Posts Tagged ‘ Banking ’

Dodd-Frank Hits and Misses

Monday, June 28th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

First the giant stimulus package, then the ambitious revamping of America’s health care delivery system. Now Congress, under the patient prodding of President Obama, is lurching toward passage of another stupendously complex bill, this time centered on financial regulatory reform. Whether you like them or not, you have to admit that big things are getting done in Washington on Obama’s watch.

If Congress passes the Dodd-Frank bill, it will be another major notch in the belt of a president who could use a political victory about now. But what’s a non-master of the universe like me to make of this 2,000-page behemoth?

It may do considerable good, but we ought to be clear about one thing: It won’t prevent the next financial crisis. As long as there are fortunes to be made in financial markets, there will be excessive risk-taking and speculation, new bubbles and panics, and powerful incentives for chicanery and fraud. No regulatory scheme can fully protect the public against ingenious new forms of human greed and folly.

That, however, is not an argument for doing nothing. The government had to react to Wall Street’s near meltdown in the winter of 2008-2009. Its interventions, beginning under President Bush and continuing into Obama’s administration, doubtless averted a full-bore financial collapse. But they also triggered a fierce and abiding public backlash against bailouts.

The Dodd-Frank bill doesn’t get everything right, but on balance it’s a reasonable response to the crisis. It imposes new disciplines on bank behavior, increases transparency for complex financial transactions and institutions, and offers consumers new protections against the clever breed of predators who have degrees from elite universities and sport $3,000 suits.

Some liberals are chagrined that the bill doesn’t break up the big banks. Conservatives echo the Wall Street Journal’s charges that the bill is a regulatory nightmare that will make it more expensive for banks to supply capital to businesses. It’s tempting to say that Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Frank (D-MA) must therefore have found some kind of centrist sweet spot, but there is something to the left-right critiques.

Most important, for example, the bill doesn’t slay the “too-big-to-fail” dragon. It leaves financial power more concentrated than ever in the hands of five mega-banks: Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and Bank of America. True, Dodd-Frank does impose the “Volcker Rule,” forbidding banks covered by federal deposit insurance from making bets (called “proprietary trading”) with their own money.  It increases capital reserve requirements to keep banks from taking excessive risks. It also sets up a council of financial guardians to anticipate systemic risks, and gives federal authorities power to seize and oversee the “orderly liquidation” of financial firms whose collapse could bring other institutions down as well.

But it’s hard to avoid the impression that the big banks will henceforth operate with a tacit government guarantee against systemic failure. This not only intensifies moral hazard – making it hard for administration officials to claim the bill would bar bailouts in the future – it also risks creating a privileged class of quasi-public banking utilities that will be able to borrow money more cheaply. That will raise the bar for new entrants and dampen competition in the banking sector.

Elsewhere, the picture looks more positive. Dodd-Frank would move much of the trade in financial derivatives onto exchanges and clearinghouses, though banks could still trade in over-the-counter derivatives to hedge their own risks. This seems like a sensible compromise that brings derivatives trading out of the shadows while retaining the ability of firms to hedge against interest rate and currency risks. In another boost for transparency, the bill would require private equity firms and hedge funds to register with regulators.

Dodd-Frank also puts in place what Obama last week called “the strongest consumer financial protections in history.” It creates a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau housed with the Fed to police mortgage lending, credit and debit cards and other consumer loans – though not by auto dealers, who somehow won an exemption from oversight. This agency presumably will prevent abuses like the “no doc” and “liar” loans that helped to trigger the subprime lending frenzy, which was the spark that started the financial crisis.

The bill doesn’t deal at all with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This is a huge omission, considering that these giant mortgage finance firms still hold a pile of dubious assets and are essentially in federal receivership.

For all its imperfections, Dodd-Frank seeks to protect consumers without creating undue regulatory obstacles to innovation in the financial sector, which traditionally has been a source of comparative economic advantage for the U.S. Pragmatic progressives ought to support it, while retaining a sense of humility about the ability of new regulatory bodies to prevent future abuses.

Photo credit: Center for American Progress Action Fund

Will GOP Block Wall Street Fix?

Tuesday, April 20th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

As the Senate turns to financial reform this week, the big question is whether any Republicans will join in, or whether the party will stick to its new political doctrine of Maximum Feasible Obstruction.

