Posts Tagged ‘ Banking ’

Financial Regulation Is Good — But Consumer Financial Protection Is Better

Thursday, February 25th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Paul Volcker, vanquisher of inflation in the early ’80s as chairman of the Federal Reserve System and now the chairman of President Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, said, “[T]he most important financial innovation that I have seen the past 20 years is the automatic teller machine.” While he qualified the comment as a “wiseacre remark,” he stood by it, going on to say, “Indeed, it was quite good in the 1980s without credit-default swaps and without securitization and without CDOs.”

Our friend Bob Litan has a new report out from the Brookings Institution on the benefits from financial innovation over the past thirty years. The report is worth reading in full, but a quick summary of his findings is found in a chart at the beginning of the paper (condensed into one image by Kevin Drum):

Given attitudes like Volcker’s, it might be surprising to see so many “+”s, connoting relative benefits, relative to “-”s, connoting developments that did not improve that part of the economy. (“0″ indicates the innovation was a wash.) But that is the reality of innovative financial instruments — they are, by and large, designed to be beneficial, but unmonitored can cause more harm than good. Innovations like credit scoring, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and inflation-protected Treasury bonds (TIPS) — all were developed since Volcker was Fed chair. But the benefits from these innovations (increased access to credit, which allows for consumption smoothing) can also lead to abuses of the system (crushing credit card debt, NINA mortgages, balloon payment mortgages) and asset bubbles. These abuses can be swept under the rug if the underlying assets in a CDO are not transparent, and that CDO is sold to an unsuspecting client by an investment bank trading desk.

The status quo is unsustainable, but attempts to ban some of these activities are problematic as well. Proclamations like the Volcker rule – limiting the scope of bank activity — are either too tightly defined to be effective or are so broad they throw out the above benefits with the bathwater. What would be better is to provide transparency in these activities — through clearing credit default swaps (CDS) and other derivatives on exchanges, providing credit terms in an easily understood manner upfront, and eliminating hidden fees — so that all involved know what they are getting into.

Litan also points out one key fact at the end of his paper: we’re not done with financial innovation. He argues that despite the headlines, not all innovation is bad, and there is more to come. He cites the work of Robert Schiller, the Yale professor who has pioneered work in housing price markets — designed to give homeowners protection they currently don’t have against a fall in the value of their home — and counter-cyclical tax policy, as an obvious source of financial innovation that is for the good.

But Litan concludes by noting that the market — not government — will continue to drive innovation, but “policymakers must be better prepared in the future than they were before the financial crisis to step in — first with disclosure standards and possibly later with more prescriptive rules” to prevent crises like the most recent one from happening again. The one area where he sees a more active government role is in consumer finance, an area in which a robust Consumer Financial Protection Agency will be key.

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The Beginning of the End?

Friday, February 19th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

The news yesterday that the U.S. Federal Reserve raised the discount rate 25 basis points (to 0.75 percent from 0.50 percent) is being interpreted as an indication of a fundamental change in how the Fed views our economic crisis. The hike in the discount rate could signal the beginning of the end of our economic crisis.

The discount rate is not to be confused with the more prominent Fed funds rate. The Fed funds rate is the rate at which banks lend money to each other in overnight loans for regulatory and liquidity requirements. The discount rate is the rate at which the Fed lends money to private retail banks — traditionally at a percent above the Fed funds rate — in short-term loans aimed at easing liquidity constraints. But in recent decades borrowing from the so-called discount window had been seen by large banks as the financial equivalent of pulling over to ask for directions — you can do it, but it’s seen as a sign of weakness. The aftermath of 9/11 was the last time the discount window had seen serious activity prior to the 2008 economic crisis.

The Fed met the current crisis in part by making the discount window more available to banks. The terms of loans through the discount window went from being overnight to ultimately 90 days. The discount rate was cut from being 100 basis points (one percent) above the Fed funds rate to 50 basis points. And in a move that underscored the gravity of the October 2008 liquidity crisis, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley turned themselves into bank holding companies — a technical change in their operating structure that required much more oversight — in part to be able to access the discount window in case they faced a liquidity crunch.

This opening of the discount window was part of a larger project by the Fed — which involved pumping liquidity into the economy by buying up almost two trillion dollars in assets — to prevent the crisis of fall 2008 from leading to a global depression. But now that the worst seems to be over from a monetary perspective, the Fed is beginning to step away from the crash position it assumed almost two years ago.

Newly reappointed Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke laid out a plan for unwinding the Fed’s position in the economy last week, testifying to Congress that “when the times comes,” the Fed will move to sell that two trillion in assets (in an orderly fashion) to a stronger market. This would give the Fed more room to manage the economy to bring us out of recession. The raising of the discount rate would be the first step in that process.

