Posts Tagged ‘ Afghanistan ’

« Older Entries

An Iraq Milestone?

Wednesday, September 1st, 2010
Will Marshall


Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

Many commentators seem puzzled over President Obama’s decision to use an Oval Office speech to mark the “end of combat operations” in Iraq. The reason: Iraq is important to Barack Obama, even if most Americans are nowadays preoccupied with a foundering economy.

Iraq, in fact, may be the reason Obama is President. During the 2008 campaign, the very green Junior Senator from Illinois used his opposition to the war to distinguish himself from more experienced rivals like Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden. His anti-war credentials allowed him to ride the powerful tide of anti-Bush sentiment among progressives. It also buttressed his claims to be a Washington outsider, the most authentic agent of political change in the race. This appealed to independents.

So it’s little wonder that Obama takes his pledge to end the Iraq war very seriously. He undoubtedly regards it as a matter of keeping faith with his core supporters. At the same time, he was careful not to inflame old passions over the war. On the contrary, he rightly praised U.S. troops for their skill and valor, offered a graceful salute to his predecessor, and urged the country to move on.

In this respect, the speech was probably the most genuinely “post partisan” of his presidency. But it also raised questions about what Obama really thinks about the war.  He noted that U.S. troops, at tremendous sacrifice, toppled one of the world’s worst tyrants and gave Iraq a chance to embrace “a different destiny.” Does that mean he disagrees with the New York Times’ characterization of Iraq as a “tragic, pointless war”? Obama sounded ambiguous on the question of whether it was all worth it, but such reticence probably comes with the job of being President.

Whether the public will regard his declaration as an important milestone is another matter. Violence in Iraq is already down, thanks at least in part to the surge that Obama initially opposed but has since implicitly endorsed by putting the same general, David Petraeus, in charge of a similar escalation in Afghanistan. What’s more, 50,000 U.S. troops will remain in Iraq for the next 16 months, and at least some of them will be fighting al Qaeda insurgents. Truth to tell, the President did little more last night that endorse the timetable set forth in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) the Bush administration negotiated with the Iraqi government.

For Obama, the significance of this moment is that it marks the transition to Iraqi responsibility for security. That’s fine, but America can’t simply wash its hands and walk away at the end of next year. Iraq didn’t ask to be invaded, or to be plunged into the hellish sectarian violence that followed. The United States has incurred an unavoidable moral obligation to help a decent political order emerge in Iraq. If that requires revisiting the SOFA, the administration shouldn’t be inflexible on the point.

In stressing the limits of America’s responsibilities, the President also drew parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States should stay in Afghanistan only as long as it takes to build the capacity of the Afghan government and security forces to defend the country against a vicious Taliban insurgency.

Obama, in fact, seemed to be implicitly advancing a new doctrine of limited U.S. military intervention. The unstated assumption: America probably will be forced to intervene again in failing and fragile states beset by terrorism or communal conflict. But we should make no open-ended commitments to counterinsurgency and national building. But war is seldom so tidy. The United States still has troops in South Korea, 57 years after the war there ended.

In all, it was an often confusing and even contradictory speech, as Fred Kaplan captured well today. It reflected the deep ambivalence of a man who rose to prominence on the strength of his anti-war stance, and now finds himself, as Commander in Chief, responsible for bringing no less than three wars – Iraq, Afghanistan and the fight against al Qaeda – to a successful conclusion.

Photo Credit: Jurveston’s photostream

Tags: , , , ,
Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix, Issues | No Comments »

Paying Bad People In Afghanistan

Thursday, August 26th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Gasp!  The CIA is paying bad people in Afghanistan!

The New York Times implies there’s a problem with fighting corruption in the Afghan government while paying the corrupt, in this case Mohammed Zia Salehi, the chief administration on Afghanistan’s National Security Council:

Mr. Salehi’s relationship with the C.I.A. underscores deep contradictions at the heart of the Obama administration’s policy in Afghanistan, with American officials simultaneously demanding that Hamid Karzai root out the corruption that pervades his government while sometimes subsidizing the very people suspected of perpetrating it.

That’s not right.  If we begin holding every official in Afghanistan to some vague corruption-based litmus test, the intelligence community would be completely handcuffed: I’d bet you a paycheck that you could pin some sort of corruption charge on every single official in the entire country.

After all, it’s a bit of a Catch-22, right?  If Afghanistan was a graft-free Jeffersonian democracy, CIA wouldn’t have such a need need to recruit unsavory sources like Salehi.  But the country is a mess, and our intelligence community better damn-well have its ear to the ground.  And if we really want to stop corruption at the highest level, Salehi has regular access to the biggest fish of them all:  Karzai.  That’s highly valuable.

