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A Timeline: Obama and Iraq

Tuesday, August 31st, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Just after President finishes his Oval Office speech on Iraq (and because they’re somewhat linked, Afghanistan), you may flip to your favorite cable news channel and listen to your favorite talking head or two banter on about the war’s history.  In an effort to set the record straight, here’s a quick guide to Barack Obama’s political history with Iraq (and by extension Afghanistan). If you want to a more detailed timeline, you can click over to the Washington Post, which has a good interactive map and timeline.  Or you can check out my new favorite site, LetMeGoogleThatForYou.com.

Here’s the bottom line: After reading just about ever single speech Obama has given on Iraq since 2002, he has been remarkably consistent for a politician.

He opposed the war, while being explicit that he’s comfortable with the use of force. He’s been steadfast that Bush was screwing around in Iraq while he should have been concentrating in Afghanistan.  Hence, this administration’s current policy is the continuation of Obama’s thinking since 2002.

However, once we were in Iraq, he recognized America’s ongoing national security concerns, and sought to promote debate on striking the balance between responsibility, national interest, and political reality.  Even though Obama opposed the surge, it was not because he was uncomfortable with using force, but because he felt that the threat of removing US troops would force political cooperation amongst Iraqi governing stakeholders.

Throughout his campaign, he stayed on message about bringing the war to a “responsible conclusion” a pledge that he has largely fulfilled.

The future is murky: Violence may return to haunt Iraq as the remaining troops are pulled out over the next 17 months (as George Bush’s 2008 SOFA dictates).   While a new Iraq government may request that continued presence of American forces past the 2011 deadline, it is dubious whether Obama, in the midst of a re-election bid, would reopen such a divisive arguement, particularly as America’s national security interests seem long-since secured.

Here are the details:

October 2, 2002: On the eve of a Congressional resolution authorizing President George Bush to use force in Iraq, Illinois State Senator Barack Obama gives a speech at a Chicago Anti-War Rally. Here’s what he said:

Let me begin by saying that although this has been billed as an anti-war rally, I stand before you as someone who is not opposed to war in all circumstances. …

After September 11th… I supported this [Bush] Administration’s pledge to hunt down and root out those who would slaughter innocents in the name of intolerance. … I don’t oppose all wars. What I am opposed to is a dumb war.

October 12, 2004: In a debate for his Illinois Senate seat against Republican Alan Keyes, Obama said this of Iraq and Afghanistan:

Ambassador Keyes and I agree on one thing, and that is that the War on Terror has to be

vigorously fought. Where we part company is how to fight it, because I think Afghanistan in fact was not a preemptive war, it was a war launched directly against those who were responsible for 9-11. Iraq was a preemptive war based on faulty evidence. … Now, us having gone in there, I do think we now have a deep national security interest in making certain that Iraq is stable. If is it not stable, not only are we going to have a humanitarian crisis, I think we are also going to have a huge national security problem on our ands—because, ironically, it has become a hotbed of terrorists consequence, in part, of our incursion there.

November 22, 2005. A speech to the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations found Obama in a reflective mood:

What do we want to accomplish now that we are in Iraq, and what is possible to accomplish? What kind of actions can we take to ensure not only a safe and stable Iraq, but that will also preserve our capacity to rebuild Afghanistan, isolate and apprehend terrorist cells, preserve our long-term military readiness, and devote the resources needed to shore up our homeland security?

[G]iven the enormous stakes in Iraq, I believe that those of us who are involved in shaping our national security policies should do what we believe is right, not merely what is politically expedient….

But I believe that, having waged a war that has unleashed daily carnage and uncertainty in Iraq, we have to manage our exit in a responsible way – with the hope of leaving a stable foundation for the future, but at the very least taking care not to plunge the country into an even deeper and, perhaps, irreparable crisis.

January 9, 2006. Senator Obama podcast following a trip to Baghdad:

I think the general view was that we were in such a delicate situation right now and that there was so little institutional capacity on the part of the Iraqi government, that a full military withdrawal at this point would probably result in significant civil war and potentially hundreds of thousands of deaths.

January 25, 2006. Senator Obama podcast following post-trip meeting with George Bush:

I believe we need to bring our troops home as quickly as possible, but to do so in a way that does not precipitate all out civil war in Iraq.

On February 22, 2006, the Sumarra Mosque, one of the holiest sites in Shiite Islam, is bombed.  The repercussions set off a spiral of increasing violence that many call a civil war.

June 26, 2006. Senator Obama floor statement on Iraq following proposed Kerry Amendment, which called for redeployment of troops.

I would like nothing more than to support the Kerry Amendment; to bring our brave troops home on a date certain, and spare the American people more pain, suffering and sorrow.

But having visited Iraq, I’m also acutely aware that a precipitous withdrawal of our troops, driven by Congressional edict rather than the realities on the ground, will not undo the mistakes made by this Administration. It could compound them. …

I do not believe that setting a date certain for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops is the best approach to achieving, in a methodical and responsible way, the three basic goals that should drive our Iraq policy: that is, 1) stabilizing Iraq and giving the factions within Iraq the space they need to forge a political settlement; 2) containing and ultimately defeating the insurgency in Iraq; and 3) bringing our troops safely home.

…

I cannot support the Kerry Amendment. Instead, I am a cosponsor of the Levin amendment, which gives us the best opportunity to find this balance between our need to begin a phase-down and our need to help stabilize Iraq.

November 20, 2006. Senator Obama speaks to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs:

The President should announce to the Iraqi people that our policy will include a gradual and substantial reduction in U.S. forces. He should then work with our military commanders to map out the best plan for such a redeployment and determine precise levels and dates. … [I]t could be suspended if at any point U.S. commanders believe that a further reduction would put American troops in danger. …

Perhaps most importantly, some of these troops could be redeployed to Afghanistan, where our lack of focus and commitment of resources has led to an increasing deterioration of the security situation there. The President’s decision to go to war in Iraq has had disastrous consequences for Afghanistan — we have seen a fierce Taliban offensive, a spike in terrorist attacks, and a narcotrafficking problem spiral out of control.

