Posts Tagged ‘ Economy ’

A More Productive Path than Self-Immolation

Wednesday, August 4th, 2010
Scott Winship



Scott Winship is research manager of the Pew Economic Mobility Project and a recent graduate of Harvard's doctoral program in social policy. The views he expresses do not represent those of Pew.

by Scott Winship

Everyone’s approvingly linking to this Edward Luce piece on “the crisis of middle-class America.” I want to set myself on fire.

Seriously, it’s discouraging to see so many people who should know better (because they’ve argued these points with me before) promoting this article.  I can’t think of another piece in the doomsday genre—and there are many—that gets it so consistently wrong. I’ll stipulate that none of the criticisms below are intended to minimize the struggles that many people are facing.  But it’s important to get this stuff right. Let me dive in, with Luce’s words in italics and my responses following:

Yet somehow things don’t feel so good any more. Last year the bank tried to repossess the Freemans’ home even though they were only three months in arrears.

The share of mortgages either in foreclosure or 3 or more months delinquent is 11.4 percent, which, because 30 percent of homeowners have paid off their mortgage, translates into 8 percent of homes. So the Freemans’ situation is typical of about one in twelve homeowners, or not quite 3 percent of households (since one-third rent).

Their son, Andy, was recently knocked off his mother’s health insurance and only painfully reinstated for a large fee.

Luce is arguing that there’s a new crisis facing the current generation. About 30 percent of those age 18 to 24 were uninsured in 2008 when the National Health Interview Survey contacted them.  I don’t have trends for that age group, but the share of Americans under age 65 without health insurance coverage was 14.7 percent in 2008, up from…14.5 percent in 1984.

And, much like the boarded-up houses that signal America’s epidemic of foreclosures, the drug dealings and shootings that were once remote from their neighbourhood are edging ever closer, a block at a time.

Well, the violent crime rate in 2008 was 19.3 per 1,000 people age 12 and up, down from 27.4 in 2000 and 45.2 in 1985.

Once upon a time this was called the American Dream. Nowadays it might be called America’s Fitful Reverie. Indeed, Mark spends large monthly sums renting a machine to treat his sleep apnea, which gives him insomnia. “If we lost our jobs, we would have about three weeks of savings to draw on before we hit the bone,” says Mark, who is sitting on his patio keeping an eye on the street and swigging from a bottle of Miller Lite. “We work day and night and try to save for our retirement. But we are never more than a pay check or two from the streets.”

The key question is, again, Is this worse than in the past? The risk of a large drop in household income has risen modestly, but people experiencing a drop end up much better off than in the past. For example, the risk of a 25 percent drop in income over 2 years has risen from 7 percent among married couples in the late 1960s to 14 percent in the mid-2000s (based on my computations from Panel Study of Income Dynamics data). But if you look at the average income of married-couple families after their 25 percent drop, it rose from $40,000 to $63,000 (in constant 2009 dollars).

Solid Democratic voters, the Freemans are evidently phlegmatic in their outlook. The visitor’s gaze is drawn to their fridge door, which is festooned with humorous magnets. One says: “I am sorry I missed Church, I was busy practicing witchcraft and becoming a lesbian.” Another says: “I would tell you to go to Hell but I work there and I don’t want to see you every day.” A third, “Jesus loves you but I think you’re an asshole.” Mark chuckles: “Laughter is the best medicine.”

Hmmm…just a typical American household…

The slow economic strangulation of the Freemans and millions of other middle-class Americans started long before the Great Recession, which merely exacerbated the “personal recession” that ordinary Americans had been suffering for years. Dubbed “median wage stagnation” by economists, the annual incomes of the bottom 90 per cent of US families have been essentially flat since 1973 – having risen by only 10 per cent in real terms over the past 37 years. That means most Americans have been treading water for more than a generation. Over the same period the incomes of the top 1 per cent have tripled. In 1973, chief executives were on average paid 26 times the median income. Now the multiple is above 300.

Adjusting for household size and using the PCE deflator to adjust for inflation, median household income in the Current Population Survey rose from $29,800 in 1973 to $40,500 in 2008 (in 2009 dollars, again based on my compuatations).  Factoring in employer and government noncash benefits would show even more impressive growth.

In the last expansion, which started in January 2002 and ended in December 2007, the median US household income dropped by $2,000 – the first ever instance where most Americans were worse off at the end of a cycle than at the start.

This is entirely a function of changes in the population composition (more Latinos) and in the share of employee compensation going to health insurance and retirement plans.

Worse is that the long era of stagnating incomes has been accompanied by something profoundly un-American: declining income mobility.

Nope. The evidence is ambiguous, but the best studies imply that intergenerational economic mobility hasn’t changed that much in the past few decades. Intra-generational earnings mobility has increased since the 1950s, though it has declined among men.

Alexis de Tocqueville, the great French chronicler of early America, was once misquoted as having said: “America is the best country in the world to be poor.” That is no longer the case. Nowadays in America, you have a smaller chance of swapping your lower income bracket for a higher one than in almost any other developed economy – even Britain on some measures. To invert the classic Horatio Alger stories, in today’s America if you are born in rags, you are likelier to stay in rags than in almost any corner of old Europe.

Tim Smeeding’s research based on the Luxembourg Income Study shows that in general Americans have higher incomes than their European counterparts as long as they are in the top 80 to 90 percent of the income distribution.  Below that, incomes are more comparable across countries, and the living standards of Americans look less impressive.  The US has comparable intergenerational earnings mobility to Europe, according to Markus Jantti’s research, except among men (but not women) who start out at the bottom.  In terms of occupational mobility, David Grusky’s research shows we’re as good or better as anywhere else, but this doesn’t translate into earnings mobility because we let people get rich or poor to a greater extent than other countries do. Jantti and Anders Bjorklund have estimated that Sweden would have the same mobility as the U.S. if the return to skill was as high there as it is here.  Finally, employer benefits further complicate how “bad” we look.

Combine those two deep-seated trends with a third – steeply rising inequality – and you get the slow-burning crisis of American capitalism. It is one thing to suffer grinding income stagnation. It is another to realise that you have a diminishing likelihood of escaping it – particularly when the fortunate few living across the proverbial tracks seem more pampered each time you catch a glimpse. “Who killed the ­American Dream?” say the banners at leftwing protest marches. “Take America back,” shout the rightwing Tea Party demonstrators.

