Virtually every election cycle produces some sort of “lessons learned” debate in both major parties.  Big victories invariably generate a scramble for credit among factions and leaders.  Big defeats often lead to “struggles for the soul” of this or that party.  Such struggles typically reflect old battles and grievances as much as fresh evidence of public opinion or the success or failure of particular strategies and tactics.  And that’s why they sometimes begin well before voters actually weigh in.

The first major trumpet blast on the Democratic side was by The Nation’s Ari Berman, who penned a New York Times op-ed with the unsubtle title: “Boot the Blue Dogs.” In fairness to Berman, the Times’ word limits forced him into a CliffsNotes version of his argument, which he has elucidated at greater length in an entire book.  But his essay does cover a lot of ground heavily occupied by those on the Left who believe that the willingness of the Obama administration and the Democratic congressional leadership to tolerate moderate-to-conservative Democrats has doomed the party politically and substantively:

With President Obama in office, some notable beneficiaries of the Democrats’ 50-state strategy have been antagonizing the party from within — causing legislative stalemate in Congress, especially in the Senate, and casting doubt on the long-term viability of a Democratic majority….

A smaller majority, minus the intraparty feuding, could benefit Democrats in two ways: first, it could enable them to devise cleaner pieces of legislation, without blatantly trading pork for votes as they did with the deals that helped sour the public on the health care bill. (As a corollary, the narrative of “Democratic infighting” would also diminish.)

Second, in the Senate, having a majority of 52 rather than 59 or 60 would force Democrats to confront the Republicans’ incessant misuse of the filibuster to require that any piece of legislation garner a minimum of 60 votes to become law.

The obvious response to Berman’s argument is that Democrats (particularly in the Senate) have been perfectly free throughout the last two years to pursue this small-majority strategy, but chose not to for one reason or another (often because some left-leaning Democratic senators opposed measures to reduce the power of the filibuster, which they have deployed during periods of Republican ascendancy).

Perhaps “booting” the Blue Dogs will make the caucus more collegial, but it won’t increase the number of progressive House or Senate members.  So what’s the harm of having Blue Dog members who will help maintain the majority, and on many occasions, will vote with the caucus as well?  As for the idea that a more ideologically consistent caucus will be able to draft “cleaner” legislation, what difference does that make if you don’t have the votes to enact it?

An additional argument that is often heard (but that Berman does not include in his Times piece) is that the power of the Democratic Party’s message is directly proportional to its consistency.   It’s pretty easy to go from this line of reasoning down the rabbit hole of cognitive science or “branding” theory, but there are a lot of progressives who seem to believe that intraparty dissent undermines progressive messaging.  By the same token, of course, democracy and the First Amendment undermine progressive messaging, but that seems a small price to pay.

A stronger argument, I’d submit, is that some Blue Dogs are fundamentally at odds with other Democrats on politically critical issues involving first principles, such as progressive taxation and economic inequality.  If House Democrats with a robust majority cannot implement the longstanding position of the Democratic Party favoring the repeal of Bush tax cuts for the wealthy (while maintaining middle-class tax cuts), the majority truly is of limited utility.

Part of the problem with this whole debate, of course, is that all Blue Dogs aren’t the same, and that no one—not Ari Berman, not Nancy Pelosi, not Tim Kaine—has the authority to define the boundaries of dissent for Democrats.  Moreover, what are the implications of a tougher party line for dissenting progressives?

What if President Obama strongly promotes a trade agenda, or a deficit reduction compromise, that infuriates the Democratic Left?  When President Clinton split with House Democrats over trade and welfare reform measures, who were the good, loyal Democrats in that fight?  Maybe that’s obvious to Ari Berman, but maybe not so much to others.

A final planted axiom in Berman’s essay should be noted for purposes of clarity: the idea that Blue Dogs exist because they were “recruited” by Rahm Emanuel.  Obviously many leading Blue Dogs have been around for much longer than 2006 or 2008.  Others have been political powers in their own districts, and national party financial backing, while helpful, wasn’t necessarily the key factor in their decisions to run for Congress.  But in any event, the suggestion that the national party could, if it chose, “recruit” more progressive candidates who could win in tough territory is not supported by much actual evidence.  Certainly primary challenges to Blue Dogs this year haven’t gone very well.

None of this is to say that congressional leaders and the White House couldn’t more effectively deploy sticks and carrots to encourage greater party discipline.  In the Senate, support for the party on cloture motions ought to become as automatic as it used to be.

But losing seats in, and perhaps control of, the House or Senate this year does not make such disciplinary measures any easier for Democrats, and the idea of deliberately shrinking the House and Senate Caucuses isn’t likely to go over very well with either Members or with the Democratic rank-and-file.  In any event, looking at the most vulnerable Democratic seats in the House, plenty of Blue Dogs are going to be “booted” and replaced with right-wing Republicans, so we will soon see if that has any sort of salutary effect on the Democratic Party.

Photo credit: Mahima Hada