In January 2007, George Bush announced ‘the Surge’, which Obama opposed. Here’s a video. Here’s what Obama said in a Senate floor statement:

The President’s decision to move forward with this escalation anyway, despite all evidence and military advice to the contrary, is the terrible consequence of the decision to give him the broad, open-ended authority to wage this war back in 2002…. I cannot in good conscience support this escalation.

Drawing down our troops in Iraq will put pressure on Iraqis to arrive at the political settlement that is needed and allow us to redeploy additional troops in Afghanistan… My plan would couple this phased redeployment with an enhanced effort to train Iraqi security forces.

As the political narrative tells us, “the surge worked.” However, if you dig a little deeper, you’ll find that three events really helped bring about a de-escalation in violence in Iraq in 2007.  Read this op-ed from my friend Michael Kleinman on what really happened.

October 2, 2007.  Early in the presidential campaign, Senator Obama pledges to bring home troops within 16 months of taking office:

I will begin to remove our troops from Iraq immediately. I will remove one or two brigades a month and get all of our combat troops out of Iraq within 16 months. The only troops I will keep in Iraq will perform the limited missions of protecting our diplomats and carrying out targeted strikes on Al Qaeda.

November 19, 2008. Just before leaving office, George Bush negotiates a new Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government.  It calls for US troops to be out of Iraq’s cities and towns by mid-2009 and out of the country altogether by the end of 2011.  Read the entire SOFA here.  Obama’s campaign timeline is more-or-less in line with Bush’s.

January 21, 2009. Just after taking office, President Obama met with military leaders and asked them to draw up a 16-month withdrawal plan from Iraq.

February 27, 2009. Obama tells Congressional leaders that he’s planning to pull all combat troops out of Iraq by August 2010. That 19 month time-line is three longer than his campaign promise. He tells lawmakers that he intends to keep 35,000-50,000 non-combat forces in the country for training and force protection. Some Democratic Congressional members are upset at the remaining forces; Generals Petraeus and Odierno are supportive.

August 25, 2010: U.S. troop numbers in Iraq at 49,700.

photo credit: U.S. Army’s photostream

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Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix, Issues | 2 Comments »

4419

Thursday, August 19th, 2010
Will Marshall


Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

4,419. That’s the number of Americans who have died in Iraq since the 2003 invasion, according to the Pentagon. Tens of thousands more have been wounded, maimed, or traumatized in various ways. And although it’s hard to get an accurate count, it’s likely that more than 100,000 Iraqis have perished.

As U.S. troops head home ahead of President Obama’s Sept. 1 deadline for ending major combat operations in Iraq, it’s worth asking: What did all this sacrifice achieve?

No dispassionate observer can doubt that Iraq, the United States, and the rest of the world are well to be rid of Saddam Hussein, one of history’s worst tyrants. He continually menaced his neighbors, invading two of them (Iran and Kuwait) and launching missiles at a third (Israel). At home, the paranoid dictator presided over a nightmarish police state in which anyone suspected of disloyalty – including school children – were abducted, tortured and murdered by the regime’s vast security apparatus. All told, the Iraqi dictator was responsible for the death of nearly two million people. He was Iraq’s weapon of mass destruction.

It took U.S. troops to free Iraqis from Saddam’s sadistic grip. Despite the many blunders the Bush administration committed following the invasion, that act of liberation is to America’s everlasting credit.

Now it remains to be seen what Iraqis will make of it. It’s easy to be pessimistic. Terrorist acts, though down, are still almost a daily occurrence. Sectarian rivalries have abated somewhat, but still seethe under the surface and could yet fracture the country. Five months after its last elections, Iraqi politicians seem paralyzed, unable to agree on a new government.

But if Iraqi democracy is a mess, even a messy politics is preferable to no democracy at all, as James Traub has argued Slowly, fitfully, a brutalized people have begun to take control of their own destiny. The United States, which will keep an “overwatch” force of 50,000 in the country for another year, still has considerable influence. There’s a reasonable chance that Iraq could continue to evolve into the Arab world’s first functioning democracy.

But even if you grant that the United States has accomplished much in Iraq, many Americans, and not just critics of the war, still wonder whether it was worth the cost. That’s a very different question, and one we’re likely to be debating long after the last U.S. soldier has left Iraq.

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Posted in Daily Fix, Uncategorized | 2 Comments »

On Gibbs v. the “Professional Left”

Friday, August 13th, 2010
Will Marshall


Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

I returned yesterday from an overseas vacation to find Washington embroiled in furious controversy over Robert Gibbs’s gibes at the “professional left.” Somehow, the shock waves from this momentous development had failed to register in Corsica, which may be a gorgeous, sun-splashed rock in the Mediterranean, but is hopelessly apathetic about U.S. politics.

Fortunately for slackers like me, Washington’s chattering class is too busy for vacations. And cable TV never rests, keeping the vital discourse of democracy going even as Americans frolic heedlessly on beaches, lakes and mountains. Well, the fun’s over for me, so I might as well wade into the fray between the frazzled White House Press Secretary and his netroots tormentors.

For starters, it’s hard not to feel some sympathy to Gibbs, for whom watching cable TV is an occupational hazard. Too much of a bad thing, is, well, bad and it’s only human for Gibbs to vent about the ideological purism of talk show anchors and lefty bloggers who imagine that most Americans are pining for a full-throated liberal avenger in the White House. Real-life politics is nothing like The West Wing.

And Democrats might as well have it out now, the summer of their economic discontent, rather than, say, in October on the eve of the midterm. One truly silly argument is that Gibb’s criticisms of the administration’s “base” could alienate them and cause them to stay home on election day. In the first place, netroots types aren’t really the Democratic Party’s base.

They are a subset of liberals, who are themselves outnumbered by moderates and conservatives in the party. And they love to be attacked, because it validates their rather inflated sense of political self-importance. The worst thing you can do to the netroots is to ignore them.

