Posts Tagged ‘ Blue Dogs ’

Political Memo: The “Centrist Premium”: The High Cost of Moderation

Thursday, August 18th, 2011
Anne Kim



Anne Kim is the managing director for policy and strategy at the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Anne Kim

For most of the last 30 years, self-described ideological moderates have comprised a plurality of the American electorate. While the share of moderates has dropped slightly in recent years, 38 percent of voters in 2010 still described themselves as such.

In Congress, on the other hand, moderates are decidedly—and increasingly—a minority. Among Democrats, the moderate New Democrat and Blue Dog Coalitions suffered heavy losses among their respective memberships in 2010 and are now outnumbered by their liberal counterparts in the Progressive Caucus. Among Republicans, moderate members are an even rarer species. In fact, there are only 33 members of the moderate Republican Main Street Partnership who are not also part of the 177-member conservative Republican Study Committee.

Analysts have offered up structural explanations—such as gerrymandering and the current political primary system—for why there aren’t more moderates in elected office to reflect America’s true ideological complexion. This paper looks at another structural disadvantage that moderate candidates and incumbents face: campaign finance.

For better or for worse, financing plays a major role in a candidate’s viability and success. Financing buys the ads and ability to raise a candidate’s profile, counter the opposition and turn out the vote. A hefty campaign war chest can be enough in itself to discourage potential rivals. According to the Federal Election Commission, House Congressional races cost a grand total of nearly $1.1 billion in 2010—or $2.5 million per seat. Moreover, elections are becoming increasingly expensive. The spending in 2010 was nearly double the $563 million spent just a decade ago in 2000.

Read the entire memo.

Did Democrats Really Lose the South For Good?

Tuesday, November 30th, 2010
Ed Kilgore



Ed Kilgore is a PPI senior fellow, as well as managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, an online forum.

by Ed Kilgore

A rash of party-switching by former Democratic state legislatures in the South has drawn attention to the parlous condition of the Donkey Party in that region following a terrible midterm election.   Jonathan Martin of Politico captured the zeitgeist with a much-discussed piece entitled, “Democratic South Finally Falls,” a testament not only to Republican gains in the region but to the advent of such endlessly predicted but long-delayed developments as the GOP conquest of the Alabama state legislature.

How bad was election night 2010 for southern Democrats?  Well, there were a total of 14 Senate and gubernatorial races in the eleven states of the Old Confederacy, and Republicans won all of them except for the Arkansas governor’s race.  Exactly one-third of the 66 House pickups for the GOP occurred in the same eleven states (along with one-third of the three Democratic pickups).  Republicans gained control of four state legislative chambers (the House and Senate in both Alabama and North Carolina), then picked up control of the Louisiana House due to a party switch.  Today Democrats control the Arkansas and Mississippi House and Senate; the Senate in Louisiana and Virginia; and nothing else.  And the Mississippi, Louisiana, and Virginia bastions will be at risk in 2011.

Were there regional bright spots for Democrats?  Sure, in individual races.  But it’s hard to call, say, North Carolina a bright spot because endangered House Democrats Larry Kissel and Mike McIntyre survived, since the state legislature was lost for the first time since Reconstruction.  Similarly, two of three targeted House Democrats in Georgia won, but Republicans swept all the statewide races for the first time ever, and are approaching a veto-proof supermajority in both state legislative chambers.

Democrats had unusually strong gubernatorial candidates facing Republicans with problems in four southern states:  South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, and Texas.  All these Democrats lost.

Now it’s important to understand that the demographic turnout patterns that made the midterms so hospitable to Republicans nationally were especially strong in parts of the South, where the pro-Republican trend among older white voters in 2008 was especially pronounced, and the predictable falloff in African-American voting after a historic cycle was especially damaging to Democrats.  That means Democrats will likely rebound (relatively speaking) in 2012 in the South as elsewhere.  Indeed, post-midterm PPP polls of Virginia and North Carolina, the two southern states carried by Obama in 2008, show the president in pretty good shape in both for 2012.

What really happened in 2010 of enduring significance is that the post-Civil Rights Act era of ticket-splitting in the South, which enabled Democrats to do much better in state and local election than at the presidential level, is finally drawing to a close, with one important qualifier: as Republicans become the natural governing party of the South, they will also be vulnerable to unhappiness with the status quo, which could produce Democratic victories, particularly in states with an irreducibly strong Democratic base.  Generally, though, congressional districts with a long history of going GOP in presidential races and Democratic in House races, like South Carolina’s 5th district or Mississippi’s 4th, aren’t likely coming back to the Democratic column now that their long-time incumbents have lost.  In addition, as the party-switching in state legislatures demonstrates, Democrats will no longer benefit from being perceived as the party of convenience for ambitious politicos with flexible ideological views.