The rise in income inequality is mostly about the top 5 percent of the top 1 percent pulling away from everyone else, and existing estimates overstate inequality and its growth by ignoring employer and government noncash benefits and possibly by ignoring different rates of inflation in different parts of the income distribution.

Unsurprisingly, a growing majority of Americans have been telling pollsters that they expect their children to be worse off than they are.

Totally wrong.  The key here is to only look at polling questions that ask people about their own kids, not kids in general.  Here are the relevant survey results I could find:

General Social Survey (1994)—45 percent said their children’s standard of living will be better (vs. 20 percent worse)
General Social Survey (1996)—47 percent
General Social Survey (1998)—55 percent
General Social Survey (2000)—59 percent
General Social Survey (2002)—61 percent said their children’s standard of living will be better (vs. 10% worse)
General Social Survey (2004)—53 percent
General Social Survey (2006)—57 percent
General Social Survey (2008)—53 percent
Economic Mobility Project (2009)—62 percent said their children’s standard of living will be better (vs. 10 percent worse)    (unlike GSS and PRC, asked only of those with kids under 18)
Pew Research Center (2010)—45 percent said their children’s standard of living will be better (vs. 26 percent worse)

BusinessWeek (1989)—59 percent said their children will have a better life than they had (and 25 percent said about as good)
BusinessWeek (1992)—34 percent said their children will have a better life than they had (and 33 percent said about as good)
BusinessWeek (1995)—46 percent said their children will have a better life than they have had (and 27 percent said about as good)
BusinessWeek (1996)—50 percent expected their children would have a better life than they have had (and 26 percent said about as good)
Harris Poll (2002)—41 percent expected children will have a better life than they have had (and 29 percent said about as good)

Harris Poll (1997)—48 percent felt good about their children’s future
Harris Poll (1998)—65 percent felt good about their children’s future (17 percent N.A.)
Harris Poll (1999)—60 percent felt good about their children’s future (15 percent N.A.)
Harris Poll (2000)—63 percent felt good about their children’s future (17 percent N.A.)
Harris Poll (2001)—56 percent felt good about their children’s future
Harris Poll (2002)—59 percent felt good about their children’s future
Harris Poll (2003)—59 percent felt good about their children’s future
Harris Poll (2004)—63 percent felt good about their children’s future

Pew Research Center (1997)—51 percent said their children will be better off than them when they grow up
Pew Research Center (1999)—67 percent said their children will be better off than them when they grow up

Bendixen & Schroth (1989)—68 percent said their children will be better off than they are
Princeton Religion Research Center (1997)—62 percent of men said their sons will have a better chance of succeeding than they did; 85 percent of women said their daughters will have a better chance
Angus Reid Group (1998)—78 percent said children will be better off than them
Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard (2000)—46 percent said they were confident that life for their children will be better than it has been for them
Economic Mobility Project (2009)—43 percent said it would be easier for their children to move up the income ladder
Economic Mobility Project (2009)—45 percent said it would be easier for their children to attain the American Dream

Also, polls consistently show that Americans say they have higher living standards than their parents.

And although the golden years were driven by the rise of mass higher education, you did not need to have graduated from high school to make ends meet. Like her husband, Connie Freeman was raised in a “working-class” home in the Iron Range of northern Minnesota near the Canadian border. Her father, who left school aged 14 following the Great Depression of the 1930s, worked in the iron mines all his life. Towards the end of his working life he was earning $15 an hour – more than $40 in today’s prices.

Thirty years later, Connie, who is far better qualified than her father, having graduated from high school and done one year of further education, makes $17 an hour.

It’s not valid to compare her pay mid-career to her father’s at the end of his career—and also, how much work experience does she have relative to him?  Did she take time off to raise kids?

The pace of life has also changed: “We used to sit around the dinner table every evening when I was growing up,” says Connie, who speaks with prolonged vowels of the Midwest. “Nowadays that’s sooooo rare.”

Time-use surveys show that while parents spend more time working (because of mothers) than in the past, they do not spend less time with children.  They spend less time doing things by themselves.

Then there are those, such as Paul Krugman, The New York Times columnist and Nobel prize winner, who blame it on politics, notably the conservative backlash which began when Ronald Reagan came to power in 1980, and which sped up the decline of unions and reversed the most progressive features of the US tax system.

Fewer than a tenth of American private sector workers now belong to a union. People in Europe and Canada are subjected to the same forces of globalization and technology. But they belong to unions in larger numbers and their health care is publicly funded.

Though unionization has declined markedly in most of these countries, and their health care policies are increasingly becoming too costly.  Also, most of the decline in unionization in the U.S. occurred before Reagan took office.

More than half of household bankruptcies in the US are caused by a serious illness or accident.

This is bad Elizabeth Warren research—she counts a bankruptcy as being “caused” by illness or accident if one was reported, but the household could have been in serious debt before these occurred.  At any rate, bankruptcies are exceedingly rare (under 1 percent of households—see Figure 13).

Pride of place in Shareen Miller’s home goes to a grainy photograph of her chatting with Barack Obama at a White House ceremony last year to inaugurate a new law that mandates equal pay for women.

As an organizer for Virginia’s 8,000 personal care assistants – people who look after the old and disabled in their own homes – Shareen, 42, was invited along with several dozen others to witness the signing.

Ah…another representative household…

More and more young Americans are put off by the thought of long-term debt.

Evidence?

Had enough?  I have speculated that to the extent economic insecurity has increased, it reflects the impact of a negativistic media (amplified by gloom-and-doom liberalism).

Picture
Pieces like Luce’s—and the blog posts it generates—affect consumer sentiment. Ben Bernanke and Tim Geithner aren’t the only people who can inadvertently talk down the economy.

This item is cross-posted at ScottWinshipWeb.