The phrase “when the time comes,” however, makes all the difference in the world, and many wiser people than I are expecting the Fed to go easy on its plan to shrink it’s balance sheet and raise rates. With unemployment hovering at 10 percent, this recession isn’t over for a lot of Americans. And, despite last quarter’s strong headline number, there is no obvious driver of GDP growth (like exports) on the horizon, so it may not be over for the rest of us, either. So it may be too soon to call the recession over and begin raising rates. The fear is that this may not be the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.

Photo credit: http://www.flickr.com/photos/laurapadgett/ / CC BY-ND 2.0

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Euro-zoned Out

Thursday, February 11th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Things in Europe are looking grimmer than my chances of getting a taxi in blizzard-slammed New York City.

Today’s announcement that Germany and France are going to provide financial aid to Greece — with stringent IMF oversight — caps off weeks of speculation that the EU would have to bail out the Hellenic Republic. The newly elected left-wing government in Greece has come clean with what the previous conservative government had been hiding — Greece’s budget deficit for last year was a whopping almost 14 percent of GDP, and this year’s is looking not better. The new government, in a bid to reassure the markets — and the other members of the Eurozone that have all sworn to adhere to the deficit limits of the founding Maastricht Treaty — has promised to get government deficits down to three percent of GDP by 2012. Seeing the coming of severe austerity measures in the wake of what wags have been desperately trying to tag the “ouzo crisis,” Greek civil servants have unsurprisingly gone on strike.

The news is no better outside the Eurozone, where, to take the most latest example, Latvia is putting up numbers that are even grimmer. The Latvian economy shrank by 18 percent the past year, and it’s not likely to rebound anytime soon. (To put that in perspective, U.S. GDP fell by 30 percent over four years at the start of the Great Depression.) Latvia has pegged its currency, the Lat, to the Euro through the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), in hopes of joining the Eurozone like Slovakia did last year, and like its neighbor to the north, Estonia, might do as soon as this July. The Baltic countries want to join the Euro, as adopting a strong currency is a surefire way to control inflation and make it easier for the government to borrow on the international markets (this is why several small economies have unilaterally adopted the Euro or the U.S. Dollar as their currency).

These two cases are emblematic of the issues facing several European countries. Greece has been lumped in with Portugal, Italy, and Spain to form the “PIGS,” southern Europe’s sluggish economies (Ireland is occasionally added to the group as a second “I”: “PIIGS”). Latvia’s problems are similar to those seen all over Eastern Europe, with Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary all facing similar — if less dire — straits. But while it looks difficult all over the EU, if I were a small business owner (or finance minister), I’d rather be in Latvia than in Greece.

Why? Because it could be a lot easier for Latvia to get out of its situation than Greece’s. Latvia has been facing a choice: aim for the Eurozone or faster recovery. While the benefits of a small country joining the monetary union make sense over the long term, when faced with a recession a currency devaluation might make more sense. This would immediately make domestic products — now cheaper to make — more competitive, stoking exports and, with them, job and GDP growth. Leaving the ERM would postpone joining the Euro for several years, which could make inflation a problem, but other countries, notably the UK, have been forced to leave the ERM before, and in the UK’s case it helped fuel a strong decade of growth in the 1990s.

The alternative to devaluation is deflation, a painful process where you ratchet down the prices of everything in your economy, from raw materials to salaries, to the point where they become competitive. This is the prospect that Greece is facing. In the Eurozone, Greece cannot lower it’s exchange rate against the markets it exports to — they all use the Euro. Devaluation also makes local currency-denominated debt much easier to pay. And this is where Greece is also getting hammered. As it looks increasingly unlikely to be able to pay its obligations, the yield on Greek debt has jumped. Greek debt is trading for less in the secondary market because investors are less sure that the government will be able to meet it’s obligations. As Greek banks hold significant amounts of Greek government debt, they are teetering on the edge of bankruptcy.

In the end, why should these issues in Europe be a concern to the U.S.? Surely problems in Athens will have limited impact on the largest economy in the world. Well, it’s worth remembering that the bankrupcty of Creditanstalt in Austria following the crash of 1929 was one of the sparks that turned a recession into the Great Depression.

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State of the Union: A Litany of Solid, Progressive Proposals

Thursday, January 28th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Facing almost as much uncertainty about the economy one year into his mandate as he did at the outset, President Obama gave his State of the Union address the way we’ve come to expect him to – sticking to his guns with cool determination while acknowledging that not everyone agrees with him. His speech highlighted what he has accomplished and promised to the American people, but didn’t propose any sweeping new changes.

