing Shed.”

Located in Dermott, Arkansas on the edge of a small cotton farm, “The Shed,” as locals call it, is a venue for gospel singers and fans to gather for song, worship, and fellowship. In the 1830s, Tocqueville toured America and witnessed the very sort of religiosity and voluntarism that motivated the Hackett family to transform a tractor shed into what has become a local community hub. The young Frenchman’s resulting sociological masterpiece, Democracy in America, explains “The Shed” and offers some timeless lessons about America’s uniquely ambitious political culture –
lessons Democrats looking for keys to ending the Great Recession ought to consider.

During his travels, Tocqueville recognized how republican ideals and cheap plentiful land had produced a profoundly optimistic, democratic, individualistic, entrepreneurial, and decidedly populist people. His shorthand for the differences between the U.S. and Western European political cultures – “American Exceptionalism”— remains a handy and useful concept progressives should both heed and employ.

“Exceptionalism” is not a Limbagh-esqe a priori verification of America’s supreme awesomeness. Rather, exceptionalism cuts both ways. The very populist impulses both bred the civil rights movement and spawned the Tea Party.

In the same way, American individualism is responsible for both a vibrant economic growth, a broad middle class, technological innovation, AND an anemic welfare state, concomitant high poverty and comparatively crime rates.

In sum, exceptionalism is not chest-thumpin’ We-Will-Rock-You, rah-rah USA cornpone; Tocqueville would recognize “The Hacketts Gospel Singing Shed” by echoing Denny Green’s infamous postgame rant, “They are who we thought they were!”

American Exceptionalism not only explains “The Shed.” It should also inform Democratic policy responses, both in substance and style, to the Great Recession.

Progressives understandably shy away from a term that seemingly reeks of parochialism and sounds like a potential first and middle name for one of Sarah Palin’s children. Instead of “exceptional” substitute “difference” and then wonder how and why Germans accept 8 percent unemployment as normal, middle class Danes ride bikes to work instead of drive cars, or Canadian cities are so neat-and-tidy. For better or for worse, the American “difference” is real.

Economic recoveries are like snowflakes—no two are ever the same. This should remind us that the “dismal science” is no hard science at all. To hear Paul Krugman or the Cato Institute’s certitude, however, one would hardly realize economists are making little more than highly educated guesses.

Ironically, even as partisan economists claim all-knowing prescience their field is thankfully moving away from technocratic certainty and toward ambiguity. While it is humbling (and quite a bit scary) to accept mysterious, unpredictable, and ultimately unknowable economic forces control our material fates, this is exactly why the American difference matters.

Modern progressive economic policy should combine short-term fiscal stimulus and long-term deficit reduction with rhetorical and policy faith in the American character. While sound policy matters, more and more economists realize that intangibles and emotions often spell the difference between recovery and double dip recessions.

The American difference really matters. Four hundred years of history (including the colonial era) proves that American optimism, individualism, entrepreneurial spirit, and waves of eager immigrants will eventually lead to robust economic recovery. Talk of decline, power moving east, and a new “normal” are reminiscent of the early 1990s when observers claimed Japan and Germany would overtake American economic leadership. If memory serves, the 1990s were fairly good economic times.

President Obama has provided such leadership. Time and again he has extolled the American work ethic and unique character; it is Congressional leaders and the liberal punditocracy, however, who are out of tune with the great resilience of the American tradition., Congressional leaders – who too often dwell myopically on technocratic details, medium versus big stimulus or extending unemployment benefits – fail to convey the most important ingredient for economic policy success: sunny optimism and a profound belief in an American difference.

All peoples in all lands hope, innovate, and work for a better future. Americans do so in their own unique, different, and yes even “exceptional” way. The route of this mess takes good policy but requires bold, optimistic, and a quintessentially American leadership. It is the sort of simple yet profound wisdom that a Frenchman; the folks of Dermott, Arkansas; and skinny kid with big ears and a funny name all know in their bones.

photo credit: Jeff Bloodworth

The Three Little Dutch Boys

Thursday, August 12th, 2010
Scott Thomasson



Scott Thomasson is the domestic policy director for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Scott Thomasson

The economic news out of Washington this week has an eerie ring of déjà vu: Congress just passed an emergency spending bill, the Fed is buying debt securities to keep the economy from sliding toward collapse, and the Administration announced it is committing billions of dollars to mortgage relief for homeowners facing foreclosure. To be sure, none of these actions has the scale or urgency of the initial responses to the financial crisis, but they are perfect examples of the policy philosophy that has dominated both economic policy since the crisis: a focus on playing defense, rather than offense.

What we saw this week were Congress, the Administration, and the Federal Reserve continuing their roles as the three little Dutch boys of the American economy, sticking fingers in the dyke to save the country from disaster. The rhetoric of stimulus is oversold and misplaced: Washington’s fiscal and monetary policies have essentially all been economic tourniquets that are better characterized as containment measures than stimulus. The Fed is shifting into quantitative easing, but only as much as necessary to fight off deflation. Congress is sending aid to the states, but only enough to keep them from having to lay off teachers. Treasury and HUD are providing assistance to the housing market, but only enough to keep people from being kicked out of their houses.