In fact, every Democratic President in recent memory has been flayed by the hard left for lapses from orthodoxy. That is especially true of Franklin Roosevelt, the President many of today’s disappointed liberals say they wish Obama would be more like.

Like Obama, FDR was called a tool of Wall Street, a trimmer, an opportunist. He was bitterly assailed for trying to rescue and restore the free enterprise system rather than replacing it with central economic planning.

This drove leading liberal New Dealers like Rexford Tugwell and Harold Ickes to distraction. Here’s Tugwell:

“They [FDR’s liberal critics] are like Chinese warriors who decide battles, not by fighting, but by desertion…They rush to the aid of any liberal victor, and then proceed to stab him in the back when he fails to perform the mental impossibility of subscribing unconditionally to their dozen or more conflicting principles.” (Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, 414)

And Ickes had some equally choice words for the perfectabilian demands of his fellow liberals:

“That so-called liberals spend so much time trying to expose fellow liberals to the sneering scorn of those who delight to have their attention called to clay feet…I get very tired of the smug self-satisfaction, the holier-than-thou attitude, the sneering meticulousness of men and women with whose outlook on economic and social questions I often regretfully find myself in accord. It seems to be a fact that a reformer would rather hold up to ridicule another reformer because of some newly discovered fly speck than he would to clean out Tammany Hall. Sometimes even the fly speck is imaginary.” (Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, 413-414)

Gibbs has a point when he says that liberals undervalue Obama’s major political achievements. On the big matters that really count – the breakthrough on universal health care, the financial regulatory bill, getting out of Iraq on time, and placing liberal women on the Supreme Court (including the Court’s first Hispanic member) – Obama unquestionably has moved the needle in a progressive direction. But if history is any guide, it won’t matter – he’s still going to get pilloried by the congenitally insatiable left for something (For failing to close Gitmo, or embrace gay marriage, or demand amnesty for immigrants, etc.)

The fundamental problem with the left’s carping about Obama is the underlying assumption that their views are shared by a majority of the country: If only he would fight harder for structural transformations in American life, the latent progressive majority would spring into being and rally behind him!

This is sheer fantasy. If the country has moved in any direction over the past two years, it is to the center, and perhaps even the center right (excepting Republicans, who have surged lemming-like off the ideological cliff). What liberals see as overly tepid moves to restructure and stimulate the economy a healthy chunk of the increasingly cranky electorate, especially independences, see as overweening government intrusion.

The party’s leftists are obviously within their rights to criticize Obama when they think he deviates from the true path, just as centrists and conservatives are. And the dialectic between the President’s essential political pragmatism and left-wing fundamentalists is probably a healthy thing. It could force Obama to articulate more clearly the overarching philosophical framework that informs a Presidency that otherwise seems to proceed on the logic of serial pragmatism.

But ultimately, left leaning Democrats aren’t going to find a better horse to ride. And the more they flog Obama, the worse Democrats are likely to do this November.

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Posted in Daily Fix, Fixing Our Broken Politics, Uncategorized | 6 Comments »

Time To End Supplemental Budgeting

Wednesday, June 30th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

The House has taken up a $30 billion supplemental appropriations bill to fund Afghanistan. However, the bill has ballooned to over $70 billon as the Democratic leadership has had to slather on non-defense appropriations to attract the votes of more progressive caucus members frustrated with nine years of slow progress in Afghanistan. There’s a $10 billion education jobs fund, $18 billion in Department of Energy loan guarantees, and $500 million for border patrol. This bill has turned the old guns vs. butter argument into a fight about guns and butter.

The bottom line is Democrats’ left flank is fed up with tough but “must have” votes on issues they view as too centrist (a health care bill minus the public option, multiple war appropriations). But this bill’s incentives are wholly inappropriate: Spending $10 billion on education-related jobs may be a worthy expenditure when considered separately, but it has no business in a defense bill. The Republicans, of course, are having a field day — they’ve exposed the Democratic split by threatening to pull potentially vital support of war-funding unless the bill is stripped “clean” of non-defense expenditures.

The good news is that there is a magic bullet, and it would solve a lot more than political bickering: End the practice of supplemental budgeting. Beyond politics, having just a single, unified defense budget would force trade-offs in a defense spending culture that has run wild in the last 10 years.

Here how supplementals work. Every year since 9/11, we’ve had essentially two or three defense budgets. This year, we’ve had three: a baseline defense budget appropriation of approximately $549 billion, a $159 billion “overseas contingency operations” (i.e., mostly Afghanistan and Iraq) budget and the current supplemental request of $30 billion (which includes several tens of billions for non-defense items discussed above).

The dirty secret is that even many of Pentagon’s “emergency war appropriations” have nothing to do with our current wars. Take the F-22, for example. Before Secretary Gates won last year’s fight to cap production of the F-22, lawmakers inserted $600 million to buy additional planes in the 2009 “emergency supplemental” after the money was shut out of the baseline 2009 budget. This happened even though not one of the 183 F-22s already owned by the U.S. military had flown a single mission over Iraq or Afghanistan. That doesn’t sound like an emergency spending necessity, does it?

Having three budgets is like having three strikes in a baseball at-bat — you have the luxury to swing and miss twice. Projects that don’t make the baseline DoD budget (strike one!) can be considered in either of the additional supplementals (strike two! strike three!) before they’re “out.”

Ending the supplementals would be like giving the batter just one strike. By combining all defense spending into one (larger) appropriation each year, the batter has just one swing — miss the first time, that’s it. The practice would force Congress to make hard choices that prioritize the war-fighter. Who wants to be the representative that adds defense pork to a bill at the expense of our fighting soldiers’ needs? And with no hope of getting additional money later in the year, it would begin to create a culture of efficiency and discipline in spending priorities.

Ultimately, Afghanistan will be funded. Having a single defense budget minimizes divisive political bickering and prioritizes the war-fighter. That’s a real win-win.

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Six Things to Watch with Petraeus in Afghanistan

Thursday, June 24th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Now that Gen. McChrystal is about to add “(ret.)” after his name, let’s examine the implications of the transition to Gen. Petraeus.

