Posts Tagged ‘ Democrats ’

Supercommittee Puts GOP on Spot

Friday, October 28th, 2011
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

Is the supercommittee President Obama’s revenge?

After last summer’s showdown over raising the debt ceiling, Obama was roundly criticized for agreeing to a deficit-reduction deal that was all spending cuts and no tax hikes. Democrats, disconsolate over this seeming capitulation to House Republicans, saw it as the low-water mark of his presidency.

Yet the deal also created the bipartisan supercommittee, which was charged with finding at least $1.2 trillion (over 10 years) in additional cuts by Nov. 23. The supercommittee has a strong incentive to succeed, since its failure will trigger an automatic, equivalent cut in domestic and defense spending.

Now, as the supercommittee spars over dueling Democratic and Republican plans for meeting the target, Republicans are on the hot seat.

Democrats this week reportedly proposed a $3 trillion package over the next decade, including $1.2 trillion in revenue increases. Republicans came back with a smaller counteroffer of $2.2 trillion. The reason, of course, is that the GOP’s anti-tax fanaticism prevents it from matching the Democrats’ debt-reduction plan without proposing truly punishing cuts in federal spending.

The Republicans claim their package includes revenues ($640 billion worth) but much of it seems to come not from actual changes in the tax code, but from increased fees and co-pays in Medicare. The rest is supply side fairy dust—around $200 billion from the higher growth supposed to be generated by future tax reform.

The upshot is that Democrats now look like they are more serious about getting the nation’s debt under control, and in a way that spreads the pain of fiscal retrenchment more equitably. Republicans look like their top priority isn’t restoring fiscal discipline, but shielding the wealthy from higher taxes.

If they refuse to deal on taxes, they’ll likely be blamed for the supercommittee’s failure and subsequent trigger of automatic spending cuts. The GOP may not care about slashing domestic spending—even though it includes critical public investments in science and technology, infrastructure and education—but they do care about defense spending, which would take a whopping, half-trillion-dollar hit.

Of course, Republicans could offer a minimum bid of $1.2 trillion in spending cuts to avoid across-the-board cuts, and call it a day. Supercommittee Democrats, however, shouldn’t let them off the hook without substantial concessions on taxes. Democrats don’t want to trigger big domestic and defense spending cuts either, but it’s better to force the issue of GOP intransigence on taxes now than during the debt ceiling debate, when America stood on the brink of default.

Even if the supercommittee does its job and approves a bipartisan debt reduction plan by Thanksgiving, it’s by no means clear that Congress will pass it. Members of Congress hate nothing more than being “shut out of the process,” and many bridle at the idea of delegating power to 12 supercommittee members to craft a massive plan and present it for an up or down vote.

Complaining that he has “no stake” in the outcome, Democratic Rep. Henry Waxman added, “I find it an outrageous process, that 12 people could rewrite the laws of the United States and come up with ideas just setting there and getting into some mood that might influence them at the moment.”

Over on the right, there’s little love for the supercommmittee. Nothing is more predictable than that Tea Party zealots will rise in righteous condemnation of any plan that includes higher tax revenues, thus breaking the party of Lincoln’s solemn covenant with anti-tax gadfly Grover Norquist.

More favorable are congressional moderates, whose main concern is that the supercommittee won’t go far enough. Nearly 100 Members from both parties signed a letter urging the supercommittee to cut $4 trillion over the next decade, the amount most budget experts believe is necessary to stabilize the debt. For pain-averse lawmakers, the logic of “going big” and not having to keep repeating these excruciating political battles over spending and taxes is pretty compelling.

If the supercommittee fails, the economic and political consequences won’t be pretty. Fresh evidence that the nation’s political leaders are incapable of coming to grips with the debt crisis will no doubt cause the markets to nosedive, and could even lead ratings agencies like Standard & Poor to downgrade the nation’s credit again. This could cast a pall over the economy, just as it’s finally showing some signs of life.

Worst of all, it would deepen the public’s already explosive anger at Washington. A mere nine percent of the voters approve of the job Congress is doing, and 89 percent say they don’t trust the government to do the right thing. By going big on debt reduction, Congress could start earning back that trust.

Photo credit: DonkeyHotey

Obama Needs New Growth Story

Thursday, September 1st, 2011
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

President ObamaThe White House this week is dribbling out new details about Obama’s forthcoming jobs package. Liberals already are complaining that the president is thinking too small, while conservatives dismiss his ideas as just more “stimulus” in drag.