With unemployment at 10 percent and Wall Street banks handing out record bonuses (Goldman Sachs’ bonuses are reported to match 2007’s record levels), and pundits reading doom for the administration in the tea leaves of the Massachusetts election, the political temptation to go populist would be strong. But Obama decided instead to reassert his progressive program for addressing the economy. Obama highlighted not grand industrial policy, but accomplishments that have helped the American people face a truly global recession. The stimulus bill helped us avoid falling off the economic precipice, and unemployment protection and COBRA extensions make a meaningful difference to people looking for work in a changing economy.

Obama’s call to Democrats to not “run for the hills” on issues such as health care suggests that the talk of that reform’s demise was premature. The embrace of centrist – and even Republican – proposals on energy, including nuclear power and offshore drilling, might offer some hope on a climate change bill making it’s way through the Senate. But until politicians spell out what sacrifices will come with addressing climate change, it may be a campaign promise that remains unfulfilled.

Disappointingly, the president soft-pedalled trade and immigration priorities. While they were mentioned, it’s notable that the president didn’t call on Congress to pass free trade agreements with South Korea, Panama and Colombia. And the reference to the Doha global trade round and immigration reform were pro forma at best, not promising any results.

Obama was laying the foundation for significant payoff from his education initiatives, however. Student loan subsidies to banks are an easily overlooked handout to Wall Street that the president was smart to put an end to. The investment in K-12 education reform, community colleges, and Pell grants will help prepare the next generation of Americans for the 21st-century economy. Incentives for debt forgiveness for public sector workers will mean that our best and brightest — who go to very expensive colleges and graduate schools — can now afford to look at public service, and can be used to limit some of the demand for a revolving door between the public and private sectors.

The president didn’t break new ground, or lay out a visionary mandate for change. But he reassured us that he was going to govern as he was elected, looking for progressive solutions to the challenges the country faces.

One last point — at last week’s “banking limits” announcement, beltway Kremlinologists were reading volumes into the fact that Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner was off to one side, while presidential economic adviser Paul Volcker was front and center. (Simon Johnson said: “Where you stand at major White House announcements is never an accident.”) Last night was Geithner’s chance to stand front-and-center — shoulder to shoulder with Bob Gates. With Larry Summers way off to the right — and I didn’t see Volcker in the audience — the handshake the president gave Geithner on his way in would seem to be sending the message that the secretary continues to be the president’s man.

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One Step Forward, One Step Back

Friday, January 22nd, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

The White House yesterday announced new restrictions on banking activity, designed to address the issues that caused the crisis 15 months ago. Wall Street reacted by letting stocks fall 200 points, which initially would make you think the announcement must be right. The White House’s plan has two main parts: a limit on the scope of banking activity and a limit on the size of banks. One part makes sense, but as presented, the other should be re-thought.

Limit on Size – The good part is the limitation on the size of banks. This will include a tighter cap on the control of deposits. Currently no bank can control more than 10 percent of the nations deposits — but Bank of America got the Bush administration to waive that in 2007 to buy LaSalle. The administration’s proposal would have this cap include non-insured assets and other deposits. While this is a good first step, its effectiveness will be spelled out in the details. Bank of America is the only bank that exceeds the current cap, and almost 25 institutions could be considered “Too Big To Fail.”

Limit on Scope – At first blush, this seems to be a ban on banks taking FDIC-insured deposits – or having received TARP money – from engaging in proprietary trading. Prop trading is a major part of Wall Street activity, in which investment banks trade with “their own money.” That is, they engage in trading on their own behalf, not on the behalf of customers. The administration is right that a lot of this trading on prop desks is speculation. However, prop trading is also how investment banks and market makers engage in risk management and hedge positions. Banning prop trading by banks would severely curtail their market-making ability, and dry up liquidity on Wall Street faster than a sponge in the sun. Better than limiting the type of activity trading desks engage in would be to limit the amount of leverage they can use in that speculation.

The administration has said it is going to work with Congressional leaders in the coming weeks to spell this out in details. We’ll see if Congress is able to improve on these suggestions.

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Taking It to the Banks

Thursday, January 14th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Following a week of trial balloons about a tax on banks and bankers, President Obama today unveiled a “financial crisis responsibility fee,” to be levied against 50 of our nation’s largest banks. While the tax will not be able to seriously address the deficits that the government faces – it’s expected to raise only $90 billion over 10 years – any tax on the financial system can affect the course of our economy. The details of the proposed tax have yet to be outlined. Compared to the alternatives, this tax is a good start – but it doesn’t go far enough.