The Washington Post story quotes an unnamed White House official saying of the transition: “It’s as seamless as it could be, not only in terms of operations but also because you put someone in who’s widely respected. No one is going to doubt that he’s the right guy for the job.”
A relatively smooth transition, to be sure, but with an emphasis on the relatively. Here’s a look at five areas where the change in command might create a bit of unease.

Political expectations: Petraeus is God, at least if you ask most elected officials on the Hill. Yes, he was the architect of the “surge” in Iraq, and the “surge” was part of the reason that violence decreased in that country. The massive increase in troops helped, but the strategy change, the Sons of Iraq’s change of allegiance and a six-month cease-fire called by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr were all critical.

If you’re really interested in learning the entire story of how Iraq’s civil war was tamed, read The Gamble by Tom Ricks. In it, Ricks quotes a Petraeus colleague (and I’m paraphrasing from memory) as saying, “David is the best general in the United States military. But he’s not as good as he thinks he is.” It’s like Favre to the Vikings. He’s still really, really good. But he’ll never be as good as in Green Bay.

Keep this in mind because, as Ricks says on his blog this morning, “Afghanistan 2010 may be an even tougher nut than Iraq 2007. … Our biggest problem in Afghanistan is the government we are supporting there, and it isn’t clear to me what Petraeus can do about that.”

Mission: Counterinsurgency theory and practice is Petraeus’ bag, so don’t expect that to change. Bear in mind that COIN is a strategy, not an outcome. It ends with some sort of negotiated peace, and it’s unclear if Petraeus has the same threshold for potential discussions with the Taliban as McChrystal. There has been American resistance to the idea (as there should be) of reconciling with any of the Taliban’s upper eschelon, but would Petraeus draw the line slightly differently than McChrystal?

Relations with Eikenberry: It became clear that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, was playing second fiddle to McChrystal, who had established a clear working relationship with Karzai. During Petraeus’ time in Iraq, he may have held more sway than then-Ambassador Ryan Crocker, but they were an inseparable team that appeared together constantly. Petraeus, who is as much of a diplomat as a solider, will work to forge a better relationship with Eikenberry and turn this operation into a true civilian-military effort.

Relations with Karzai: Karzai very publicly lobbied for McChrystal to stay, and by many accounts, the two were on the same page (at least professionally). Is it possible that they were too close? Will Petraeus do a better job using America’s isolated points of leverage to extract more from the Afghan government?

Relations with Pakistan: This quote says it all:

McChrystal also played a key role in improving Kabul’s rocky relationship with Islamabad.

Yet Petraeus probably has as much, if not more, clout in Islamabad. He was an early proponent of a regional strategy that prioritized improving relations with Pakistan in hopes of persuading it to target the Afghan Taliban fighters who use Pakistani hideouts to plot attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Petraeus has visited Pakistan numerous times, delivering assurances that the U.S. troop buildup in Afghanistan would not spill over into Pakistan, visiting Pakistani paramilitary forces in the northwestern city of Peshawar and regularly praising Pakistan’s fight against its domestic Taliban.

“There’s a complete understanding of each other’s situation,” a senior Pakistani military official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “He’s not a stranger.”

Troops on the ground: There’s been no shortage of troops in Afghanistan who voiced their displeasure with McChrystal’s restrictions on the use of force. Think of it this way: you’re an 18-year-old Marine, –and you’ve become a trained killer and sent to a war zone. But your commanding general seems like he’s telling you not to do the job you’ve been trained for. Many of the troops’ quotes imply a certain amount of lost respect for McChrystal. Petraeus will have to work to explain the mission and win them over to a “mission first” mentality. Training stateside should also be adjusted accordingly.

Petraeus is the consummate pro, and he’ll no doubt do his best in an incredibly challenging environment with far-from-certain results. My take is that this transition will be as smooth as one could hope.

Photo credit: Jon-Phillip Sheridan’s Photostream

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Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix | 2 Comments »

A Progressive Lesson from Reagan (Seriously)

Wednesday, June 9th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Peter Beinart has a must-read in the latest Foreign Policy on the mythology of Ronald Reagan — and the conservative movement that keeps perpetuating it.

As someone whose first job in D.C. was interning at a lobby firm that had — no kidding — a framed portrait of St. Ron in every office, I relish lines that tether President Reagan back to his terrestrial home, such as:

During his presidency, Reagan repeatedly invoked the prospect of an alien invasion as a reason for the United States and the Soviet Union to overcome their differences. Whenever he did, [National Security Adviser Colin] Powell would mutter, “Here come the little green men.”

That’s some delicious red meat right there.

But if we focus there — and Reagan haters are apt to do just that — we miss the real lesson. Beinart might douse ice water on the conservative narrative of Reagan, but he makes a strong case for the lesson that Obama can and should learn from The Great Communicator:

Reagan’s political genius lay in recognizing that what Americans wanted was a president who exorcised the ghost of the Vietnam War without fighting another Vietnam.

Americans loved Reagan’s foreign policy for the same reason they loved the 1985 blockbuster Rambo, in which the muscle-bound hero returns to Vietnam, kicks some communist butt, and no Americans die. Reagan’s liberal critics often accused him of reviving the chest-thumping spirit that had led to Vietnam. But they were wrong. For Reagan, chest-thumping was in large measure a substitute for a new Vietnam, a way of accommodating the restraints on U.S. power while still boosting American morale.

[...]

Obama can, and should, be Reaganesque in his effort to project great strength at low risk. That means understanding that America’s foreign-policy debates are often cultural debates in disguise.