Comparing Employment Changes During Recessions

Monday, August 2nd, 2010
Scott Winship



Scott Winship is research manager of the Pew Economic Mobility Project and a recent graduate of Harvard's doctoral program in social policy. The views he expresses do not represent those of Pew.

by Scott Winship

I keep seeing that chart that shows how employment declines in the current recession are so much worse than in past ones. You know, this one:

On many dimensions, of course, the current recession is much worse, but this chart has always seemed funny to me. And after reading Paul Krugman mock the idea that the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s were at all comparable, I decided to make my own damn chart. Because the above chart looks at employment levels, which are affected by labor force growth, I decided to look at employment rates instead (subtracting the unemployment rate for each month from 100). Because the composition of the labor force has also changed over time (lots more married women, most notably), I decided to confine to white men ages 20 and up. And because it’s unclear to me what “peak” is used in this chart (see the vague note at the bottom of Rampell’s chart) and since the relationship of the NBER business cycle peak to the unemployment rate involves a lag, I decided to measure from the peak employment level. Got all that? Here’s my chart:

I’ve labeled the lines the same way that Rampell’s chart is labeled, by the recessions that followed each employment rate peak. The figures are from BLS and are based on their seasonally adjusted series.

This approach makes clear why people were disappointed by the “jobless” recoveries from the recessions of the early 1990s and 2000s, which were no faster than after the much more severe recession of the early 1970s (though of course, the declines in employment were much smaller to begin with). More to the point, it also shows that while the current recession still looks bad, bad, bad, the decline in employment is comparable to the decline during the double-dip recession, which is apparent from the “1980″ line. That’s not the most fantastic news of course, but it’s worth noting. Unfortunately, I doubt this is the chart you’ll see others use and update as things evolve in the next few months.

This item is cross-posted at ScottWinshipWeb.

Congress and Climate: The Long View

Wednesday, July 28th, 2010
Nathan Richardson



Nathan Richardson is a visiting scholar at Resources for the Future. The views expressed here are his own.

by Nathan Richardson

As you know by now, no climate bill will emerge from this Congress. Most have picked up Lindsey Graham’s metaphor — “cap and trade is dead” — though I prefer to think of a bill as “mathematically eliminated”. In other words, the right reaction is not permanent loss of hope but “wait til next year.” That hope is faint, however, given the likely makeup of the next Congress.

It has not taken long for the process of taking stock and assigning blame to begin. Will Marshall here at Progressive Fix has written on Congress’ failure (and I agree with everything he writes). The New York Times op-ed page has been dominated by pieces on why the bill failed, and who is to blame. Grist  summarizes reactions. I don’t have much to add to what has already been said. I’m disappointed, but not surprised, and I think there is plenty of blame to go around. That said, I’m still very optimistic about the prospects for action on climate – and by that I mean specifically a national, comprehensive carbon price – in the relatively near future. I think failure in 2010 is a setback, but will be viewed in retrospect as a minor one. This is little different from the way I felt weeks or months ago, but events of last week seem to have suddenly made me a contrarian. Climate pessimism is the new zeitgeist. So why the optimism? Because changes are coming that make climate action inevitable. The world is moving, with or without the Senate.

Some of these changes are structural. Above all, climate policy has to face physical reality, not just social and political preferences. The science of climate change is clear on the big issues, is constantly improving its predictions, and is deepening our understanding of the climate system. The longer we wait, the more we will know — and the warmer the planet will get. Those skeptical of climate science have played almost no role in the failure of climate legislation this year; they were marginal from the beginning. Better knowledge, and tangible evidence of the consequences of climate change, will make the case for action steadily stronger. Physics, as much as politics, will move the “centrist” position on climate towards action. I hope this will be by way of clear but remote physical evidence, such as melting icecaps, rather than by way of weather disasters or droughts. Demographics point in the right direction as well. Young people tend to be more strongly in favor of limiting carbon emissions (though not all polls agree). As today’s youth start to vote and gain power and influence, legislators will have to respond or choose another career.

Another more or less structural change on the way is pressing need for deficit reduction. As both Tyler Cowen and Nate Silver have pointed out in the last couple of days, this, too, will increase the chances of a price on carbon. Higher taxes are almost a certainty given our debt burden and the plausible range of spending cuts. As Cowen puts it, a price on carbon is the “least bad tax” in the sense that it discourages harmful actions (emitting carbon) rather than productive activity.

Other changes come from policies already in the pipeline. Existing state and federal laws provide some authority for regulating carbon emissions, though results will be more modest and costs higher than they would be with a uniform national carbon price. This is my area of expertise, and we’ve written a lot on the issue at Resources for the Future. The summary is this – the EPA can get modest but meaningful carbon reductions with the tools it has, likely at modest cost. EPA regulations on “traditional” pollutants like sulfur dioxide, which are emitted primarily by fossil fuel (and above all coal) plants will also have co-benefits for carbon emissions. These incidental reductions in carbon emissions will make the goals we need to reach with an eventual carbon price more modest. In the past, health benefits from reduction in pollution from coal has been cited as a secondary reason to price carbon. Now, the tables are turned – moves to reduce these pollutants using existing Clean Air Act authority will have climate benefits. Put it this way – in the long or even medium-term, climate action isn’t dead, but coal is, at least unless carbon capture and storage technology becomes available at modest cost. David Roberts at Grist makes this point, with the added irony that coal will likely be begging for cap-and-trade before long, since it would probably give the industry a handout in the form of allowances that could be sold as plants are shut down.

Finally, there’s the economy. Whether out of opportunism or genuine fear, concerns over the economic impact of climate policy fueled opposition this year. If 2010 politics could be matched with the 2007 economy, I have no doubt that a climate bill (of some kind) would have passed the Senate. The politics will get rosier for climate action, for the reasons I explained above. The economy will strengthen as well, and “jobs” will not dominate politics to the extent that they are the only acceptable justification for policy, and the rhetorical foundation of all opposition to policy. Those that agree with Ross Douthat that “sometimes it makes sense to wait, get richer, and then try to muddle through” will be more prepared to muddle through as we get richer. If the economy does not improve, we have bigger problems – though the one small benefit of our economic troubles is that it has likely bought us a little time on climate. Carbon emissions are down sharply over the last few years. In fact it will be an interesting question to look back once we have some perspective and ask whether the economic crisis was beneficial or harmful in climate terms.

These changes are all inevitable or at least very likely. Together, they will make a carbon price ever more politically possible, and eventually politically necessary. As most people who have considered the climate problem seriously have known for a long time, pricing carbon is the only workable solution. Eventually, it will come.