I understand the desire to keep things above-board, but tough situations demand hard choices, and paying a well-placed but corrupt source is clearly the lesser evil.

Photo credit: World Economic Forum’s photostream

Tags: , , , , ,
Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix, Uncategorized | 1 Comment »

Why Democrats Must Change the Defense Budget Process, Now

Wednesday, July 28th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

For the first time in my life, I think I agree with John Boehner (R-OH) when it comes to national security. Well, sort of. (And trust me, that’s a tough admission from a guy who wrote this column eviscerating Boehner’s track record on national security.)

Here’s what the Minority Leader said following yesterday’s war funding vote to send $33 billion to support the military deployment in Afghanistan:

“We’ve been through all of this wrangling, and for what? All we’ve created is more uncertainty for our troops in the field, more uncertainty for the Pentagon, and it’s all unnecessary.”

Before you go thinking that I’ve lost my mind, let me explain. Boehner is trying to ding Democrats politically for so much as debating (and then voting against) the Afghanistan supplemental. Essentially, Boehner chafes because Democrats refuse to write the Pentagon a blank check. While I fully support funding troops in the field, you’re about to see why I’m not endorsing Boehner’s blank check by any stretch.

But on the other hand, if you’re sick and tired of having to revisit this “wrangled” vote several times a year, the man might just have a point. And I’ll bet he doesn’t even know it. Democrats would do well to pay attention.

For the third time this year, Congress has appropriated money for Afghanistan. They did it first in the baseline defense budget (“check please!” $549 billion), the “overseas contingency fund” ($129 billion), and now this $33 billion supplemental. That comes to a whopping total of some $711 billion (depending on how you round, of course).

Each of these appropriations not only causes consternation throughout the Democratic caucus, but also reinforces the idea that Pentagon spending is void of any sense of restraint. After all, if you’re trying to sneak a defense appropriation into the first bill and it gets axed, the current system gives you two more chances to slide it in.

The current appropriation is a perfect example — just one month ago it was $30 billion, yet at yesterday’s vote, it grew ten percent to $33 billion. Why does Congress need an extra $3 billion today that they didn’t 30 days ago?

The good news is that Boehner has unwittingly opened the door for a sensible, pragmatic solution to defense budgeting: end the supplemental budgeting process. End the wrangling.

Instead of voting on three separate defense bills that total $711 billion, just vote on one bill that is $711 billion. Not only would it avoid stomach-turning votes for Democrats, a single defense appropriation would limit wasteful spending and prioritize America’s soldiers deployed on the field of battle.

Think of it this way: Once that money is appropriated, that’s it. There’s a definitive bottom line that Congress has to stick to. This forces hard choices about spending priorities based on a set amount. It is not the typical defense budget two-step of what’s available both now and what can be added in the future.

Money would be allocated first and foremost to the warfighter. Faced between the choice of spending money on the weapons, logistics and salaries that our deployed troops need, and buying more of a weapons system we don’t require. What choice do you want your member of Congress to make?

But with today’s three defense budgets, Congress can buy the all the weapons they want, and then appropriate as much as they need for the war.

John Boehner talks about “certainty” for the Pentagon, but he’s only talking about the certainty of spending more, with no sense of discipline.  If Democrats are smart, they’ll roll our three budgets into one, and be certain about prioritizing the warfighter and starting to control defense spending.

Photo Credit: The U.S. Army’s Photostream

Tags: , , , ,
Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix | No Comments »

Wikileaks: Lack of Editorial Discretion

Tuesday, July 27th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Does the existence of a whistle-blower website like Wikileaks do more harm or good? Decisions about exposing information to the public depends on nuance and context, and it’s clear that in the wake of this case, Julian Assange, the site’s editor-in-chief and public face, has little appreciation for either.

Wikileaks is, in effect, a conduit for purported whistle-blowers, and describes itself as a “buttress against unaccountable and abusive power” and prides itself on “principled leaking.”

As a vehicle for whistle-blowing, the site has a responsibility to assert editorial discretion about the content it supplies, carefully weighing costs and benefits to the whistle-blowing party, those the information directly impacts and third parties. If Wikileaks is an open-repository for secret information without discretion and vetting, that’s a problem.

Prior to releasing the current military documents, the site should have exercised discretion with the following criteria in mind:

– Does the totality of the information indicate unequivocal, fact-based wrongdoing?
– Is this information new? Does it add to the public debate?
– Does its release endanger or save lives?
– Does its release cost or save public money?