Reagan was a master of symbolic acts — like awarding the Medal of Honor to overlooked Vietnam hero Roy Benavidez — that made Americans feel as though they were exorcising Vietnam’s ghost without refighting the war. Obama must be equally shrewd at a time when he has no choice but to retreat from Iraq and eventually Afghanistan. That means more than ritual incantations about flag and country; it means rhetorically challenging those who unfairly attack the United States. From a purely foreign-policy perspective, publicly confronting Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez when they malign the United States, or calling out universities that ban military recruiters from campus, might seem useless. But for U.S. presidents, there is no pure foreign-policy perspective; being effective in the world requires domestic support. [emphases added]

If Democrats are going to close the ever-elusive national security gap and strongly defend what I’ve called a sterling record on national security, they’re going to have to swallow some pride and steal one from the Gipper.

Photo credit: Fresh Conservative’s Photostream

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Israel Must Learn to Eat Soup with a Knife

Monday, June 7th, 2010
Rachel Kleinfeld


Rachel Kleinfeld is the CEO of the Truman National Security Project.

by Rachel Kleinfeld

I love Israel. From the golden light that falls across the stones of Jerusalem to the banh mi sandwiches made by Vietnamese refugees welcomed by an empathetic Prime Minister Begin, Israel has a beauty and history I hold dear. Keeping this state, and this liberal tradition, safe is why it is so important that Israel understand the depth – and the cause – of its failure last week.

Israel’s leaders lack a fundamental understanding of the threats of the 21st century, or the type of power it takes to quell them. And by misunderstanding, they are endangering their country’s very existence.

Power matters – particularly for a small state like Israel, with an array of real enemies. For many years, Israel has used two primary levers of power. Its immense military might gives it the power to physically destroy its enemies, from bombing Iraq’s nuclear reactor to routing the armies of attacking Arab states. Meanwhile, its friendship with the U.S. augments its armed prowess with the power of an alliance that provides crucial financial support and contains potential threats from countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

But in the 21st century, military power isn’t what it once was. Israel is rarely going to face “clean fights” against armies of clearly identified enemies marching across the desert. Instead, it is going to confront the messy realities of modern, non-state-based warfare. The Turkish organization that sponsored last week’s flotilla had ties to al-Qaeda. A number of individuals aboard were connected to Hamas and other violent organizations. But the boat was also full of peace activists, international diplomats and other well-intentioned individuals who served as (perhaps unwitting) human shields for these more nefarious groups. The smorgasbord of causes on that flotilla was not accidental: it is de rigueur among smart insurgent groups worldwide.

Insurgents know what Israel, apparently, does not. Using military means against unarmed opponents is not only wrong, it also strengthens the insurgents’ cause, inflames their supporters, motivates donors and garners great press.

A flotilla of cell-phone-carrying, Twitter- and Facebook-posting activists can ignite the 24-hour news cycle and get their version of events in front of world public opinion long before any country can muster its sclerotic bureaucratic organs. By the time the state responds, the narrative has already been set. Israel becomes the British fighting Gandhi, or the National Guard turning their hoses on Southern civil rights protesters. We know who won those battles.

Fine, many might snort. Israel may lose the weak-kneed support of the so-called “international community” but it is more important to stop real threats decisively. After all, Israel has had to put up with some international hand-wringing for its military actions in the past. But by bombing Iraq’s Osirik reactor, Syria’s blossoming nuclear reactor or the grounded Egyptian Air Force in 1967, it averted real threats that otherwise could have knocked it out of existence.

Force is still a useful, necessary deterrent against military threats from other countries. Threats from terrorist organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah and others that mix humanitarianism and populist appeals with violence are no less real, but as Israel learned in its ill-conceived 2006 war in Lebanon, force doesn’t work as well against them. As America’s own counterinsurgency manual states, insurgents met with force alone simply melt back into the population, their ranks augmented by new converts and their bank accounts brimming with funds from new supporters. The insurgents then live to fight long wars of attrition that sap their enemies physically, mentally and spiritually.

It is that last category that Israel must pay particular attention to, because it risks losing its other lever of power. As Peter Beinart pointed out in a much-quoted story in the New York Review of Books, young American Jews identify with Israel insofar as it lives up to its founding values. They want to support the state that took in the Vietnamese boat people, not the state that mines Palestinian olive groves. Fighting insurgent wars largely through force necessarily leads Israel to violate the spirit of its own humanitarian founding – and to alienate the supporters in America it needs for its survival.

Victory against insurgents requires a new perspective and new tools. As T.E. Lawrence explained, one must “learn to eat soup with a knife.” George W. Bush didn’t understand counterinsurgency, and his failure allowed the insurgent threat in Iraq and Afghanistan to grow and metastasize. Now, Israel’s leaders must master the signature threat of the 21st century. Its hammer worked well against the state-based threats it faced during the first 50 years of its existence. But Israel had better find other options in its toolkit if it is to quell the threats it faces today.

Photo credit: Lilachd’s Photostream

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Posted in A Progressive Security Strategy, Daily Fix | 3 Comments »

Progressives: Own the National Security Debate! Please!

Thursday, June 3rd, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

If you read the conclusion of today’s Democracy Corps/Third Way poll analysis, one thing becomes abundantly clear: Democrats remain disturbingly not confident talking about national security.

[M]any Democrats seem relatively silent about the accomplishments of the Obama administration and their party on national security. Though a few are stressing the administration’s efforts on the new START treaty and nuclear proliferation, fewer still seem to be stressing the administration’s accomplishments regarding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, efforts to strengthen the military, and steps to combat terrorism. The survey strongly suggests progressives should speak out forcefully on these issues, and remind voters of the contrasts between those relative successes and the failures the country witnessed under eight years of Bush-Cheney. [emphasis added]

When the president scores 53 percent approval even after two significant domestic terrorist attempts in the last six months, that’s a strong statement. Even the last few months have seen a significant 10-point shift — moderates have changed allegiances and now trust Democrats more than Republicans on national security by six points.

Progressives need to own the national security narrative, a message I’ve tried to hammer home repeatedly over the last several months. Here’s an excerpt from a piece I wrote back in April for Roll Call:

[T]he Obama administration has quietly put together a sterling record on national security. So why are Democrats so down in the dumps? As one party strategist put it, Democrats “are behaving like the president has a 30 percent approval rating. On these [security] issues, Democrats inherently believe that no one will believe our arguments.”
There’s plenty for progressives to cheer. … Progressives stand for strong, smart security policy. Obama has terrorists in retreat and American prestige on the rise. Democrats need to begin owning their successes if the American public is to give credit where it’s due.