This doctrine is predicated on the idea that Barack Obama, elected with nearly 53 percent of the vote, is a dangerous radical bent on extinguishing American liberties and importing Euro-style social democracy. It’s an idea so crazy on its face that many progressives are convinced that racism must lurk behind it.

Maybe, but some conservatives also convinced themselves that Bill Clinton maintained a secret airport in Arkansas to import narcotics from Central America. The right’s feral attacks on Clinton led a sympathetic Toni Morrison to dub him in a figurative sense “America’s first black president.”

Whether or not race is a factor, Republicans have evidently calculated that there is no political cost in withholding cooperation from Obama, at least on domestic issues. That may have been true of health care, which lost public support as the debate wore on. But fixing Wall Street is another matter.

The Pew Center for Research reported yesterday that Americans overwhelmingly favor (by 61-31) reform of financial rules, even as they evince growing skepticism of government activism. It’s pretty clear the public takes a “never again” stance toward bailing out Wall Street bankers, speculators and bonus babies.

That’s why Mitch McConnell, the GOP Senate leader, latched onto the theme that the bill crafted by Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) would actually make future bailouts more likely. President Obama blasted that “cynical and deceptive assertion” over the weekend, and McConnell yesterday seemed to back down.

Still, Democrats need Republican votes to bring a bill to the floor. The Washington Post reports this morning that Democrats are targeting Sens. Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins of Maine and Bob Corker of Tennessee. Bucking his party’s sullenly oppositionist temper, Corker has worked constructively with Sen. Mark Warner (D-VA) to offer sensible improvements to the Dodd bill.

That bill is snagged on GOP opposition to a new regulatory body, to be independent but lodged in the Federal Reserve, that would protect consumers of credit cards, mortgages and other loans from deceptive or predatory practices. Dodd has signaled a willingness to compromise on another controversial provision, an industry-financed $50 billion fund to liquidate bankrupt firms. And the New York Times reports today financial sector lobbyists have lavished contributions on members of the Agriculture Committee, which is grappling with a key provision to regulate derivatives.

During the health care debate, Republicans did not appear to be moved by the plight of Americans with no medical insurance. But financial reform involves something Republicans traditionally care deeply about – money. Where are the sobersided conservatives of yesteryear, who understood that the safety and soundness of our financial system is fundamental to America’s economic health? Striking the right balance between regulation and innovation, security and risk, is an urgent national priority that ought to engage responsible leaders in both parties.

If Republicans aren’t willing to set aside reflexive partisanship long enough to stand up for American capitalism, we really are in a world of political hurt.

Photo credit: http://www.flickr.com/photos/epicharmus/ / CC BY 2.0

Partisanship Uncorked

Thursday, April 1st, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

A little over a week ago, I praised Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN) for working with Sen. Mark Warner (D-VA) to come up with some bipartisan improvements to the financial regulatory reform package that Senate Banking Committee Chair Chris Dodd (D-CT) is looking to get through the Senate in time for Memorial Day. I may have spoken too soon. Corker said yesterday:

“I couldn’t support the bill in its current form,” Mr. Corker said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. “I am absolutely not throwing in the towel. I have no plans to support the current legislation. I hope we’ll get back to the negotiating table.”

This is, of course, a familiar tactic. After a year of being actively courted by the administration and Democrats, congressional Republicans claimed they couldn’t support health care reform, but were willing to stall further by espousing an interest in negotiating. But despite Corker’s backing away from a bill that as recently a last week he said he thought was going to pass, it’s worth sticking to the principle of a bill with bipartisan ideas.

The big idea that Warner and Corker worked on was including an autonomous Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) as part of the Federal Reserve System. While sticking the CFPA in the Fed is an ungainly solution, it does have the benefit of giving the CFPA start-up funding through the Fed’s balance sheet. Additionally, creating a brand-new agency out of the parts of others does have the chance of echoing the struggles the Department of Homeland Security had getting off the ground, a fate a Fed-housed CFPA can avoid.

Senate Democrats shouldn’t bend over backwards and try to pass a flawed bill in the hopes of convincing Republicans to get on board. But neither should they give up on looking for broad-based support for meaningful reform.

The Dodd Plan Is Good — But It Can Be Made Better

Thursday, March 18th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT), looking for a capstone to his 30-year career in the Senate, unveiled his vision for financial regulatory reform this week. The chairman of the Senate Banking Committee has long been dogged by claims that he’s in the pocket of the financial industry and hedge funds, but his plan is a robust effort to address the systemic issues that led to the 2008 financial crisis. While it’s far from perfect, the Dodd proposal is a good one that could be made even better with a few tweaks.