By its own standard, Wikileaks, at best, punted. More likely, it outright failed and discredited itself.

Assange could not make a reliable judgment about the totality of the information he released because he could not have possibly known what exactly he was releasing. With Wikileaks staff reportedly of about five full-timers and a budget of $300,000, it’s difficult to imagine how the site could have shifted through so many documents and assembled a reasonable cost-benefit analysis, even with an “army” of hundreds of part-time volunteers. Rather, he essentially outsourced vetting to The New York Times, Guardian, Der Spiegel, and other websites that have cattle-called hungry readers to sift through the material. Ergo, Wikileaks likely had no idea if it was releasing ironclad evidence of wrongdoing.

Second, as I detailed yesterday, the information was clearly not “new.” It only served to amplify public debate. Further, the information’s release likely endangered American lives, and certainly jeopardized American sources in methods and consequently, its safety.

Finally, it’s unclear about saving public money, unless you argue that ending the war would do so. But that argument, much like the answers to all of the above, suggest that Assange and Wikileaks are motivated much more by activism than journalism. And that discredits any strain of legitimate public service the site hopes to render in the future.

From now on, Wikileaks would do well to know exactly what it’s releasing, know that it’s a new fact, and weigh the balance of lives, security and money.

Photo Credit: Joe-manna’s Photostream

Tags: , , , ,
Posted in Daily Fix, Uncategorized | No Comments »

Time To End Supplemental Budgeting

Wednesday, June 30th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

The House has taken up a $30 billion supplemental appropriations bill to fund Afghanistan. However, the bill has ballooned to over $70 billon as the Democratic leadership has had to slather on non-defense appropriations to attract the votes of more progressive caucus members frustrated with nine years of slow progress in Afghanistan. There’s a $10 billion education jobs fund, $18 billion in Department of Energy loan guarantees, and $500 million for border patrol. This bill has turned the old guns vs. butter argument into a fight about guns and butter.

The bottom line is Democrats’ left flank is fed up with tough but “must have” votes on issues they view as too centrist (a health care bill minus the public option, multiple war appropriations). But this bill’s incentives are wholly inappropriate: Spending $10 billion on education-related jobs may be a worthy expenditure when considered separately, but it has no business in a defense bill. The Republicans, of course, are having a field day — they’ve exposed the Democratic split by threatening to pull potentially vital support of war-funding unless the bill is stripped “clean” of non-defense expenditures.

The good news is that there is a magic bullet, and it would solve a lot more than political bickering: End the practice of supplemental budgeting. Beyond politics, having just a single, unified defense budget would force trade-offs in a defense spending culture that has run wild in the last 10 years.

Here how supplementals work. Every year since 9/11, we’ve had essentially two or three defense budgets. This year, we’ve had three: a baseline defense budget appropriation of approximately $549 billion, a $159 billion “overseas contingency operations” (i.e., mostly Afghanistan and Iraq) budget and the current supplemental request of $30 billion (which includes several tens of billions for non-defense items discussed above).

The dirty secret is that even many of Pentagon’s “emergency war appropriations” have nothing to do with our current wars. Take the F-22, for example. Before Secretary Gates won last year’s fight to cap production of the F-22, lawmakers inserted $600 million to buy additional planes in the 2009 “emergency supplemental” after the money was shut out of the baseline 2009 budget. This happened even though not one of the 183 F-22s already owned by the U.S. military had flown a single mission over Iraq or Afghanistan. That doesn’t sound like an emergency spending necessity, does it?

Having three budgets is like having three strikes in a baseball at-bat — you have the luxury to swing and miss twice. Projects that don’t make the baseline DoD budget (strike one!) can be considered in either of the additional supplementals (strike two! strike three!) before they’re “out.”

Ending the supplementals would be like giving the batter just one strike. By combining all defense spending into one (larger) appropriation each year, the batter has just one swing — miss the first time, that’s it. The practice would force Congress to make hard choices that prioritize the war-fighter. Who wants to be the representative that adds defense pork to a bill at the expense of our fighting soldiers’ needs? And with no hope of getting additional money later in the year, it would begin to create a culture of efficiency and discipline in spending priorities.

Ultimately, Afghanistan will be funded. Having a single defense budget minimizes divisive political bickering and prioritizes the war-fighter. That’s a real win-win.

Tags: , , , , , ,
Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix, Fiscal Responsibility | No Comments »

Six Things to Watch with Petraeus in Afghanistan

Thursday, June 24th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Now that Gen. McChrystal is about to add “(ret.)” after his name, let’s examine the implications of the transition to Gen. Petraeus.

