Everyone knows that America’s attempt to implant democracy in Iraq was a fool’s errand. Everyone, that is, but the Iraqi people.
Stubbornly defying terrorist bombings and official incompetence, they turned out in force to vote in national elections over the weekend. Although the outcome isn’t yet known, the elections confirmed Iraq’s status as the Middle East’s most important, if precarious, experiment in democracy.
The process hasn’t been pretty, but there’s no denying that something like a normal, pluralistic politics is emerging in a society brutalized by a sadistic tyrant and scarred by the sectarian violence that followed the U.S. invasion. The big question now is whether Iraqis will continue along the path of power-sharing and representative government, or give up on democracy and opt for some form of authoritarian rule, which is the norm in their neighborhood.
It’s easy to be pessimistic about Iraq, so let’s start with the positive side of the ledger. First, al Qaeda has been defeated. Though it still perpetrates atrocities against Iraqi civilians, it has scant popular support and cannot stand up to Iraq’s army and police. Sectarian strife also has subsided, at least for the moment; the Economist reports that civilian casualties are at a six-year low.
Second, politics is becoming less sectarian as communal groups splinter and forge cross-cutting alliances. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has broken with the main Shia groups, which failed to field their own candidate for his post. Also expected to do well is former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, a nationalist whose coalition includes Shia and Sunnis. In the north, a reform movement called “Change” has broken with the two dominant Kurdish parties on the issue of local political corruption. And in pointed contrast to Iran, Iraq’s Shia clerical establishment stays out of politics.
On the other side of the ledger, Iraq’s emerging political order faces several enormous challenges. One is a fatal combination of governmental weakness and corruption. The central government still cannot supply basic infrastructure, including electricity. Rampant bribery and cronyism are giving democracy a bad name and feeding popular sentiment for strongman rule. It’s not hard to imagine Iraq moving toward a “soft authoritarianism” like Egypt’s or perhaps the even more stifling models of Syria or Saudi Arabia.
The Iraqi economy is in shambles. Unemployment is pervasive and private industry is weak; government is the employer of first and last resort in Iraq. Although the country has enormous oil reserves, there’s a real danger it could use them to foster dependence on state subsidies rather than private sector work.
Finally, there’s the question of what happens when U.S. troops are no longer around to backstop Iraq’s political evolution. Under the Status of Forces Agreement signed by the Bush administration and Baghdad, all U.S. forces must be out by the end of 2011. As Peter Beinart warns, this deadline may not allow enough time for the consolidation of democracy in Iraq. The United States plays a quiet but vital role in mediating sectarian conflicts and helping Iraqis set up nonpartisan governing institutions. In our absence, civil war could flare up again, Iran might escalate its internal interference in Iraqi affairs, or there could be a military coup in reaction to public anger over the chaos and incompetence of civilian government.
Of course, the United States cannot unilaterally change the Status of Forces Agreement. But Obama should be vigilant and open to a request from the Iraqi government to do so should that become necessary. We have come too far, at enormous expense to both Iraqis and Americans, to give up now on Iraq’s struggles to build a decent government that rules by popular consent.


Iraq is having
If you are at all interested in the future national security of the United States, do yourself a favor and take a few minutes to read Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
I haven’t written much on the Marja offensive—the joint US/Afghan/NATO operation in the Helmand province city of the same name—because I wanted to see how it played out before drawing sweeping conclusions.
Take a minute to soak in
This is unbelievably rich. Check out
Francis Fukuyama is often derided in progressive circles because he was one of the architects of neoconservatism. Fair enough — when you’re one of the intellectual driving forces behind the Iraq War, that’s going to cost some credibility down the road. But Fukuyama’s shaky track record goes back even farther, when he predicted in 1992’s The End of History and The Last Man that the end of the Cold War essentially signaled the end of ideological struggle between civilizations. Someone forgot to tell that to al Qaeda.
The following is a guest column from Major General Donald Edwards, Vermont Army National Guard (Ret.), who served in the military for 37 years.
I’d be remiss if I let Jack Murtha’s (D-PA)
President Obama’s first State of the Union address was a surprisingly prosaic affair for a man of his oratorical gifts. It was practical, concrete, and workmanlike, long on common sense and short on inspiration.
In the most raucous and gutsy State of the Union I can remember — the president challenged Democrats to not run for the hills, thrust the onus of governance on Republicans, and stared down Chief Justice John Roberts — national security policy came and went with hardly a whimper. It’s not that the president didn’t spent a significant chunk of his speech on the topic (he did), but rather that what he said didn’t break new ground.