Over and over since the crisis, policy makers in both parties have remained optimistic that the U.S. economy was inherently dynamic and resilient enough that we could rely on growth to materialize from somewhere, as long as we put a solid floor underneath to contain the damage and prevent more negative shocks to the economy. Given the huge amounts being spent and our country’s history from past recessions, this was not an unreasonable approach at the time, especially for those with any concern for fiscal responsibility.

So far, the containment strategy has proved extremely successful in keeping us from sinking into a full-blown depression. However, at this point, we still have farther to go on the path to a sustainable recovery than most economists and politicians had hoped. This morning we got the new jobless numbers, and they aren’t good.  Wall Street was hoping for better news, and the markets’ negative reaction only compounds the growing anxiety (even allowing for the low volume in August, when stocks historically are more vulnerable to bad news). The extended string of bad economic news, coupled with a lack of credible cheerleading from Washington, is creating a palpable crisis of confidence in our economy and our leadership.

While the Fed is signaling between the lines that it may be prepared for stronger action, Congress and the President seem to be headed in the other direction. Campaign politics have lawmakers talking more about contractionary fiscal discipline than taking any new actions to boost the economy. Even in the debate about extending the Bush tax cuts, the options being considered do not include anything stimulative compared to the status quo. Congress has painted itself into a corner by waiting until taxes are automatically set to go up if it fails to act, and now it will likely be forced to extend most or all of them simply to avoid a contractionary fiscal outcome. Again, playing economic defense.

It’s time we think seriously about shifting gears and talking about reasonable stimulus again, instead of waiting for the next hole to plug. As Will Marshall has argued here, keeping public spending and debt under control is critically important, and Democrats need to talk openly about how we prepare for the day of reckoning when the spending claw-backs kick in, since Republicans have lost all credibility on fiscal discipline. However, growth is still the most urgent concern; the signals from bond-market vigilantes are telling us that, as Stan Collander argues well today.

There is a still a place in the debate for looking into additional stimulus, both on the tax side and with additional cost-effective spending. For example, public investment in infrastructure can be used to leverage private capital off the sidelines as well by making the private sector an active partner in stimulus efforts. Instead of continuing to put fingers in the dyke, we need to be more proactive in finding the companies in the private sector who want to rebuild the dyke, and put people and money to work again.

Photo Credit: OliBac’s Photostream

Do Americans Think Their Kids Will Do Better?

Wednesday, August 11th, 2010
Scott Winship



Scott Winship is research manager of the Pew Economic Mobility Project and a recent graduate of Harvard's doctoral program in social policy. The views he expresses do not represent those of Pew.

by Scott Winship

Kevin Drum notes my last post and then wonders, “What I’m more curious about is what this looked like in the 50s, 60s, and 70s. Was optimism about our kids’ futures substantially higher then?”

The results I showed were mostly from a fantastic database of polling questions called “Polling the Nations”, which I recommend to everyone (though it’s not free, it’s not that expensive relative to other resources).  That’s why they only start in the mid-80s, and there’s a gap between the mid-00s and the two or three polls I cite from this year and last (my look at this question was a few years ago).

Anyway, Kevin’s query reminded me that there’s another compilation of polling questions that is also amazing—the book, What’s Wrong, by public opinion giants Everett Carll Ladd and Karlyn Bowman.  And it’s a free pdf.

So, let me add some results to those I posted before.  I’m focusing, to the extent possible, on questions that ask parents about their own children.  When people are asked about “kids today” instead of their own kids, they are much more likely to be Debbie Downers—a phenomenon that journalist David Whitman dubbed the “I’m OK, They’re Not” syndrome, which is much more general than questions about children’s future living standards.  Also, let’s be careful to distinguish between levels and trends.

First, let’s look at the confidence parents have that life for their children will be better.

Percentage of parent confidence that life for their children will be better
Year Very confident Fairly confident Not at all confident
1973 26% 36% 30%
1974 25 41 28
1975 23 39 32
1976 31 39 25
1979 25 41 29
1982 20 44 32
1983 24 38 33
1988 20 45 28
1992 17 46 31
1995 17 44 34
2000 46* N/A 48*
Source: Roper Starch Worldwide; *Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard

That last one shouldn’t be directly compared with the others—not only did it only offer a yes-or-no response, it was also asked of all adults.  More on that in a sec.  What we see from the Roper surveys is a fairly steady decline in solid confidence, but not much of a trend in pessimism.

The main dynamic is that parents have moved from being “very” confident to “only fairly” confident.  It looks like there may have been a small decline in optimism from the late 1980s through the mid-1990s.  But it’s interesting that from 1973 to 1995, between 61percent and 70%percent were at least fairly confident that their kids would be better off.

The Washington Post polling result provides a nice opportunity to look at the “I’m OK, They’re Not” pattern, since all adults were asked the question, even though fewer than half had children under 18 in their household.  In a poll my employer* commissioned from Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research and Public Opinion Strategies, we asked parents about their expectations for their children’s living standards.  We asked people who had no children under 18 at home about “kids today.”