The Washington Post story quotes an unnamed White House official saying of the transition: “It’s as seamless as it could be, not only in terms of operations but also because you put someone in who’s widely respected. No one is going to doubt that he’s the right guy for the job.”
A relatively smooth transition, to be sure, but with an emphasis on the relatively. Here’s a look at five areas where the change in command might create a bit of unease.

Political expectations: Petraeus is God, at least if you ask most elected officials on the Hill. Yes, he was the architect of the “surge” in Iraq, and the “surge” was part of the reason that violence decreased in that country. The massive increase in troops helped, but the strategy change, the Sons of Iraq’s change of allegiance and a six-month cease-fire called by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr were all critical.

If you’re really interested in learning the entire story of how Iraq’s civil war was tamed, read The Gamble by Tom Ricks. In it, Ricks quotes a Petraeus colleague (and I’m paraphrasing from memory) as saying, “David is the best general in the United States military. But he’s not as good as he thinks he is.” It’s like Favre to the Vikings. He’s still really, really good. But he’ll never be as good as in Green Bay.

Keep this in mind because, as Ricks says on his blog this morning, “Afghanistan 2010 may be an even tougher nut than Iraq 2007. … Our biggest problem in Afghanistan is the government we are supporting there, and it isn’t clear to me what Petraeus can do about that.”

Mission: Counterinsurgency theory and practice is Petraeus’ bag, so don’t expect that to change. Bear in mind that COIN is a strategy, not an outcome. It ends with some sort of negotiated peace, and it’s unclear if Petraeus has the same threshold for potential discussions with the Taliban as McChrystal. There has been American resistance to the idea (as there should be) of reconciling with any of the Taliban’s upper eschelon, but would Petraeus draw the line slightly differently than McChrystal?

Relations with Eikenberry: It became clear that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, was playing second fiddle to McChrystal, who had established a clear working relationship with Karzai. During Petraeus’ time in Iraq, he may have held more sway than then-Ambassador Ryan Crocker, but they were an inseparable team that appeared together constantly. Petraeus, who is as much of a diplomat as a solider, will work to forge a better relationship with Eikenberry and turn this operation into a true civilian-military effort.

Relations with Karzai: Karzai very publicly lobbied for McChrystal to stay, and by many accounts, the two were on the same page (at least professionally). Is it possible that they were too close? Will Petraeus do a better job using America’s isolated points of leverage to extract more from the Afghan government?

Relations with Pakistan: This quote says it all:

McChrystal also played a key role in improving Kabul’s rocky relationship with Islamabad.

Yet Petraeus probably has as much, if not more, clout in Islamabad. He was an early proponent of a regional strategy that prioritized improving relations with Pakistan in hopes of persuading it to target the Afghan Taliban fighters who use Pakistani hideouts to plot attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Petraeus has visited Pakistan numerous times, delivering assurances that the U.S. troop buildup in Afghanistan would not spill over into Pakistan, visiting Pakistani paramilitary forces in the northwestern city of Peshawar and regularly praising Pakistan’s fight against its domestic Taliban.

“There’s a complete understanding of each other’s situation,” a senior Pakistani military official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “He’s not a stranger.”

Troops on the ground: There’s been no shortage of troops in Afghanistan who voiced their displeasure with McChrystal’s restrictions on the use of force. Think of it this way: you’re an 18-year-old Marine, –and you’ve become a trained killer and sent to a war zone. But your commanding general seems like he’s telling you not to do the job you’ve been trained for. Many of the troops’ quotes imply a certain amount of lost respect for McChrystal. Petraeus will have to work to explain the mission and win them over to a “mission first” mentality. Training stateside should also be adjusted accordingly.

Petraeus is the consummate pro, and he’ll no doubt do his best in an incredibly challenging environment with far-from-certain results. My take is that this transition will be as smooth as one could hope.

Photo credit: Jon-Phillip Sheridan’s Photostream

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix | 2 Comments »

What No One Is Paying Attention to in the Rolling Stone Article

Wednesday, June 23rd, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

The now-infamous Rolling Stone article that earned Gen. Stanley McChrystal a one-way trip out of Afghanistan has attracted attention for what it says about the White House.

And in a way, that’s a good thing.

Because once you get past the name-calling scandal, the article is really a takedown of counterinsurgency strategy and, by extension, a subtle get-out-of-Afghanistan-now message. In an attempt to categorize the debate about whether to adopt a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, here’s Hasting’s characterization:

COIN, as the theory is known, is the new gospel of the Pentagon brass, a doctrine that attempts to square the military’s preference for high-tech violence with the demands of fighting protracted wars in failed states. COIN calls for sending huge numbers of ground troops to not only destroy the enemy, but to live among the civilian population and slowly rebuild, or build from scratch, another nation’s government – a process that even its staunchest advocates admit requires years, if not decades, to achieve. The theory essentially rebrands the military, expanding its authority (and its funding) to encompass the diplomatic and political sides of warfare: Think the Green Berets as an armed Peace Corps.

