Michael S. Chase is an associate professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the U.S. Naval War College and a fellow with the Truman National Security Project. The opinions expressed here are his alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Naval War College, Department of the Navy or Department of Defense.
It’s clear that China’s Navy is growing in size and quality. Not only does China have the largest navy in East Asia, it has an increasingly modern and capable force of imported and indigenously produced destroyers, frigates, missile patrol craft, and submarines. Beijing is even planning to deploy its own aircraft carriers, a development sure to alarm neighbors such as Japan, Vietnam, and India.
But what does it mean for American policy makers? Should the United States increase its own maritime power in response to Beijing’s growing strength? Are there diplomatic levers that Washington might pull to forestall potential Chinese aggression? Below, I explore these issues, first by giving a brief history of China’s evolving naval strategies since the People’s Republic began in 1949. (It’s critical that U.S. policy makers understand the evolution of China’s thinking about the roles and missions of its navy.) Then, I provide a full accounting of recent Chinese naval hardware developments. Finally, I draw policy recommendations designed to help American policy makers manage the challenges that have arisen as a result of China’s improving capabilities, regional assertiveness and expanding global interests.
In short, the U.S. will need to strengthen its ties to key countries in East Asia and develop strategic and tactical military concepts and capabilities that would allow it to counter China’s growing military power. Meanwhile, U.S. policy makers must seek collaboration with the Chinese military in an effort to highlight the benefits of being a global stakeholder to Beijing.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has enjoyed an unparalleled ability to project military power around the globe, as the world’s leading superpower.
But in recent years, potential U.S. rivals have invested in weapons systems and strategies that challenge America’s ability to project such global power. It is part of an “anti-access and area denial” (AA/AD) approach based on operational concepts and military capabilities that deter, delay, or disrupt U.S. military power projection. An AA/AD strategy works not by threatening to best America in a direct contest, but by preventing U.S. military engagement in the first place.
This is the first installment in a three-part series investigating the state of China’s military. The other articles in this series will look at China’s missile capabilities and naval modernization.
This week, China’s National People’s Congress will convene its annual meeting in Beijing. Among the developments that are expected from the gathering is one we should all pay close attention to: the announcement of China’s 2010 defense budget.
Beijing has given the military double-digit budget increases for well over a decade, and some Chinese security analysts are calling for a larger-than-usual boost this year in a bid to signal China’s anger over the latest U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Whatever the exact amount of China’s official defense budget, the announcement will once again highlight China’s growing military power — and the potential challenge it poses to the U.S.
