Posts Tagged ‘ espionage ’

In Plain Sight: A Look at the Russian Spy Ring

Tuesday, June 29th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

I peered nervously into my colleagues’ offices after reading this morning’s wrap-up of the Russian spy case:

The operation, referred to by U.S. investigators as “the Illegals program,” was aimed at placing spies in nongovernmental jobs, such as at think tanks, where they could glean information from policymakers and Washington-connected insiders without attracting attention.

I realize Steven had studied in Russia, and this afternoon I’m going to fire up the old Blackadder tapes and figure out just how to catch him in the act.

Kidding aside, the story goes that 10 Russian spies were arrested (one remains at-large) as part of the largest espionage takedown I can remember.

Dan Drezner over at Foreign Policy thinks the whole thing is “low-rent” and “bizarre” because the ring is charged only with being “unregistered agents of a foreign government.” Drezner’s opinion is just odd — by definition, the nature of espionage is difficult to detect and harder to prove. To put this in perspective, it’s a huge deal when one intelligence operative gets caught — think Aldrich Ames, Robert Hansen, or most recently, my former professor Kendall Myers. Now we have 10, who worked in a loosely coordinated manner. The fact that we know as much as we do is testament to some pretty solid counterintelligence work.

Perhaps Drezner is unimpressed because of the nature of the suspects’ work: The press has categorized them more as talent-spotters who would recruit Americans in influential positions to provide information, not the actual spies themselves who’d bring documents out of sensitive government buildings. But I think categorization is likely an underestimation of what they actually did. These individuals may have recruited talent, but they also would have probably played a role in transmitting information back to Moscow.

The group was likely composed of Russia’s best. Remember the first (and best) Mission:Impossible with the “NOC” list? NOC stands for Non-Official Cover, and that’s what we’re talking about here — deep cover spies whose true identities are hidden from all but a handful of people. When Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claims to have no idea what this is all about, that’s because he really doesn’t. Anonymity and deniability is by design.

Click over to Jeff Stein’s SpyTalk blog to get a flavor of how seamlessly the ring blended in with their American communities. I always find it hysterical that the neighbors are so shocked when spies in their midst are exposed — if the neighbors aren’t shocked that the normal-looking Canadian next door was leading a massive international Russian spy ring, then that would be news.

The investigation went on for nearly 10 years. Seem excessive? Why, after all, would we let these guys continue to spy on the U.S. if we knew what they were up to? Since this group served as talent spotters and intelligence mules, their operations had to be drawn out and subtle as they slowly became comfortable with, and then pitched, their recruits.

To firm up their cover, they’d spend months and months working their “real jobs” and only dip into the shadowy underworld on occasion and when they felt safe. Furthermore, the FBI needed to catch them absolutely red-handed, which is no easy task. Nothing like starting a potentially massive international scandal without iron-clad proof, huh? The FBI finally got what they needed on Sunday, with a fake dead drop of $5,000. And the decade-long investigation probably means that any intelligence damage has been limited. By keeping tabs on them for so long, we should know their extended network fairly well.

Should we be surprised that Russia is still spying on us? Hell no. We do it to them. And other countries, including our close allies, do it to us (albeit for varying motives). Everyone’s looking for an informational advantage, and that’s what spying can get you.

Finally, there’s been a lot made of the timing of this incident, right on the heels of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to DC. Accordingly, we should expect Russian retaliation just to save face — they’ll probably PNG a handful of low-level diplomats whom they suspect of doubling as spies.

This could become a major international incident akin to Britain’s deteriorating relations with Moscow after the 2006 murder in London of Alexander Litvinenko, likely by Russian intelligence agents. However, I doubt it will. The timing of the arrests was bad, but they send a message of subtle strength to the Kremlin — despite wanting good relations with Moscow, Washington won’t be pushed around.

Photo credit: worldeconomicforum

What Will Our Cybersecurity Apparatus Look Like?

Thursday, April 15th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

As I write, Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander is giving Senate testimony about why he’s qualified to lead Department of Defense’s new Cyber Command. He undoubtedly fits the bill and is probably about the most qualified senior-level military man in the country to serve in this capacity. He’s led the National Security Agency for the last four and half years, and has 35 years of experience within the ranks of Army Intelligence.