Neither critique gets to the heart of the problem. The U.S. economy is enduring an investment and job drought that began well before the Great Recession hit late in 2007. The public is strikingly pessimistic about the nation’s economic prospects and has lost confidence in the conventional remedies pushed by both parties.

More than a batch of new programs, Americans need a new story about how to regain our economic dynamism. We need a fundamentally new model for economic growth, and the president’s kit-bag of new micro-initiatives doesn’t add up to one.

His proposals mostly seem sensible, but absent a new vision for dealing with the economy’s structural problems, they give off a whiff of spaghetti-against-the-wall desperation. The administration is hoping that something, anything will move the needle on job creation and get unemployment trending down.

Here, according to various media accounts, is what the White House job package is likely to include:

  • A $5,000 tax credit for hew hires.
  • A five percent reduction in payroll taxes on any net increase in wages.
  • $50 billion in new spending on infrastructure.
  • An overhaul of patent laws to encourage faster innovation.
  • A new mortgage refinancing scheme to help “underwater” homeowners avoid foreclosures that are depressing housing prices.

Liberals have a point in arguing that these initiatives are unlikely to have more than a marginal impact on jobs and economic growth. The tax credit and payroll tax reduction will likely expand employment, but they also will reward companies for hiring workers they would have hired in any case. Michael Greenstone, former chief economist for the president’s Council of Economic Advisers, estimates the tax credit will create 900,000 additional jobs at a cost of $30 billion. The United States must create 21 million new jobs over the next decade to return to full employment.

Modernizing America’s antiquated infrastructure is essential, even if the immediate job gains are likely to be modest. While it’s conceivable that $50 billion could leverage large-scale private investment in new infrastructure, there’s a catch: The administration does not envision funneling that money into a truly independent infrastructure bank. That’s likely to scare off private investors, who need assurances that big capital projects will be chosen on economic rather than political grounds.

The real problem, however, isn’t that Obama isn’t spending enough. It’s that this spray of programmatic buckshot won’t deal with structural impediments to economic innovation and growth. As PPI has argued, U.S. policy makers need a new model of economic growth centered on production, not consumption; on saving and investing, not borrowing; and on exports, not imports.

Obama needs to fit his specific initiatives within the broader story of an American economic comeback sparked by a shift from debt-fueled consumption to domestic production. This narrative should explain how overconsumption—by both U.S. households and governments—helped to create the job slowdown, wage stagnation, financial bubbles and exploding debts that have plagued our economy since 2000. It would connect America’s twin economic imperatives: creating jobs and controlling the national debt. It would say: If we don’t curb the unsustainable growth of entitlement spending (mostly for health care consumption), we will squeeze out strategic public investments the nation’s physical, human and knowledge capital—infrastructure, skilled workers, and new technology.

But a “producer society” narrative doesn’t just reinforce progressive demands for more strategic public investment. It also lends weight to conservative calls for policies that create a climate more conducive to innovation, entrepreneurship, and business creation. In fact, it will take a new fusion of liberal and conservative economic prescriptions to get America moving again.

Key elements of such a fusion include a sweeping overhaul of personal and corporate taxes, a light-handed approach to regulating companies that invest heavily in innovation,  stronger constraints on Medicare and Medicaid spending, new investments in technical education to supply workers for advanced manufacturing, and the transformation of our archaic K-12 school system by choice and digital learning. And, as I’ve written elsewhere, it also requires a new partnership between U.S. workers and those companies that are investing in creating jobs in the United States.

President Obama’s ideas for spurring job growth are fine as far as they go, but they don’t go nearly far enough. He needs to offer the country a new story of economic success, that once again makes America a dynamo of production and middle class job creation.

Photo credit: OFA

Welfare Nostalgia Won’t Help Poor

Friday, August 26th, 2011
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

Some liberal commentators marked the 15th anniversary of welfare reform this week with a curious lament: Welfare rolls aren’t growing fast enough.

“If you think the point of the program is to help the poor, then no, welfare reform is not working,” asserts Ezra Klein of the Washington Post. He cites an article by Jake Blumgart in The American Prospect, who frets that welfare rolls have “merely inched upward” during the late recession and jobless recovery.

“At the heart of the worst recession in 80 years, TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) funds only reached 4.5 million families, or 28 percent of those living in poverty,” Blumgart writes. “By contrast, in 1995, the old welfare system covered 13.5 million families, or 75 percent of those living in poverty.”

Before we wax too nostalgic for the good old days of big welfare rolls, it’s worth remembering that progressives led the charge for welfare reform.