Pooling everyone together, 47 percent of adults said kids would have higher living standards. But the parents were much more optimistic about their own children, with 62 percent saying their kids’ living standards would improve.  So the Washington Post result might have been right in the range of the Roper results had the question been asked only of parents.
Other polls have asked whether parents think their children will be better off when they are the same age:

Percentage of parents that think their children will be better off when they are the same age
Year Better off financially Not better off
1981 47 43
1982 43 41
1983 44 45
1985 62 29
1986 74 19
1991 66 25
1994 47* 39*
1995 54 39
1996 52 39
1996 51‡ N/A
1997 51‡ N/A
1999 67‡ N/A
Sources: ABC News/Washington Post;  *Newsweek; Pew Research Center

So optimism declined between the mid-1980s and early-1990s, recovered starting in the mid-1990s, and generally remained above early 1980s levels (when the economy was in recession).  Except for 1983 majorities or pluralities hold the optimistic position.

Another series of polls asked parents whether their children will have a better life than they have had.  They also indicate a decline in optimism from the late 1980s to the early 1990s and a subsequent rebound:

Parents outlook on their children’s life
Year Better life About as good
1989 59% 25%
1992 34 33
1995 46 27
1996 50 26
2002 41* 29*
Sources: BusinessWeek; *Harris Poll

Strong majorities thought the children would have as good a life as them or better, and while more people thought their kids would have a better life than thought they would have a worse life, optimism failed to win a majority of parents in a number of years.  The trends appear to reveal a decline in optimism from the mid- or late-1990s to the early 2000s.  Considering all of these trends thus far, a fairly clear cyclical pattern is emerging, as Kevin observed in his post.

The early 2000s dip also shows up in Harris Poll questions asking whether parents feel good about their children’s future:

Percentage of parents that feel good about their children’s future
Year Feel good
1997 48%
1998 65
1999 60
2000 63
2001 56
2002 59
2003 59
2004 63
Source: Harris Poll

The dip is revealed to be related to the 2001 recession, as optimism rebounded thereafter, again following the business cycle. Again, solid majorities generally take the optimistic position.

The longest time series available asks parents whether their children’s standard of living will be higher than theirs.  Unfortunately, it appears that most of these polls ask the question of adults without children too:

Percentage of parents that believe their children will achieve a higher standard of living
Year Higher standard of living Lower standard of living
1989 52% 12%
1992 47 15
1993 49 17
1994 43 22
1994 45* 20*
1995 46 17
1996 47* N/A
1998 55* N/A
2000 59* N/A
2002 61* N/A
2004 53* N/A
2006 57* N/A
2008 53* N/A
2009 47/62† N/A
2010 45‡ 26‡
Sources: Cambridge Reports/Research International; *General Social Survey; †Economic Mobility Project; ‡Pew Research Center

Once again the cyclical pattern emerges, though it is not quite as clear in the mid-2000s.  Optimism is far more prevalent than pessimism in every year, reaching majorities from the late 1990s until the current recession.  Even today, optimism is no lower than in the mid-1990s, and the EMP poll implies that when looking just at parents with children under 18 living at home, solid majorities continue to believe their kids will have a higher living standard.

Taken together, there is very little evidence that a supposed stagnation in living standards is reflected in Americans’ concerns about how their children will do.  The survey patterns show that parental optimism follows a cyclical pattern, generally is more prevalent than pessimism, and did not decline over time.  In fact, we can compare beliefs in 1946 to 1997 for one question—whether “opportunities to succeed” (1946) or the “chance of succeeding” (1997) will be higher or lower than a same-sex parent’s has been:

·       Roper Starch Worldwide (1946)—64 percent of men said their sons’ opportunities to succeed will be better than theirs (vs. 13 percent worse); 61 percent of women said their daughters’ opportunities to succeed will be better than theirs (vs. 20 percent worse)
·       Princeton Religion Research Center (1997)—62 percent of men said their sons will have a better chance of succeeding than they did (vs. 21 percent worse); 85 percent of women said their daughters will have a better chance (vs. 7 percent worse)

As one would expect, mothers in 1946 believed their daughters would have more opportunity, but surprisingly that view was even more prominent in 1997.  And among men, there was very little change.  Notably, unemployment was slightly lower in 1946 than in 1997, so this isn’t a matter of apples to oranges.

Or even more strikingly, consider two polls asking the following question: Do you think your children’s opportunities to succeed will be better than, or not as good as, those you have? (If no children:) Assume that you did have children.
·       Roper Starch Worldwide (1939)—61 percent better vs. 20 percent not as good vs. 10 percent same (question asked about opportunities of sons compared with fathers)
·       Roper Starch Worldwide (1990)—61 percent better vs. 21 percent not as good vs. 12 percent same

While the 1939 question only refers to males, given the relatively low labor force participation of women at the time, it is perhaps still comparable to the 1990 question.  However, the unemployment rate was 17.2 percent in 1939 compared with 5.6 percent in 1990.  Still, the two are remarkably close.

