Posts Tagged ‘ China ’

Policy Brief: How a Competitiveness Audit Can Help Create Jobs

Friday, November 18th, 2011
Michael Mandel



Michael Mandel is the chief economic strategist at the Progressive Policy Institute and the founder of Visible Economy LLC, a New York-based news and education company.

Diana G Carew



Diana G. Carew is an Economist at the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Michael Mandel and Diana G Carew

America is deep in a jobs crisis. The unemployment rate is stuck around 9 percent nationally, with states such as Florida, Nevada and South Carolina in double digits. Real wages for educated workers are still plunging, while new college graduates are squeezed between rising student loans and the toughest labor market in recent memory.

Against this backdrop, the global economy looms large as both threat and promise. There’s a justifiable fear that America has lost its competitiveness, that our jobs are being siphoned to China and India, that the wages of our young people are being depressed by a global education glut. At the same time, the rapidly growing markets of the developing world could be a potent target for U.S. exports of goods, services, and intellectual capital, creating good jobs here.

In this global economy, we need to know which industries are internationally competitive, which ones aren’t, and whether the gaps are closing or widening. Unfortunately, the reality is this data currently does not exist. And what we don’t know hurts us, because it prevents us from pursuing effective strategies for boosting US jobs.

Although the government collects reams of economic data, it doesn’t measure what’s most vital to our ability to reverse America’s jobs decline: how our goods and services stack up against those of China and other competitors in terms of price.

You can’t fix what you can’t measure. We need a new national jobs strategy that begins with an accurate way of measuring America’s competitive prowess, on an industry-by-industry basis.

This policy brief proposes that the Bureau of Labor Statistics undertake a “Competitiveness Audit.” The Competitiveness Audit will compare the price of selected imports with the comparable domestically produced goods and services. That will tell us the size of the ‘price gap’ between imports and domestic production.

Read the entire brief.

Chinese Navy Confirms Construction of Varyag-class Aircraft Carrier

Wednesday, June 8th, 2011
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

General Chen Bingde, head of the general staff of China’s People Liberation Army (PLA), has confirmed that his country is constructing its first aircraft carrier, an ex-Soviet Varyag set to begin sea trials next year. Spy-masters in Washington and London have been monitoring the ship’s progress for some time, but Gen. Chen’s comments are the first public commentary on its existence. Purchased from a Ukrainian shipyard in 2002 for $20million by a Macau-based company, the original contract stipulated that the vessel could not be used for military purposes. The buyer claimed the ship would be converted into a floating amusement park, complete with a hotel and casino. Whoops.

Adding an aircraft carrier to its fleet continues to amplify the PLA’s global reach capabilities, and at a time when China is asserting a more aggressive strategic posture in the South China Sea. China has made maritime territorial claims there, drawing ire of the United States and countries in the region, which have insisted instead freedom of international waterways.

That’s why, in part, confirmation of the aircraft carrier is likely to raise the hackles of policy makers in Western capitals, fearful–despite Beijing’s claims to the contrary–that the addition of a major instrument of power projection represents an obvious threat.

While such fears are well-founded, it’s also important to place the Chinese military expansionism within a proper context. In that vein, PPI has offered a series of memos on China’s military over the course of 2010, including this piece explicitly on its Navy. U.S. Naval War College Professor Mike Chase concludes:

[T]he U.S. will need to strengthen its ties to key countries in East Asia and develop strategic and tactical military concepts and capabilities that would allow it to counter China’s growing military power. Meanwhile, U.S. policy makers must seek collaboration with the Chinese military in an effort to highlight the benefits of being a global stakeholder to Beijing.

Other pieces in the series are on China’s military budget and priorities and Beijing’s anti-access/area-denial strategy. Read them here.  And finally, back in December, PPI did a fantastic panel discussion featuring Chip Gregson, Asst. Secretary of Defense for Asia, Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE), as well as Joe Nye, Jim Fallows, and the aforementioned Mike Chase. Check out the video here.

Defense Contractors Suffer Network Attacks as Pentagon Issues Cyber Strategy

Monday, June 6th, 2011
Matthew Dahl



Matt Dahl is a judicial clerk in Virginia and writes about national security law on his blog. The views expressed here are his own.

by Matthew Dahl

Last week reports emerged about attempted cyber attacks against the internal networks of three major U.S. defense contractors: Lockheed Martin, L-3 Communications, and Northrop Grumman.  All of the attempted hacks tried to access the companies’ internal networks using compromised remote-access security tokens, which are believed to be linked to yet another hack that occurred at a different government contractor, RSA, in March.