In the discussion of taxing banks and bankers, a couple of possibilities have been floated, some of which can reap short-term political points, others of which have the potential to promote progressive policies:

Bonus tax – One of the easiest – and politically most satisfying – would be a tax on excess bonuses. The British exercised this option on London bankers this past year. Bonuses in the City above a certain amount were taxed at a 50 percent rate. Banks responded by threatening to move offshore and – when that threat rang hollow – doubled the bonus pool they paid out to bankers. The end result was that the bankers whose decisions led in part to the crisis were financially unharmed, the British government raised a relative pittance in taxes, shareholders in City banks took a hit (as the bonus pools were increased at their expense), and the underlying fault lines in the British banking system remain unaddressed.

Transaction tax – The worst of the options would be a tax on transactions. As discussed before, this would merely pour sand in our financial system, breaking it and slowing economic recovery.

Excess profits tax – A more appealing option would be a tax on excess profits. A defining aspect of the financial bubble of the last decade was the fact that financial profits were 40 percent of overall corporate profits – more than double the slice financials made up of profits in the 1980s. A tax on these excess profits would rein that in. But while this could be useful, as Simon Johnson points out, it would be fairly easy to game, and end up being ineffective.

Tax on assets – A tax on bank assets above a certain amount addresses not just political sentiment that banks have made it through the crisis unscathed, but also the fact that banks are too big to fail. Encouraging banks to “right-size” themselves would make our economy safer from the systemic risk imposed by banks like Citigroup or Bank of America – which are debilitated but whose failure would be economically catastrophic.

Excess leverage tax – Taxing the leverage that financial institutions use to increase returns would allow us to avoid situations like that faced a year and a half ago when Lehman Brothers – leveraged over 30:1 – collapsed over the course of a weekend. It would make banks “safer” but would leave them still too big. In the event a bank were to fail, it would still be a systemic threat to our economy. This would be a more targeted version than an assets tax, but it would be harder to implement — definitions of leverage differ – and if not properly defined would leave hedge funds, insurance companies and other “non-bank financial institutions” untouched, leading to a crisis like that perpetuated by Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 or AIG last fall.

The taxes unveiled today are a very tentative step down the path towards an effective tax on assets. But the administration’s proposal is too broad – affected institutions could be as small as $50 billion — and too light to be effective.

If the Obama administration were strictly looking to tax the problem of an outsized and dangerous financial industry out of existence, a combination of the last two taxes — properly implemented to cover the whole financial sector when looking at leverage and focused on banks that are bigger than, say, $300 billion when looking at assets — would be the most effective. But hastily implemented, they could have unintended consequences, crippling our economy while merely pushing the problem offshore. Coordination with the EU and other G-20 countries will be vital to help with the de-leveraging of our economy.

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Making the Interest Rate Interesting

Wednesday, January 6th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

As we head into the new year, one of the biggest questions facing the economy is: “Whither the interest rate?” This number is set by the Federal Open Market Committee and its targeting of the fed funds rate – or the rate at which banks lend funds to each other – is currently effectively zero (technically in a range from zero to 0.25 percent). It’s been there for just over a year, and is likely going to stay there for the better part of 2010 (if I could tell you when, I wouldn’t be here – I’d be lighting cigars with hundred-dollar bills some place much warmer).

Despite its provenance as a dry economic term, the interest rate is interesting. It’s a fundamental piece of how our economy works. It determines everything, from how likely you are to get a loan or a mortgage (ceteris paribus – as the economists like to say – the lower the rate, the more lending that is done), to how likely we’re going to have inflation (high interest rates head off inflation, ceteris paribus), to how much a dollar is worth (a higher interest rate relative to overseas rates means it’ll be worth more, cete- you get the idea), to how fast the economy will grow (higher interest rates mean slower growth). It is usually the most powerful tool in any central banker’s toolbox, and certainly the one that’s most often used.

In addition to its central role in the economy, the interest rate is interesting for two other reasons these days.

First, there is the discussion of where the interest rate should be for recovery. There’s a good rule of thumb to determine what the ideal interest rate is: the Taylor rule. Very briefly put, the Taylor rule takes the inflation rate and the unemployment rate and uses them to compute what the ideal interest rate should be (check out the San Francisco Fed for more info). According to some Fed research last spring, the Taylor rule says that interest rates should be at -5 percent (that’s negative five percent – as unemployment is 1.5 percent higher now, the Taylor rule would say the rate now should be even lower).