That’s why the issue isn’t with Lt. Gen Alexander’s qualifications, but whether the structure of the whole cyber defense enterprise is the right one. The Pentagon stands up its new Cyber Command to coordinate all cyber activities under its umbrella, but he’ll also remain in his job at the NSA. He believes his new organizational mission is to integrate:

[C]yberspace operations and synchronizing warfighting effects across the global security environment; providing support to civil authorities and international partners; directing global information grid operations and defense; executing full-spectrum military cyberspace operations; serving as the focal point for deconfliction of DOD offensive cyberspace operations; providing improved shared situational awareness of cyberspace operations, including indications and warning.

… which sure sounds a lot like his old organizational mission at Ft. Meade.

And Alexander is christened with his new duties as Noah Shachtman has actually proposed to separate powers within the cyber community:

There’s the signals-intelligence directorate, the Big Brothers who, it is said, can tap into any electronic communication. And there’s the information-assurance directorate, the cybersecurity nerds who make sure our government’s computers and telecommunications systems are hacker- and eavesdropper-free. In other words, there’s a locked-down spy division and a relatively open geek division. The problem is, their goals are often in opposition. One team wants to exploit software holes; the other wants to repair them. This has created a conflict — especially when it comes to working with outsiders in need of the NSA’s assistance. Fortunately, there’s a relatively simple solution: We should break up the NSA.

While it would seem that these two actions — elevating the NSA’s director to oversee the whole kit-and-caboodle while keeping him entrenched in his old job and thus creating overlapping bureaucracies — are working at cross-purposes, it’s quite possible that perhaps we’re moving in that direction, albeit in measured fashion.

Sounds crazy? Think of it this way — in order to separate the NSA’s directorates, there would have to be political breathing space within the cyberspy bureaucracy to break them up. So instead of appearing like Alexander is getting a demotion by only controlling whichever half his old agency he ends up with, he gets a new title and the current directorate heads get elevated to new positions.

This surely isn’t gospel, but remains an interesting possibility.

China and the Cyber Threat

Wednesday, February 17th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

James Fallows of The Atlantic has an excellent piece on China and the cyber threat (as well as some other points on the Chinese military). A few excerpts about cybersecurity:

China has hundreds of millions of Internet users, mostly young. In any culture, this would mean a large hacker population; in China, where tight control and near chaos often coexist, it means an Internet with plenty of potential outlaws and with carefully directed government efforts, too. In a report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission late last year, Northrop Grumman prepared a time line of electronic intrusions and disruptions coming from sites inside China since 1999. In most cases it was impossible to tell whether the activity was amateur or government-planned, the report said. But whatever their source, the disruptions were a problem. And in some instances, the “depth of resources” and the “extremely focused targeting of defense engineering data, US military operational information, and China-related policy information” suggested an effort that would be “difficult at best without some type of state-sponsorship.”

[...]

[Cyber authorities] stressed that Chinese organizations and individuals were a serious source of electronic threats—but far from the only one, or perhaps even the main one. You could take this as good news about U.S.-China relations, but it was usually meant as bad news about the problem as a whole.

[...]

This led to another, more surprising theme: that the main damage done to date through cyberwar has involved not theft of military secrets nor acts of electronic sabotage but rather business-versus-business spying. Some military secrets have indeed leaked out, the most consequential probably being those that would help the Chinese navy develop a modern submarine fleet. And many people said that if the United States someday ended up at war against China—or Russia, or some other country—then each side would certainly use electronic tools to attack the other’s military and perhaps its civilian infrastructure. But short of outright war, the main losses have come through economic espionage. “You could think of it as taking a shortcut on the ‘D’ of R&D,” research and development, one former government official said.

And Fallows adds one general extraordinarily striking cautionary note that has little to do with China, but that all policy makers should pay attention to:

[N]early everyone in the business believes that we are living in, yes, a pre-9/11 era when it comes to the security and resilience of electronic information systems. Something very big—bigger than the Google-China case—is likely to go wrong, they said, and once it does, everyone will ask how we could have been so complacent for so long. Electronic-commerce systems are already in a constant war against online fraud. [emphasis added]

The entire piece is worth your time, but those are the big highlights. From my perspective, I’ve seen first-hand how the Pentagon is well-aware of the threat and is devoting substantial assets to detect and disrupt the intrusions. I’m not just talking about the NSA’s new cyber command either — cyber is the hot, new frontier and that creates incentives for every agency under the sun to grab a few million smackers from the budget for working the issue. But where’s the line between effective cyber defense and too many agencies tripping over one another?