Amidst news of last week’s attacks, DoD is preparing a formal cyber strategy and a list of deployable cyber weapons. The strategy is not in response to the incursions, but as the first formal cyber strategy written by the Pentagon, it obviously has bearing on USG’s response to them, as well as future assaults.

The strategy is not yet public, but two important provisions are known: First, that the Pentagon may use conventional force to respond to a cyber attack against the U.S.; second, that the strategy explicitly contains an authorization framework, reportedly requiring the military to obtain presidential approval before deploying cyber weapons.

While it’s time that the U.S. government assembled clear policies to respond to cyber attacks, it is important to recognize the unique challenges contained therein. Two of the most important are 1) assigning responsibility for an attack and 2) assuring that any retaliation avoids excessive collateral damage.

First, unlike attacks with conventional weapons, an attacker has more opportunities to hide his origin in cyberspace. For example, state actors can create plausible deniability behind contracted criminal groups, a tactic likely used by Russia and China. It’s unclear how the new strategy will deal with this point.

Second, if the U.S. government is able to correctly attribute an attack, its response would have to comport with international law, specifically a statute known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC). The United States is bound to the LoAC through multiple treaties such as the 1907 Hague Conventions and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well as through customary international law. Two elements of the LoAC pose particular challenges in the cyber realm: proportionality and distinction.

Proportionality may be a particularly tough nut to crack, as we know that the Pentagon’s policy will permit retaliating against a cyber attack with conventional weapons. It’s new ground, and the argument could be made that launching a missile in response to a computer-based attack is inherently disproportionate. However, we must recognize that a cyber attack has the ability to cause actual loss of life if, for example, it were aimed at air traffic control systems and caused planes to crash. Under the new policy, only an attack of this magnitude would allow a conventional response to a cyber attack, and it is imperative that such a response be proportionate.

Distinction is another problematic element of the LoAC because cyber weapons can have unintended consequences.  The amount of damage that a conventional weapon does is known before it is used even though it may damage unintended targets.  Not so in the cyber world: Vital military and civilian assets may reside on the same network, thus making it difficult to limit damage to the legitimate military target. Furthermore, cyber weapons are different because entities that reside in cyberspace are interconnected on a global scale: attacking a target on a server in China can also cause damage to another server in Canada.  This actually happened in 2010 when the U.S. military took down a jihadist website hosted in Saudi Arabia that led to disruption to more than 300 servers in Saudi Arabia, Texas, and Germany.

These are only a couple of considerations that complicate the use of cyber weapons, and developing a strong cyber capabilities must occur within the context of these considerations. With so much of its vital national assets relying on the Internet, the U.S. must equip itself with both the strong defensive capabilities and project power in cyberspace, as well as with robust policies to regulate these capabilities.

Photo Credit: West Point Public Affairs.

A Milestone in Trade

Wednesday, May 18th, 2011
Michael Mandel



Michael Mandel is the chief economic strategist at the Progressive Policy Institute and the founder of Visible Economy LLC, a New York-based news and education company.

by Michael Mandel

In 1987  the G6 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the UK) accounted for 55 percent of U.S. goods imports. That same year, China, Mexico and Brazil only accounted for 8 percent of imports.

In 2010 the U.S. reached a milestone–for the first time, imports from China/Mexico/Brazil exceeded imports from the G6 countries. In the year ending March 2011, imports from China/Mexico/Brazil equaled 32 percent of goods imports, compared to 31 percent for the G6 countries. Here’s another way of seeing the same thing. Please note that OPEC’s share, and the share of “all other countries,” don’t change very much. It’s really the G6 versus a handful of  low-cost importers.

One final note. The shift in sourcing is most likely happening because the goods made in China/Mexico/Brazil are less expensive than the same goods made in France/Germany/UK. Unfortunately, the BLS import price statistics are not able to pick up the price drops from shifts in country sourcing.

Suppose for example that goods made in China are sold for one-third less than the same goods made in Japan. Then for the same physical quantity of imports, that shift in sourcing will cause the nominal value of imports to be one-third lower. This imparts a significant downward bias to the import penetration ratio.

Crossposted from Mandel on Innovation and Growth.