[...]

The entire COIN strategy is a fraud perpetuated on the American people,” says Douglas Macgregor, a retired colonel and leading critic of counterinsurgency who attended West Point with McChrystal. “The idea that we are going to spend a trillion dollars to reshape the culture of the Islamic world is utter nonsense.

Or this:

After several hours of haggling, McChrystal finally enlisted the aid of Afghanistan’s defense minister, who persuaded Karzai’s people to wake the president from his nap. This is one of the central flaws with McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy: The need to build a credible government puts us at the mercy of whatever tin-pot leader we’ve backed – a danger that Eikenberry explicitly warned about in his cable.

To sum up, you have a questionable description of COIN, followed by a single opinion from someone whose stated qualifications are that he went to college with McChrystal (who knows if Macgregor has any COIN expertise) deriding the entire concept.

It’s one thing to report on who McChrystal is, what he’s said, where he comes from, and the difficulty of mission he’s trying to accomplish. But it’s quite another to falsely characterize his mission as a Sisyphean task from the get-go. Clearly, the president, having consulted and deliberated for three months, believes that there’s significant reason to hope counterinsurgency can bring about hard-fought American security.

For a better discussion of COIN, I’d encourage you to read papers like this, by David Kilcullen, author of the Accidental Guerilla and an actual COIN expert. In the paper linked above, Kilcullen properly characterizes COIN as difficult and far from a guaranteed success, but forwards a thoughtful framework for how COIN practitioners might organize their efforts to bring about the best chances of sustainable security.

…you may now return to your regularly scheduled name-calling.

Photo credit: The US Army’s Photostream

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix | 1 Comment »

That McChrystal Article

Tuesday, June 22nd, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Washington is abuzz this morning with news of an as-yet-unpublished Rolling Stone profile of Gen. Stanley McChrystal. You can read the nastier bits here and here, but let’s just say that we learn that the general and his entourage have some not terribly complementary things to say about Obama, Biden, National Security Advisor Jim Jones, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry and U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke.

Though the full article isn’t out, leaks of the article make the attacks seem more personal rather than professional in nature, though I guess it’s likely that personal animosity is probably an extension of professional differences. And for those scoring at home, some of the attacks aren’t even that clever. No, I don’t think “Biden” sounds anywhere close to “Bite Me.”

The moral of this story is simple: Never, ever let your staff get trapped on a 12-hour bus ride between Paris and Berlin during a volcanic ash eruption with an all-access reporter. Duh. Michael Hastings, the freelance journalist who penned the piece, went on Morning Joe today and dropped that a lot of his material came from a European trip with McChrystal and co. that was extended and forced onto a bus thanks to Eyjafjallajokull (or as the military calls it, “E-15″). In such confined spaces and after such a stressful travel experience, people tend to get punchy and let things slip.

You’d expect that after such a flabbergasting news bomb, McChrystal’s staff would offer a “clarification” or denial or retraction or… something. But instead, there was an apology sent from McChrystal to reporters:

I extend my sincerest apology for this profile. It was a mistake reflecting poor judgment and should never have happened. Throughout my career, I have lived by the principles of personal honor and professional integrity. What is reflected in this article falls far short of that standard. I have enormous respect and admiration for President Obama and his national security team, and for the civilian leaders and troops fighting this war and I remain committed to ensuring its successful outcome.

In other words: it’s all true.

McCrystal and his staff’s comments are certainly beyond the pale, and the profile continues to confirm erstwhile speculation that there are significant fissures within the U.S. team in Afghanistan. First, there was McChrystal’s interview with “60 Minutes” last September, where he dished on the Pentagon’s slow-response and his lack of contact with Obama. Then there was Ambassador Eikenberry’s leak of a strategy memo that resisted McChrystal’s call to increase troop levels. That’s on top of an eyebrow-raising speech in London that got him hauled onto Air Force One for a chat with the president. And now this.

Some are howling that this amounts to insubordination and that McChrystal should be fired. That may be true, and McChrystal is being reeled into D.C. tomorrow to explain himself. At the very least, it’s amazingly dumb public relations. You don’t get to be a flag officer in the U.S. military without being accustomed to the chain of command. And McChrystal and any loose-lipped staff should know that you keep your disagreements private and then execute the orders of the commander in chief. But who knows, maybe that’s not the way McChrystal, an ex-commander of the insular and secretive Special Ops, was used to conducting himself.

