Posts Tagged ‘ housing ’

Underwater: Home Values in 2012 Battleground States

Thursday, January 19th, 2012
Jason Gold



Jason Gold is the director of the Progressive Policy Institute’s “Rethinking U.S. Housing Policy Project” and senior fellow for financial services policy.

Anne Kim



Anne Kim is the managing director for policy and strategy at the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Jason Gold and Anne Kim

As the 2012 election approaches, the nation’s unemployment rate will continue to drive the political debate and, in turn, the fortunes of President Obama and his GOP rivals.

Despite the central focus on unemployment, however, another number deserves equal attention as a barometer of the nation’s overall economic health: housing values.

As catastrophic as it is to lose a job, the percentage of Americans who are unemployed is actually exceeded by the percentage of Americans who have either lost significant wealth from their homes or are currently “underwater”—owing more on their mortgages than their homes are worth. Since 2006, Americans have lost a total of $7 trillion in housing wealth—a figure that, according to the Federal Reserve, is more than half of the nation’s aggregate home equity.

In recent days, the Obama Administration has telegraphed its intention to devote more energy to housing—and with a focus on foreclosures and defaults. While this is laudable, the Administration should not neglect a second front: the tremendous loss of housing wealth.

In this report, we make our case by analyzing home values in the 16 battleground states that will serve as the proving ground for 2012. In 15 of these states, home values have fallen by an average of 16% since October 2008. We also offer up suggestions for tackling this issue.

No doubt, every contender for the White House will have a jobs plan. But no economic plan can be complete without an equally robust plan to rebuild housing—and in particular, to rebuild housing wealth. Policies that address this loss of wealth, even for those not at immediate risk of losing their homes, makes sense both politically and economically

Negative equity: A new crisis in middle-class wealth

In a reversal of the optimism that is typical of Americans, 41% of people in a January 2012 poll—including a majority of seniors—said they feel less financially secure than last year, while just 14% said they feel more secure.

The loss of wealth—and housing wealth in particular—might help explain why.

According to the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, 62.5% of families suffered a loss of wealth from 2007 to 2009. Moreover, says the Fed, “declines in home equity were an important driver of decreases in wealth.”

  • Homes made up 47.6% of the total non-financial assets held by Americans in 2009. Between 2007 and 2009, American homeowners saw their equity drop by a median of 11.8% (or $18,700).
  • From its peak in 2006, the Case-Shiller housing index (the “Dow” of home values) has fallen 32.93%, including an 11.33% decline from October 2008. Median home prices have fallen from $196,600 to $164,100.
  • As many as 12 million Americans are now “underwater” with mortgages that are more than their homes are worth.

The loss of home equity has broad implications for the nation’s economy beyond mere sentiments of economic confidence. For example, underwater homeowners can’t qualify to refinance their homes, which means they can’t take advantage of one of the Administration’s most successful monetary policies: low interest rates. A 1% lower interest rate on a $200,000 mortgage can mean $168 less in interest payments per month—money that could be spent in the broader economy on other things.

Underwater borrowers are also stuck in their homes, unable to trade up or move out (a problem that also limits job mobility). Negative equity also means no nest egg for homeowners nearing retirement, and fewer resources to draw on for households seeking to finance a new business, help a child through college or weather out a spell of unemployment or ill health.

Download the report.

A New Idea To Fix the Housing Market

Tuesday, March 1st, 2011
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

The U.S. housing market continues to stumble. The median home price is now at its lowest level since April 2002 and the percentage of Americans who believe that homeownership is a safe investment continues to decline. Meanwhile, policy is largely at a standstill. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner continues to urge a go-slow approach on the phase-out of government supported mortgages through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. And all House Republicans can come up with is trying to kill the Obama Administration’s efforts to stem foreclosures through the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP) and other related programs.

Economist Robert I. Lerman has proposed a cost-effective way to reinvigorate the stalled housing market: The federal government should provide a million vouchers that allow low-income renters to become homeowners and allow some of the two million holders of rental vouchers to convert them into homeownership vouchers.

The plan is outlined in a memo entitled “Homeownership Vouchers: A Plan to Reinvigorate the Economy While Helping Low-Income Families.” It’s written by .

The basic idea is that these vouchers would create a new pool of potential owners to buy up depressed housing stock. Since the federal government already provides rental vouchers, it may as well turn those rental vouchers into ownership vouchers. And actually, doing so would save the government money, since in almost all housing markets mortgage payments would be lower than the market rent.

The plan has other benefits as well. As Lerman writes:

A rise in home prices would reduce the number of homeowners who find their homes worth far less than their mortgages. It would discourage these “underwater” homeowners from walking away from their mortgages; allow more families to refinance at low interest rates, thereby reducing the rate of foreclosures; and, ultimately, it would generate new construction jobs and spur associated job growth. Increased home values also can play an indirect role in job creation, since more small business owners would again be able to use their home as collateral for loans to maintain and expand their business.

In short, “Homeownership Vouchers” is a smart way to stimulate the housing market, expand the dream of homeownership to low-income families, and give the economy some added juice, all while potentially saving the government money.