The upside for southern Democrats is that the long-term demographic trends favoring them in the region—growing minority populations, continued in-migration of less conservative voters, and the increased importance of “knowledge jobs”—haven’t gone away.  And without question, southern Democrats are continuing to converge with their national counterparts in ideology as conservative white rural voters complete their migration out of the Democratic coalition.   Overall, southerners will still be more moderate than Democrats from areas with a strong labor movement or a tradition of cultural progressivism, but much of the argument that southern Blue Dogs are muddling the message or obstructing the legislation of the national party has become moot.

Did Democrats Lose for Structural Reasons, or Were They Punished for Mistakes?

Tuesday, November 9th, 2010
Ed Kilgore



Ed Kilgore is a PPI senior fellow, as well as managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, an online forum.

by Ed Kilgore

In unfinished business from last Tuesday, there are still eight House races unresolved, after 11th district of Virginia Republican candidate Keith Fimian conceded to Rep. Gerry Connolly.   While Reps. Ben Chandler of KY and Jerry McInerny of CA hold leads with scattered ballots still out and recounts possible,  Republicans appear to lead in the other six races (involving Democratic incumbents Jim Costa of CA, Melissa Bean of IL, Tim Bishop and Dan Maffei of NY, and Bobby Etheridge of NC, and Solomon Ortiz of TX).  If all current leads held, Republican gains would come in at 65, but my guess is that one or two of the Democrats now trailing will pull out a win.

The unresolved gubernatorial races are now down to just one, in Minnesota, where Republicans still bitter about the outcome of the 2008 Senate race seem determined to delay certification of Mark Dayton’s election as governor as long as they possibly can.

As the vote counting winds down, of course, the post-election interpretation battles are just now warming up. There are, of course, partisan differences, with Republicans tending to treat the results as a historic and perhaps semi-permanent repudiation of Barack Obama, the Democratic Party, liberalism, socialism, the New Deal, elitism, progressivism, or you-name-it.

Democrats are more divided, with some drawing big (and often varying) lessons from the defeat, and others stressing structural factors that made the results inevitable and/or lessened its predictive value for the future.  The former, “big lessons” camp is itself divided between progressives who think Democrats lost because they discouraged the party base and compromised too much with Republicans and Blue Dogs (and/or failed to take the kind of radical steps that could have actually revived the economy), and centrists who think Democrats “overreached” by trying to implement an agenda that the economic emergency made undoable and unpopular.

The “structuralist” interpretation (which I happen to largely share) was succinctly summarized by Ruy Texeira and John Halpin of the Center for American Progress:

Why did the Democrats decisively lose this election? It’s not really a mystery. The 2010 midterms were shaped by three fundamental factors: the poor state of the economy, the abnormally conservative composition of the midterm electorate, and the large number of vulnerable seats in conservative-leaning areas.

Much of the argument over what happened and why will inevitably revolve around the big swing in self-identified independent voters between 2006-08 and 2010.   Are these the same voters, or different subsets of voters (i.e., was this a pure “swing” in voting behavior, or at least partly an illusion of changes in self-identification and turnout patterns?)?  Is the “swing” attributable to factors other than independent identity (e.g., age), or to a genuine change in ideology, or to a rejection of “Obamaism,” or to a continuing rejection of the status quo across administrations and party regimes, or to simple unhappiness about the economy?  The answers to these questions have a large bearing on how each party should act in order to improve its performance in 2012.

One thing that is relatively clear is that the Republican “wave” broke pretty evenly across the electoral landscape, at least in House races; regions where Democrats did relatively well (e.g., the Pacific Coast) are just more favorable to Democrats.   Here’s how Nate Silver of FiveThirtyEight explained it:

Rather than a realigning election, then, 2010 served as more of an aligning election: congressional districts behaved less independently from one another, and incumbency status mattered less. Instead, they hewed tightly to national trends and the overall partisanship of each district. Most of the incumbent congressmen whose districts had been outliers before (mainly Democrats like Representative Gene Taylor, whose district gave just 31 percent of its vote to Barack Obama, but also a couple of Republicans like Representative Joseph Cao) were forced into early retirement.