A robust Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) is vital. Concerns over creating a whole new bureaucracy have to be balanced against developing a consumer watchdog agency that has teeth to rein in subprime mortgages, hidden banking fees and the like. I got to hear Sen. Mark Warner (D-VA) talk about this with Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN) at a panel sponsored by the National Journal, where they described striking that balance by housing the CFPA in the Fed. The new autonomous agency would get Fed funding for its activities but would not fall under its oversight. That responsibility would fall on a CFPA director appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. This should give it enough independence from the financial institutions that fund the Fed to make the agency a real force for protecting consumers.

However, as described in the bill, the CFPA would exempt some lenders from oversight. An improvement would be to follow President Obama’s lead and create a CFPA that covers retail activities from all financial entities, including small banks, auto loan and mortgage originators (like Countrywide or GMAC), and payday lenders. The Department of Defense got military personnel protected from such lenders four years ago, finding that such loans “undermine military readiness, harm the morale of troops and their families, and add to the cost of fielding an all-volunteer fighting force.”

The Dodd bill includes the so-called Volcker rule, limiting the scope of bank activity, which I’ve argued before won’t make a real difference in prop trading, as banks can mask it behind market-making and client trading. However, the excess leverage tax in the Volcker rule — if properly beefed up — will discourage firms from becoming Too Big Too Fail (TBTF). And where the bill as envisioned doesn’t seem to rein in behemoths like Citi or Bank of America, increasing the capital requirements on overly large firms is a relatively easy fix, if the political pressure from bank lobbyists can be overcome.

The bill looks to wind down TBTF through a special financial panel of bankruptcy court, which would allow systemic risk overseers — envisioned in the bill as comprised of representatives from Treasury, the Fed and the CFPA — to take vulnerable firms into receivership and liquidation in times of crisis. The FDIC would manage a $50 billion fund that banks would pay into to provide liquidity in these situations. As envisioned, the treasury secretary petitions the court, the financial firm in question responds, and the court has 24 hours to decide. But a decision can be appealed to a Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court, a process that could take up to 30 days. In a financial era in which multibillion dollar institutions like Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers can evaporate over the course of a weekend, giving management 30 days in which to stonewall means that an orderly wind-down as the new rule envisions is unlikely.

We’re waiting to see what will come from Sens. Jack Reed (D-RI) and Judd Gregg (R-NH) on derivatives, but the existing language encourages increased transparency and centralized clearing for standardized derivatives (the maligned CDS’s and the like) and increases margin requirements for non-standard derivatives. All trades being reported will help regulators understand the evolution of the financial system better.

The inclusion of a non-binding shareholder vote on executive pay will give shareholders a greater role in compensation. While it won’t solve the “heads I win, tails you lose” problem of Wall Street’s bonus structure, it will give outsiders more say on pay and hopefully check the worst excesses.

Like the CFPA and the chairman of the Fed, the proposed legislation would also make the New York Fed presidency a White House appointment. That role, which was vital at the height of the 2008 crisis when now-Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner held it, and was central in previous crises, like the LTCM meltdown of 1998, has long been seen as beholden to Wall Street. A presidential appointment would increase its independence form investment banks.

As presented, the Dodd bill has its flaws — in addition to the ones mentioned above, others have argued that political realities have compromised the force of the bill, and because it hasn’t addressed leverage, the seeds of an asset-bubble-driven crisis like the most recent one are still there. It’s true, as Sen. Dodd said when he announced the bill: “This legislation will not stop the next crisis from coming. No legislation can…” But this bill — with improvements — can give regulators the tools they need to address future crises in a more proactive manner.

Financial Regulation Is Good — But Consumer Financial Protection Is Better

Thursday, February 25th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Paul Volcker, vanquisher of inflation in the early ’80s as chairman of the Federal Reserve System and now the chairman of President Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, said, “[T]he most important financial innovation that I have seen the past 20 years is the automatic teller machine.” While he qualified the comment as a “wiseacre remark,” he stood by it, going on to say, “Indeed, it was quite good in the 1980s without credit-default swaps and without securitization and without CDOs.”