“Ending welfare as we know it” was arguably President Bill Clinton’s most radical challenge to the political status quo, and the biggest policy change to happen on his watch. By the time he took office in 1992, the welfare system was held in nearly universal contempt by Americans across the socio-economic spectrum. Not only had it failed to make a dent in poverty, but taxpayers believed it undermined work, personal responsibility and family. The system also had failed the poor, providing them neither effective preparation for work or links to jobs, nor public subsidies sufficient to lift them out of poverty.

Clinton had a better idea: Rather than subsidizing dependence on the state and isolation from the economic mainstream, public assistance ought to require and reward work. To “make work pay,” Clinton got Congress in 1993 to approve a massive expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, which is essentially a “work bonus” for low-wage earners. The credit has become a social policy rarity—an anti-poverty program that actually works.

On Aug. 21, 1996, after having vetoed two draconian bills sent to him by the Republican Congress, Clinton signed a law which put a time limit on benefits, and replaced the old, open-ended welfare entitlement with a block grant to the states. In combination with the work bonus and other reforms (e.g., cracking down on deadbeat dads and expanding child care support) and a robustly growing economy, the results were galvanic.

More than 7 million people left the rolls between 1996 and 2001. From its peak of 14.4 million in March 1994, the number of people on welfare dropped by 63 percent to 5.3 million in 2001. Millions of welfare recipients left the dole for jobs. Teen pregnancy and out-of-wedlock birth rates dropped dramatically. And the number of Americans living in poverty declined dramatically, by nearly 8 million people.

While some liberals predicted that ending the entitlement would produce scenes of Calcutta-style misery in America—and a few quit the Clinton administration in protest—the public heartily approved. By realigning U.S. social assistance with a strong work ethic and personal responsibility, Clinton’s reforms helped mitigate public hostility toward public assistance and unlock Americans inherent generosity—overall federal and state spending (including EITC costs) to support low-income families actually rose after 1996. They also deprived culture warriors of a favorite, racially tinged theme: When was the last time you heard a Republican candidate mock “welfare queens?”

In the late 1990s, of course, jobs were plentiful. Now the economy isn’t creating enough jobs to bring unemployment back down to earth. Obviously this undercuts policies aimed at speeding transitions from welfare to work, and liberals are right to draw attention to the hardships the jobless recovery imposes on our most vulnerable families.

But they are wrong to assume that welfare’s cash payments are somehow still central to America’s efforts to fight poverty, relieve social distress or shorten recessions. Clinton’s emphasis on “work first” made the unemployment system, rather than welfare, the safety net of first resort for low-income families in downturns. And indeed that is what has happened.

According to a recent Urban Institute fact sheet:

“Unemployment benefits substitute for welfare: three in ten low-income (below 200 percent of the federal poverty level) single parents received unemployment benefits in 2009, double the share receiving in 2005. This suggests that as more single mothers went to work during the late 1990s and early 2000s, more could qualify for unemployment benefits in the event of job loss. Also, many states have recently expanded eligibility for unemployment benefits.”

The other big, countercyclical response to the recession and sluggish job growth has come from the food stamp program (now called SNAP). Last month, the Urban Institute reported that nearly 45 million people receive help from SNAP, an increase of about 69 percent since the recession began in 2007. Many states have seen dramatic growth in their food assistance caseloads as well.

In other words, poor families increasingly rely on other social supports to tide them over hard times. Liberals have a point, however, in arguing against enforcing strict time limits on welfare benefits during a prolonged job drought. Although the Clinton reforms held up well during the 2000-2001 recession, this one is far worse. The “work-first” architecture isn’t perfect, and progressives should be open to sensible modifications based on new and unforeseen economic challenges.

Rather than resurrect the old dependency-fostering entitlement, however, progressives should try more creative approaches. We should be prepared to spend more money to help more families from sinking into poverty through no fault of their own. But, in keeping with the spirit of Clinton’s reforms, new funding should go to support work. This could take the form of a new public works initiative or—perhaps more likely, given GOP control of the House—direct subsidies to employers to hire low-income workers.

The states already have the ability to waive work requirements for a portion of their caseloads; Washington could broaden such authority temporarily, until job growth starts to pick up. Here again, the challenge will be getting GOP austerity freaks to get in touch with their inner “compassionate conservative.”

In any event, it’s hard to see how relitigating the 1996 reform will help the poor. The entitlement ethos isn’t exactly making a comeback in America. And there’s no evidence it would work any better now than before.

 

Political Memo: The “Centrist Premium”: The High Cost of Moderation

Thursday, August 18th, 2011
Anne Kim



Anne Kim is the managing director for policy and strategy at the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Anne Kim

For most of the last 30 years, self-described ideological moderates have comprised a plurality of the American electorate. While the share of moderates has dropped slightly in recent years, 38 percent of voters in 2010 still described themselves as such.

