Posts Tagged ‘ Executive pay ’

Wall Street’s Bonus Problem

Friday, November 20th, 2009
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of California, Berkeley. In 2008-2009, he was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution.

by Lee Drutman

For all of pay czar Kenneth Feinberg’s efforts, bonuses on Wall Street show no signs of slowing. Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and JP Morgan Chase & Co. (all of which have paid back their TARP obligations) are reportedly paying $30 billion in bonuses this year.

There is a very simple reason that people on Wall Street are making so much money and will continue to do so, no matter what pay cuts are imposed. It is because there is still so much money to be made.

Over the last few decades, the too-smart-for-their-own-good set on Wall Street has become incredibly good at using money to make money through a devil’s dictionary of obscure trading strategies, as well as a rough fee structure for clients. In both areas, they have taken advantage of lax regulation and even laxer enforcement.

Consider: In the 2000s, the finance sector accounted for an absurdly high 41 percent of domestic corporate profits. Between 1973 and 1985, it never accounted for more than 16 percent; it has risen steadily since. In other words: an absurd amount of the wealth in this country is going to the bankers.

As long as this is the case, bonuses will continue to be absurd. Pay is a consequence of this distended economy-wide profit pie, not a cause. As long as there is money on the table (and there is), the clever folks in investment banking and hedge funds will find a way to make sure they’re the ones pocketing it.

The financial services regulation moving through the House and Senate will take some of this money off the table (though probably not enough), and may close some opportunities for making money out of the global economy through gouging and speculation (though, as I suggested in an earlier post, a financial transaction tax would make this more effective). But the important thing is that a Wall Street with a smaller place in the economy is also a Wall Street that will simply have less to pay its people.

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The Right Way to Curb Executive Pay

Thursday, October 22nd, 2009
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Yesterday, word was leaked that after telling Bank of America head honcho Ken Lewis to expect a goose-egg in salary for 2009, the Obama administration pay czar Ken Feinberg was going to give pay cuts to chief executives at four other financial firms, including Citigroup and AIG, and the automakers GM and Chrysler. While no one to the left of Steve Forbes can really defend multimillion dollar payouts to executives for driving companies and the economy into the ground (and don’t be fooled — despite getting $0 in salary, Lewis will take home $53 million in “other compensation” this year), this plan isn’t the way to rein in payouts. It might feel good in the short term, but it doesn’t solve anything and could cause problems in the future.

First, cutting pay for financial executives in 2009 is a bit like slamming the barn door after the horse has bolted. These problems were festering for many years, and most of the chief executives who are running these companies weren’t in charge when errors were made — the beleaguered Lewis excepted, and he’s stepping down at the end of the year. So they’re getting blamed for their predecessors’ decisions.

It also doesn’t affect the main culprits who got us into this mess. The notorious Joe Cassano from AIG FP in London — who almost single-handedly drove the insurer into the ground — is untouched by the decision.

And, despite what the administration might hope, the rest of Wall Street is not going to rein in salary practices either in sympathy with their comrades or fear of rebuke. The companies affected are the ones that still have significant stakes owned by the government. Those that have returned their TARP money — Goldman and JP Morgan — are unaffected.

Given the incentive to work for a company with pay limited by the government or one where pay isn’t limited, people will jump ship for the latter. This has the potential to make the already weak companies — Bank of America and Citi, for example — even weaker. Which means that we might have a bigger problem on our hands if either of the two largest banks in the country drift with no one at the wheel (Lewis’ decision to resign without a replacement means we might see this at Bank of America anyway).

Finally, there is the concern that this will be the only chance we have to move on keeping salaries in the financial industry in line with a level that benefits the country, not bankers. When taking a hard look at pay in the future, bankers can use this as political cover, claiming that the administration has already “dealt with the issue.”

A better solution to the pay issue is to look not at short-term, feel-good measures, but to implement longer-term solutions. Line up incentives for bankers with those of shareholders and the American people. Eliminate “guaranteed” bonuses. Replace cash payouts and options with restricted stock grants, vesting over time, keeping executives interested in the long-term health of companies.

Rep. Barney Frank (MA) has pushed the Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009 through the House with a “Say on Pay” measure, giving shareholders a non-binding say on management salaries at the annual meeting, an idea that has merit. But its non-binding nature and the fact that most shareholder votes are made by institutional investors (more often than not either current or former I-bank employees) as proxies for their clients limit the measure’s effectiveness. A more effective part of the same bill also requires bonuses to be in line with risk-taking.

Even better is the fact that incentives will be disclosed. A little known secret on Wall Street is that traders can make more than the CEOs, and the trader’s payouts are normally undisclosed. If such incentive structures were spelled out to investors, they might not be so sanguine in signing off.

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