Of course, whether climate action will happen is easier to predict than how long it will take. I don’t have an solid answer for the latter question. Some of the shifts I mention will take longer than others. Structural changes, like global warming itself and demographic shifts, may take a long time to affect politics. Policies in the pipeline are more well-understood, but many are in the planning stage and could be held up, possibly by litigation. Meaningful EPA regulations on carbon could be in place by late 2011, or might not be effective until near the end of the decade. Economic improvement should, I hope, come more quickly – but there are of course no guarantees, and the “joblessness” of the recovery to date may mean the economy will dominate politics for longer than growth figures would indicate. So I don’t  know when we’ll have real climate legislation. My best guess would be 2013 -  another presidential & congressional election, presumably a stronger economy, fossil industries under pressure from the EPA and states, and, plausibly, palpable evidence of climate change could all converge to make a comprehensive climate bill politically possible. But that’s only a guess.

A critical look at last week’s events and, indeed, the last few years of congressional inertia is warranted. Pushing for action on climate – whether at the grassroots or in the Capitol – is still desperately needed. The longer we wait, the greater the risk and the higher the cost. But these events are just minor scenes in a story whose end we already know. Climate action may come sooner, or it may come later, but it will come.

Photo Credit: Casino Jones’ Photostream

How Bad is the Job Situation, Really?

Wednesday, July 14th, 2010
Scott Winship



Scott Winship is research manager of the Pew Economic Mobility Project and a recent graduate of Harvard's doctoral program in social policy. The views he expresses do not represent those of Pew.

by Scott Winship

When it comes to economic conditions, I’m generally a glass-three-quarters-full kind of guy. Take unemployment. Quick—what was the risk in 2008 that an American worker would experience at least one bout of unemployment? Chances are you thought that that risk was higher than one in eight.* But figures from government surveys indeed suggest that thirteen out of fifteen workers (or would-be workers) had not a single day unemployed during the first year of the “Great Recession”.** (Incidentally, the recessions of the mid-1970s and the early 1980s were also called the “Great Recession” by some commentators.)

The 2009 data won’t be out until later in the year, but if last year ends up comparable to the depths of the early 1980s recession, then the average worker will “only” have had a seven in nine chance of avoiding unemployment.*** But these figures overstate economic risk because some unemployment is voluntary and much of it is brief. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the chance that a worker experienced an unemployment spell lasting more than two weeks during the three years from 2001 to 2003 was just one in thirteen—a period covering the last recession.

So as I’ve been following the debate about unemployment insurance and whether it actually worsens the unemployment rate, I’ve actually been open to the idea that being able to receive benefits for up to two years might create perverse incentives. The research is not as uniformly dismissive of the idea as some liberal assessments have implied (go to NBER’s website and search the working papers for “unemployment” if you want to check this out yourself).

In particular, the idea that there were 5 people looking for work for every job opening struck me as sounding overly alarmist. So I started looking into the numbers to determine whether I thought they were reliable. The figures folks are using rely on a survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics called the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, which unfortunately only goes back to December of 2000. But the Conference Board has put out estimates of the number of help wanted ads since the 1950s. Through mid-2005, the estimates were based on print ads, as far as I can tell, but the Conference Board then switched to monitoring online ads. You can find the monthly figures for print ads here and the ones for online ads here. The JOLT and unemployment figures are relatively easy to find at BLS’s website.

When I graphed the two Conference Board series (which requires some indexing to make them consistent–the print ad series being an index pegged to 1987 while the online series gives the actual number of ads) against the number of unemployed, and then the JOLT series against the unemployed, here’s what I found:

I’ll just say I was shocked and that I am much more sympathetic to extension of unemployment insurance than I was yesterday.

*The post originally said one in ten, which was wrong (the result of mistakenly using a figure I had computed for an older age range). Technically, the the figure was 13.2%, or 1 in 7.6.
** The original post said nine out of ten.
*** The original post said that if it reaches the depths of the 1990s recession, then the average worker will have had a five in six chance of unemployment. I located data for the early 1980s recession, which is a better comparison to the current one.


Andy Grove and a Needed Conversation

Tuesday, July 13th, 2010
Dane Stangler



Dane Stangler is research manager at the Kauffman Foundation.

by Dane Stangler

The recent Bloomberg BusinessWeek cover story by former Intel CEO Andy Grove, “How to Make an American Job,” has stimulated no shortage of reaction in the blogosphere. From the even-handed and the thoughtful, to the politely skeptical and the sharply critical, bloggers and commentators have weighed in on Grove’s essay.

What precipitated this running debate is Grove’s apparent suggestion that, to spur job creation and innovation, the United States should instigate a national-level industrial policy which favors some companies over others. He points to successful Asian economies as potential models. The distinguishing characteristic of the favored companies would be, what Grove asserts is the real engine of job creation, the scaling process:

Equally important is what comes after that mythical moment of creation in the garage, as technology goes from prototype to mass production. This is the phase where companies scale up. They work out design details, figure out how to make things affordably, build factories, and hire people by the thousands. Scaling is hard work but necessary to make innovation matter.

Other commentators have already pointed out that Grove perhaps focuses too much on manufacturing (and specifically technology manufacturing such as semiconductors), and that he misses the critical importance of startup firms to job creation and innovation.

I agree that the long-running lament over the loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States is overdone—much of that employment reduction has come about through productivity gains rather than offshoring. The scaling process Grove celebrates is in fact partly responsible for the loss of technology manufacturing jobs. Since 2000, industry concentration in Silicon Valley has increased dramatically in sectors such as computer equipment manufacturing and semiconductor manufacturing while employment has fallen. Just last week, my colleague Tim Kane published a report on just how much startups matter to net job creation in the United States. As Tim puts it, startups aren’t everything, they’re the only thing.

Finally, Vivek Wadhwa offers what is probably the best take on Grove’s article—Vivek is hugely knowledgeable about innovation in China and India, and offers, as others have not, actual concrete suggestions for how we can reignite economic growth in the United States.

Despite the flaws in Grove’s essay,  it should not be dismissed. For one thing, he is a highly intelligent and highly successful entrepreneur who has lived through—indeed, helped shape—dramatic transformations of the U.S. economy.