OK, can we put this question to bed?  Americans believe their children will do as well or better than they have done, and this belief hasn’t weakened over time.  Now let’s get back to arguing about objective living standards rather than subjective fears about them.

* For the love of God, nothing you’ll ever read on my blog has anything to do with my job—there are people at Pew whose ulcers flare at employees’ side hustles like mine.

This item is cross-posted at ScottWinshipWeb.

Photo Credit: fiskfisk’s Photostream

Unflattening Taxes on the Rich

Monday, August 9th, 2010
Ed Kilgore



Ed Kilgore is a PPI senior fellow, as well as managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, an online forum.

by Ed Kilgore

As Congress prepares for a big debate on the fate of the Bush tax cuts, there’s an internal debate breaking out in progressive circles on how to deal with tax rates on the very wealthy, not just those currently in the top income tax bracket.

This debate-within-the-debate is being driven by two external data points: First, the fact that income inequality in the United States during the last two (or arguably, the last four) decades has especially manifested itself in the concentration of wealth at the very top of the income ladder; and second, the fact that higher taxes for “millionaires” consistently polls well.

James Suroweicki explains the first point nicely in a recent column in The New Yorker:

Between 2002 and 2007…the bottom ninety-nine per cent of incomes grew 1.3 per cent a year in real terms–while the incomes of the top one per cent grew ten per cent a year. That one per cent accounted for two-thirds of all income growth in those years. People in the ninety-fifth to the ninety-ninth percentiles of income have represented a fairly constant share of the national income for twenty-five years now. But in that period the top one per cent has seen its share of national income double; in 2007, it captured twenty-three per cent of the nation’s total income. Even within the top one per cent, income is getting more concentrated: the top 0.1 per cent of earners have seen their share of national income triple over the same period. All by themselves, they now earn as much as the bottom hundred and twenty million people. So at the same time that the rich have been pulling away from the middle class, the very rich have been pulling away from the pretty rich, and the very, very rich have been pulling away from the very rich.

The current debate over taxes takes none of this into account.

Thus, framing the tax progressivity question as mainly involving rates for those with incomes well below super-rich levels misses the mark, and, as both Surowiecki and (for months now) Jonathan Chait have pointed out, misses a political opportunity associated with a widespread popular conviction that the very wealthy don’t pay their fair share of taxes.

In terms of the stakes involved in proposing something like a “millionaire’s tax” (essentially a new and higher top rate on very high incomes), Nate Silver has shown at FiveThirtyEight that it could indeed raise some pretty serious federal revenues.

But the political bonus of a “millionaire’s tax” proposal goes beyond the numbers: it would help expose the really dramatic gap between the two parties on the whole concept of progressive taxation.

After all, even as Democrats debate making federal income taxes more progressive, a growing and increasingly dominant segment of Republicans favor “flattening” tax rates to eliminate progressivity, exempting capital and corporate income from taxation, and/or shifting taxation away from income altogether and focusing it on consumption. And even for those Republicans who don’t embrace radical tax proposals, the “thinking” behind them is the rationale for the vague support for high-end or business tax cuts that’s almost universal in today’s GOP, in growing contradiction with conservative demands for debt-and-deficit reduction.

Anything that makes this contrast more vivid, on terms supported by big majorities of the American public, is a pretty good idea for Democrats. So I’d strongly recommend that in the debate over extending or eliminating Bush’s tax cuts for the top bracket, proposals to crate a new bracket for the “super-rich” ought to become an essential ingredient.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist

Comparing Employment Changes During Recessions

Monday, August 2nd, 2010
Scott Winship



Scott Winship is research manager of the Pew Economic Mobility Project and a recent graduate of Harvard's doctoral program in social policy. The views he expresses do not represent those of Pew.

by Scott Winship

I keep seeing that chart that shows how employment declines in the current recession are so much worse than in past ones. You know, this one:

On many dimensions, of course, the current recession is much worse, but this chart has always seemed funny to me. And after reading Paul Krugman mock the idea that the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s were at all comparable, I decided to make my own damn chart. Because the above chart looks at employment levels, which are affected by labor force growth, I decided to look at employment rates instead (subtracting the unemployment rate for each month from 100). Because the composition of the labor force has also changed over time (lots more married women, most notably), I decided to confine to white men ages 20 and up. And because it’s unclear to me what “peak” is used in this chart (see the vague note at the bottom of Rampell’s chart) and since the relationship of the NBER business cycle peak to the unemployment rate involves a lag, I decided to measure from the peak employment level. Got all that? Here’s my chart:

I’ve labeled the lines the same way that Rampell’s chart is labeled, by the recessions that followed each employment rate peak. The figures are from BLS and are based on their seasonally adjusted series.

This approach makes clear why people were disappointed by the “jobless” recoveries from the recessions of the early 1990s and 2000s, which were no faster than after the much more severe recession of the early 1970s (though of course, the declines in employment were much smaller to begin with). More to the point, it also shows that while the current recession still looks bad, bad, bad, the decline in employment is comparable to the decline during the double-dip recession, which is apparent from the “1980″ line. That’s not the most fantastic news of course, but it’s worth noting. Unfortunately, I doubt this is the chart you’ll see others use and update as things evolve in the next few months.