Kerry Challenges Obama on North Korea

Tuesday, March 1st, 2011
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

A rift seems to have opened between the Obama administration and Sen. John Kerry (D-MA), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on the ever-sensitive topic of North Korea. Sen. Kerry convened a hearing today on the subject, and previewed his own views in a press statement released this morning:

[T]he best option is to consult closely with South Korea and launch bilateral talks with North Korea when we decide the time is appropriate. Fruitful talks between the U.S. and North Korea can lay the groundwork for resumption of the Six Party Talks. Right now, we simply cannot afford to cede the initiative to North Korea and China because neither country’s interests fully coincide with ours.

Let me be clear: We must get beyond the political talking point that engaging North Korea is somehow “rewarding bad behavior.” It is not. [bold mine]

This differs from what Kurt Campbell, President Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State for Asia, had to say on the issue as he spoke during Sen. Kerry’s hearing:

The United States remains committed to meaningful dialogue, but we will not reward North Korea for shattering the peace or defying the international community. If North Korea improves relations with South Korea and demonstrates a change in behavior … the United States will stand ready to move toward normalization of our relationship. However, if it maintains its path of defiance and provocative behavior and fails to comply with its obligations and commitments, it stands no chance of becoming a strong and prosperous nation. [again, bold is mine]

Kerry seems ready to tango, Obama isn’t. Which is it? I could write a diatribe with my own analysis and recommendations, or I could take the easy way out and suggest you attend PPI’s event on North Korea tomorrow. We’ll have Assistant Secretary Campbell and a panel of experts there to answer your questions and see just where the US — and China — should do to defuse tensions on the peninsula. Click here to register. Details below.

Defusing Tensions on the Korean Peninsula:

What America—and China—Should Do

Keynote Address:

The Honorable Kurt Campbell

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Featured Panelists:

Scott Snyder, Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation

Karin Lee, Executive Director, The National Committee on North Korea

Gordon Flake, Executive Director, The Mansfield Foundation

Date:

Wednesday, March 2, 2011, 2 p.m.

Location:

University of California Washington Center

First Floor Auditorium

1608 Rhode Island Ave. NW

Washington, DC

Click here to register

Defusing Tensions on the Korean Peninsula: What America—and China—Should Do

Tuesday, February 22nd, 2011
The Progressive Policy Institute





by The Progressive Policy Institute

Defusing Tensions on the Korean Peninsula:
What America—and China—Should Do.

Keynote Address:
The Honorable Kurt Campbell
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Featured Panelists:
Scott Snyder, Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation
Karin Lee, Executive Director, The National Committee on North Korea
Gordon Flake, Executive Director, The Mansfield Foundation

Date:
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
2 p.m.

Location:
University of California Washington Center
First Floor Auditorium
1608 Rhode Island Ave. NW
Washington, DC

Register for this event.

If you have any questions, please contact 202-525-3926.

Space is limited. RSVP required.

MEDIA COVERAGE:
The event is open to the press. Media in attendance are required to register in advance of the event to Steven Chlapecka at 202.525.3931 or schlapecka@ppionline.org.

Hosted in collaboration with the University of California Washington Center.

China’s Reverse Robin Hood: Stealing Intellectual Property from the Poor

Wednesday, January 19th, 2011
Scott Andes



Scott M. Andes is a research analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.

by Scott Andes

Many of the facts relating to the globalization of intellectual property (IP) theft over the last decade are not debatable.  For example, IP theft has decreased the market share of U.S. firms and destroyed or prevented the creation of millions of U.S. jobs.  While currently 18 million Americas are employed in IP-intensive industries, the U.S. economy loses over $20 billion annually to IP theft and in 2007 IP theft reduced global trade by 5 to 7 percent.

However once one gets beyond a simple fact-based analysis the debate over IP theft becomes more contentious.  Specifically when it comes to policy prescriptions such as the true societal cost of IP theft, enforcement strategies and stakeholders rights, there is significant disagreement.  One of the most contentious elements of IP theft is how to deal with developing countries.  As technology spreads to emerging markets, specifically in Eastern Europe and Asia, faster than legal frameworks to prosecute IP violations, theft has steadily risen.  For example, although emerging markets only account for 20 percent of the software market, they make up 45 percent of software piracy.  China is a particular conspicuous violator.  According to the EU, China remains the number one country in terms of number of seized pirated goods, both in number and volume, at EU borders.  And over 90 percent of video games consumed in China are pirated.