In Congress, on the other hand, moderates are decidedly—and increasingly—a minority. Among Democrats, the moderate New Democrat and Blue Dog Coalitions suffered heavy losses among their respective memberships in 2010 and are now outnumbered by their liberal counterparts in the Progressive Caucus. Among Republicans, moderate members are an even rarer species. In fact, there are only 33 members of the moderate Republican Main Street Partnership who are not also part of the 177-member conservative Republican Study Committee.

Analysts have offered up structural explanations—such as gerrymandering and the current political primary system—for why there aren’t more moderates in elected office to reflect America’s true ideological complexion. This paper looks at another structural disadvantage that moderate candidates and incumbents face: campaign finance.

For better or for worse, financing plays a major role in a candidate’s viability and success. Financing buys the ads and ability to raise a candidate’s profile, counter the opposition and turn out the vote. A hefty campaign war chest can be enough in itself to discourage potential rivals. According to the Federal Election Commission, House Congressional races cost a grand total of nearly $1.1 billion in 2010—or $2.5 million per seat. Moreover, elections are becoming increasingly expensive. The spending in 2010 was nearly double the $563 million spent just a decade ago in 2000.

Read the entire memo.

Why the Liberal Base Has so Little Leverage With Obama

Monday, July 25th, 2011
The Progressive Policy Institute





by The Progressive Policy Institute

Ed Kilgore in Salon:

Progressive elite disgruntlement with the administration of Barack Obama has been aired so many times during the last year that it is sometimes difficult to remember how deep and wide it has become. Like lights blinking off in house after house late at night, the number of liberal opinion-leaders willing to offer robust support for Obama’s policies and political strategy and tactics has steadily dwindled to the point where it appears as an occasional dull glimmer on the cable news shows and in the op-ed pages and the blogosphere. But up until now, signs of any rank-and-file liberal Democratic “base” revolt against Obama have been few and far between. Perhaps that’s why a poll from CNN last week publicized as showing that liberals were the main source of his latest drop in approval ratings got more attention than a random survey normally captures.

There has certainly been a persistent and growing gap between elite and non-elite progressive attitudes towards the 44th president and his administration. Liberal elite defections from the Obama camp started early and have spread steadily.

Read the full article here.

Will Marshall in Politico on the Gang of Six

Wednesday, May 18th, 2011
The Progressive Policy Institute





by The Progressive Policy Institute

Head on over to Politico’s site today to see Will Marshall’s take on the implosion of the Gang of Six, a group of Senators trying to forge a bipartisan compromise on the budget. Here’s an excerpt, but click here to read the whole piece:

Sen. Tom Coburn’s defection from the Gang of Six obviously sets back prospects for restoring fiscal sanity in Washington. Nonetheless, the now diminished Gang remains the only plausible vehicle for advancing the political breakthrough achieved by the president’s Fiscal Commission.

To the surprise of many jaded Washington observers, the commission struck a fiscal “grand bargain” that marries tax and entitlement reform. Defying the Norquist Doctrine, Coburn and two other GOP senators agreed to close tax expenditures and use the savings not only to lower individual and corporate tax rates, but also to cut the federal deficit. This prompted a reciprocal act of political courage by several Democrats led by Sen. Dick Durbin, who embraced Social Security reforms unpopular with liberals.

Continue reading the whole piece at Politico.

More College Graduates, More Democratic Voters?

Thursday, March 24th, 2011
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

This week, Secretary of Education Arne Duncan announced competitive grants to encourage states to increase their college graduation rates, with a goal to add eight million college graduates by 2020.

Sure, there are plenty of legitimate policy-related reasons why we might want to increase the number of college graduates. After all, as Secretary Duncan put it, “We all know that the best jobs and fastest-growing firms will gravitate to countries, communities, and states with a highly qualified work force.”

But, for those who can’t imagine Obama doing anything without an ulterior motive, consider the graphs below that show that increasing the number of college graduates might also increase the number of Democratic voters and reduce the number of Republican voters.

 

 

The first graph shows the state-level relationship between the percentage of individuals identifying as Democrats (data from Gallup) and the percentage of individuals with bachelor’s degrees. There’s a clear, statistically significant relationship that explains 28 percent of the state-level variation in Democratic identification. For every one percentage point increase in college graduates in a state, the percentage of Democratic identifiers increases by 0.75 percent.

The second graph shows the state-level relationship of Republican identifiers and college graduates. As you’d expect, it’s pretty much the reverse. For every one percentage point increase in college graduates, the percentage of individuals identifying as Republicans decreases by 0.76 percentage points. This simple regression explains 30 percent of the variation.