Furthermore, scale companies are important to economic growth. No one can talk about the economic history of the United States without mentioning the scale companies that, at each stage of development, pioneered innovations, reduced costs and generally helped spread prosperity: Union Pacific, Standard Oil, Ford Motor, Wal-Mart, Intel, Microsoft, Google. Obviously, economic growth cannot solely be ascribed to such firms—they are only one piece of the economic ecosystem and while Grove may have overemphasized scale, he certainly was not wrong to discuss it. But the process of scaling must be contextualized: startups are essential in part because, without them, we do not even get to the scaling process. Competition helps ensure that scaling is accompanied by innovation and efficiency. Once they reach a certain level of scale, large firms depend on the acquisition of startups as a source of innovations and new jobs.

Scale firms can also be merely seen as incidents of deeper factors driving growth. After I gave a presentation on the economic contribution of high-growth firms a few months ago, an eminent economist dismissed everything by saying, “well, yes, but this is all simply explained by information technology; that’s the real story of growth.” The IT-as-the-root-of-all-prosperity argument has been popular in recent years but, as Paul Kedrosky later pointed out to me, this is a “turtles all the way down” type of argument. Behind IT is cheap energy, behind cheap energy is access to natural resources, behind natural resources … and so on. (Scale companies, in fact, could even be seen as a fertile source of knowledge for economists themselves: Thomas McCraw, inter alios, has argued that the rise of scale firms in the second half of the 1800s helped prompt the marginal revolution in economic thought.)

All of this still overlooks the most important part of Grove’s article, a point that escaped me upon first reading: “A new industry needs an effective ecosystem in which technology knowhow accumulates, experience builds on experience, and close relationships develop between supplier and customer.” The reason that the scaling process—rather than simply scale itself—is economically important is the learning-by-doing path by which it proceeds. Knowledge accumulates, innovations come and go, companies iterate back and forth—this is the messy process by which economic growth happens. If this reading is correct, Grove is claiming that the offshoring of technology manufacturing jobs threatens such learning-by-doing. In this formulation, productivity gains in manufacturing can actually undermine future cycles of learning and iterating.

The conversation Grove is trying to stimulate is worth having. It is probably too much to extrapolate technology manufacturing to the entire U.S. economy. There are certainly sectors, aside from manufacturing, in which learning-by-doing drives growth and it is not clear that those sectors have lost such capacity. Software development and certain institutions in the world of health care rely on this process. Yochai Benkler’s work can be seen as emphasizing the extent to which learning and iteration underwrites a great deal of innovation across the economy today.

But Grove’s point should be taken seriously in the sense that real barriers exist to innovation and the scaling process in many areas of the economy. Rather than seeing his article as a call for a government-driven competitiveness agenda or industrial policy, we should read it as a starting point for seeking out release valves at which small changes can be made that would release huge amounts of pent-up entrepreneurial energy. The stunted process of commercializing innovations out of universities leaps to mind as an area ripe for such analysis, as does current immigration policy. The national conversation about innovation and economic growth should be engaged in exactly this type of search.

Photo credit: jurvetson

Putting America on a Fiscally Sustainable Course — Fiscal Commission Public Forum Webcast

Monday, July 12th, 2010
Megan Milligan



Megan Milligan is an intern at the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Megan Milligan

PPI President Will Marshall’s remarks before the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform during the commission’s first public listening session:

Read Will’s written testimony.

Washington Independent: With Income Gap at 80-Year High, Solutions Remain Elusive

Monday, July 12th, 2010
Tessa Gellerson





by Tessa Gellerson

In the Washington Independent, PPI President Will Marshall discusses the need for innovation and entrepreneurship in combating the U.S.’ widening income gap:

“What we need is a policy conducive to innovation and entrepreneurship,” said Will Marshall, president of the Progressive Policy Institute, a think tank. “You need the energy of invention just as we saw in the late 90s. We need another spurt of innovation-fueled growth.”

“Inequality is one of the great structural challenges facing America,” Marshall continued. “It raises questions about whether the American dream still works. … That’s why it demands attention from policymakers as something we’ve got to squarely face.”

Read the full article.

Culture War and Peace

Wednesday, July 7th, 2010
Ed Kilgore



Ed Kilgore is a PPI senior fellow, as well as managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, an online forum.

by Ed Kilgore

It’s no big secret that one of the rising smart-money favorites for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination is Indiana Gov. Mitch Daniels. Matter of fact, back in January, when National Journal asked 109 Republican “insiders” to rank possible nominees in terms of likelihood, Daniels finished fifth, tied with Sarah Palin and well ahead of Newt Gingrich and Mike Huckabee. And at the same time, 111 Democratic “insiders” ranked Daniels fourth when asked about the most formidable prospective GOP candidate. And that was all before a slow but steady drumbeat of interest in the Hoosier, culminating in one of those long, hagiographical magazine profiles that often serve as the informal launching pad of presidential runs, this one by Andrew Ferguson for The Weekly Standard.

You can see the logic behind the Daniels-for-president enthusiasm. Virtually unknown among voters outside Indiana, Daniels has none of the baggage accompanying retreads like Gingrich, Huckabee and Mitt Romney, or even fellow-insider-favorite Haley Barbour, much less the lightning-rod Palin. He’s a state official who has never had to cast a controversial vote in Congress, but also has DC street cred from his work in the Reagan White House and his stint as George W. Bush’s first OMB director (where he exited before the inevitable gusher of red ink really exploded). He’s very popular in a state carried by Barack Obama in 2008, and his state’s positive fiscal record stands out sharply against a national landscape of state fiscal disaster. Moreover, as Ferguson’s profile illustrates, Daniels has a moderately quirky but folksy personality that seems a lot more appealing than those of other, dark horses like Tim Pawlenty of Minnesota or John Thune of South Dakota.

Given the newly rediscovered monomania for deficit hawkery among Republicans, buttressed by Tea Party demands for smaller government now, Daniels looks like someone who can credibly wear a green eyeshade at a time when that’s the sexiest look around.

But in the self-same Ferguson profile that exemplified the emergence of Daniels ‘12 buzz, the putative candidate himself (who has mastered a stance of disinterested availability for a White House run) tossed a little hand grenade into his own camp:

And then, he says, the next president, whoever he is, “would have to call a truce on the so-called social issues. We’re going to just have to agree to get along for a little while,” until the economic issues are resolved.