Our friend Bob Litan has a new report out from the Brookings Institution on the benefits from financial innovation over the past thirty years. The report is worth reading in full, but a quick summary of his findings is found in a chart at the beginning of the paper (condensed into one image by Kevin Drum):

Given attitudes like Volcker’s, it might be surprising to see so many “+”s, connoting relative benefits, relative to “-”s, connoting developments that did not improve that part of the economy. (“0″ indicates the innovation was a wash.) But that is the reality of innovative financial instruments — they are, by and large, designed to be beneficial, but unmonitored can cause more harm than good. Innovations like credit scoring, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and inflation-protected Treasury bonds (TIPS) — all were developed since Volcker was Fed chair. But the benefits from these innovations (increased access to credit, which allows for consumption smoothing) can also lead to abuses of the system (crushing credit card debt, NINA mortgages, balloon payment mortgages) and asset bubbles. These abuses can be swept under the rug if the underlying assets in a CDO are not transparent, and that CDO is sold to an unsuspecting client by an investment bank trading desk.

The status quo is unsustainable, but attempts to ban some of these activities are problematic as well. Proclamations like the Volcker rule – limiting the scope of bank activity — are either too tightly defined to be effective or are so broad they throw out the above benefits with the bathwater. What would be better is to provide transparency in these activities — through clearing credit default swaps (CDS) and other derivatives on exchanges, providing credit terms in an easily understood manner upfront, and eliminating hidden fees — so that all involved know what they are getting into.

Litan also points out one key fact at the end of his paper: we’re not done with financial innovation. He argues that despite the headlines, not all innovation is bad, and there is more to come. He cites the work of Robert Schiller, the Yale professor who has pioneered work in housing price markets — designed to give homeowners protection they currently don’t have against a fall in the value of their home — and counter-cyclical tax policy, as an obvious source of financial innovation that is for the good.

But Litan concludes by noting that the market — not government — will continue to drive innovation, but “policymakers must be better prepared in the future than they were before the financial crisis to step in — first with disclosure standards and possibly later with more prescriptive rules” to prevent crises like the most recent one from happening again. The one area where he sees a more active government role is in consumer finance, an area in which a robust Consumer Financial Protection Agency will be key.

The Beginning of the End?

Friday, February 19th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

The news yesterday that the U.S. Federal Reserve raised the discount rate 25 basis points (to 0.75 percent from 0.50 percent) is being interpreted as an indication of a fundamental change in how the Fed views our economic crisis. The hike in the discount rate could signal the beginning of the end of our economic crisis.

The discount rate is not to be confused with the more prominent Fed funds rate. The Fed funds rate is the rate at which banks lend money to each other in overnight loans for regulatory and liquidity requirements. The discount rate is the rate at which the Fed lends money to private retail banks — traditionally at a percent above the Fed funds rate — in short-term loans aimed at easing liquidity constraints. But in recent decades borrowing from the so-called discount window had been seen by large banks as the financial equivalent of pulling over to ask for directions — you can do it, but it’s seen as a sign of weakness. The aftermath of 9/11 was the last time the discount window had seen serious activity prior to the 2008 economic crisis.

The Fed met the current crisis in part by making the discount window more available to banks. The terms of loans through the discount window went from being overnight to ultimately 90 days. The discount rate was cut from being 100 basis points (one percent) above the Fed funds rate to 50 basis points. And in a move that underscored the gravity of the October 2008 liquidity crisis, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley turned themselves into bank holding companies — a technical change in their operating structure that required much more oversight — in part to be able to access the discount window in case they faced a liquidity crunch.

This opening of the discount window was part of a larger project by the Fed — which involved pumping liquidity into the economy by buying up almost two trillion dollars in assets — to prevent the crisis of fall 2008 from leading to a global depression. But now that the worst seems to be over from a monetary perspective, the Fed is beginning to step away from the crash position it assumed almost two years ago.

Newly reappointed Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke laid out a plan for unwinding the Fed’s position in the economy last week, testifying to Congress that “when the times comes,” the Fed will move to sell that two trillion in assets (in an orderly fashion) to a stronger market. This would give the Fed more room to manage the economy to bring us out of recession. The raising of the discount rate would be the first step in that process.

The phrase “when the time comes,” however, makes all the difference in the world, and many wiser people than I are expecting the Fed to go easy on its plan to shrink it’s balance sheet and raise rates. With unemployment hovering at 10 percent, this recession isn’t over for a lot of Americans. And, despite last quarter’s strong headline number, there is no obvious driver of GDP growth (like exports) on the horizon, so it may not be over for the rest of us, either. So it may be too soon to call the recession over and begin raising rates. The fear is that this may not be the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.