The problem with negative interest rates is that while they’re technically feasible, they really discourage lending (would you give me a dollar today if I promised you ninety cents next Tuesday?). More realistically, negative real interest rates are possible if you encourage inflation. But inflation eats away at economic growth – ask Zimbabwe – and the “inflation tax” of high inflation falls disproportionately on the poor.

But inflation hawks have been arguing for the Fed to raise rates for a couple of months – to two percent. These hawks tend to be strongly laisse faire conservatives, One of the voices saying we should ignore the Taylor rule is – as Brad DeLong points out – the man who invented it himself, Stanford University’s (and Bush Treasury appointee) John Taylor.

Secondly, as the old saying goes: when the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem begins to look like a nail. Interest rates, while powerful, cannot solve every economic problem. The Taylor rule tells us we shouldn’t raise the interest rate, we can’t lower the interest rate, and no one is happy where the economy is now. At a time when the interest rate is at zero, and should be negative, alternatives need to be explored. As Clive Crook says in his latest column:

Interest rates that take into account asset prices as well as general inflation are part of this, of course. But when it comes to financial regulation, the key thing is rules that recognise the credit cycle, and change as it proceeds. Most important, as argued by Charles Goodhart in these pages, capital and liquidity requirements should be time-varying and strongly anti-cyclical. In good times, when lending is expanding quickly and financial institutions’ concerns about capital and liquidity are at their least, the requirements should tighten. Under current rules, they do the opposite.

Crook is right that unusually low capital ratios (and their counterparts – high leverage ratios) were a catalyst of last year’s crisis. Now that we need to get the economy going again, banks need to lend. One way to do so would be to lower capital ratios (if it wouldn’t bring the solvency of some large banks into question). As part of a regulatory reform package, policymakers should pursue a counter-cyclical capital requirements policy.

They should also expand who has to follow capital requirements. As currently defined, only depository institutions and not investment banks – such as Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch were, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley used to be – are required to follow the Fed’s Board of Governor’s capital requirements. Getting other financial institutions to respond to capital requirements will make that a much more powerful tool.

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Breaking the Glass-Steagall Myth

Friday, December 18th, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Bank of America Tower, Seattle, WAWord going around Washington this week is that Sens. John McCain (R-AZ) and Maria Cantwell (D-WA) are pushing to reinstate Glass-Steagall:

McCain and Cantwell, a Washington Democrat, join other lawmakers in Congress proposing to reinstate the 1933 law, repealed a decade ago by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act that led to a rise in conglomerates including Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America Corp. active in retail banking, insurance and proprietary trading. Legislation to reinstate the ban was introduced today in the House.

While this move is a well-meaning attempt to rein in the financial sector, it doesn’t address the issues that caused last fall’s crisis.

Glass-Steagall was aimed at separating “boring” retail banking (the Bailey Building and Loan Association, for example) from “risky” investment bankers (Gordon Gekko). It was eventually repealed, as U.S. banks felt it put them at a disadvantage in the global marketplace against European “universal” banks, such as Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, and HSBC.

At the time there was concern that repealing Glass-Steagall would create banks that were systematically dangerous. In hindsight, that concern would seem to be born out — but it isn’t. After all, the three major bank collapses that precipitated the crisis were Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers. All three were obviously Too Big Too Fail, but all three would have been unaffected by a reinstatement of Glass-Steagall — none of them is a retail bank (this is why you never saw Merrill or Lehman ATMs).

Rather than focusing on micromanaging bank structure, and stifling entrepreneurship in the financial sector, the Senators would be better served by evaluating different options to limit the size of Too Big Too Fail banks. A smarter idea would be to extend the retail bank deposits cap idea to total bank assets. Currently, no bank can have more than 10 percent of total national retail deposits (Bank of America got a waiver for the 2007 purchase of Chicagoland’s LaSalle bank and now has 12.2 percent of national deposits). Peter Boone and Simon Johnson suggest applying this simple principle to total bank liabilities. They recommend a limit of 2 percent of GDP, which is in line with the $300 billion that Felix Salmon has been recommending since March. Importantly, it’s also in line with the de facto $100 billion threshold that bank regulators are using now.

This way the government isn’t running banks and bankers can pursue the capitalist impulse that drives our economy. But with a cap on liabilities, the decisions of bankers cannot threaten our economy like they have in the past.

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Left-Right Convergence?

Wednesday, December 16th, 2009
Ed Kilgore



Ed Kilgore is a PPI senior fellow, as well as managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, an online forum.

by Ed Kilgore

The latest intra-progressive dustup over health care reform displays a couple of pretty important potential fault lines within the American center-left. One has to do with political strategy, and the role of the Democratic Party and the presidency in promoting progressive policy goals and social movements. I’ll be writing about that subject extensively in the coming days.