Predictably, Mike Huckabee pounced on the “truce” idea (or gaffe, or whatever it was):

“Apparently, a 2012 Republican presidential prospect in an interview with a reporter has made the suggestion that the next president should call for a ‘truce’ on social issues like abortion and traditional marriage to focus on fiscal problems,” Huckabee said. “In other words, stop fighting to end abortion and don’t make protecting traditional marriage a priority.”

“For those of us who have labored long and hard in the fight to educate the Democrats, voters, the media and even some Republicans on the importance of strong families, traditional marriage and life to our society, this is absolutely heartbreaking. And that one of our Republican ‘leaders’ would suggest this truce, even more so,” said Huckabee, a social conservative who is weighing another presidential run.

Christian Right warhorse Tony Perkins chipped in with his own more harshly worded condemnation of Daniels for talk of a culture-war truce:

We cannot “save the republic,” in Gov. Daniels’ words, by killing the next generation. Regardless of what the Establishment believes, fiscal and social conservatism have never been mutually exclusive. Without life, there is no pursuit of happiness. Thank goodness the Founding Fathers were not timid in their leadership; they understood that “truce” was nothing more than surrender.

Other, more sympathetic social conservatives, like National Review’s Ramesh Ponnuru, wondered if Daniels had simply misspoken or overstated his focus on fiscal issues, but also warned him not to get carried away with fiscal-first rhetoric:

A lot of people will cheer [Daniels'] statement: Truces are usually popular, and most people see the economic issues as more important than the social ones at this moment. But I’m not sure how a truce would work. If Justice Kennedy retired on President Daniels’s watch, for example, he would have to pick someone as a replacement. End of truce.

I also can’t help but think of Phil Gramm’s presidential campaign in 1996. Like Daniels, Gramm was an enthusiastic budget-cutter. Concern about big government was running strong in the years just prior to that election. Gramm had a solid social-conservative record, but consciously chose not to campaign on it; he famously flew out to Colorado Springs to tell James Dobson, “I’m not a preacher.” That approach helped to doom Gramm’s campaign.

Finally, the Washington Post’s resident religious conservative Mike Gerson gave Daniels a chance to backtrack, and the Hoosier allowed as how cultural issues with a fiscal dimension, like the Mexico City rules (and presumably abortion funding generally), would not fall under any “truce.”

Crisis averted? Perhaps; certainly many Republicans will be privately counseling Daniels not to make the same mistake twice, and he’d be smart to take advantage of the Kagan confirmation issue by blowing the dog whistle of determination to appoint “strict constructionist” judges. Meanwhile, he’ll get some credit from the shrinking band of social moderates in the GOP, not to mention libertarians, along with secular MSM types whose skepticism of the Tea Party movement has always been tempered by their obvious relief at the sight of conservatives thumping not Bibles but the Constitution.

But it’s worth noting that Huckabee’s not the only 2012 possibility who is taking a different tack than Daniels on the culture wars. And indeed, the other candidate with a bullet next to his name of late, and in public polls rather than insider buzz (viz. a recent PPP survey of Texas Republicans, which placed him at the top of the 2012 list with or without home-state Gov. Rick Perry), is none other than Newt Gingrich, who seems determined to escalate the culture wars into a full-scale Clash of Civilizations.

The former House Speaker raised some eyebrows in May when his new, just-in-time-for-the-campaign book, To Save America, came out, with the unsubtle subtitle of: Stopping Obama’s Secular-Socialist Machine. Most of the negative commentary involved his comparison of the Obama administration to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and even on that assertion, he’s only partially backtracked, according to a Fox News report:

Gingrich said that he stands by his argument that the “secular-socialist machine” represents as great a threat to America as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, not in the sense of the immorality of those deadly regimes, but as a “threat to our way of life.”

In the book itself, Gingrich calls this “threat” an “existential threat,” a term most often heard in connection with Israeli fears of a genocidal nuclear attack by Iran. And he is very clear that he’s not just fretting over debt or deficit forecasts, but instead is fighting an anti-religious threat to the essence of American culture:

[E]ven more disturbing than the threats from foreign terrorists is a second threat that is right here at home. It is an ideology so fundamentally at odds with historic American values that it threatens to undo the cultural ethics that have made our country great. I call it “secular-socialism.”

The Left has thoroughly infiltrated nearly every cultural commanding height of our civilization.

Not much of a hint of any “truce” in that kind of talk, is there?

So which of these two conservative Republicans best has his finger on the conservative Republican zeitgeist, the green-eyeshaded Daniels or the crusading Gingrich? Will there be peace with the socialist infidels until the books are balanced, or total war until the secularist roots of the socialist “machine” are destroyed once and for all?
It’s probably worth remembering where both of these men–and particularly the nationally-obscure Daniels–would have to begin any path to the White House: in Iowa.

This is not only a caucus states where social conservatives have always had a disproportionate influence (viz. Huckabee’s astonishing 2008 victory over Mitt Romney, who outspent him a gazillion-to-one). It’s also a place where conservative activists are more than a little obsessed with the goal of overturning the State Supreme Court’s legalization of same-sex marriage, a process that cannot, due to the vagaries of Iowa constitutional law, culminate before 2014.

Here’s guessing that a awful lot of Iowa Republican Caucus-goers won’t be ready to smoke any peace-pipes with their secular-socialist–and in their eyes, “sodomite”–enemies real soon, and that Daniels will have a tough sell convincing them otherwise.

This item is cross-posted at The Democratic Strategist.

Photo credit: Indiana Public Media

A Nation of Pilot Projects?

Wednesday, July 7th, 2010
Mike Signer



Mike Signer is a senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Mike Signer

More news this weekend that the Obama administration continues to pursue its unheralded campaign to reverse retrograde Bush-era policies and put the nation on a more sustainable footing. The president announced that the Department of Energy will award $2 billion in conditional commitments from the Recovery Act to two solar companies for plants in Arizona, Colorado, and Indiana, which together will create over 5,000 jobs.

The president’s heart is clearly in this cause. In his address, he said, “Already, I’ve seen the payoff from these investments. I’ve seen once-shuttered factories humming with new workers who are building solar panels and wind turbines; rolling up their sleeves to help America win the race for the clean energy economy.”