Spooks in the Machine: How the Pentagon Should Fight Cyber Spies

Wednesday, January 6th, 2010
Noah Shachtman



Noah Shachtman is a contributing editor at Wired magazine, and the editor of its award-winning national security blog, "Danger Room."

by Noah Shachtman

Spooks in the MachineDownload the full report.

In Washington, “cybersecurity” is a term that’s come to have a thousand meanings, and none at all. Any crime, prank, intelligence operation, or foreign-government attack involving a computer has become a “cyber threat.” Russian teenagers defacing Georgia’s websites, hackers eyeing the power grid, overseas powers embedding government microchips with malicious code – they all share equal billing as cyber foes. The vague definition muddies the debate about what the real dangers are, where they lie, and how to respond to them. No wonder it took the White House so long to find someone to serve as a “czar” to coordinate government-wide responses. No wonder Congress is having such a hard time passing smart legislation.

But at the Pentagon, they aren’t worried about some kid painting a Hitler moustache on Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ online portrait. They’re not even that concerned about a full-scale attack on the military’s networks – even though the modern American way of war depends so heavily on the free flow of data. In the military, there’s now broad agreement that one cyber threat trumps all others: electronic espionage, the infiltration (and possible corruption) of Defense Department networks. The Pentagon is seeking to coalesce around an organizational response, if not clear-cut answers, to the cyber-spying problem. But it’s a very open question whether the solutions that they have come up with will make things better or worse for the military.

Well-placed spy software not only opens a window for an adversary to look into American military operations. That window can also be used to extract information — everything from drone video feeds to ammunition requests to intelligence reports. Such an opening also gives that enemy a chance to introduce his own false data, turning American command-and-control systems against themselves. How does a soldier trust an order, if he doesn’t know who else is listening – or who gave the order in the first place?  “For a sophisticated adversary, it’s to his advantage to keep your network up and running. He can learn what you know. He can cause confusion, delay your response times – and shape your actions,” says one Defense Department cyber official.

Cyber spying on sensitive government networks isn’t some theoretical concern. In December, we learned that militants could tap into the overhead surveillance feed of almost any aircraft in the American fleet – from spy drones to fighter jets. The Wall Street Journal reported earlier this year that intruders were able to copy and siphon off “several terabytes of data” about the advanced F-35 Joint Strike Fighter stealth aircraft from the unclassified networks of defense contractor Lockheed Martin. In 2008, USB “thumb drives” were used to slip malicious and self-replicating code onto military computers. According to a 60 Minutes report, the software was able to monitor the classified networks of U.S. Central Command, which runs the American war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, the unclassified e-mail system of the Office of the Secretary of Defense was compromised. Earlier in the decade, a researcher from Sandia National Laboratories caught Chinese cyber sleuths with specs for the U.S. Army’s helicopter mission-planning system and for Falconview, the Air Force’s aerial imagery software.

The Problem of the Open Network

What’s particularly vexing about these intrusions is that sophisticated methods weren’t necessarily required to get inside the networks. In 2007, detailed schematics of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan and the Camp Bucca detention facility in Iraq were downloaded by reporters from file transfer protocol servers with easy-to-find passwords or no protection at all. The malware that spread via thumb drive across the military in 2008 had been around, in one form or another, since the early ‘90s. In 2009, troops were so susceptible to virus- or Trojan-laden messages — supposedly sent from friends on Facebook and Twitter — that U.S. Strategic Command network security officers wanted to ban access to the social networks altogether.

In other words, the end user – the service member or Pentagon civilian sitting at his desktop – is largely responsible for letting in these electronic intruders. They’re the ones who set passwords to “1234,” plug unknown drives into their computer, or download a Trojan virus when all they meant to do was sneak a peek at some online porn. “This makes us our own worst threat,” writes one Department of Defense network security specialist. “There are a variety of reasons for this and most are tied to the collective DoD inability to mitigate known vulnerabilities — vulnerabilities users intentionally and unintentionally utilize to create adverse impacts or risks.”