So what now? There is, of course, a very good possibility that this will be the end of the road. But that decision isn’t as easy as you might think. For one, Obama is not a knee-jerk politician who reacts instantly to every negative media report. He’s careful, deliberate and won’t be pressured.

Furthermore, this is an issue of national security, not petty politics. The president has to make decisions in the long-term interest of American safety and in consideration of the country’s sons and daughters in harm’s way. So, absent a ridiculous inability to keep things out of the press, changing an otherwise strategically competent theater commander in the midst of a major counterinsurgency campaign may not be the best thing to do at the moment. Obama has to thread the needle between team chemistry in Afghanistan and a PR nightmare to give both Afghanistan and the U.S. the best chances for long-term security.

And it’s with that in mind that any decision to replace McChrystal will be made.

Photo Credit: isafmedia

Tags: , , , , , , , ,
Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix | No Comments »

A Progressive Lesson from Reagan (Seriously)

Wednesday, June 9th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Peter Beinart has a must-read in the latest Foreign Policy on the mythology of Ronald Reagan — and the conservative movement that keeps perpetuating it.

As someone whose first job in D.C. was interning at a lobby firm that had — no kidding — a framed portrait of St. Ron in every office, I relish lines that tether President Reagan back to his terrestrial home, such as:

During his presidency, Reagan repeatedly invoked the prospect of an alien invasion as a reason for the United States and the Soviet Union to overcome their differences. Whenever he did, [National Security Adviser Colin] Powell would mutter, “Here come the little green men.”

That’s some delicious red meat right there.

But if we focus there — and Reagan haters are apt to do just that — we miss the real lesson. Beinart might douse ice water on the conservative narrative of Reagan, but he makes a strong case for the lesson that Obama can and should learn from The Great Communicator:

Reagan’s political genius lay in recognizing that what Americans wanted was a president who exorcised the ghost of the Vietnam War without fighting another Vietnam.

Americans loved Reagan’s foreign policy for the same reason they loved the 1985 blockbuster Rambo, in which the muscle-bound hero returns to Vietnam, kicks some communist butt, and no Americans die. Reagan’s liberal critics often accused him of reviving the chest-thumping spirit that had led to Vietnam. But they were wrong. For Reagan, chest-thumping was in large measure a substitute for a new Vietnam, a way of accommodating the restraints on U.S. power while still boosting American morale.

[...]

Obama can, and should, be Reaganesque in his effort to project great strength at low risk. That means understanding that America’s foreign-policy debates are often cultural debates in disguise.

Reagan was a master of symbolic acts — like awarding the Medal of Honor to overlooked Vietnam hero Roy Benavidez — that made Americans feel as though they were exorcising Vietnam’s ghost without refighting the war. Obama must be equally shrewd at a time when he has no choice but to retreat from Iraq and eventually Afghanistan. That means more than ritual incantations about flag and country; it means rhetorically challenging those who unfairly attack the United States. From a purely foreign-policy perspective, publicly confronting Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez when they malign the United States, or calling out universities that ban military recruiters from campus, might seem useless. But for U.S. presidents, there is no pure foreign-policy perspective; being effective in the world requires domestic support. [emphases added]

If Democrats are going to close the ever-elusive national security gap and strongly defend what I’ve called a sterling record on national security, they’re going to have to swallow some pride and steal one from the Gipper.

Photo credit: Fresh Conservative’s Photostream

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix | No Comments »

Progressives: Own the National Security Debate! Please!

Thursday, June 3rd, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

If you read the conclusion of today’s Democracy Corps/Third Way poll analysis, one thing becomes abundantly clear: Democrats remain disturbingly not confident talking about national security.

[M]any Democrats seem relatively silent about the accomplishments of the Obama administration and their party on national security. Though a few are stressing the administration’s efforts on the new START treaty and nuclear proliferation, fewer still seem to be stressing the administration’s accomplishments regarding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, efforts to strengthen the military, and steps to combat terrorism. The survey strongly suggests progressives should speak out forcefully on these issues, and remind voters of the contrasts between those relative successes and the failures the country witnessed under eight years of Bush-Cheney. [emphasis added]

When the president scores 53 percent approval even after two significant domestic terrorist attempts in the last six months, that’s a strong statement. Even the last few months have seen a significant 10-point shift — moderates have changed allegiances and now trust Democrats more than Republicans on national security by six points.