However, as good as it is, the announcement leaves a lingering question: On cutting-edge infrastructure issues such as solar, will we continue to be a nation of pilot projects? Or will we take any quantum leaps and achieve actual national policy?

There’s nothing to quarrel with in the announcements themselves. Abengoa Solar will build the plant in Arizona, which, when complete, will provide enough clean energy to power 70,000 homes. Over 70 percent of the components and products used in construction will be manufactured here in the U.S.

Abound Solar Manufacturing is building the Colorado and Indiana plants, which will produce millions of state-of-the-art solar panels each year—in Indiana’s case, using an empty Chrysler factory.

In announcing the plants on July 4th weekend, the president said, “But what this weekend reminds us, more than any other, is that we are a nation that has always risen to the challenges before it. We are a nation that, 234 years ago, declared our independence from one of the greatest empires the world had ever known. We are a nation that mustered a sense of common purpose to overcome Depression and fear itself. . . I know America will write our own destiny once more.”

But the question is whether the scale, scope, and ambition of our solar policy rises to the level of the president’s language. The Recovery Act monies, and the policies underlying them, have been attacked left and right for failing to deliver on a set of clear national priorities. The stimulus dollars have been spread so wide and thin that they’ve been vulnerable to attacks both on pork and policy grounds.

That two solar plants are heralded as helping America “win the race for a clean economy” is the same pattern we’ve seen elsewhere in the collision between the clean economy campaign and today’s toxic budgetary and political environment. We saw the pattern in high-speed rail. As PPI’s Mark Reutter has noted, the administration announced $8 billion in stimulus funds that would go to a handful of projects. But without additional administration pressure, those funds are only being followed by $1 billion of congressional authorization. As 100 members of Congress wrote the president recently, “[G]iven budget constraints, we cannot continue to rely on general authorizations and appropriations to finance high-speed rail. We need to identify a dedicated revenue source for high-speed rail, and we need your help to do that.”

We have also seen the pattern in nuclear energy, where the administration took the bold step of announcing loan guarantees for two new nuclear plants in Georgia, the first built in a generation. However, the president’s language again made the actual commitment pale in comparison to the challenge. In announcing the guarantees, he cited the fact that there are, today, 56 nuclear reactors under construction around the world: 21 in China; six in South Korea, and five in India. He said, “Whether it’s nuclear energy or solar or wind energy, if we fail to invest in the technologies of tomorrow, then we’re going to be importing those technologies instead of exporting them.  We will fall behind. Jobs will be produced overseas instead of here in the United States of America. And that’s not a future that I accept.”

The ambitions are noble and the rhetoric stirring, but the question is whether we really are shaping a future here—or just a set of ambitious but singular pilot projects.

Yes, there is too little money in annual authorizations for serious infrastructure. But as infrastructure expert Norm Anderson has recently written for PPI, “The financing issue — not a surprise for anyone in the infrastructure business — is the number one problem facing the industry.”

This is all the more reason the administration should follow the stirring rhetoric about competitiveness and “writing our destiny” by creating a new institution, such as an infrastructure bank of the type proposed by Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) and supported by the president in the past, that would create a long-term funding source and the energy for true national policy.

Photo credit: Bilfinger Berger Group

Recommendations on Curbing the National Deficit

Friday, July 2nd, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

The following is the is an excerpt from Will Marshall’s June 30 testimony before the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform during the commission’s first public listening session:

Chairman Bowles, Chairman Simpson, and Members of the Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss ways to put America on a fiscally sustainable course.

Once unemployment rates start to fall, U.S. policy makers must be prepared to pivot sharply from fiscal stimulus to fiscal restraint. Otherwise, a large and growing federal debt will deplete our capital stock and thereby limit future economic growth. It will divert resources from productive investment to interest payments on the debt, half of which is already held by foreign lenders. And it will shake investor confidence, here and abroad, in the fundamental soundness of the U.S. economy, eventually driving interest rates up and the dollar down.

Despite these dire and entirely foreseeable consequences, too many federal policy makers remain in denial about the need for fiscal discipline. You have taken on what many consider a Mission Impossible: forging a bipartisan consensus on how to defuse the nation’s debt crisis. That’s put you in the crosshairs of extreme partisans of the left and right, who imagine this problem can be solved strictly at the other side’s expense. By refusing either to cut spending or raise taxes, the two have joined in a tacit conspiracy to bankrupt the country.

Common to both is the assumption that you can have fiscal responsibility, or you can have progressive government, but you can’t have both. We at the Progressive Policy Institute have always rejected this false choice. We believe that a progressive government can and must live within its means, and that if it instead chases the illusion of borrowed prosperity, it’s not really progressive.

To paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt, Americans know instinctively that borrowing routinely to consume more than you produce is both bad economics and bad morals. I don’t think it’s an accident that, as public worries about deficits have been mounting, public trust in government has been plummeting.

So there’s a lot riding on your ability to forge consensus behind a bold and balanced plan to restore fiscal responsibility. Let me offer some thoughts on what that plan should include from the perspective of a “progressive fiscal hawk.”

Read the entire testimony.

Dodd-Frank Hits and Misses

Monday, June 28th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

First the giant stimulus package, then the ambitious revamping of America’s health care delivery system. Now Congress, under the patient prodding of President Obama, is lurching toward passage of another stupendously complex bill, this time centered on financial regulatory reform. Whether you like them or not, you have to admit that big things are getting done in Washington on Obama’s watch.

If Congress passes the Dodd-Frank bill, it will be another major notch in the belt of a president who could use a political victory about now. But what’s a non-master of the universe like me to make of this 2,000-page behemoth?

It may do considerable good, but we ought to be clear about one thing: It won’t prevent the next financial crisis. As long as there are fortunes to be made in financial markets, there will be excessive risk-taking and speculation, new bubbles and panics, and powerful incentives for chicanery and fraud. No regulatory scheme can fully protect the public against ingenious new forms of human greed and folly.

That, however, is not an argument for doing nothing. The government had to react to Wall Street’s near meltdown in the winter of 2008-2009. Its interventions, beginning under President Bush and continuing into Obama’s administration, doubtless averted a full-bore financial collapse. But they also triggered a fierce and abiding public backlash against bailouts.