Now let’s look at the relationship of state-level education to state-level liberals and conservatives. Here the relationship is even more significant:

For every one percentage point increase in state-level college graduates, the percentage of liberals also increases by 0.75 percentage points. Impressively, education level explains 66 percent of variation in state-level percentage of liberals.

By contrast, for every one percentage point in college graduates, there is a 0.88 percentage point decline in the share of conservatives, and this by itself explains 58 percent of the state-level variation in the number of conservatives.

Does this mean that there is a simple causal story that education makes people more liberal either because (in the conservative telling) it turns them into elitist snobs, or (in the liberal telling) it gives them enough knowledge to understand how the world works?

Maybe. Maybe not. Perhaps liberal, Democratic states invest more in education, which is why those states have more college graduates. It’s also important to note that 1) these are state-level, not individual-level relationships, and 2) this is a static relationship, not a time series.

Nonetheless, the graphs are quite telling. The more college graduates, the more Democratic (and especially more liberal) the state. The fewer college graduates, the more Republican and (and especially more conservative) the state. There’s clearly something going on here, and I’m actually quite curious to hear how conservatives would respond.

Increasing the number of college graduates by eight million would bring the number of college graduates in the United States from approximately 83 million (27 percent) to 91 million (about 29 percent in 2020). That’s two percentage points, and if the relationship between state-level education and voting is indeed causal, it would mean a 1.5 percentage point increase in the share of Democratic identifiers and a similar decline among Republican identifiers. This could tip some states.

Well, now I’ve given conservatives an argument against increasing the number of college graduates.

Why Dems Are Doing Worse in Some States than Others: It’s Race, Not the Economy

Tuesday, March 15th, 2011
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

In 2008, Democrats enjoyed a solid advantage in partisan identification. By 2010, that advantage had largely evaporated. As I detailed in a previous post, in every state, the Democratic partisan ID advantage has declined, and by an average of nine percentage points.

But the decline has not been equal across the nation. In fact, there is a good deal of variation in the change in Democratic identification across states, ranging from a ranging from a drop of 22.2 percent in New Hampshire (from +13.2% to -9.0%) to a drop of just 1.6 percent in Mississippi (see this table for state-by-state numbers).

Why should these changes vary so much from state to state? Are there demographics that might explain this?

As it turns out, the only statistically significant predictor of the decline in democratic partisan affiliation advantage is the percentage of white people in the state. Surprisingly, the state economy (at least as measured by unemployment rate or change in unemployment rate) doesn’t seem to matter.

Unemployment

Let’s begin with the unemployment rate, since a good deal of the analysis around the 2010 election was an “it’s the economy stupid” story: voters blamed Democrats for high unemployment, and voted Republican to express their anger and frustration.

Yet, what’s remarkable about this scatterplot (above) is that the story doesn’t hold up. If anything, the relationship seems to be slightly opposite what the conventional wisdom would lead us to expect: the Democrats appear to have lost more support in states that have relatively lower unemployment rates. However, it is not statistically significant.

Still, it’s possible that what matters is not the absolute unemployment rate, but rather the change. Yet, once again, the scatterplot (below) shows that this is not the case. The more unemployment dropped between November 2008 and November 2010, the less the average decline in Dems’ partisan ID advantage. Though the relationship is actually stronger than above, it is still not a statistically significant one.

These numbers just don’t fit with the story of voters turning against Democrats for a failing economy. Take Nevada: Unemployment jumped from 8.0 percent to 14.3 percent, yet Democrats partisan ID declined by only; Similarly, California: Unemployment goes up from 8.4 percent to 12.4 percent.

On the other side, consider New Hampshire: Unemployment goes up from 4.3 percent to 5.4 percent (both among the lowest in the nation), but Democrats lose 22.2 percentage points in partisan ID advantage; Or South Dakota: Enemployment up from just 3.4 percent to just 4.5 percent, but the Dem partisan ID advantage falls up 10.4 percent.

Manufacturing

Another possibility is that what matters is the economic make-up of the economy, and in particular, perhaps states that rely disproportionately on manufacturing are more likely to have a lot of anxious voters, since manufacturing is a dying industry. But if we plot the decline in Democratic partisan ID and the manufacturing as share of the state GDP, there is no relationship.

Seniors

Another possibility is that Democrats are losing out in states with more seniors, since senior citizens are reportedly turning against Democrats. A scatter-plot shows a clear relationship, though not quite a statistically significant one (but close!). Generally, the more seniors in a state, the more Democrats have lost in their partisan ID advantage. However, the number of seniors explains only three percent of the variation in the Democratic vote share decline.