Progressives need to own the national security narrative, a message I’ve tried to hammer home repeatedly over the last several months. Here’s an excerpt from a piece I wrote back in April for Roll Call:

[T]he Obama administration has quietly put together a sterling record on national security. So why are Democrats so down in the dumps? As one party strategist put it, Democrats “are behaving like the president has a 30 percent approval rating. On these [security] issues, Democrats inherently believe that no one will believe our arguments.”
There’s plenty for progressives to cheer. … Progressives stand for strong, smart security policy. Obama has terrorists in retreat and American prestige on the rise. Democrats need to begin owning their successes if the American public is to give credit where it’s due.

The Democracy Corps/Third Way analysis offers solid, straightforward recommendations. These are hardly liberal fantasy — they’re pragmatic, progressive ways to emphasize what has been a successful beginning on national security that will translate into electoral gains.

  • Speak in stronger terms about anti-terror efforts.
  • Stress efforts to support and strengthen the military.
  • Emphasize successful attempts toward greater international cooperation.
  • Emphasize domestic and economic renewal as an element of national strength.
  • Provide a contrast to the Bush-Cheney administration.

Two quick comments on the specifics of the recommendations. First, on the economy “as an element of national strength,” we’re now wondering less why the White House put such a strong emphasis on precisely that point in last week’s National Security Strategy. And on that final point, John Boehner’s been going around claiming that the administration’s counterterrorism successes have been “lucky,” an argument that the survey says falls flat with voters. I’d offer my evisceration of Boehner here (it was fun to write, so please check it out).

Tags: , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix | No Comments »

Top 10 Pragmatic Progressive Ideas from the National Security Strategy

Friday, May 28th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Since copies of the Obama administration’s new National Security Strategy began to circulate, there’s been a lot of cheering about how different from Bush’s it is. And true, it is. That’s made clear in the letter from the president on the document’s first page. And my hunch is that people stop there — you get your headline, and you run with it, not bothering to read the rest of the document.

Well, guess what? I just cozied up with a chicken sandwich, a Diet Coke and a bag of chips and read the whole enchilada.

It’s long and at times unwieldy. I understand, for example, that “spending taxpayer’s dollars wisely” is important, but not sure the White House should be compelled to include it in the strategy text. But that’s indicative of Obama’s style — when you seek input from everyone, you’ll tend to end up with a longer list.

But after digging through the document, it’s worth pointing out the specifics of how the strategy has a distinctly pragmatic progressive outlook. With that, here are the top 10 examples:

1. It reaffirms that America’s values are the source of its power, and that American exceptionalism endures:

[T]he work to build a stronger foundation for our leadership within our borders recognizes that the most effective way for the United States of America to promote our values is to live them. America’s commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are essential sources of our strength and influence in the world.  America has always been a beacon to the peoples of the world when we ensure that the light of America’s example burns bright.

2. It prioritizes terrorism, Iraq, and Afghanistan while weighing them in the context of the 21st century’s other threats:

[T]hese wars—and our global efforts to successfully counter violent extremism—are only one element of our strategic environment and cannot define America’s engagement with the world. Terrorism is one of many threats that are more consequential in a global age. The gravest danger to the American people and global security continues to come from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. The space and cyberspace capabilities that power our daily lives and military operations are vulnerable to disruption and attack. Dependence upon fossil fuels constrains our options and pollutes our environment. Climate change and pandemic disease threaten the security of regions and the health and safety of the American people.

3. America will only be secure if all government agencies coordinate effectively:

To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same. … We are improving the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly. We are also improving coordinated planning and policymaking and must build our capacity in key areas where we fall short.

4. It is comfortable with, but prudent about, the use of force:

While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction. When force is necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.

5. It’s tough as nails on al Qaeda:

[W]e reject the notion that al-Qa’ida represents any religious authority. They are not religious leaders, they are killers; and neither Islam nor any other religion condones the slaughter of innocents.

6. It advocates the responsible, measured pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons:

As long as any nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.

7. The Obama administration trusts the UN:

We are enhancing our coordination with the U.N. and its agencies. We need a U.N. capable of fulfilling its founding purpose — maintaining international peace and security, promoting global cooperation, and advancing human rights. To this end, we are paying our bills. We are intensifying efforts with partners on and outside the U.N. Security Council to ensure timely, robust, and credible Council action to address threats to peace and security.

8. “Democracy promotion” — a term that became identified with the Bush administration — isn’t a dirty phrase:

The United States supports the expansion of democracy and human rights abroad because governments that respect these values are more just, peaceful, and legitimate. We also do so because their success abroad fosters an environment that supports America’s national interests.