Still many IP opponents like to argue that IP is a plot hatched by the North to keep the South poor.  Countries like China argue that they are poor and technology transfer (much of it forced or stolen) is an integral part of their development strategy.  If IP laws keep developing countries from getting drugs or other IP-based technologies critical to overcoming barriers to growth then an argument could be made that IP laws should change.  Indeed, IP laws are not divinely manifested, but created within a legal geography because society values the creation of knowledge and believes such knowledge ought to be protected in the marketplace.  The question becomes, is this the type of IP violation that is coming from China—a form of redistribution from rich OECD countries to China, a developing nation?

No it is not.  China and other IP violating nations are willing to take IP wherever they can find it, not just pulling a Robin Hood of stealing from the rich to give to the poor.   They will steal from the even poorer to give to the poor.  This point was has hit home to me when I recently met an entrepreneur named Emanuael Narh while in Ghana.  Narh is the CEO of Step Technologies, a small start-up based out Accra that allows customers to monitor their home security system through mobile devices.  Step Technologies came into existence through the Ghana Multimedia Incubator Centre (GMIC), Ghana’s sole IT incubator program.  Narh designed his prototype while still an undergraduate at the University of Ghana and developed it further in his year of compulsory national service where the concept was noticed by representatives of GMIC.  Over the last several years GMIC has provided work space and helped Narh develop his idea to a commercial level, file patent work, find seed funding, and partner with distributors, and two years ago Step Technologies was finally ready to begin manufacturing.  After going through an extensive bidding process a Chinese manufacturing firm won the contract and Step Technologies transferred their technical details and information for production.  However, over the next several months GMIC noticed something peculiar; within the Chinese manufacturer’s supply network in China devices identical to that of Step Technologies’ began to appear in the market without the permission of Step and without paying a licensing fee.

When I asked Narh about what he thought happened he was cautious to not make any accusation without evidence.  He simply said, “We eventually changed manufacturers out of fears our concept was not safe.”  Others I have met with involved in developing Ghana’s IT sector who are aware of Step Technology’s situation were less cautious, telling me flat out, “of course the manufacturer stole the idea.”

Step Technologies’ story is not unique.  China has developed an explicit strategy that holds that it is acceptable to take IP from anywhere in the world, not just from the rich North.  If the victims of Chinese IP theft are from rich countries it is coincidental and if they are from poor countries, then it is collateral damage.  To emphasize the point consider the fact China’s GDP is 192 times greater than Ghana’s and China’s GDP per capita is over seven times greater.  Rampant IP theft from China (as well as other developing countries like Russia) is not some kind of Robin Hood strategy to bootstrap the poor on the backs of those who can afford it, it is a systemic national strategy to use or take whatever from whomever possible.

Leaders throughout Africa are well aware that in order to grow their economies they must move from commodities to knowledge-based enterprises.  Step Technologies is a model for doing so; an Africa entrepreneur, aided by a government-funded incubator program, is eventually competitive in the marketplace.  (By the way, Step Technologies has found another manufacturer and is now in major markets throughout Africa with plans to go global in the next several years).  This is the type of economic development that benefits Africa and the global economy.  Yet the process of creating knowledge-intensive industries is long and difficult and without any potential recourse for IP theft from market-dominating countries the route can be next to impossible.  As one Ghanaian fund manager responded to my question about IP theft from China, “It’s a struggle but what can we do?”

Africa has enough challenges to development, IP theft from WTO nations should not be yet another hurdle.

This piece is cross-posted at Innovation Policy Blog

Chinese-U.S. Exchange Rates and Knowledge Capital Flows: Why We Feel Poorer

Wednesday, January 19th, 2011
Michael Mandel



Michael Mandel is the chief economic strategist at the Progressive Policy Institute and the founder of Visible Economy LLC, a New York-based news and education company.

by Michael Mandel

The short summary:   The Chinese policy of buying dollars can be best understood as an indirect purchase of U.S. knowledge capital–technology and business know-how.  That, in a nutshell, is why we feel poorer today. Unless the Obama Administration understands the link between the undervalued yuan and the global  flows of knowledge capital,  negotiations with China are doomed to fail.

Viewed in the usual economic light, Chinese exchange rate policy in recent years looks like a gift to the U.S..   By buying up dollars to keep the yuan low, China–still a poor country– is effectively lending money to the U.S.–still a rich country–to buy Chinese products.  According to the official statistics, the U.S. has run a cumulative $1.4 trillion trade deficit with China since 2005. But over the same period, Chinese ownership of  dollar-denominated financial assets in the U.S. has risen by $1.3 trillion.