Photo credit: http://www.flickr.com/photos/laurapadgett/ / CC BY-ND 2.0

Euro-zoned Out

Thursday, February 11th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Things in Europe are looking grimmer than my chances of getting a taxi in blizzard-slammed New York City.

Today’s announcement that Germany and France are going to provide financial aid to Greece — with stringent IMF oversight — caps off weeks of speculation that the EU would have to bail out the Hellenic Republic. The newly elected left-wing government in Greece has come clean with what the previous conservative government had been hiding — Greece’s budget deficit for last year was a whopping almost 14 percent of GDP, and this year’s is looking not better. The new government, in a bid to reassure the markets — and the other members of the Eurozone that have all sworn to adhere to the deficit limits of the founding Maastricht Treaty — has promised to get government deficits down to three percent of GDP by 2012. Seeing the coming of severe austerity measures in the wake of what wags have been desperately trying to tag the “ouzo crisis,” Greek civil servants have unsurprisingly gone on strike.

The news is no better outside the Eurozone, where, to take the most latest example, Latvia is putting up numbers that are even grimmer. The Latvian economy shrank by 18 percent the past year, and it’s not likely to rebound anytime soon. (To put that in perspective, U.S. GDP fell by 30 percent over four years at the start of the Great Depression.) Latvia has pegged its currency, the Lat, to the Euro through the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), in hopes of joining the Eurozone like Slovakia did last year, and like its neighbor to the north, Estonia, might do as soon as this July. The Baltic countries want to join the Euro, as adopting a strong currency is a surefire way to control inflation and make it easier for the government to borrow on the international markets (this is why several small economies have unilaterally adopted the Euro or the U.S. Dollar as their currency).

These two cases are emblematic of the issues facing several European countries. Greece has been lumped in with Portugal, Italy, and Spain to form the “PIGS,” southern Europe’s sluggish economies (Ireland is occasionally added to the group as a second “I”: “PIIGS”). Latvia’s problems are similar to those seen all over Eastern Europe, with Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary all facing similar — if less dire — straits. But while it looks difficult all over the EU, if I were a small business owner (or finance minister), I’d rather be in Latvia than in Greece.

Why? Because it could be a lot easier for Latvia to get out of its situation than Greece’s. Latvia has been facing a choice: aim for the Eurozone or faster recovery. While the benefits of a small country joining the monetary union make sense over the long term, when faced with a recession a currency devaluation might make more sense. This would immediately make domestic products — now cheaper to make — more competitive, stoking exports and, with them, job and GDP growth. Leaving the ERM would postpone joining the Euro for several years, which could make inflation a problem, but other countries, notably the UK, have been forced to leave the ERM before, and in the UK’s case it helped fuel a strong decade of growth in the 1990s.

The alternative to devaluation is deflation, a painful process where you ratchet down the prices of everything in your economy, from raw materials to salaries, to the point where they become competitive. This is the prospect that Greece is facing. In the Eurozone, Greece cannot lower it’s exchange rate against the markets it exports to — they all use the Euro. Devaluation also makes local currency-denominated debt much easier to pay. And this is where Greece is also getting hammered. As it looks increasingly unlikely to be able to pay its obligations, the yield on Greek debt has jumped. Greek debt is trading for less in the secondary market because investors are less sure that the government will be able to meet it’s obligations. As Greek banks hold significant amounts of Greek government debt, they are teetering on the edge of bankruptcy.

In the end, why should these issues in Europe be a concern to the U.S.? Surely problems in Athens will have limited impact on the largest economy in the world. Well, it’s worth remembering that the bankrupcty of Creditanstalt in Austria following the crash of 1929 was one of the sparks that turned a recession into the Great Depression.

State of the Union: A Litany of Solid, Progressive Proposals

Thursday, January 28th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Facing almost as much uncertainty about the economy one year into his mandate as he did at the outset, President Obama gave his State of the Union address the way we’ve come to expect him to – sticking to his guns with cool determination while acknowledging that not everyone agrees with him. His speech highlighted what he has accomplished and promised to the American people, but didn’t propose any sweeping new changes.