In other words, there was a general, national shift in favor of Republicans that produced relatively predictable results.  That’s true whether you believe the shift involved a sea change in the ideological views of the electorate or just typical midterm turnout patterns and a typical reaction to a bad economy.  A similar shift towards Democrats in 2012 would produce similar Democratic House gains—with the exception of the advantages Republicans are now poised to achieve through redistricting.

So why do these post-election interpretive arguments matter?  Well, to state the most obvious factor, if Republicans accept a structuralist interpretation, they are likely to be very cautious about advancing a radically conservative agenda, since the likely 2012 electorate is going to produce semi-automatic Democratic gains, which may also be augmented by any improvements in the national economy.  If, to cite another example, Democrats accept a “big lessons to learn” interpretation, it would dictate a significant change in strategy for the Obama administration and congressional leaders; unfortunately, the progressive and centrist versions of this interpretation point in very different directions.

Photo credit: Leol 30

In Defense of the Blue Dogs

Tuesday, October 26th, 2010
Ed Kilgore



Ed Kilgore is a PPI senior fellow, as well as managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, an online forum.

by Ed Kilgore

Virtually every election cycle produces some sort of “lessons learned” debate in both major parties.  Big victories invariably generate a scramble for credit among factions and leaders.  Big defeats often lead to “struggles for the soul” of this or that party.  Such struggles typically reflect old battles and grievances as much as fresh evidence of public opinion or the success or failure of particular strategies and tactics.  And that’s why they sometimes begin well before voters actually weigh in.

The first major trumpet blast on the Democratic side was by The Nation’s Ari Berman, who penned a New York Times op-ed with the unsubtle title: “Boot the Blue Dogs.” In fairness to Berman, the Times’ word limits forced him into a CliffsNotes version of his argument, which he has elucidated at greater length in an entire book.  But his essay does cover a lot of ground heavily occupied by those on the Left who believe that the willingness of the Obama administration and the Democratic congressional leadership to tolerate moderate-to-conservative Democrats has doomed the party politically and substantively:

With President Obama in office, some notable beneficiaries of the Democrats’ 50-state strategy have been antagonizing the party from within — causing legislative stalemate in Congress, especially in the Senate, and casting doubt on the long-term viability of a Democratic majority….

A smaller majority, minus the intraparty feuding, could benefit Democrats in two ways: first, it could enable them to devise cleaner pieces of legislation, without blatantly trading pork for votes as they did with the deals that helped sour the public on the health care bill. (As a corollary, the narrative of “Democratic infighting” would also diminish.)

Second, in the Senate, having a majority of 52 rather than 59 or 60 would force Democrats to confront the Republicans’ incessant misuse of the filibuster to require that any piece of legislation garner a minimum of 60 votes to become law.

The obvious response to Berman’s argument is that Democrats (particularly in the Senate) have been perfectly free throughout the last two years to pursue this small-majority strategy, but chose not to for one reason or another (often because some left-leaning Democratic senators opposed measures to reduce the power of the filibuster, which they have deployed during periods of Republican ascendancy).

Perhaps “booting” the Blue Dogs will make the caucus more collegial, but it won’t increase the number of progressive House or Senate members.  So what’s the harm of having Blue Dog members who will help maintain the majority, and on many occasions, will vote with the caucus as well?  As for the idea that a more ideologically consistent caucus will be able to draft “cleaner” legislation, what difference does that make if you don’t have the votes to enact it?

An additional argument that is often heard (but that Berman does not include in his Times piece) is that the power of the Democratic Party’s message is directly proportional to its consistency.   It’s pretty easy to go from this line of reasoning down the rabbit hole of cognitive science or “branding” theory, but there are a lot of progressives who seem to believe that intraparty dissent undermines progressive messaging.  By the same token, of course, democracy and the First Amendment undermine progressive messaging, but that seems a small price to pay.

A stronger argument, I’d submit, is that some Blue Dogs are fundamentally at odds with other Democrats on politically critical issues involving first principles, such as progressive taxation and economic inequality.  If House Democrats with a robust majority cannot implement the longstanding position of the Democratic Party favoring the repeal of Bush tax cuts for the wealthy (while maintaining middle-class tax cuts), the majority truly is of limited utility.

Part of the problem with this whole debate, of course, is that all Blue Dogs aren’t the same, and that no one—not Ari Berman, not Nancy Pelosi, not Tim Kaine—has the authority to define the boundaries of dissent for Democrats.  Moreover, what are the implications of a tougher party line for dissenting progressives?

What if President Obama strongly promotes a trade agenda, or a deficit reduction compromise, that infuriates the Democratic Left?  When President Clinton split with House Democrats over trade and welfare reform measures, who were the good, loyal Democrats in that fight?  Maybe that’s obvious to Ari Berman, but maybe not so much to others.