Whites

Finally, we come to the share of white voters. Here we have a consistent pattern, and one that is statistically significant (and explains 13 percent of the state-level variation). For every ten percent increase in white voters as a share of the electorate, the predicted decline in Democratic ID advantage is almost one full percentage point (the one outlier in the lower left is Hawaii, which is highly Asian. Without that outlier, the relationship would be even stronger).

This re-emphasizes the problems that Democrats seem to be having with white voters. (Democrats have not enjoyed parity with Republicans among white voters in 20 years, but 2010 was especially bad, with white voters breaking 62-to-38 for Republicans in the mid-term elections.)

This explains why the Democratic decline in diverse states like California (47 percent white) and Nevada (66 percent white) is less than in lily-white states like South Dakota (90 percent white) and New Hampshire (95 percent white), even though California and Nevada have much higher levels of unemployment.

These results exist regardless of economic circumstances (these findings are robust even in a statistical model that controls for all the other possible factors discussed).

Conclusions

The brief summary of this analysis is that race may matter more than the economy for  why voters have been identifying more and more as Republicans for the last two years.

Of course, there are obvious caveats to this interpretation, most significantly the fact that I am playing around with state-level data, as opposed to individual-level data.

But the patterns are discouraging for Obama and the Democrats. Much prognostication has argued that the number one factor for 2012 will be the unemployment rate, because historically, the unemployment rate has been a very strong predictor of whether the incumbent party wins or not. This analysis suggests that something else is going on as well. Democrats are having a hard time with seniors and particularly white voters, and it’s not just a story about the state of the economy.  Democrats ignore these scatterplots at their peril.

Update: I’ve written a response to some of the comments entitled “Am I a Race-Baiter?”

How Gallup’s Partisan ID Numbers Could Mean Trouble for Obama in 2012

Tuesday, March 15th, 2011
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

In looking ahead to 2012, I’ve been playing around with Gallup’s State of the States numbers on political party affiliations. Gallup asks people whether they identify as Democrats or Republicans, and really pushes Independents to pick a side, which means that you can get a pretty good picture of where voters are

In 2008, Democrats had a party affiliation advantage in 42 states, and that affiliation advantage was at least 10 points in 28 states. In 2010, just two years later, Democrats enjoyed an affiliation advantage in 28 states, and had an advantage of more than 10 points in just 12 states. On average, Democratic Party affiliation advantage has gone down by 9.0 percentage points. In other words, the country went from being solidly Democratic to just slightly so. But it gets a little more troubling for Obama when translated into Electoral College math.

Since Democrats seem to enjoy a party affiliation advantage in Gallup’s polling that is slightly higher than the state voting patterns (Gallup thinks this is because Republicans vote at higher rates), in 2008, the state with the lowest Democratic affiliation advantage that went to Obama was Virginia, which was +9.0% Democrat. If that threshold carries over to 2012, and the party affiliation numbers remain the same, the Republican candidate would pick up at least 358 electoral votes, possibly more, since a couple of states that had even higher Democratic advantages than +9.0% voted for McCain in 2008.

Looking ahead to 2012, the key will be the states in the more than five percent but less than ten percent Democratic advantage range. Here we have a whole bunch of probable swing states: Iowa (+5.1%), North Carolina (+5.2%), Minnesota (+5.4%), Ohio (5.6%), Pennsylvania (6.4%), Michigan (+7.3%), and Washington (+7.7%). If Obama takes these seven states (but still loses West Virginia, which is +9.7% Dem, but he lost last time at +18.9%) Dem, he gets 271 electoral votes, just enough to win.

Key swing states that have fallen below the five percent Democratic advantage now include: Nevada (+4.5%, down from +11.3%), Florida (+3.1%, down from +9.1%), Wisconsin (2.6%, down from 17.8%(!)), Colorado (+2.6%, down from 10.7%), and Virginia (-0.3% down from +9.0%).

Obviously, there is a fair amount of time between now and November 2012, and things could shift back in the other direction. Since we know independents broke strongly for Republicans in 2010, it’s a decent bet that a fair amount of the shift toward Republicans comes from independents, and that those independents could be won back. Moreover, the Republican presidential field continues to look week.

In a subsequent post, I’ll be dealing with what I think is a very intriguing question raised by these numbers: that there is a good deal of variation in the change in Democratic identification across states, ranging from a ranging from a drop of 22.2 percent in New Hampshire (from +13.2% to -9.0%) to a drop of 1.6 percent in Mississippi (already a pretty red state).