With unemployment at 10 percent and Wall Street banks handing out record bonuses (Goldman Sachs’ bonuses are reported to match 2007’s record levels), and pundits reading doom for the administration in the tea leaves of the Massachusetts election, the political temptation to go populist would be strong. But Obama decided instead to reassert his progressive program for addressing the economy. Obama highlighted not grand industrial policy, but accomplishments that have helped the American people face a truly global recession. The stimulus bill helped us avoid falling off the economic precipice, and unemployment protection and COBRA extensions make a meaningful difference to people looking for work in a changing economy.

Obama’s call to Democrats to not “run for the hills” on issues such as health care suggests that the talk of that reform’s demise was premature. The embrace of centrist – and even Republican – proposals on energy, including nuclear power and offshore drilling, might offer some hope on a climate change bill making it’s way through the Senate. But until politicians spell out what sacrifices will come with addressing climate change, it may be a campaign promise that remains unfulfilled.

Disappointingly, the president soft-pedalled trade and immigration priorities. While they were mentioned, it’s notable that the president didn’t call on Congress to pass free trade agreements with South Korea, Panama and Colombia. And the reference to the Doha global trade round and immigration reform were pro forma at best, not promising any results.

Obama was laying the foundation for significant payoff from his education initiatives, however. Student loan subsidies to banks are an easily overlooked handout to Wall Street that the president was smart to put an end to. The investment in K-12 education reform, community colleges, and Pell grants will help prepare the next generation of Americans for the 21st-century economy. Incentives for debt forgiveness for public sector workers will mean that our best and brightest — who go to very expensive colleges and graduate schools — can now afford to look at public service, and can be used to limit some of the demand for a revolving door between the public and private sectors.

The president didn’t break new ground, or lay out a visionary mandate for change. But he reassured us that he was going to govern as he was elected, looking for progressive solutions to the challenges the country faces.

One last point — at last week’s “banking limits” announcement, beltway Kremlinologists were reading volumes into the fact that Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner was off to one side, while presidential economic adviser Paul Volcker was front and center. (Simon Johnson said: “Where you stand at major White House announcements is never an accident.”) Last night was Geithner’s chance to stand front-and-center — shoulder to shoulder with Bob Gates. With Larry Summers way off to the right — and I didn’t see Volcker in the audience — the handshake the president gave Geithner on his way in would seem to be sending the message that the secretary continues to be the president’s man.

One Step Forward, One Step Back

Friday, January 22nd, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

The White House yesterday announced new restrictions on banking activity, designed to address the issues that caused the crisis 15 months ago. Wall Street reacted by letting stocks fall 200 points, which initially would make you think the announcement must be right. The White House’s plan has two main parts: a limit on the scope of banking activity and a limit on the size of banks. One part makes sense, but as presented, the other should be re-thought.

Limit on Size – The good part is the limitation on the size of banks. This will include a tighter cap on the control of deposits. Currently no bank can control more than 10 percent of the nations deposits — but Bank of America got the Bush administration to waive that in 2007 to buy LaSalle. The administration’s proposal would have this cap include non-insured assets and other deposits. While this is a good first step, its effectiveness will be spelled out in the details. Bank of America is the only bank that exceeds the current cap, and almost 25 institutions could be considered “Too Big To Fail.”

Limit on Scope – At first blush, this seems to be a ban on banks taking FDIC-insured deposits – or having received TARP money – from engaging in proprietary trading. Prop trading is a major part of Wall Street activity, in which investment banks trade with “their own money.” That is, they engage in trading on their own behalf, not on the behalf of customers. The administration is right that a lot of this trading on prop desks is speculation. However, prop trading is also how investment banks and market makers engage in risk management and hedge positions. Banning prop trading by banks would severely curtail their market-making ability, and dry up liquidity on Wall Street faster than a sponge in the sun. Better than limiting the type of activity trading desks engage in would be to limit the amount of leverage they can use in that speculation.

The administration has said it is going to work with Congressional leaders in the coming weeks to spell this out in details. We’ll see if Congress is able to improve on these suggestions.

Taking It to the Banks

Thursday, January 14th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Following a week of trial balloons about a tax on banks and bankers, President Obama today unveiled a “financial crisis responsibility fee,” to be levied against 50 of our nation’s largest banks. While the tax will not be able to seriously address the deficits that the government faces – it’s expected to raise only $90 billion over 10 years – any tax on the financial system can affect the course of our economy. The details of the proposed tax have yet to be outlined. Compared to the alternatives, this tax is a good start – but it doesn’t go far enough.