To put it another way, the conventional statistics seem to be saying that  the U.S. is getting $350+ billion a year in cheap clothing, electronics products, and toys at no real cost today.  What’s not to like?

But if this explanation was really correct–if  that purchase of dollars  was a gift from China–the U.S. would  be feeling happy and prosperous right now.  We have received all of these cheap goods and services, without having to give up very many of our own resources.

But of course, the U.S. doesn’t feel rich and happy right now–we feel poorer, while the Chinese are feeling more prosperous. How can we explain this?

The  reason why the Chinese purchase of dollars seems like a gift is  because we have a 20th century statistical system trying to track a 21st century  global economy. We can do a decent job tracking the flows of goods and services and a passable job tracking financial flows.  But there is no statistical agency tracking global knowledge capital flows–and that’s where the real story is. Take a look at this diagram.

The first three boxes represent the conventional view: The U.S. gets cheap goods and services, and then pays for them by selling financial  assets.

But that leaves out the  the transfer of knowledge capital  from the U.S. to China. In effect, the Chinese purchase of dollars is a mammoth subsidy for the transfer of technology and business-know into China.

Consider this. When China keeps the yuan low, that’s an inducement for U.S.-based companies to set up factories and research facilities in China, both for sale in China and for imports back to the U.S. .  And that, in turn, requires a transfer of  technology and business know-how from the U.S. to China.

My favorite example is furniture makers.  Over the years, U.S. furniture makers had accumulated this vast storehouse of knowledge–for example, how to make  coatings on dining room tables that are less likely to chip or discolor from heat or liquids. That’s one of the differences between a low-quality and a high-quality table.

As the manufacturing of furniture was offshored to China, the knowledge capital had to be transferred as well.   And that, in turn, helped turn the Chinese furniture industry into a global exporting powerhouse.

Now, let’s stop and make  three points here. First, we need to compliment China. It is not easy to absorb knowledge capital from the outside and make good use of it.  Frankly, all sorts of other countries could have tried the same exchange rate trick, and it wouldn’t have worked for them.

Second, the transfer of knowledge capital to China doesn’t mean that the same knowledge capital  disappears in the U.S. However, our knowledge capital  does become less valuable because there is more global competition–and that’s why we feel poorer. (see my earlier post on the writedown of knowledge capital)

Third, what’s needed from Washington is a sophisticated  response that both focuses on rebuilding our own knowledge capital, while at the same time slowing down the exchange-rate knowledge capital pump. More to come on this.

crossposted at Mandel on Innovation and Growth

Hu’s on First

Tuesday, January 18th, 2011
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

China’s President Hu is winging his way to DC as I type, set to dine with President Obama this evening.  The summit will be an interesting mix of symbolism and substance — most summits share elements of both, of course, because the two sides are usually equally interested in the wonkery and pageantry.  This time, not so — the substance and symbolism are bifurcated. China values the image of a proper reception on the world’s stage, while the U.S. is more interested in taking a hard line, discussing military ties, North Korea, human rights, currency revaluation and the like.

PPI has churned out a fair bit of China-related material in the last several months, and if you’re trying to read up on everything China-related during the summit, here’s a good guide to set you on the right path:

1.  In December, PPI hosted a forum on US-China relations, featuring Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE), Asst SecDef for Asia Chip Gregson, plus James Fallows, Joseph S. Nye Jr., and Mike Chase (see below).  We were trying to get at the question of balance in dealing with China’s rise — emphasizing cooperation where we can, being aggressive when we must, while properly understanding the limits of China’s power. As Nye put it during the panel:

There is a rise in Chinese power, but it’s a mistake to over-estimate it. The size of China’s economy and our economy may be equal in size by 2030, but they will not be equal in composition, and per capita income will only be 1/3 of our per capita income.

You can watch the CSPAN coverage here.

2.  Naval War College professor and PPI author Michael Chase has written three memos on the Chinese military, which you can read here (on China’s military budget), here (on its anti access and area denial strategy), and here (on its growing naval capacities).  Here’s his basic conclusion:

In short, the U.S. will need to strengthen its ties to key countries in East Asia and develop strategic and tactical military concepts and capabilities that would allow it to counter China’s growing military power. Meanwhile, U.S. policy makers must seek collaboration with the Chinese military in an effort to highlight the benefits of being a global stakeholder to Beijing.

3.  Finally, yours truly has penned a series of China-related posts in the last few months, on issues like North Korea, Chinese soft power (or lack thereof), and open-seas sovereignty issues.