This item is cross-posted at ScottWinshipWeb.

Dems and Spending: There Will be Blood

Thursday, July 29th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

The Congressional Budget Office’s latest fiscal forecasts confirm that America faces a fiscal emergency. The national debt is projected to double as a share of GDP from 32 percent in 2001 to 66 percent next year. Then it could rise to 90 percent by the end of this decade, and reach 146 percent by 2030. At that point, we’d be spending about 36 percent of tax revenue to finance our debts, up from 9 percent today.

The nation’s yawning fiscal gaps, driven largely by entitlement spending, can’t be closed by a combination of economic growth and tax hikes. When it comes to government spending, there will be blood. Only not now: At the federal level at least, unemployment will have to fall dramatically, probably to around 5 or 6 percent, before real discipline can be imposed on public spending. Otherwise a premature turn to austerity could plunge the national economy back into recession.

Let’s stipulate that Republicans are consummate hypocrites when it comes to fiscal discipline. On taking power in 2000, they let budget controls lapse, spent the hard-won surplus they inherited on tax cuts, charged a trillion-dollar prescription drug entitlement to the nation’s credit card, and launched the very Wall Street bailout they now have the temerity to denounce.

And now GOP leaders insist that the Bush 2001 and 2003 tax cuts be extended to the wealthy, not just middle class families as President Obama has proposed. Since they offer no offsetting spending cuts or tax hikes, this would add between $2-$3 trillion to the national debt over the next decade.

Okay, Republicans have no shame, and Democrats are paragons of fiscal rectitude by comparison. Nonetheless, Democrats before long will have to commit what many regard as unnatural acts: make deep cuts in public spending.

For a sobering glimpse of what the future might hold, look at California. Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger yesterday declared a state of emergency in a bid to force state legislators to pass a budget aimed at closing a $19 billion shortfall.

The Golden States deficit, according to Reuters, “is 22 percent of the $85 billion general fund budget the governor signed last July for the fiscal year that ended in June, highlighting how the steep drop in California’s revenue due to recession, the housing slump, financial market turmoil and high unemployment have slashed its all-important personal income tax collection.”

Democratic lawmakers nonetheless have blocked Schwarzenegger’s proposals for deep spending cuts, leaving the gubernator to threaten another round of unpaid furloughs for state workers. California may also be forced to issue IOUs instead of payments to vendors if the legislature fails to pass a budget soon.  And the state is trying to renegotiate generous pension schemes for state employees.

The California crisis should be a wake up call for Democrats in Washington. A major fiscal retrenchment is coming, and they need to be better prepared for it than their counterparts in Sacramento.

Photo Credit: Anonymous Account’s Photostream

America in 2030: A Fiscal Portrait

Monday, July 26th, 2010
Adriana Sanchez de Lozada



Adriana Sanchez de Lozada is an intern at the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Adriana Sanchez de Lozada

The Congressional Budget Office’s long-term budget forecasts on the national fiscal health are highly educated guesswork, but guesswork just the same. The 2030s are pretty far off, and the degree of forecasting uncertainty is higher than it once was. As CBO explains “the current degree of economic dislocation exceeds that of any previous period in the past half-century, so the uncertainty inherent in current forecasts probably exceeds the historical average.” But let’s imagine that the 2030s have arrived, and that CBO’s budget projections have come true. What would America look like?

For starters, Social Security would be flat broke. All U.S. Treasury’s IOUs to Social Security will have been cashed in. Since the Social Security trust funds will be completely depleted and, because Social Security is barred by law from borrowing from the federal government, the program will be unable to meet its obligations. Thus, by the end of the 2030s, payable benefits would have to be cut by 20 percent. Is it possible to imagine that the government will suddenly cut 20 percent of the benefits it hands out? That seems unlikely — the law would be changed and borrowing would resume.

In fact, Social Security’s problems would start much earlier. In 2016, according to CBO, its outlays would begin to regularly exceed its revenues, and consequently Social Security would first start to regularly call in its IOUs. Thus, the Treasury Department would need to borrow billions of dollars each year to pay back what it borrowed from Social Security’s trust funds.

If Social Security is expected to be in bad shape by the 2030s, the big public health care programs, Medicare and Medicaid, would be doing even worse. The culprits being an aging population and expanding health care costs, which are scheduled to grow faster than the U.S. economy. By the 2030s the number of people over the age of 65 — the beneficiaries – will have increased by 90 percent while those between 20 and 65 — the contributors — will have grown by a meager 10 percent.

In the 2030s, federal spending on mandatory health care programs accounts for 11 percent of GDP, about twice the level in 2010. Add in Social Security, and the big three entitlements cost about 16 percent of GDP. Keep in mind that primary spending for the 40 year period before 2010 averaged 18.5 percent of GDP. This means that in 2030, the U.S. government will either be unable to direct resources to other priorities (like education,) or will have to increase a tax rate by roughly double that of 2010.