In the discussion of taxing banks and bankers, a couple of possibilities have been floated, some of which can reap short-term political points, others of which have the potential to promote progressive policies:

Bonus tax – One of the easiest – and politically most satisfying – would be a tax on excess bonuses. The British exercised this option on London bankers this past year. Bonuses in the City above a certain amount were taxed at a 50 percent rate. Banks responded by threatening to move offshore and – when that threat rang hollow – doubled the bonus pool they paid out to bankers. The end result was that the bankers whose decisions led in part to the crisis were financially unharmed, the British government raised a relative pittance in taxes, shareholders in City banks took a hit (as the bonus pools were increased at their expense), and the underlying fault lines in the British banking system remain unaddressed.

Transaction tax – The worst of the options would be a tax on transactions. As discussed before, this would merely pour sand in our financial system, breaking it and slowing economic recovery.

Excess profits tax – A more appealing option would be a tax on excess profits. A defining aspect of the financial bubble of the last decade was the fact that financial profits were 40 percent of overall corporate profits – more than double the slice financials made up of profits in the 1980s. A tax on these excess profits would rein that in. But while this could be useful, as Simon Johnson points out, it would be fairly easy to game, and end up being ineffective.

Tax on assets – A tax on bank assets above a certain amount addresses not just political sentiment that banks have made it through the crisis unscathed, but also the fact that banks are too big to fail. Encouraging banks to “right-size” themselves would make our economy safer from the systemic risk imposed by banks like Citigroup or Bank of America – which are debilitated but whose failure would be economically catastrophic.

Excess leverage tax – Taxing the leverage that financial institutions use to increase returns would allow us to avoid situations like that faced a year and a half ago when Lehman Brothers – leveraged over 30:1 – collapsed over the course of a weekend. It would make banks “safer” but would leave them still too big. In the event a bank were to fail, it would still be a systemic threat to our economy. This would be a more targeted version than an assets tax, but it would be harder to implement — definitions of leverage differ – and if not properly defined would leave hedge funds, insurance companies and other “non-bank financial institutions” untouched, leading to a crisis like that perpetuated by Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 or AIG last fall.

The taxes unveiled today are a very tentative step down the path towards an effective tax on assets. But the administration’s proposal is too broad – affected institutions could be as small as $50 billion — and too light to be effective.

If the Obama administration were strictly looking to tax the problem of an outsized and dangerous financial industry out of existence, a combination of the last two taxes — properly implemented to cover the whole financial sector when looking at leverage and focused on banks that are bigger than, say, $300 billion when looking at assets — would be the most effective. But hastily implemented, they could have unintended consequences, crippling our economy while merely pushing the problem offshore. Coordination with the EU and other G-20 countries will be vital to help with the de-leveraging of our economy.

Making the Interest Rate Interesting

Wednesday, January 6th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

As we head into the new year, one of the biggest questions facing the economy is: “Whither the interest rate?” This number is set by the Federal Open Market Committee and its targeting of the fed funds rate – or the rate at which banks lend funds to each other – is currently effectively zero (technically in a range from zero to 0.25 percent). It’s been there for just over a year, and is likely going to stay there for the better part of 2010 (if I could tell you when, I wouldn’t be here – I’d be lighting cigars with hundred-dollar bills some place much warmer).

Despite its provenance as a dry economic term, the interest rate is interesting. It’s a fundamental piece of how our economy works. It determines everything, from how likely you are to get a loan or a mortgage (ceteris paribus – as the economists like to say – the lower the rate, the more lending that is done), to how likely we’re going to have inflation (high interest rates head off inflation, ceteris paribus), to how much a dollar is worth (a higher interest rate relative to overseas rates means it’ll be worth more, cete- you get the idea), to how fast the economy will grow (higher interest rates mean slower growth). It is usually the most powerful tool in any central banker’s toolbox, and certainly the one that’s most often used.

In addition to its central role in the economy, the interest rate is interesting for two other reasons these days.

First, there is the discussion of where the interest rate should be for recovery. There’s a good rule of thumb to determine what the ideal interest rate is: the Taylor rule. Very briefly put, the Taylor rule takes the inflation rate and the unemployment rate and uses them to compute what the ideal interest rate should be (check out the San Francisco Fed for more info). According to some Fed research last spring, the Taylor rule says that interest rates should be at -5 percent (that’s negative five percent – as unemployment is 1.5 percent higher now, the Taylor rule would say the rate now should be even lower).