But the other potential fault line is ideological, and is sometimes hard to discern because it extends across a variety of issues. To put it simply, and perhaps over-simply, on a variety of fronts (most notably financial restructuring and health care reform, but arguably on climate change as well), the Obama administration has chosen the strategy of deploying regulated and subsidized private sector entities to achieve progressive policy results. This approach was a hallmark of the so-called Clintonian, “New Democrat” movement, and the broader international movement sometimes referred to as “the Third Way,” which often defended the use of private means for public ends. (It’s also arguably central to the American liberal tradition going back to Woodrow Wilson, and is even evident in parts of the New Deal and Great Society initiatives alongside elements of the “social democratic” tradition, which is characterized by support for publicly operated programs in key areas.)

To be clear, this is not the same as the conservative “privatization” strategy, which simply devolves public responsibilities to private entities without much in the way of regulation. In education policy, to cite one example, New Democrats (and the Obama administration) have championed charter public schools, which are highly regulated but privately operated schools that receive public funds in exchange for successful performance of publicly-defined tasks. Conservatives have typically called for private-school vouchers, which simply shift public funds to private schools more or less unconditionally, on the theory that they know best how to educate children.

Now clear as this distinction seems to “New Democrats,” there are a considerable number of progressives who think it’s largely a distinction without a difference, in education policy and elsewhere. And we are seeing that fundamental divergence on opinion on other, more prominent issues right now. On the financial front, the Obama administration reflexively pursued a strategy of regulation and subsidies for the financial sector, without modifying the fundamental nature of financial institutions, even as critics on the left argued for nationalization (at least temporarily) of key financial functions. At the more popular level, critics of TARP from the left joined critics of TARP from the right in deploring “bailouts” of failed financial institutions, even though the two groups of critics held vastly different views of the right alternative course of action.

Similarly in the health care reform debate, the Obama administration pursued legislation that utilized regulated and subsidized private for-profit health insurers to achieve universal health coverage. This approach was inherently flawed to “single-payer” advocates on the left, who strongly believe that private for-profit health insurers are the main problem in the U.S. health care system. The difference was for a long time papered over by the cleverly devised “public option,” which was acceptable to many New Democrat types as a way of ensuring robust competition among private insurers, and which became crucial to single-payer advocates who viewed it as a way to gradually introduce a superior, publicly-operated form of health insurance to those not covered by existing public programs like Medicare and Medicaid. (That’s why the effort to substitute a Medicare buy-in for the public option, which Joe Lieberman killed this week, received such a strong positive response from many progressives whose ultimate goal is an expansion of Medicare-style coverage to all Americans).

Now that the public option compromise is apparently no longer on the table, and there’s no Medicare buy-in to offer single-payer advocates an alternative path to the kind of system they favor, it’s hardly surprising that some progressives have gone into open opposition, and are using the kind of outraged and categorical language deployed by Marcy Wheeler yesterday. As with the financial issue, there’s now a tactical alliance between conservative critics of “ObamaCare,” who view the regulation and subsidization of private health insurers as “socialism,” and progressive critics of the legislation who view the same features as representing “neo-feudalism.”

To put it more bluntly, on a widening range of issues, Obama’s critics to the right say he’s engineering a government takeover of the private sector, while his critics to the left accuse him of promoting a corporate takeover of the public sector. They can’t both be right, of course, and these critics would take the country in completely different directions if given a chance. But the tactical convergence is there if they choose to pursue it.

For those of us whose primary interest is progressive unity and political success for the Democratic Party, it’s very tempting to downplay or even ignore this potential fault-line and the left-right convergence it makes possible. It’s also easy to dismiss critics-from-the-left of Obama as people primarily interested in long-range movement-building rather than short-term political success; that’s true for some of them. But sorting out these differences in ideology and perspective is, in my opinion, essential to the progressive political project. And with a rejuvenated and increasingly radical right’s hounds baying and sniffing at the doors of the Capitol, we don’t have the time or energy to spare in dialogues of the deaf wherein we call each other names while getting ready for the elections of 2010 and 2012.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

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A Game Plan for Infrastructure

Thursday, December 10th, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

A Game Plan for InfrastructureIt’s a sign of the times when “our bridges and roads are falling apart” gets cited as an issue more pressing than college football’s annoying Bowl Championship Series (BCS) on ESPN.