The Dodd-Frank bill doesn’t get everything right, but on balance it’s a reasonable response to the crisis. It imposes new disciplines on bank behavior, increases transparency for complex financial transactions and institutions, and offers consumers new protections against the clever breed of predators who have degrees from elite universities and sport $3,000 suits.

Some liberals are chagrined that the bill doesn’t break up the big banks. Conservatives echo the Wall Street Journal’s charges that the bill is a regulatory nightmare that will make it more expensive for banks to supply capital to businesses. It’s tempting to say that Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Rep. Frank (D-MA) must therefore have found some kind of centrist sweet spot, but there is something to the left-right critiques.

Most important, for example, the bill doesn’t slay the “too-big-to-fail” dragon. It leaves financial power more concentrated than ever in the hands of five mega-banks: Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and Bank of America. True, Dodd-Frank does impose the “Volcker Rule,” forbidding banks covered by federal deposit insurance from making bets (called “proprietary trading”) with their own money.  It increases capital reserve requirements to keep banks from taking excessive risks. It also sets up a council of financial guardians to anticipate systemic risks, and gives federal authorities power to seize and oversee the “orderly liquidation” of financial firms whose collapse could bring other institutions down as well.

But it’s hard to avoid the impression that the big banks will henceforth operate with a tacit government guarantee against systemic failure. This not only intensifies moral hazard – making it hard for administration officials to claim the bill would bar bailouts in the future – it also risks creating a privileged class of quasi-public banking utilities that will be able to borrow money more cheaply. That will raise the bar for new entrants and dampen competition in the banking sector.

Elsewhere, the picture looks more positive. Dodd-Frank would move much of the trade in financial derivatives onto exchanges and clearinghouses, though banks could still trade in over-the-counter derivatives to hedge their own risks. This seems like a sensible compromise that brings derivatives trading out of the shadows while retaining the ability of firms to hedge against interest rate and currency risks. In another boost for transparency, the bill would require private equity firms and hedge funds to register with regulators.

Dodd-Frank also puts in place what Obama last week called “the strongest consumer financial protections in history.” It creates a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau housed with the Fed to police mortgage lending, credit and debit cards and other consumer loans – though not by auto dealers, who somehow won an exemption from oversight. This agency presumably will prevent abuses like the “no doc” and “liar” loans that helped to trigger the subprime lending frenzy, which was the spark that started the financial crisis.

The bill doesn’t deal at all with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This is a huge omission, considering that these giant mortgage finance firms still hold a pile of dubious assets and are essentially in federal receivership.

For all its imperfections, Dodd-Frank seeks to protect consumers without creating undue regulatory obstacles to innovation in the financial sector, which traditionally has been a source of comparative economic advantage for the U.S. Pragmatic progressives ought to support it, while retaining a sense of humility about the ability of new regulatory bodies to prevent future abuses.

Photo credit: Center for American Progress Action Fund

Learning from Eurostar, Where London Meets Paris

Monday, June 28th, 2010
Mark Reutter



PPI Fellow Mark Reutter is the former editor of Railroad History and author of Making Steel: Sparrows Point and the Rise and Ruin of American Industrial Might (2005, rev. ed.).

by Mark Reutter

It’s a curious truth, though not yet widely understood, that we pay for high-speed rail whether we have it or not. We pay not only in congested highways, delayed air flights and disastrous oil spills, but also in a cumulative national slowdown that might be called arrested development.

This point is conveyed by a sharply reported article in the Financial Times that describes the business, cultural and even culinary changes in London 15 years after the start of high-speed Eurostar service to Paris.

Paris is 213 miles from London as the crow flies (about the same as Washington from New York), but “Paris seemed almost as exotic as Jakarta to Britons” before Eurostar service began in late 1994, FT’s Simon Kuper writes.

Nowadays, “what strikes you when going from Paris to London are the similarities.” Boasting a quarter of a million French inhabitants, London has become the sixth-largest French city, Kuper notes, while central Paris is “packed” with British nationals, some of them commuting multiple times a week to London on the train.

Transforming Travel

Eurostar is more than just a sleek conveyance for spoiled travelers, but a fundamental driver of progress. Back in the 19th century, people spoke of steam trains as “annihilating time and space.” Until railways became widely available, humans depended on animals for overland transportation and were limited by such factors as the feed required for a team of horses.

Each subsequent transportation revolution – the development of steamships in place of sailing vessels, the advent of flight with the Wright brothers, the mass production of motorcars, the arrival of jet planes replacing propeller craft – packed a wallop that reverberated across boundaries and social classes, tying people together in new and different ways.

The automobile made suburbia possible, while jets turned tourism into a global enterprise, to cite two examples. Equally fascinating is that the technology undergirding all of these revolutions was widely known and available to all nations, but only in western Europe and the U.S was the technology exploited in full.

That is until recently when the rebirth of rail travel – trains operating at several times the speed of highway traffic on dedicated rights of way – was pioneered in Japan, improved in Europe and now exploited to the max in China.

User-Friendly Networks

American policymakers, preoccupied by budget deficits and poll numbers, appear to be missing the larger picture, namely, that our standard of living is dependent on deploying the latest tools in transportation. In many corridors, high-speed rail is the best solution among traffic needs and sound environmental policy, and concentrating public funds upon it would represent a vast step forward in the use of transportation money.

One basic element ignored in Washington is the recognition that current rail traffic is far below what it would be had intercity rail service been remotely adequate under Amtrak. Some train journeys take longer today than they did when Herbert Hoover was president. It is impossible to predict how much dormant traffic is waiting to be tapped by a revitalized rail system.

The Eurostar trains that link downtown London with central Paris in just over two hours have not only enlivened both cities, according to Kuper, but created “user-friendly networks” that allow scientists and businessmen to exchange ideas quickly.

With other high-speed routes connecting France with Belgium, Germany with Austria, Switzerland with Italy, and, soon, France with Spain, the balance of scientific networks, which shifted to the U.S. after World War II, has swung back to Europe, according to his analysis.

In other words, efficient transportation is as important to a city’s or nation’s bloodstream as unfettered capital markets or sustained R&D. Here’s hoping the Obama administration, which supports high-speed rail, starts to make the case for expanded funding with the same clarity and celerity as the business-minded Financial Times.

Photo credit: Slices of Light