Finally, America in the 2030s will groan under mind-boggling public debt, assuming the country’s fiscal fortunes are calculated by the CBO under what’s called a “current policy” scenario. In this case, the CBO assumes that no major public policy innovations will occur throughout the lifetime of its projection. This scenario reflects the political reality we face today. For example, congress is currently debating whether to extend the Bush tax cuts and “patch” the Alternative Minimum Tax. If political inaction prevails, debt-to-GDP ratio would exceed 200 percent by the 2030s, even with an economic recovery.

It is true that the U.S. holds a privileged position by virtue of the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency. But we have no idea how a debt of this magnitude would affect our ability to invest in future growth, and to keep borrowing from abroad. Moreover, in the 2030s, interest payments on the national debt are nine percent of GDP, from just one percent of GDP in 2010. If we continue borrowing at the projected rates beyond 2030, interest spending would exceed total federal revenues 15 years thereafter.

Finally, this grim fiscal portrait of America in the 2030s rests on optimistic assumptions. CBO projections assume that revenue will average around 19 percent of GDP and that long-term interest rates remain low. They also assume away the strong likelihood that America will face another economic crisis or armed conflict between 2010 and 2030.

The key for policy-makers, of course, is to envision a different fiscal future for America – and to act on it just as soon as the economy recovers.

Photo Credit: Alancleaver_2000’s Photostream

Everything Should Not be on the Budget Cutting Table: The Case for Expanding Public Investment

Friday, July 16th, 2010
Robert Atkinson



Dr. Robert D. Atkinson is the founder and president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, and the author of The Past and Future of America’s Economy: Long Waves of Innovation That Power Cycles of Growth (Edward Elgar, 2005).

by Robert Atkinson

The International Monetary Fund recently scolded the U.S. government for running large budget deficits. Leaving aside the absurdity of cutting deficits when unemployment is still extremely high, it’s clear that at some point – as joblessness declines toward 5 percent – deficit reduction will need to begin in earnest. But the real question is how to do that. There’s a risk that the Washington economic class – grounded as they are in 20th century neo-classical economics — will fail to balance the twin imperatives of fiscal discipline and public investment.

Indeed the common refrain that has become the new “group think” in DC is that “everything should be on the table” when it comes to addressing the debt. For example, the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Debt Reduction Task Force says, “everything should be on the table.” Even President Obama, who has at least rhetorically talked about the need for increases in public investment and fought to include public investment in the stimulus, now says that everything should be on the table. Other groups echo this intellectually easy, but intellectually simplistic, position. Pete Peterson’s Concord Coalition likewise calls for “applying budget discipline to all parts of the budget.” The New America Foundation’s Committee for a Responsible Budget supports a budget freeze on all discretionary spending. For these budget hawks, subsidies to farmers to produce crops that aren’t needed fall in the same category as funding for the National Science Foundation to advance science and technology critical to our nation’s future: they both cost money and both should be cut.

The Government’s Role

But there are some things that governments do – on the tax and spending sides – which drive productivity, spur innovation, improve health, clean up the environment and create other benefits that most certainly should not be on the table. The National Commission on Surface Transportation Financing (which I had the honor of chairing) recently highlighted a federal highway and transit funding gap of nearly $400 billion over the next five years. Increased federal support for highways and transit would lead to significantly greater societal benefits (reduced traffic congestion, higher productivity) than the costs in revenues. Yet some groups wave the budget red flag to oppose expanded infrastructure investment, even if increased user fees, such as the gas tax, pay it for. As ITIF has demonstrated, increasing the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit from 14 to 20 percent would return $9 billion more to the Treasury than it would cost. And as ITIF and the Breakthrough Institute have shown, solving climate change requires significant increases in federal support for clean energy innovation, but the benefits (saving the planet) are massive.

If neo-classical-inspired budget hawks want everything to be on the table, liberal Keynesians want to put practically nothing on the table, except higher taxes on the wealthy and business. For example, economist Jamie Galbraith would take entitlement reform off the table. His solution: pray the Chinese keep lending us money. Likewise, Jeff Faux, founder of the liberal Economic Policy Institute argues that, “The deficit projections no more reflect a crisis of “entitlement” overspending than they reflect a ‘crisis’ in any other category of spending, like military spending or agricultural subsidies. Sensible governance understands that the fact that a program area is expanding does not make it the source of fiscal imbalance. But with entitlements off the table, you can’t solve the government’s fiscal problems simply by raising taxes on the rich.

All Spending Is Not the Same

What’s behind this widespread unwillingness to prioritize investment? Budget hawks fear that sparing one item from the chopping block will only validate the demands of interest groups to exempt their pet programs. In addition, many adhere to a neo-classical economics perspective, which holds that government plays a negligible role in economic growth and should be neutral with regard to private sector activity. In the purest form of this thinking, everything is on the table, because nothing is more important than anything else. To paraphrase Michael Boskin, a neo-classical Bush I economist, a dollar of public investment on computer chips has the same societal value as a dollar spent on potato chips. But government should be anything but neutral. Science and infrastructure funding is more valuable than farm subsidies. Government support for research in computer chips is more valuable than support for potato chips.