Why has the Democratic advantage fallen much more precipitously in some states than others? And could knowing why help Democrats at all? Stay tuned.

2012 and the Anxiety Belt

Wednesday, March 9th, 2011
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

As thoughts begin to drift to 2012, a debate is emerging whether Obama can win without Ohio. William Galston, who has now written a second installment of his Obama-needs-Ohio series, is of the mind that, “If a candidate can carry Ohio, he will have appealed to a large enough slice of the national electorate to have won the states that tilt even further in his preferred direction, and he is odds-on to win the race.”

As every pundit knows, the road to 1600 Pennsylvania Ave has run through Ohio for 11 consecutive elections, earning the Buckeye State a reputation as a national bellwether. The odds of this happening entirely by chance would be 1 in 2,048.

In my mind, however, the question is not so much about Ohio per se. It’s about the entire region, or what I’m calling the Anxiety Belt, because a lot of people there are worried that their best days are behind them.

As a state, Ohio is actually not particularly representative. It is one of the least educated in the U.S., and has one of the highest manufacturing bases. It is also older, whiter, and poorer than your average state.

But, if we look beyond Ohio and add in the other key five swing states in the region – Pennsylvania (20 votes), Michigan (16 votes), Indiana (11 votes), Wisconsin (10 votes), and Iowa (6 votes) – we now have an important block that adds up to 81 votes.

And these states are similar to Ohio as a whole: less educated, more manufacturing-oriented, Whiter, older. and slightly poorer than the nation as a whole.

In the 2010 elections, Democrats lost five House seats each in Pennsylvania and Ohio, and two seats apiece in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Michigan. Democrats also lost all four Senate seats up for election in these six states (Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin).

Demographics do matter. Democrats have not enjoyed parity with Republicans among white voters in 20 years (since Bill Clinton), but 2010 was especially bad, with white voters breaking 62-to-38 for Republicans in the mid-term elections. When you’re trying to win a state that is, say, 85 percent white, even if you can garner 100 percent of the minority vote, it is mathematically impossible to win that state unless you at least win 41.3 percent of the White vote, assuming equal turnout.

Of course, even if Obama loses all six of these states but keeps every state he won in 2008, he would still come out with 281 electoral votes. But this would mean keeping Florida (29 votes), North Carolina (15 votes), Virginia (13 votes), Colorado (9 votes, Nevada (6 votes), and New Mexico (5 votes). This doesn’t leave much room for error.

Of course, one of the ongoing questions in electoral strategy is to what extent regional differences still come into play. Matthew Dickinson has calculated that 2010 was the most nationalized election in at least 56 years, and that “the relative influence of national factors in both presidential and midterm congressional elections has been on the rise for several decades.” Certainly, there will be a strong national component to the election.

But that doesn’t mean Obama can ignore the concerns of the Anxiety Belt, which is, on average, older, poorer, whiter, and less well-educated than the nation as a whole. In the simplest terms, Obama can’t afford to forgo the 81 electoral votes that this represents because it leaves him no cushion elsewhere. And to get these votes, he’s going to have to figure out how to speak to at least some of the anxious white working class because the coalition of college-educated and minority voters is just not as strong there as elsewhere.

Obama’s Approval Numbers Creep Up: How Can He Build on This?

Wednesday, January 12th, 2011
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

About a month ago, in the wake of a the great tax-cut compromise, I wrote a post entitled “Why Obama’s Approval Numbers Are About to Creep Up.” At the time, I reasoned that the tax cut deal was popular, Obama was playing to his strength as a broker of compromise, and a little public disagreement with the hard left might help him among political independents and moderates.

At the time, his approval rating was hovering around 47 percent. A month later, the latest AP-GfK Poll has it at 53 percent, the highest it’s been since March 2010, right before the healthcare debate kicked into high gear. More importantly for Democrats, 53 percent of Americans now rate them favorably, compared to 45 percent who view them unfavorably, almost an exact reverse of where voters were on Election Day.

But Republicans are also doing better. Last fall, only 29 percent approved of Republicans in Congress, but now that number is up to 36 percent. And Congress’s overall approval ratings, which fell to the teens at the end of last year, are back up to 26 percent.

So, in the wake of a lame-duck Congress in which some serious stuff was accomplished, it seems that Americans feel a little better about their leaders generally. It’s also possible that without the vitriolic attacks ad of campaign season invading everybody’s space, there’s a little bit of an inevitable bounce.