The Democracy Corps/Third Way analysis offers solid, straightforward recommendations. These are hardly liberal fantasy — they’re pragmatic, progressive ways to emphasize what has been a successful beginning on national security that will translate into electoral gains.

  • Speak in stronger terms about anti-terror efforts.
  • Stress efforts to support and strengthen the military.
  • Emphasize successful attempts toward greater international cooperation.
  • Emphasize domestic and economic renewal as an element of national strength.
  • Provide a contrast to the Bush-Cheney administration.

Two quick comments on the specifics of the recommendations. First, on the economy “as an element of national strength,” we’re now wondering less why the White House put such a strong emphasis on precisely that point in last week’s National Security Strategy. And on that final point, John Boehner’s been going around claiming that the administration’s counterterrorism successes have been “lucky,” an argument that the survey says falls flat with voters. I’d offer my evisceration of Boehner here (it was fun to write, so please check it out).

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Top 10 Pragmatic Progressive Ideas from the National Security Strategy

Friday, May 28th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Since copies of the Obama administration’s new National Security Strategy began to circulate, there’s been a lot of cheering about how different from Bush’s it is. And true, it is. That’s made clear in the letter from the president on the document’s first page. And my hunch is that people stop there — you get your headline, and you run with it, not bothering to read the rest of the document.

Well, guess what? I just cozied up with a chicken sandwich, a Diet Coke and a bag of chips and read the whole enchilada.

It’s long and at times unwieldy. I understand, for example, that “spending taxpayer’s dollars wisely” is important, but not sure the White House should be compelled to include it in the strategy text. But that’s indicative of Obama’s style — when you seek input from everyone, you’ll tend to end up with a longer list.

But after digging through the document, it’s worth pointing out the specifics of how the strategy has a distinctly pragmatic progressive outlook. With that, here are the top 10 examples:

1. It reaffirms that America’s values are the source of its power, and that American exceptionalism endures:

[T]he work to build a stronger foundation for our leadership within our borders recognizes that the most effective way for the United States of America to promote our values is to live them. America’s commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are essential sources of our strength and influence in the world.  America has always been a beacon to the peoples of the world when we ensure that the light of America’s example burns bright.

2. It prioritizes terrorism, Iraq, and Afghanistan while weighing them in the context of the 21st century’s other threats:

[T]hese wars—and our global efforts to successfully counter violent extremism—are only one element of our strategic environment and cannot define America’s engagement with the world. Terrorism is one of many threats that are more consequential in a global age. The gravest danger to the American people and global security continues to come from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. The space and cyberspace capabilities that power our daily lives and military operations are vulnerable to disruption and attack. Dependence upon fossil fuels constrains our options and pollutes our environment. Climate change and pandemic disease threaten the security of regions and the health and safety of the American people.

3. America will only be secure if all government agencies coordinate effectively:

To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same. … We are improving the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly. We are also improving coordinated planning and policymaking and must build our capacity in key areas where we fall short.

4. It is comfortable with, but prudent about, the use of force:

While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction. When force is necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.

5. It’s tough as nails on al Qaeda:

[W]e reject the notion that al-Qa’ida represents any religious authority. They are not religious leaders, they are killers; and neither Islam nor any other religion condones the slaughter of innocents.

6. It advocates the responsible, measured pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons:

As long as any nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.

7. The Obama administration trusts the UN:

We are enhancing our coordination with the U.N. and its agencies. We need a U.N. capable of fulfilling its founding purpose — maintaining international peace and security, promoting global cooperation, and advancing human rights. To this end, we are paying our bills. We are intensifying efforts with partners on and outside the U.N. Security Council to ensure timely, robust, and credible Council action to address threats to peace and security.

8. “Democracy promotion” — a term that became identified with the Bush administration — isn’t a dirty phrase:

The United States supports the expansion of democracy and human rights abroad because governments that respect these values are more just, peaceful, and legitimate. We also do so because their success abroad fosters an environment that supports America’s national interests.

9. The United States’ security is closely linked to clean energy:

As long as we are dependent on fossil fuels, we need to ensure the security and free flow of global energy resources. But without significant and timely adjustments, our energy dependence will continue to undermine our security and prosperity. This will leave us vulnerable to energy supply disruptions and manipulation and to changes in the environment on an unprecedented scale.  The United States has a window of opportunity to lead in the development of clean energy technology.

10. It calls on politicians to stop being ridiculous and put country above politics:

Throughout the Cold War, even as there were intense disagreements about certain courses of action, there remained a belief that America’s political leaders shared common goals, even if they differed about how to reach them. In today’s political environment, due to the actions of both parties that sense of common purpose is at times lacking in our national security dialogue. This division places the United States at a strategic disadvantage.

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Boehner Still Struggling with National Security

Wednesday, May 19th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

John Boehner at Press ConferenceHow’s this for nerve? At a press conference on May 6, Republican Minority Leader Rep. John Boehner of Ohio accused the Obama administration of relying on “luck” to keep America safe. But Boehner’s own recipe for national security is based on even less. Rather than engage the White House in a constructive dialogue on how best to protect the nation, Boehner chose to throw political rotten tomatoes. His gamesmanship is a disturbing reminder that the House minority leader cares more about winning elections than keeping the country safe.

Amazingly, Boehner chose to lob his rhetorical garbage in the wake of the successful manhunt for would-be Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad. Ignoring the incredibly efficient work of America’s defense, security, and law enforcement agencies, Boehner charged the administration with operating “without a real, comprehensive plan to confront and defeat the terrorist threat.”

But clearly Boehner doesn’t have a clue of just how hard the administration has been working. Earlier this year, the Department of Defense issued its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). And in a few weeks, the White House will release its National Security Strategy. This may come as a shock to Boehner, but the QDR — led by Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, a Republican himself — and the National Security Strategy actually are the administration’s “comprehensive plans”.

