Posts Tagged ‘ Citigroup ’

Dodd-Frank Hits and Misses

Monday, June 28th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

First the giant stimulus package, then the ambitious revamping of America’s health care delivery system. Now Congress, under the patient prodding of President Obama, is lurching toward passage of another stupendously complex bill, this time centered on financial regulatory reform. Whether you like them or not, you have to admit that big things are getting done in Washington on Obama’s watch.

If Congress passes the Dodd-Frank bill, it will be another major notch in the belt of a president who could use a political victory about now. But what’s a non-master of the universe like me to make of this 2,000-page behemoth?

It may do considerable good, but we ought to be clear about one thing: It won’t prevent the next financial crisis. As long as there are fortunes to be made in financial markets, there will be excessive risk-taking and speculation, new bubbles and panics, and powerful incentives for chicanery and fraud. No regulatory scheme can fully protect the public against ingenious new forms of human greed and folly.

That, however, is not an argument for doing nothing. The government had to react to Wall Street’s near meltdown in the winter of 2008-2009. Its interventions, beginning under President Bush and continuing into Obama’s administration, doubtless averted a full-bore financial collapse. But they also triggered a fierce and abiding public backlash against bailouts.

The Dodd-Frank bill doesn’t get everything right, but on balance it’s a reasonable response to the crisis. It imposes new disciplines on bank behavior, increases transparency for complex financial transactions and institutions, and offers consumers new protections against the clever breed of predators who have degrees from elite universities and sport $3,000 suits.

Some liberals are chagrined that the bill doesn’t break up the big banks. Conservatives echo the Wall Street Journal’s charges that the bill is a regulatory nightmare that will make it more expensive for banks to supply capital to businesses. It’s tempting to say that Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Frank (D-MA) must therefore have found some kind of centrist sweet spot, but there is something to the left-right critiques.

Most important, for example, the bill doesn’t slay the “too-big-to-fail” dragon. It leaves financial power more concentrated than ever in the hands of five mega-banks: Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and Bank of America. True, Dodd-Frank does impose the “Volcker Rule,” forbidding banks covered by federal deposit insurance from making bets (called “proprietary trading”) with their own money.  It increases capital reserve requirements to keep banks from taking excessive risks. It also sets up a council of financial guardians to anticipate systemic risks, and gives federal authorities power to seize and oversee the “orderly liquidation” of financial firms whose collapse could bring other institutions down as well.

But it’s hard to avoid the impression that the big banks will henceforth operate with a tacit government guarantee against systemic failure. This not only intensifies moral hazard – making it hard for administration officials to claim the bill would bar bailouts in the future – it also risks creating a privileged class of quasi-public banking utilities that will be able to borrow money more cheaply. That will raise the bar for new entrants and dampen competition in the banking sector.

Elsewhere, the picture looks more positive. Dodd-Frank would move much of the trade in financial derivatives onto exchanges and clearinghouses, though banks could still trade in over-the-counter derivatives to hedge their own risks. This seems like a sensible compromise that brings derivatives trading out of the shadows while retaining the ability of firms to hedge against interest rate and currency risks. In another boost for transparency, the bill would require private equity firms and hedge funds to register with regulators.

Dodd-Frank also puts in place what Obama last week called “the strongest consumer financial protections in history.” It creates a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau housed with the Fed to police mortgage lending, credit and debit cards and other consumer loans – though not by auto dealers, who somehow won an exemption from oversight. This agency presumably will prevent abuses like the “no doc” and “liar” loans that helped to trigger the subprime lending frenzy, which was the spark that started the financial crisis.

The bill doesn’t deal at all with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This is a huge omission, considering that these giant mortgage finance firms still hold a pile of dubious assets and are essentially in federal receivership.

For all its imperfections, Dodd-Frank seeks to protect consumers without creating undue regulatory obstacles to innovation in the financial sector, which traditionally has been a source of comparative economic advantage for the U.S. Pragmatic progressives ought to support it, while retaining a sense of humility about the ability of new regulatory bodies to prevent future abuses.

Photo credit: Center for American Progress Action Fund

Taking It to the Banks

Thursday, January 14th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Following a week of trial balloons about a tax on banks and bankers, President Obama today unveiled a “financial crisis responsibility fee,” to be levied against 50 of our nation’s largest banks. While the tax will not be able to seriously address the deficits that the government faces – it’s expected to raise only $90 billion over 10 years – any tax on the financial system can affect the course of our economy. The details of the proposed tax have yet to be outlined. Compared to the alternatives, this tax is a good start – but it doesn’t go far enough.

In the discussion of taxing banks and bankers, a couple of possibilities have been floated, some of which can reap short-term political points, others of which have the potential to promote progressive policies:

Bonus tax – One of the easiest – and politically most satisfying – would be a tax on excess bonuses. The British exercised this option on London bankers this past year. Bonuses in the City above a certain amount were taxed at a 50 percent rate. Banks responded by threatening to move offshore and – when that threat rang hollow – doubled the bonus pool they paid out to bankers. The end result was that the bankers whose decisions led in part to the crisis were financially unharmed, the British government raised a relative pittance in taxes, shareholders in City banks took a hit (as the bonus pools were increased at their expense), and the underlying fault lines in the British banking system remain unaddressed.

Transaction tax – The worst of the options would be a tax on transactions. As discussed before, this would merely pour sand in our financial system, breaking it and slowing economic recovery.

Excess profits tax – A more appealing option would be a tax on excess profits. A defining aspect of the financial bubble of the last decade was the fact that financial profits were 40 percent of overall corporate profits – more than double the slice financials made up of profits in the 1980s. A tax on these excess profits would rein that in. But while this could be useful, as Simon Johnson points out, it would be fairly easy to game, and end up being ineffective.

Tax on assets – A tax on bank assets above a certain amount addresses not just political sentiment that banks have made it through the crisis unscathed, but also the fact that banks are too big to fail. Encouraging banks to “right-size” themselves would make our economy safer from the systemic risk imposed by banks like Citigroup or Bank of America – which are debilitated but whose failure would be economically catastrophic.

Excess leverage tax – Taxing the leverage that financial institutions use to increase returns would allow us to avoid situations like that faced a year and a half ago when Lehman Brothers – leveraged over 30:1 – collapsed over the course of a weekend. It would make banks “safer” but would leave them still too big. In the event a bank were to fail, it would still be a systemic threat to our economy. This would be a more targeted version than an assets tax, but it would be harder to implement — definitions of leverage differ – and if not properly defined would leave hedge funds, insurance companies and other “non-bank financial institutions” untouched, leading to a crisis like that perpetuated by Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 or AIG last fall.

The taxes unveiled today are a very tentative step down the path towards an effective tax on assets. But the administration’s proposal is too broad – affected institutions could be as small as $50 billion — and too light to be effective.

If the Obama administration were strictly looking to tax the problem of an outsized and dangerous financial industry out of existence, a combination of the last two taxes — properly implemented to cover the whole financial sector when looking at leverage and focused on banks that are bigger than, say, $300 billion when looking at assets — would be the most effective. But hastily implemented, they could have unintended consequences, crippling our economy while merely pushing the problem offshore. Coordination with the EU and other G-20 countries will be vital to help with the de-leveraging of our economy.