Read the full report here.

Homeownership Vouchers: A Plan to Reinvigorate the Economy While Helping Low-Income Families

Tuesday, March 1st, 2011
Robert Lerman



Robert I. Lerman is a professor of economics at American University and Institute Fellow at Urban Institute. He has published widely on economic and social policy issues, including the potential for expanding apprenticeship in the U.S. and the interactions between family structure and labor market outcomes.

by Robert Lerman

Read the Policy Memo

While easy monetary policy and a large fiscal stimulus have limited the economic downturn and helped generate modest growth, few believe the economy can grow fast enough to reduce unemployment without the recovery of the housing sector. Yet, no such recovery is in sight. As of late December 2010, the headline story was “Housing Recovery Stalls: Fresh Fall in Home Prices is Headwind for Economy.”1 Construction output remains 30 percent below pre-recession levels and is no higher today than it was a year ago (about 30 percent of all lost jobs were in the construction industry). The unemployment rate among construction workers is about 19 percent, double the national average. There are still 7 million homes in foreclosure or with mortgages that are 90 days delinquent. House prices continue to stagnate.

So far, federal initiatives aimed at shoring up the housing sector have cost tens of billions of dollars but have been ineffective and poorly targeted. The tax credit for homebuyers may have sped up some home purchases, but it did so at a high cost and with benefits flowing to many high-income families. It subsidized purchases that would have taken place without the credit, resulting in a cost to the taxpayer of $43,000 per new home purchased and a total budget cost of $15-20 billion, which was twice as much as Congress expected. President Obama’s Homeowner Affordability and Stability plan has reached only a small percentage of eligible homeowners.

The potential benefits of increasing the demand for owner-occupied housing are enormous. A rise in home prices would reduce the number of homeowners who find their homes worth far less than their mortgages. It would discourage these “underwater” homeowners from walking away from their mortgages; allow more families to refinance at low interest rates, thereby reducing the rate of foreclosures; and, ultimately, it would generate new construction jobs and spur associated job growth. Increased home values also can play an indirect role in job creation, since more small business owners would again be able to use their home as collateral for loans to maintain and expand their business.

Read the Policy Memo

Financial Regulation Is Good — But Consumer Financial Protection Is Better

Thursday, February 25th, 2010
Mike Derham



Mike Derham is chair of PPI's Innovative Economy Project.

by Mike Derham

Paul Volcker, vanquisher of inflation in the early ’80s as chairman of the Federal Reserve System and now the chairman of President Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, said, “[T]he most important financial innovation that I have seen the past 20 years is the automatic teller machine.” While he qualified the comment as a “wiseacre remark,” he stood by it, going on to say, “Indeed, it was quite good in the 1980s without credit-default swaps and without securitization and without CDOs.”

Our friend Bob Litan has a new report out from the Brookings Institution on the benefits from financial innovation over the past thirty years. The report is worth reading in full, but a quick summary of his findings is found in a chart at the beginning of the paper (condensed into one image by Kevin Drum):

Given attitudes like Volcker’s, it might be surprising to see so many “+”s, connoting relative benefits, relative to “-”s, connoting developments that did not improve that part of the economy. (“0″ indicates the innovation was a wash.) But that is the reality of innovative financial instruments — they are, by and large, designed to be beneficial, but unmonitored can cause more harm than good. Innovations like credit scoring, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and inflation-protected Treasury bonds (TIPS) — all were developed since Volcker was Fed chair. But the benefits from these innovations (increased access to credit, which allows for consumption smoothing) can also lead to abuses of the system (crushing credit card debt, NINA mortgages, balloon payment mortgages) and asset bubbles. These abuses can be swept under the rug if the underlying assets in a CDO are not transparent, and that CDO is sold to an unsuspecting client by an investment bank trading desk.

The status quo is unsustainable, but attempts to ban some of these activities are problematic as well. Proclamations like the Volcker rule – limiting the scope of bank activity — are either too tightly defined to be effective or are so broad they throw out the above benefits with the bathwater. What would be better is to provide transparency in these activities — through clearing credit default swaps (CDS) and other derivatives on exchanges, providing credit terms in an easily understood manner upfront, and eliminating hidden fees — so that all involved know what they are getting into.

Litan also points out one key fact at the end of his paper: we’re not done with financial innovation. He argues that despite the headlines, not all innovation is bad, and there is more to come. He cites the work of Robert Schiller, the Yale professor who has pioneered work in housing price markets — designed to give homeowners protection they currently don’t have against a fall in the value of their home — and counter-cyclical tax policy, as an obvious source of financial innovation that is for the good.

But Litan concludes by noting that the market — not government — will continue to drive innovation, but “policymakers must be better prepared in the future than they were before the financial crisis to step in — first with disclosure standards and possibly later with more prescriptive rules” to prevent crises like the most recent one from happening again. The one area where he sees a more active government role is in consumer finance, an area in which a robust Consumer Financial Protection Agency will be key.