Maybe Boehner missed it because he was too busy coming up with his own “plan.” Boehner actually did convene something called the National Security Solutions Group, a caucus of 18 Republicans that was supposed “to develop solutions to the current and future threats.” But to date, Boehner’s clique looks more like political theater than substantive intellect — it hasn’t issued a single new idea. And the QDR makes Boehner’s group look out-of-date, insufficient, and redundant anyway.

Perhaps Boehner failed to offer security ideas at his press conference because he lacked the confidence that any of his own might actually work. With a national security track record like Boehner’s, he probably calculated that it would be best to insult and run, rather that defend the policies he has supported in the past.

Exhibit A of Boehner’s policy stinkers? Invading Iraq.

Since that one didn’t turn out to be the cakewalk that Boehner, Dick Cheney, and George W. Bush originally planned, it’s understandable why he might be gun shy about forwarding new ideas. Indeed, Boehner remains so obsessed by Iraq that his website — as of this writing — continues to insist that Iraq, not Osama Bin Laden’s home in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, is “the central front of a global war [on terror].” Never mind that al Qaeda only came to Iraq after America did.

Then there’s Boehner’s odd belief that the administration’s decision to reorient missile defense — a policy supported by Secretary Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — comes at the expense of America’s allies. So how do those allies actually feel? Just fine, it turns out. Take it from Radoslaw Sikorski, Poland’s Foreign Minister, who said in the first week of May that “Polish-American relations are solid” and that Poland “rather like[s] the new version better than the previous one” of missile defense.

Boehner also sided with Dick Cheney in endorsing torture. General David Petraeus had a different view, saying torture was “neither useful nor necessary” and calling on America to “occupy the moral high ground.”

The fact is that John Boehner has been consistently wrong about which policies keep America safe. He’s reckless and out-of-touch with the national security landscape of the 21st century and more concerned with winning elections than stopping terrorism. His catcalls at the Obama administration only distract attention from the serious national security challenges America continues to face.

John Boehner is right that we need more than luck to defeat terrorism. We need national leaders to rise above empty rhetoric to protect the country in a bi-partisan manner. Unfortunately, Boehner is not acting like one of those leaders.

Photo credit: republicanconference / CC BY-NC 2.0

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Gates and Fiscal Responsibility (Again)

Thursday, May 13th, 2010
Jim Arkedis


Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

This past weekend Secretary of Defense Bob Gates continued to talk his Kansas brand of sense about Pentagon spending. After a lecture on shipbuilding last week at the Navy League teed up tough questions to the Navy — like whether we can continue to afford $7 billion submarines — Gates took to the Eisenhower Library in his home state to expand that theme across his entire department. I’d bet you a crisp $20 bill that this is the line that caused an audible gasp in Reston and on the Hill:

The Defense Department must take a hard look at every aspect of how it is organized, staffed, and operated – indeed, every aspect of how it does business. In each instance we must ask: First, is this respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of economic and fiscal duress? And second, is this activity or arrangement the best use of limited dollars, given the pressing needs to take care of our people, win the wars we are in, and invest in the capabilities necessary to deal with the most likely and lethal future threats?

As a starting point, no real progress toward savings will be possible without reforming our budgeting practices and assumptions. Too often budgets are divied up and doled out every year as a straight line projection of what was spent the year before. Very rarely is the activity funded in these areas ever fundamentally re-examined – either in terms of quantity, type, or whether it should be conducted at all. That needs to change.

But then again, maybe the shock value has worn off — fiscal responsibility has been such a theme under Gates’ leadership that perhaps tough-minded rhetoric on defense spending now comes with little surprise.

Then Gates delved into specifics. And now it was the soldiers’, sailors’, airmen’s, and marines’ turn to get nervous:

[H]ealth-care costs are eating the Defense Department alive, rising from $19 billion a decade ago to roughly $50 billion – roughly the entire foreign affairs and assistance budget of the State Department. The premiums for TRICARE, the military health insurance program, have not risen since the program was founded more than a decade ago. Many working age military retirees – who are earning full-time salaries on top of their full military pensions – are opting for TRICARE even though they could get health coverage through their employer, with the taxpayer picking up most of the tab. In recent years the Department has attempted modest increases in premiums and co-pays to help bring costs under control, but has been met with a furious response from the Congress and veterans groups. The proposals routinely die an ignominious death on Capitol Hill.

The resistance to dealing with TRICARE stems from an admirable sentiment: to take good care of our troops, their families, and veterans – especially those who have sacrificed and suffered on the battlefield. This same sentiment motivates the Congress routinely to add an extra half percent to the pay raise that the Department requests each year. Furthermore, the all-volunteer force, which has been a brilliant success in terms of performance, is a group that is older, more likely to have spouses and children, and thus far costlier to recruit, retain, house, and care for than the Eisenhower-era military that relied on the draft of young single men to fill out its ranks.

Those are the political and demographic realities we face. To a certain extent they limit what can be saved and where. But as a matter of principle and political reality, the Department of Defense cannot go to the America’s elected representatives and ask for increases each year unless we have done everything possible to make every dollar count. Unless there is real reform in the way this department does its business and spends taxpayer dollars.

Two quick points here.

First, America’s armed personnel and their families represent an important political constituency. No administration wants the baggage that comes with reducing benefits for America’s fighting men and women. For the time being, that includes this one. If a serious restructuring of military pay and benefits ever occurs, it would likely be in about year six or seven of the Obama administration, safely after reelection.

Even then, it might prove impossible as Congress continues to feed the beast of fiscal irresponsibility. News broke just today that the Hill is about to vote on a 1.9 percent military pay raise. Guess what? That’s a half-percent more than the Pentagon recommended.

Second, in my mind, the structure of the benefits isn’t the problem. It’s the amount of care. I wrote a paper last year called “The Pentagon’s Most Expensive Weapon,” and I concluded that once you add up all outlays — including costs associated with the Department of Veterans Affairs — for military personnel, DoD spends not the $136 billion it tells you, but more than $300 billion.