For liberals, reducing spending on entitlements will not only harm working Americans, but will also reduce economic growth, since Keynesian doctrine holds that growth comes from increasing aggregate demand – meaning pump more money into the economy, period.

In contrast, an innovation economics approach to the budget distinguishes between spending on consumption and spending on investment. For innovation economics advocates, all spending (either on the tax or expenditure side) should be on the table, and all investment (on the tax and expenditure side) should be off the table.

Tax, Cut and Invest

The last time Washington paid attention to deficits was in the first Clinton term. At that time PPI Vice President Rob Shapiro wrote a series of reports with the title, “Cut and Invest.” The notion was that we should cut unnecessary spending and use a significant share of the savings to invest in the nation’s future, including education, infrastructure and research. That was the right message then and it is the right message now. Although today, such a report might be best titled, “Tax, Cut and Invest.” To solve the budget deficit in a way that enables the significant increases needed in investment, we need to raise some taxes, cut some spending and increase some investment.

The general outline should look like this: On the tax side, we should let the Bush tax cuts on the wealthy expire, including: dividend taxes, estate taxes (above a certain modest size) and top marginal rates. We should increase the gas tax by at least 15 cents a gallon (and index it to inflation) and at the same time institute a carbon tax. We should consider a border-adjustable business activity tax. We should eliminate the home mortgage interest deduction. (Home ownership has many societal benefits, but as we see from other nations without these large tax incentives, nations can get high levels of home ownership without wasteful subsidies.)

On the spending side, we need to deal with entitlements, including: progressive indexing of Social Security benefits and increasing the retirement age, continued health care reform — particularly focused on driving innovation to cut costs and cutting entitlements to farmers — farm subsidies. This should be a gradual process to spread the pain over time.

And most importantly, we should significantly expand investments. We need to expand investments in education and training, science and research, technology (including, but not limited to clean energy) and physical infrastructure. In order to ensure that companies in the U.S. are globally competitive and create jobs here at home, we need to expand corporate tax expenditures. For example, create a new corporate competitiveness tax credit that would include a much more generous credit for research and development, and a credit for business investments in workforce training and new capital equipment, especially software. Making these investments will cost money in the short run. But they will also generate returns to the economy and the government in the long term. In economic downturns, successful corporations don’t cut key investments because they know that these investments are vital to gaining market share and competitive advantage in the moderate term. Governments should think the same way.

So let’s stop talking about putting everything on the table and instead recognize that not only do investments need to be off the table, they need to get more from what’s on the table.

Rob Atkinson is president and founder of ITIF, a Washington-based think tank providing cutting-edge thinking on technology and economic policy issues.

Photo Credit: Gliko’s Photostream

Putting America on a Fiscally Sustainable Course — Fiscal Commission Public Forum Webcast

Monday, July 12th, 2010
Megan Milligan



Megan Milligan is an intern at the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Megan Milligan

PPI President Will Marshall’s remarks before the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform during the commission’s first public listening session:

Read Will’s written testimony.

Recommendations on Curbing the National Deficit

Friday, July 2nd, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

The following is the is an excerpt from Will Marshall’s June 30 testimony before the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform during the commission’s first public listening session:

Chairman Bowles, Chairman Simpson, and Members of the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss ways to put America on a fiscally sustainable course.

Once unemployment rates start to fall, U.S. policy makers must be prepared to pivot sharply from fiscal stimulus to fiscal restraint. Otherwise, a large and growing federal debt will deplete our capital stock and thereby limit future economic growth. It will divert resources from productive investment to interest payments on the debt, half of which is already held by foreign lenders. And it will shake investor confidence, here and abroad, in the fundamental soundness of the U.S. economy, eventually driving interest rates up and the dollar down.

Despite these dire and entirely foreseeable consequences, too many federal policy makers remain in denial about the need for fiscal discipline. You have taken on what many consider a Mission Impossible: forging a bipartisan consensus on how to defuse the nation’s debt crisis. That’s put you in the crosshairs of extreme partisans of the left and right, who imagine this problem can be solved strictly at the other side’s expense. By refusing either to cut spending or raise taxes, the two have joined in a tacit conspiracy to bankrupt the country.

Common to both is the assumption that you can have fiscal responsibility, or you can have progressive government, but you can’t have both. We at the Progressive Policy Institute have always rejected this false choice. We believe that a progressive government can and must live within its means, and that if it instead chases the illusion of borrowed prosperity, it’s not really progressive.

To paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt, Americans know instinctively that borrowing routinely to consume more than you produce is both bad economics and bad morals. I don’t think it’s an accident that, as public worries about deficits have been mounting, public trust in government has been plummeting.

So there’s a lot riding on your ability to forge consensus behind a bold and balanced plan to restore fiscal responsibility. Let me offer some thoughts on what that plan should include from the perspective of a “progressive fiscal hawk.”

Read the entire testimony.