A final planted axiom in Berman’s essay should be noted for purposes of clarity: the idea that Blue Dogs exist because they were “recruited” by Rahm Emanuel.  Obviously many leading Blue Dogs have been around for much longer than 2006 or 2008.  Others have been political powers in their own districts, and national party financial backing, while helpful, wasn’t necessarily the key factor in their decisions to run for Congress.  But in any event, the suggestion that the national party could, if it chose, “recruit” more progressive candidates who could win in tough territory is not supported by much actual evidence.  Certainly primary challenges to Blue Dogs this year haven’t gone very well.

None of this is to say that congressional leaders and the White House couldn’t more effectively deploy sticks and carrots to encourage greater party discipline.  In the Senate, support for the party on cloture motions ought to become as automatic as it used to be.

But losing seats in, and perhaps control of, the House or Senate this year does not make such disciplinary measures any easier for Democrats, and the idea of deliberately shrinking the House and Senate Caucuses isn’t likely to go over very well with either Members or with the Democratic rank-and-file.  In any event, looking at the most vulnerable Democratic seats in the House, plenty of Blue Dogs are going to be “booted” and replaced with right-wing Republicans, so we will soon see if that has any sort of salutary effect on the Democratic Party.

Photo credit: Mahima Hada

Blue Dogs Only Chasing Their Tail

Tuesday, March 9th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

It often seems that Blue Dog Democrats, along with a handful of Senate moderates, are the only people in Washington who are serious about fiscal responsibility. Chasing the will-o-the-wisp of a balanced budget amendment, however, seems more likely to distract from than advance that essential cause.

The idea is seductively simple: The only way to restrain deficit spending in Washington is to make it unconstitutional. That’s how the states keep their books balanced, and there’s no reason the federal government shouldn’t do the same.

In fact, there are several. Consider that today’s federal deficit is about 12 percent of GDP. It’s going to go down as the economy recovers, but the spending and tax adjustments that would have to be made to get it all the way down to zero would be unduly draconian and disruptive. Also, unlike state mandates, a federal balanced budget amendment for accounting reasons would not distinguish between capital investment and consumption. But government borrowing to invest in public infrastructure or higher education, for example, makes economic sense, because it will generate more economic activity and amortize itself over time.

What’s more, the federal government acts as the nation’s fiscal safety valve, or strategic reserve. During severe economic downturns, the only way many states can provide services while preserving their fiscal virtue is to get counter-cyclical assistance (or revenue sharing) from Washington. A constitutional ban on deficits could prevent Washington from responding to emergencies of all kinds.

In truth, we don’t need a balanced federal budget — we need a disciplined federal budget. Congress would be better off adopting Sen. Mike Bennett’s (D-CO) sensible suggestion that federal deficits be held first to four percent, then to three percent of GDP each year. At that level, they’d be gradually whittled down by economic growth, and the government could borrow without swelling the national debt.

A balanced budget amendment, moreover, is a blunter instrument than we need to deal with overspending and undertaxing in Washington. It doesn’t hone in on the real problem, which is the automatic and unsustainable growth in entitlement spending. A better idea, from the Brookings-Heritage Fiscal Seminar, is to bring Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security on budget, which would require Congress to periodically reconcile income and spending to keep the programs solvent.

Finally, a balanced budget amendment is just too damn difficult to enact. Congress has to approve Constitutional amendments by a two-thirds vote, well nigh inconceivable given how hard it is to muster the 60 votes needed to break a filibuster. Then three-fourths of the states would have to approve an amendment.

Demanding a balanced budget amendment thus is more of a symbolic gesture than a real solution to America’s fiscal crisis. Recall that it was a key plank in the GOP’s 1994 Contract with America, but Republicans quickly lost interest once they won control of Congress. Nonetheless, Newt Gingrich has endorsed the amendment in a bid to recapture the old magic for this year’s midterm elections.

Unlike the Republicans, of course, the Blue Dogs have real street cred when it comes to fiscal rectitude. They fought successfully to resurrect “pay go” rules that require Congress to offset new spending with tax hikes or budget cuts. And key Blue Dog leaders like Rep. Jim Cooper (D-TN) have led the charge for a bipartisan commission to get entitlement spending under control.

It’s vital, though, that progressive deficit hawks not let the holy grail of a constitutional amendment deflect them from the gritty, day-to-day battles in Congress to get America’s exploding deficits and debts under control.