Why are these costs skyrocketing? It’s a simple function of our foreign policy — America’s service members may be getting older and costlier, but since Afghanistan and Iraq, they’re also getting injured more frequently and in greater numbers.  Here’s my conclusion:

The problem of rising personnel costs can only be addressed from higher up the chain. Extended deployments overseas invariably increase costs because of the strain they place on the force — in casualties, logistics, sustainability, and recruiting and retention costs. Once the force has recovered from Iraq and Afghanistan, it is incumbent on America’s civilian leadership to carefully weigh the extended cost burden placed on the Pentagon’s personnel account when plotting our global security strategy. In short, America must choose its wars and deployments carefully, as exploding personnel costs are the untold story of Pentagon spending in 2010 and beyond.

In other words, you can talk about trimming benefits and reducing the ever illusive “waste, fraud, and abuse,” and that is no doubt a good thing. And so is eliminating unneeded weapons systems.

But if we’re going inject real savings on personnel into the system, we can’t just talk about TRICARE, we have to stop fighting dumb wars. And ultimately, that decision is above Gates’ pay grade.

Photo credit: http://www.flickr.com/photos/eschipul/ / CC BY-SA 2.0

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Four Things Obama Needs to Do in the Middle East

Wednesday, April 21st, 2010
Shadi Hamid


Shadi Hamid is the deputy director of the Brookings Doha Center and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

by Shadi Hamid

In a recent piece, I discussed the growing sense of “Bush nostalgia” among Arab reformers. Such nostalgia has less to do with George W. Bush and more to do with the period of democratic promise the Middle East experienced in 2004-5, partly a result of aggressive, but short-lived, efforts to put pressure on authoritarian regimes.

For its part, the Obama administration has shown little real interest in democratization in the Arab world, falling back on the “pragmatic” neo-realism of the Clinton and first Bush administrations. Compared to the destructive policies of his predecessor, President Obama’s approach seems a breath of fresh air. But his foreign policy vision, while certainly sensible, has so far been remarkably conventional and unimaginative. Perhaps that’s what was initially needed. Now, however, is the time for bolder, more creative policy making. Here are four things Obama can – and should – do in the Middle East to advance U.S. interests and ideals:

  • Recognize the region’s changing balance of power. Traditional allies like Egypt and Jordan (two of the world’s largest U.S. aid recipients) are losing influence. Increasingly authoritarian, erratic and perceived as excessively pro-American, they have little credibility with Arab audiences. On the other hand, emerging powers like Turkey and Qatar are pursuing independent foreign policies and maintaining positive relations with both the West and the “rejectionist” camp (Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah). Not surprisingly, both countries, seen as “honest brokers,” have played a major role in mediating regional conflicts and supporting dialogue efforts, including on the Syrian-Israeli, Israeli-Palestinian, Hamas-Fatah and internal Lebanese tracks. The U.S. should encourage their efforts, keeping in mind that they may be uniquely well-positioned to exert influence on Iran and Syria.
  • Promote Turkish accession to the EU. Turkey is the closest thing the Middle East has to a “model,” one of only two countries in the world led by a democratically elected Islamist party. According to a 2009 survey, 64 percent of Arab respondents in seven countries believe “Turkey’s EU membership prospects make Turkey an attractive partner for reform in the Arab world.” Considering its growing regional importance, the U.S. cannot afford for Turkey to turn inward and become embroiled in conflict between its secularist military and Islamist-leaning government. For a time, Turkey’s desire to join the EU provided incentives to implement wide-ranging legal and political reforms. However, as the EU drags its feet on accession talks, and Turks lose hope in EU membership, the reform process looks less encouraging than ever. Turkey must, however, remain enmeshed in Western institutions and partnerships. The Obama administration should use its leverage with European allies to ensure the accession process moves forward.
  • Begin strategic engagement with nonviolent Islamist groups. In most Arab countries, Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan and Syria, are the largest, most influential opposition groups. But Obama has so far failed to engage them, despite his emphasis on “dialogue” with diverse actors. Engagement would serve several purposes, discussed in detail here, including information-gathering, improving our credibility with Arab publics and putting pressure on autocratic regimes to open up. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, or another senior official, could begin by giving a major speech on the U.S. and political Islam (something which the Clinton administration did on several occasions), stating unequivocally that the U.S. will accept democratic outcomes, even if that means the election of Islamist parties. The State Department should also issue a directive explicitly permitting State Department employees, including ambassadors in the region, to meet with and incorporate members of Islamist organizations in their programming.
  • Embrace “positive conditionality.” The U.S. gives hundreds of millions of dollars annually to Arab authoritarian regimes. Rather than cutting aid, which is unlikely to be politically viable, the U.S. could offer large packages in additional assistance, conditioned on meeting a series of explicit benchmarks on democratization. If the country failed to meet these benchmarks, the aid would be withheld and carried over to a reform “endowment” for the next fiscal year. This way, the more governments rejected the aid, the greater the incentive would be to accept it in future years.

None of these four “steps” are particularly revolutionary. But that’s the point: the Obama administration could take action immediately – if it had the political will. With the troop drawdown in Iraq, and the Iranian nuclear threat, there may be a temptation to wait for a better time. But, in the Middle East, the better time, sadly, never seems to come.

If anything, a confluence of factors appears to be converging, suggesting the time to act is now. There are critical elections in Egypt and Jordan coming up in 2010 (and 2011). For the first time in Egypt, there is an inspiring national figure, Mohamed ElBaradei, who seems capable of uniting a notoriously fractious opposition behind a common vision for reform. Egypt, along with Algeria and Tunisia, will be facing succession struggles sooner rather than later. Meanwhile, internal tensions in Turkey seem to be rising, with the threat of escalation looming in the background. In other words, this is a difficult time of transition in the Middle East and the U.S. will need to do considerably more than just tread water.

The views expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of the Progressive Policy Institute.

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