Time To End Supplemental Budgeting

Wednesday, June 30th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

The House has taken up a $30 billion supplemental appropriations bill to fund Afghanistan. However, the bill has ballooned to over $70 billon as the Democratic leadership has had to slather on non-defense appropriations to attract the votes of more progressive caucus members frustrated with nine years of slow progress in Afghanistan. There’s a $10 billion education jobs fund, $18 billion in Department of Energy loan guarantees, and $500 million for border patrol. This bill has turned the old guns vs. butter argument into a fight about guns and butter.

The bottom line is Democrats’ left flank is fed up with tough but “must have” votes on issues they view as too centrist (a health care bill minus the public option, multiple war appropriations). But this bill’s incentives are wholly inappropriate: Spending $10 billion on education-related jobs may be a worthy expenditure when considered separately, but it has no business in a defense bill. The Republicans, of course, are having a field day — they’ve exposed the Democratic split by threatening to pull potentially vital support of war-funding unless the bill is stripped “clean” of non-defense expenditures.

The good news is that there is a magic bullet, and it would solve a lot more than political bickering: End the practice of supplemental budgeting. Beyond politics, having just a single, unified defense budget would force trade-offs in a defense spending culture that has run wild in the last 10 years.

Here how supplementals work. Every year since 9/11, we’ve had essentially two or three defense budgets. This year, we’ve had three: a baseline defense budget appropriation of approximately $549 billion, a $159 billion “overseas contingency operations” (i.e., mostly Afghanistan and Iraq) budget and the current supplemental request of $30 billion (which includes several tens of billions for non-defense items discussed above).

The dirty secret is that even many of Pentagon’s “emergency war appropriations” have nothing to do with our current wars. Take the F-22, for example. Before Secretary Gates won last year’s fight to cap production of the F-22, lawmakers inserted $600 million to buy additional planes in the 2009 “emergency supplemental” after the money was shut out of the baseline 2009 budget. This happened even though not one of the 183 F-22s already owned by the U.S. military had flown a single mission over Iraq or Afghanistan. That doesn’t sound like an emergency spending necessity, does it?

Having three budgets is like having three strikes in a baseball at-bat — you have the luxury to swing and miss twice. Projects that don’t make the baseline DoD budget (strike one!) can be considered in either of the additional supplementals (strike two! strike three!) before they’re “out.”

Ending the supplementals would be like giving the batter just one strike. By combining all defense spending into one (larger) appropriation each year, the batter has just one swing — miss the first time, that’s it. The practice would force Congress to make hard choices that prioritize the war-fighter. Who wants to be the representative that adds defense pork to a bill at the expense of our fighting soldiers’ needs? And with no hope of getting additional money later in the year, it would begin to create a culture of efficiency and discipline in spending priorities.

Ultimately, Afghanistan will be funded. Having a single defense budget minimizes divisive political bickering and prioritizes the war-fighter. That’s a real win-win.

Ancient History

Friday, June 25th, 2010
Elbert Ventura



Elbert Ventura is the managing editor of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Elbert Ventura

Bruce Bartlett has a column up in today’s Fiscal Times that drills home just how far the Republican Party has veered from the center over the last few years. Bartlett recounts the story of the 1990 budget deal, which saw President George H.W. Bush reach across the aisle and strike a compromise with Democrats in an effort to shrink the deficit. The compromise on Bush’s end is, of course, now legendary: a violation of his “read my lips” pledge during the 1988 campaign that there would be no new taxes.

Working with Democratic majorities in both houses, the president knew that getting through measures on the spending side of the ledger would require some concessions on his part. Bartlett sums up the outcome of the budget negotiations:

Budget negotiations finally concluded in late September. The final deal cut spending by $324 billion over five years and raised revenues by $159 billion. The most politically toxic part of the deal, as far as congressional Republicans were concerned, involved an increase in the top statutory income tax rate to 31 percent from 28 percent, which had been established by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The top rate had been 50 percent from 1981 to 1986 and 70 percent from 1965 to 1980.

More importantly, the deal contained powerful mechanisms for controlling future deficits. In particular, a strong pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rule required that new spending or tax cuts had to be offset by spending cuts or tax increases. There were also caps on discretionary spending that were to be enforced by automatic spending cuts.

The conservative base, of course, went ballistic. Their opposition was reflected in the House of Representatives, where 163 Republicans voted against the budget, while only 10 voted for it. The Senate was a little better — half of Republicans approved the deal. These days, getting half of the Republican Senate caucus to go along with anything the Democratic majority pushes would be a minor miracle.

The consequences of Bush’s budget deal are well known. The violation of his tax pledge would prove to be a devastating weapon for political opponents in the 1992 campaign. But the economic consequences are less heralded. President Clinton deserves credit for bringing sanity and surpluses to the budget in the 1990s, but budget experts agree that his predecessor’s budget deal contributed to that achievement.

Bartlett quotes the GOP’s tax-cutting commissar, Grover Norquist, to underscore conservative suspicion of budget deals: “Budget deals where they actually restrain spending and raise taxes are unicorns.” Only spending cuts, Norquist argues, are permissible. The way the right is moving these days, we’re more likely to see a unicorn than a GOP leader going against party orthodoxy on taxes.

Photo credit: sdk