The Pentagon spends millions of dollars every year on so-called “information assurance” – checking to see that military desktops are loaded only with trusted software, and reminding users not to respond to e-mails from Nigerians with dubious business propositions. But within the Defense Department, these are seen as Sisyphean tasks. “With seven million systems in the DoD, think how many idiots there are bound to be,” one Pentagon cybersecurity official says.

cybersecurity memo photo 3The armed forces find it much easier to ban something than to educate its troops about responsible use. MySpace and YouTube are inaccessible from Pentagon computers – even though the military makes extensive use of the sites. Thumb drives are mostly forbidden as well, even though battlefield units rely on them to swap data in lonely places where bandwidth is hard to find. In the name of information security, information flow has been restricted. Meanwhile, secret overhead surveillance feeds are routinely left unencrypted; with an off-the-shelf satellite dish and $26 software, militants can see through the Air Force’s eyes in the sky. It’s a problem the military has known about for more than a decade but never bothered to fix. According to the Wall Street Journal, “the Pentagon assumed local adversaries wouldn’t know how to exploit it.”

Clearly, there needs to be a rather serious re-evaluation of military information assurance. The Pentagon needs to do a better job of figuring out theoretical risks from actual dangers; secret drone feeds can’t be left open while blogs are placed off-limits. Troops also need to be trained – and then trusted. The military routinely gives a 19-year-old private the power to kill everyone he sees. Surely, if that private can be taught to use an automatic rifle responsibly, he can be educated in computing without sharing secrets.

An Imperfect Solution

Now, many in the military are wondering whether an even more serious overreaction is in the works. In June, Secretary Gates established U.S. Cyber Command to coordinate all of the military’s activities online. Heading the new command will be Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, director of the super-secret National Security Agency. Conveniently for Alexander, the command will be located at Ft. Meade, Maryland – right next to the NSA’s headquarters. The job of stopping electronic espionage, in other words, is being put in the hands of the military and intelligence outfit which is already responsible for snooping on e-mail, breaking electronic encryption algorithms, and sneaking into foreign networks. It has a logic: Our cyber spies will tackle their cyber spies. And few government agencies can rival the NSA’s information security expertise.

But the move is problematic, too. For all of the NSA’s brainpower, the agency has had its share of spectacular failures. It spent six years and $1.2 billion on the “Trailblazer” effort to sift through electronic communications, with little to show for it. The successor project, “Turbulence,” has proved problematic, as well.

The NSA’s well-developed (some would say overdeveloped) sense of secrecy could also be an issue. Much of the country’s network infrastructure is in private, not government, hands. A great deal of today’s most important cybersecurity research is being pursued at private companies and universities, from Microsoft to M.I.T. How well can a clandestine agency work with these unclassified groups? Or even with military groups that might not be able to match the NSA’s security clearances?

Finally, the NSA has a rich history of monitoring the communications of Americans – sometimes legally, sometimes not. Earlier this year, the Justice Department confirmed that the agency was still “overcollecting” on U.S. citizens, despite the wide latitude the NSA now enjoyed to spy on whom they like. According to the New York Times, the agency even “tried to wiretap a member of Congress without a warrant.” Some in the armed forces cybersecurity community argue that in order to stop online espionage, the infiltrators need to be caught before they enter American networks. Cyberdefense becomes cyberoffense. With such a broad charter, the monitoring of innocent Americans’ datastreams would only grow, with an agency well-known for privacy violations in charge.

Guard the Networks – or Live Without Them

Clearly, the NSA has a major role to play in the nation’s network security. They’ve got the expertise that’s lacking in the various armed services’ geek squads, the network policy makers at U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Task Force Global Network Operations, and the Defense Information Systems Agency’s cadre of Pentagon system administrators. But the NSA’s role can’t be all-encompassing. The agency needs to be part of a team. That team needs to include players that can work with experts both in and out of government. And that team needs to have oversight of the NSA’s activities, so that citizens’ civil liberties aren’t slaughtered wholesale in the name of cybersecurity.

Other groups within the Pentagon are trying to make the armed forces more resilient in the face of cyber attacks. They not only want to make the military’s data networks less susceptible to infiltration – they want to make its social connections more durable, too. If the military information grid is compromised, and orders can’t be trusted, they want service members to be able to carry on with their missions regardless.

Troops can’t lose time-honored skills just because they’re in a digital age. They need to be able to navigate without electronic maps, assemble information without online databases, and distribute battle plans without e-mail. Some cybersecurity specialists say that more and more “redundant” networks need to be added in order to keep the military’s data flowing. But for this group, the most important cyber defense may be learning to live without networks at all.

Download the full report.