But the main takeaway point is that this is good news for Obama and the Democrats. As a new Gallup Poll highlights, across the political spectrum, every group except “very conservative” (even just plain old conservative) thinks that it is more important to compromise than to stick to beliefs. On this question, by the way, moderates look almost identical to both the “liberal” and “very liberal” group.

Hopefully, the Arizona tragedy will have at least some staying power as a wake-up call to the dangers of political extremism, and continue shine a favorable light on Obama’s talents as adult-in-the-room.

However, the challenge for Obama remains to do more than just get all the kids to play nice with each other. He also still needs to lay out a galvanizing positive vision to get voters excited, as he did in his campaign. These are anxious times, and anxious times are fertile ground for the politics of blame and anger, especially absent any optimism for the future.

Obama and the Democrats are gaining back a little political momentum, and the spirit of problem-solving is enjoying a mini-renaissance. Great. But let’s capitalize on this. It needs to be a starting point for working toward solutions to the generational problems that our nation faces, like solving our looming deficit crisis or restructuring the economy for the 21st century. You’ll be hearing more from us on this subject soon.

White Voters vs. Obamacare

Wednesday, January 12th, 2011
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

House Republicans want to repeal health care reform in the worst way, even if it means doing what they slammed President Obama for doing last year: taking their eye off Americans’ economic travails.

They’ve convinced themselves that health reform is a drag on recovery, even though its main provisions won’t kick in for several years. They also claim a popular mandate to undo reform, even though polls show the public evenly divided on the issue.

There is one significant voter block, however, that strongly backs repeal: white voters, and especially white blue collar voters. Health care, unfortunately, is an issue that illuminates a deep racial/ethnic fissure in American politics.

As Ron Brownstein reports in a fascinating National Journal analysis of new exit poll data, 56 percent of white voters back repeal, while an overwhelming majority of minority voters favor either expanding or maintaining Obama’s reforms.

It’s already been widely reported that white voters backed Republican candidates in last year’s midterm 60-37 percent. That’s the lowest percentage Democrats have garnered from white voters since modern polling began. Brownstein’s analysis sheds new light on those voters’ attitudes toward Obama’s policies and government’s role in general. For Democrats and progressives, it’s not a pretty picture:

  • Three fourths of minority voters, but only 35 percent of whites, approve of Obama’s performance.
  • Whites are strongly skeptical of expansive government: 63 percent say government is doing too many things best left to people and businesses. An almost identical percentage of minorities say government should do more to solve problems.
  • Whites give priority to reducing government deficits; minorities to more public spending to create jobs.
  • Nearly half of whites who voted in the midterm identified themselves as conservatives.
  • Blue collar (non-college graduates) whites form the hard core of skepticism toward Obama and his party. They backed GOP candidates by 2-1.
  • Democrats were only competitive among whites in 2010 in two demographics—college-educated women and under 30-voters.

It’s always a mistake to over interpret the results of a single election, but it’s been a very long time—the post-Watergate election in 1974—since Democrats won an outright majority of the white vote. The defection of blue collar Democrats, the mainstay of the grand old New Deal coalition, also is old news.

Margins matter, of course, and Obama will have to narrow the racial-ethnic chasm to win reelection in 2012, even as he re-energizes his base of minority and young voters, and college women. But electoral calculations aside, the appearance of what Brownstein calls a new “color line” in U.S. politics isn’t good for the nation’s political soul. Progressives need to engage white voters more directly on questions about the size and role of government. We should be serious about making government more accountable, about enabling citizens and communities to do more for themselves, and about reining in runaway federal deficits and debts. But we should also stand firmly for public activism to rebuild America’s productive capacities, particularly our run-down infrastructure, curb out-of-control medical costs and make the promise of equal opportunity real for all citizens.

Obamacare, in fact, is a good place to start that conversation. Progressives ought to be open to refinements and improvements (especially strengthening its cost containment provisions), while remaining resolute in defending the core achievement of extending, at long last, basic health protection to all Americans. After all, blue collar white voters are not natural allies of health insurance companies. They have as much interest as anyone else in having access to affordable care, not losing coverage if they get injured or sick or change jobs, keeping their kids covered through age 26, and in encouraging medical providers to charge based on the quality, rather than quantity of care they deliver.

Progressives should also take the opportunity to remind white voters that Obamacare is no alien import from Canada or Europe, but a national version of Romneycare – the comprehensive coverage approach pioneered in Massachusetts with the full support of that notorious socialist, then-Gov. Mitt Romney.

It’s time, in short, to bring the health care debate down from the level of ideological abstraction – the only level on which conservatives can win – to the concrete realities facing U.S. families struggling with soaring health costs and spotty coverage.