The problem with negative interest rates is that while they’re technically feasible, they really discourage lending (would you give me a dollar today if I promised you ninety cents next Tuesday?). More realistically, negative real interest rates are possible if you encourage inflation. But inflation eats away at economic growth – ask Zimbabwe – and the “inflation tax” of high inflation falls disproportionately on the poor.

But inflation hawks have been arguing for the Fed to raise rates for a couple of months – to two percent. These hawks tend to be strongly laisse faire conservatives, One of the voices saying we should ignore the Taylor rule is – as Brad DeLong points out – the man who invented it himself, Stanford University’s (and Bush Treasury appointee) John Taylor.

Secondly, as the old saying goes: when the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem begins to look like a nail. Interest rates, while powerful, cannot solve every economic problem. The Taylor rule tells us we shouldn’t raise the interest rate, we can’t lower the interest rate, and no one is happy where the economy is now. At a time when the interest rate is at zero, and should be negative, alternatives need to be explored. As Clive Crook says in his latest column:

Interest rates that take into account asset prices as well as general inflation are part of this, of course. But when it comes to financial regulation, the key thing is rules that recognise the credit cycle, and change as it proceeds. Most important, as argued by Charles Goodhart in these pages, capital and liquidity requirements should be time-varying and strongly anti-cyclical. In good times, when lending is expanding quickly and financial institutions’ concerns about capital and liquidity are at their least, the requirements should tighten. Under current rules, they do the opposite.

Crook is right that unusually low capital ratios (and their counterparts – high leverage ratios) were a catalyst of last year’s crisis. Now that we need to get the economy going again, banks need to lend. One way to do so would be to lower capital ratios (if it wouldn’t bring the solvency of some large banks into question). As part of a regulatory reform package, policymakers should pursue a counter-cyclical capital requirements policy.

They should also expand who has to follow capital requirements. As currently defined, only depository institutions and not investment banks – such as Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch were, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley used to be – are required to follow the Fed’s Board of Governor’s capital requirements. Getting other financial institutions to respond to capital requirements will make that a much more powerful tool.

Breaking the Glass-Steagall Myth

Friday, December 18th, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Bank of America Tower, Seattle, WAWord going around Washington this week is that Sens. John McCain (R-AZ) and Maria Cantwell (D-WA) are pushing to reinstate Glass-Steagall:

McCain and Cantwell, a Washington Democrat, join other lawmakers in Congress proposing to reinstate the 1933 law, repealed a decade ago by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act that led to a rise in conglomerates including Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America Corp. active in retail banking, insurance and proprietary trading. Legislation to reinstate the ban was introduced today in the House.

While this move is a well-meaning attempt to rein in the financial sector, it doesn’t address the issues that caused last fall’s crisis.

Glass-Steagall was aimed at separating “boring” retail banking (the Bailey Building and Loan Association, for example) from “risky” investment bankers (Gordon Gekko). It was eventually repealed, as U.S. banks felt it put them at a disadvantage in the global marketplace against European “universal” banks, such as Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, and HSBC.

At the time there was concern that repealing Glass-Steagall would create banks that were systematically dangerous. In hindsight, that concern would seem to be born out — but it isn’t. After all, the three major bank collapses that precipitated the crisis were Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers. All three were obviously Too Big Too Fail, but all three would have been unaffected by a reinstatement of Glass-Steagall — none of them is a retail bank (this is why you never saw Merrill or Lehman ATMs).

Rather than focusing on micromanaging bank structure, and stifling entrepreneurship in the financial sector, the Senators would be better served by evaluating different options to limit the size of Too Big Too Fail banks. A smarter idea would be to extend the retail bank deposits cap idea to total bank assets. Currently, no bank can have more than 10 percent of total national retail deposits (Bank of America got a waiver for the 2007 purchase of Chicagoland’s LaSalle bank and now has 12.2 percent of national deposits). Peter Boone and Simon Johnson suggest applying this simple principle to total bank liabilities. They recommend a limit of 2 percent of GDP, which is in line with the $300 billion that Felix Salmon has been recommending since March. Importantly, it’s also in line with the de facto $100 billion threshold that bank regulators are using now.

This way the government isn’t running banks and bankers can pursue the capitalist impulse that drives our economy. But with a cap on liabilities, the decisions of bankers cannot threaten our economy like they have in the past.