And, while the president hasn’t fulfilled his promise to set up an eight-team playoff yet, he’s taken the issue of infrastructure head-on. The administration’s focus on infrastructure investment is good for both long-term growth and generating jobs through the quick start-up of “shovel ready” projects.

However, one-time disbursements like those outlined in the Recovery Act or the president’s announcement earlier this week fall short of fixing more fundamental issues.

On the heels of Obama’s speech at Brookings on Tuesday, Rep. Keith Ellison (D-MN) is at the same venue today pushing a much more sustainable approach.

Ellison is a co-sponsor on Rep. Rosa DeLauro’s (D-CT) National Infrastructure Development Bank Act, a good start on developing sustainable infrastructure funding the country so desperately needs.

DeLauro and and Ellison’s bill builds on the work of a bipartisan commission chaired by former Sen. Warren Rudman (R-NH) and titan of finance Felix Rohatyn. The bill envisions $5 billion a year from the federal government to capitalize the bank and a government debt guarantee of up to $50 billion.

But even Ellison and DeLauro’s idea can be improved upon. As outlined in Jessica Milano’s PPI policy memo, “Building our 21st Century Infrastructure,” an American Infrastructure Bank (AIB) seeded with a one-time investment at the federal level — a potential use for the TARP funds the president announced this week — and stakeholder buy-ins from the states would be a more effective way to fund a bank dedicated to financing infrastructure programs.

An infrastructure bank would offer a way to leverage much larger private sector investments from a strapped public budget. The bank would raise inexpensive funding for infrastructure projects by issuing debt on the capital markets backed by the U.S. government’s credit rating. By backing these bonds with the revenue or assets of the projects they are financing, taxpayers would not be left to pick up the bill. These projects would be determined according to strict criteria that promote economic development while being fiscally and environmentally sound.

After the President’s remarks on Tuesday, Gov. Ed Rendell of Pennsylvania — an infrastructure bank supporter — said the president had “essentially” endorsed the idea of an AIB. But while the president sounded open to the idea this week, he hasn’t gotten behind the legislation needed to get it done. President Obama endorsed an infrastructure bank back when he was candidate Obama. But, much like his promise of reforming the BCS, this threatens to become another campaign promise that falls by the wayside. Now’s the moment for the president to come off the sidelines and lead a sustained drive down the field.

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Some Unanswered Questions on Financial Reform

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

The Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA)-authored Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed the House Financial Services Committee last Wednesday, and could come to a floor vote in the House as soon as this week. Through legislative jujitsu on Frank’s part, the bill will have a lead on Sen. Chris Dodd’s (D-CT) efforts in the Senate.

The day after the committee passed the legislation, I saw Rep. Ed Perlmutter (D-CO) talk about it at an event hosted by the National Journal and got to exchange a few words with him on the subject. He was positive about the bill and its chances in the House (it will likely pass easily), and gave positive marks to the administration’s handling of the crisis in its first year in office.

But while Perlmutter said he felt the House has done its part to address regulatory reforms, I thought some of the accomplishments he touted leave unanswered fundamental questions raised by the financial crisis.

He spoke about the legislation’s planned Financial Stability Council, that would provide a forum for regulators like the Fed to address systemic risk. But the Financial Stability Council, instead of facilitating coordination among regulators, won’t live up to expectations — much like what happened with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that was supposed to facilitate information-sharing in the intelligence sector, but has had limited effectiveness in getting different agencies to talk to each other. The weak mandate of a Financial Stability Council would lead to regulator shopping by financial institutions, a temptation that can lead to problems similar to those seen in the case of under-regulated AIG. Moreover, the resolution authority that the council would have is useful only after the fact — it would not preemptively deal with the Too Big To Fail problem we still face.

Fixing Mark-to-Market Requirements

More generally, however, Perlmutter mentioned two ideas the House is considering that could actually contain the seeds of our next crisis.

One idea is extending the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) loosening of mark-to-market requirements for financial institutions to value their securities. Perlmutter wants to suspend mark-to-market and make permanent the FASB’s contentious April decision to ease mark-to-market rules.

The rule would let the Financial Stability Council order FASB to suspend mark-to-market in cases where there is no market in a security or securities are being sold in a “fire sale” or distressed environment. More worrisome, however, is that banks get to declare whether the market in the securities they are holding is distressed or not. Banks can drive a truckload of bad investment decisions through this loophole without having to disclose them on their bottom line or affecting capital requirements. Under this new rule, banks will have no incentive to conduct diligent analysis of the securities they hold — anything that turns out to be worthless (like bonds backed by subprime loans) can just be called “distressed.” This would decrease transparency and not restore confidence to the system.