Even though there seem to be a thousand pressing issues, here’s an overarching one that could could have grave implications in years to come:

Sino-American tensions in military relations are nothing new, but Secretary Gates’ trip continues to expose a fascinating—and potentially dangerous—rift inside the Chinese bureaucracy: the lack of communication between Beijing’s military and civilian leaders.

This week, China unveiled the J-20, its first and only stealth fighter.  China’s bizarre choice of this week—during Gates’ visit—to flex its newfound military muscles by test-flying the J-20 for the first time. When Gates signaled to President Hu that the test flight was unnecessarily provocative, Hu replied that it had “absolutely nothing to do” with Gates’ visit. Pointedly, Gates acknowledged his concern about the Chinese military acting independently of the political leadership, a problem that could in a worst-case scenario lead to unauthorized military action against, for example, Taiwan.

Getting China’s leaders to communicate with one another is well-outside the Obama administration’s powers, of course, but continuing to press Beijing’s political leadership on the issue is a good start.

      Mr. Gates Goes To Beijing

      Tuesday, January 11th, 2011
      Jim Arkedis



      Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

      by Jim Arkedis

      Defense Secretary Robert Gates is in China, meeting with President Hu today in a diplomatic effort to warm military-to-military relations between the two countries. Gates’ trip is in advance of the Obama-Hu summit in Washington next week.  Military relations had frosted over this summer following $6.4 billion in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

      Gates’ meeting with Hu followed on the heels of an encounter with Chinese defense chief Liang Guanglie, where the two agreed to begin regular strategic security talks in an effort to reduce tensions. The Pentagon believes that a structured long-term dialogue will build trust and focus on longer term issues as the United States—regardless of administration—will likely arm Taiwan for decades to come.

      Top of the to-do list on military cooperation will no doubt be North Korea, and it’s hardly coincidence that Gates used this visit to highlight advances in Pyongyang’s military technology that could threaten the West Coast within five years.  Further, as Michael Chase points out in a series of PPI memos on the Chinese military, getting Chinese buy-in on North Korea may rely in part on building trust first in areas like humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and anti-piracy missions, to name a few.

      Sino-American tensions in military relations are nothing new, but Secretary Gates’ trip continues to expose a fascinating—and potentially dangerous—rift inside the Chinese bureaucracy: the lack of communication between Beijing’s military and civilian leaders.

      This week, China unveiled the J-20, its first and only stealth fighter.  China’s bizarre choice of this week—during Gates’ visit—to flex its newfound military muscles by test-flying the J-20 for the first time. When Gates signaled to President Hu that the test flight was unnecessarily provocative, Hu replied that it had “absolutely nothing to do” with Gates’ visit. Pointedly, Gates acknowledged his concern about the Chinese military acting independently of the political leadership, a problem that could in a worst-case scenario lead to unauthorized military action against, for example, Taiwan.

      Getting China’s leaders to communicate with one another is well-outside the Obama administration’s powers, of course, but continuing to press Beijing’s political leadership on the issue is a good start.

      Standing Up to the Chinese Threat

      Thursday, December 23rd, 2010
      Will Marshall



      Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

      by Will Marshall

      Maybe it’s just the growing pains of an adolescent superpower, but China has begun to flex its newfound muscles in ways inconsistent with its “peaceful rise.” Its bullying behavior demands a firm pushback from the United States – starting next month when Chinese President Hu Jintao comes to Washington for talks with President Obama.

      The unmistakably imperious trend in China’s conduct has definitely caught the world’s attention. Take its recent arm-twisting campaign to prevent nations from participating in a Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for Liu Xiaobo, a prominent democracy activist serving an 11-year sentence for subversion. Nineteen countries caved shamelessly to China’s demands. In a display of insecurity worthy of Burma’s insular and paranoid junta, the government also cracked down on domestic dissidents and barred travel to Oslo.

      read the entire piece at RealClearWorld

      Watch PPI’s All-Star Cast Talk China

      Thursday, December 16th, 2010
      Jim Arkedis



      Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

      by Jim Arkedis

      In case you missed it, CSPAN’s coverage of PPI’s event on China is available here.  We had an all-star cast of speakers, including Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia Chip Gregson, professors Joe Nye of Harvard and Mike Chase of the Naval War College, and James Fallows of The Atlantic.

      We also want to highlight some press coverage in the last few days, including this Reuters story, this one from VOA, and a mention in the Washington Times.  More to follow, we think.