9. The United States’ security is closely linked to clean energy:

As long as we are dependent on fossil fuels, we need to ensure the security and free flow of global energy resources. But without significant and timely adjustments, our energy dependence will continue to undermine our security and prosperity. This will leave us vulnerable to energy supply disruptions and manipulation and to changes in the environment on an unprecedented scale.  The United States has a window of opportunity to lead in the development of clean energy technology.

10. It calls on politicians to stop being ridiculous and put country above politics:

Throughout the Cold War, even as there were intense disagreements about certain courses of action, there remained a belief that America’s political leaders shared common goals, even if they differed about how to reach them. In today’s political environment, due to the actions of both parties that sense of common purpose is at times lacking in our national security dialogue. This division places the United States at a strategic disadvantage.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix | 1 Comment »

Bagram Detainee Case Likely Headed to the High Court

Thursday, May 27th, 2010
Matthew Dahl


Matt Dahl is a judicial clerk in Virginia and writes about national security law on his blog. The views expressed here are his own.

by Matthew Dahl

In 2008, the Supreme Court decided that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay had the constitutional right to challenge the legality of their detention. Thus ended the question of whether all detainees in the fight against terrorism had a right to habeas corpus, right? As with all complex legal questions, the answer is never that simple.

The federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia added to the complexity of the habeas corpus issue when it ruled last Friday on a case filed by three detainees being held at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Bagram is not only the largest American military base in Afghanistan, it also serves as a major detention center for those taken prisoner there, and allegedly holds some prisoners captured in other countries as well. In an opinion by Chief Judge David Sentelle, a Reagan appointee, the court found that the constitutional right of habeas corpus does not extend to detainees being held at the base.

The court made three central determinations in its decision. First, it found that the current procedure used at Bagram to deal with the detainees is even worse than the procedure that was used at Gitmo, which the Supreme Court found to be unconstitutional. The procedures at Gitmo, referred to as Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), did not allow detainees access to an attorney and severely restricted a detainee’s right to present evidence on his behalf or rebut evidence by the government. The court in this case found that the procedures at Bagram, called Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Boards (UECRBs), were even less sufficient than the CSRTs, and found that this factor initially favored giving Bagram detainees habeas corpus.

But despite that finding, the court found that two other factors weighed against granting the right. It concluded that Bagram is in fact different from Gitmo because the U.S. does not intend Bagram to be a permanent base similar to Gitmo, which has been operating for over a hundred years. More importantly, it found that giving Bagram detainees the right to habeas corpus could adversely affect the military’s ability to carry out operations in Afghanistan.

It is true that giving the detainees at Bagram the right to habeas corpus could cause a host of problems. It would require giving the detainees access to attorneys, and creating that system could eat up badly needed military assets. Also, Bagram detainees whose detentions were invalidated would most likely be released inside Afghanistan. This could put enemy fighters directly back on to the battlefield.

However, as the D.C. Court of Appeals admits, the fact still remains that the Bagram detainees are being held without constitutionally sufficient procedures available to them. If the U.S. is going to operate a prison where habeas corpus does not apply, what is to stop it from shipping all future terrorist detainees to Bagram to avoid giving them the right?

That’s why this case is on a beeline to the Supreme Court. While the Court has disagreed with the D.C. Court of Appeals on detainee cases, it is far from clear how it will come out on this issue. One factor making it hard to predict is that the Court’s makeup will be different from when it decided its last major detainee case with the addition of Justice Sotomayor and – almost certainly – Elena Kagan.

In its last major detainee case, the Court split down ideological lines, with Justice Kennedy writing the opinion and siding with the more liberal justices. It is likely that Justice Sotomayor, as part of the liberal bloc, would vote for extending habeas corpus to the Bagram detainees. Similarly, soon-to-be Justice Kagan would almost certainly be in favor of extending the right to Bagram detainees — in 2005, while dean of Harvard Law School, she joined in a letter with three other law school deans stating that detainees should be allowed access to federal courts for review of procedures such as CSRTs and UECRBs.

That said, neither are very experienced with national security cases, so one can’t say for sure how each will vote. Another factor making it difficult to predict the outcome is the fact that Bagram and Gitmo are situated differently. Both are active military bases, but Bagram is operating in a theater of war. Allowing detainees at Bagram to engage in the habeas corpus process could affect the military’s war effort in Afghanistan, a fact that could sway one or more of the liberal justices to the other side.

The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Progressive Policy Institute.

Photo Credit: U.S. Army Africa’s Photostream

Tags: , , , , , , ,
Posted in Daily Fix | No Comments »

« Older Entries