But mark-to-market does have the bad consequence of increasing volatility in bank balance sheets. During crises like last year’s, banks can even perversely see mark-to-market improve their bottom line the closer they get to bankruptcy.

A better idea than the one Perlmutter mentioned has been put forward by PPI contributor Robert Pozen in his new book, Too Big To Save. Pozen suggests delinking banking capital regulations from accounting mark-to-market rules by effectively recognizing all securities as being “held for sale” (an accounting distinction) for regulatory purposes. This would allow us to continue to keep the transparency in assets that mark-to-market allows, while avoiding the bottom line volatility that banks would like to avoid.

What to Do About Sarbanes-Oxley

The second idea is exempting firms from some Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) reporting requirements. Passed in the wake of Enron, SOX was designed to hold companies and their executives accountable for their auditing, and eliminate some glaring conflicts of interest in financial auditing.

SOX does two good things. It makes a publicly held company have legitimate auditors, and ensures that those same auditors aren’t also advising the company on how to prepare the books for auditing (thereby basically handing over the answer key before a test). SOX also made sure that companies had proper controls that minimized the risk of errors in financial statements and of people either using company money inappropriately (as Enron did in off-balance-sheet shell companies) and of people embezzling money. Exempting firms from this would eventually lead to the same bad behavior happening again.

That said, SOX isn’t without flaws. Many in the auditing industry perceive it as very manpower intensive and, as a result, a significant burden to publicly listed companies, especially smaller ones (with income under $100 million). The SEC has responded by annually exempting small companies from some reporting requirements, but the exemption is not going to be extended past next year.

The solution to this problem is to streamline SOX to make it less burdensome to companies, not gutting it and letting new Enrons bubble up. Instead of providing an internal control report with each annual filing to the SEC — which can require up to three percent of a small company’s income — the SEC and Congress should encourage accounting oversight boards to spell out further guidelines and best practices to adopt. This streamlined SOX could even be extended to non-public financial institutions, as a key part of what allowed Bernie Madoff to steal people’s money for so long was having a small one-man upstate auditor keep tabs on his multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme.

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Too Big to Run

Thursday, December 3rd, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

In discussions about the dismal state of the economy, the existence of “too big to fail” institutions has emerged as a recurring cause for concern. In particular, Bank of America and Citigroup (the first and third largest banks in the country, respectively) are firms whose size makes them an “existential threat” to the well-being of the economy.

(Bank #2 in size is JPMorgan, whose chief, Jamie Dimon, has been going around saying that we can end “too big to fail” without capping the size of financial institutions by providing regulators with resolution authority over banks — the ability to wind them down in an orderly fashion. While resolution authority can help in cases — like Lehman’s — where banks become insolvent, these after-the-fact measures would not prevent the liquidity crisis that selling against a too-big-to-fail institution would cause.)

While Citigroup has made efforts to break itself up, including selling off its half of the Smith Barney joint venture with Morgan Stanley, Bank of America under Ken Lewis has been resistant to downsizing, adamant that clients benefit from its size. But with the embattled Lewis having announced he will step down at the end of the year, the bank is looking for a new chief.

And that search has run up against a problem — not only are these firms seen as “too big to fail,” they’re also too big to run:

At least two candidates for the top job at Bank of America Corp. told directors that the giant bank should consider breaking itself up… [One candidate, former Bank of Hawaii CEO Michael O'Neill] recently told the Bank of America search committee that the bank’s risk-adjusted capital wasn’t being used productively. He added that the company should become simpler and less prone to volatility

How big is Bank of America? With over $2.25 trillion in assets, it has a pervasive presence in our economy. The numbers from the Wall Street Journal are staggering:

Bank of America is the largest U.S. bank by assets and has 6,000 branches, 18,000 automated-teller machines and relationships with 53 million households, or roughly one out of every two households in the U.S.

Whereas the mantra “bigger is better” was applied to the financial industry over the past 20 years, there is now a reassessment of that idea. But instead of providing clear guidance on how to get financial institutions to a more reasonable size (and, indeed, what that size is), the government is sending unclear signals, with conflicting announcements on which companies it is willing to bail out and tepid additional reporting requirements that won’t rein in outsized firms.

Rather than add to the uncertainty, the administration should come out with guidelines on how it proposes to solve the “too big to fail” problem. Whether through voluntary break-up of banks it has a stake in, anti-trust measures, or by instituting a too-big-to-fail tax, the administration should lay out clear rules for banks to follow. This will allow big banks to stop chasing their tails on executive decisions — like Bank of America is doing — and get back to business.

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