Posts Tagged ‘ Iraq ’

Obama Finds His Voice – And America’s

Friday, September 24th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

Ordinarily, U.S. presidents don’t make headlines by extolling liberty and democracy before an international audience. But when President Obama did just that yesterday at the United Nations, it signaled a welcome shift from his previous reticence on these themes.

Here’s the key passage:

Yet experience shows us that history is on the side of liberty; that the strongest foundation for human progress lies in open economies, open societies, and open governments. To put it simply, democracy, more than any other form of government, delivers for our citizens. And I believe that truth will only grow stronger in a world where the borders between nations are blurred.

For sure, in his 2009 Cairo speech and elsewhere, the President has argued that individual freedom and democracy are universal aspirations. But in general, the administration’s voice has often seemed muted when it comes to standing up for liberal values.

Critics, for example, have cited Obama’s apparent downgrading of human rights in relations with China; U.S. eagerness to “reset” relations with Russia even as that country slides back into authoritarianism; and, the White House’s failure to offer full-throated support to Iran’s “green” movement which arose in protest over a rigged 2009 election.

The administration’s ambivalence about America’s responsibility to abet the spread of liberal democracy is no mystery. It’s a reaction to George W. Bush’s ill-conceived “freedom agenda”, which seemed to conflate U. S. democracy promotion with the use of force in Iraq and threats of “regime change” in hostile countries like Iran and North Korea. Bush’s unmodulated, even messianic, rhetoric about supporting democratic revolutions everywhere rattled America’s foes but also unnerved our friends as well.

President Obama has devoted his first two years to reassuring the world that America is returning to its tradition of cooperative internationalism, and he’s largely succeeded.  The U.S. “brand” has been refurbished and America’s global approval ratings have risen.

But in rectifying its predecessor’s mistakes, this administration sometimes leaned too far in the opposition direction. At times it seemed to embrace foreign policy “realism”, which emphasizes material interests and geopolitics and downplays the role of political values and structures in shaping countries’ international conduct.  In a telling omission, the administration has organized its foreign policy around the “three Ds” – diplomacy, development and defense – conspicuously excluding a fourth D for democracy.

But realism is antithetical to liberalism, which is why it has been most often associated with Republicans like Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft. From Woodrow Wilson’s day on, Democrats have argued that America can best advance its interests and ideals by throwing her weight on the side of individual rights, economic freedom and democracy. Their guiding philosophy is not realism but liberal internationalism, which holds that a freer world is a safer, more prosperous world.

Obama seemed to reaffirm that outlook yesterday. At the same time, the President continued to be clear that his administration’s approach to supporting democracy would be nothing like Bush’s. Picking up a theme introduced in recent speeches by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, he promised greater U.S. support for embattled civil society organizations in authoritarian countries.

Finally, Obama stressed that promoting democracy is not something America should do unilaterally, but in concert with new democracies as well as old allies. That was a pointed challenge to countries like South Africa and some Latin American countries, who have been reluctant to speak out against human rights abuses and tyrannical rule in their own neighborhoods.

In all, it was an important speech that realigned U.S. foreign policy with core values that have defined it at its best, and led to its greatest triumphs.

photo credit: transplanted mountaineer

9/11, Nine Years Later: A Call for Patience in Afghanistan

Friday, September 10th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

On the anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks, many Americans continue to question the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan. It is now America’s longest, and perhaps most frustrating, war. Shouldn’t we be done with this by now?

Though Bin Laden remains alive, his core al Qaeda followers remain pinned down in Pakistan and could not likely muster a 9/11-style attack today. While Al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and elsewhere continue to launch ill-conceived, amateurish attempts to kill us, the most Americans probably don’t feel like they’re about to die in a horrific act of terror.

As much as Americans would like to put Afghanistan behind us, patience is needed. It’s a tough argument to make, but—moral obligation aside—there remains a compelling national security reason for America’s continued military presence in Afghanistan.
Nine years removed from that tragic day, Americans feel generally safe. Though time certainly, and thankfully, heals all wounds, we cannot allow it to cloud this reality: if America withdraws from Afghanistan tomorrow, there is an unacceptably high risk that the Taliban would return to power. And under the Taliban’s umbrella, Osama Bin Laden’s clique would slowly rebuild its capability to launch a massive attack against the United States.

The Taliban will only be assured a permanent spot on the ash-heap of history when Afghanistan’s civil and security institutions are strong enough to fill the power vacuum the Taliban would dearly like to occupy. We’re simply not there yet, and that’s why Americans have to summon a dose of strategic patience.

It is a logic President Obama has understood since he was a state senator in Illinois. His most liberal supporters would like to believe he was a proto-typical anti-war liberal, but the president has been strikingly consistent in his rhetoric and support for America’s military presence in Afghanistan since first speaking out in October 2002.

Whether America succeeds in eventually leaving behind a stable Afghanistan capable of self-governance free of Taliban influence remains an open question. At the very least, America is better equipped to do so now than during the past nine years, having pivoted to adopt a properly resourced counter-insurgency strategy that prioritizes protecting the Afghan population and holding land over killing bad guys. Had George Bush not diverted critical resources like manpower, money, and presidential-focus to an ill-conceived war in Iraq, one can only guess how much further along America’s efforts would stand today.

This month, Afghans will vote again in parliamentary elections. Their success is hardly assured— elections are certainly important pillars of an emerging democracy, but they are not ends in and of themselves. There will likely be violence and accusations of vote-rigging and financial corruption. Hamid Karzai may well appear more of a dictator-in-waiting than he did even one year ago. Does that mean we should throw in the towel?

No. Nation building, a dirty-yet-accurate description of America’s role in Afghanistan, is a torturously slow and difficult process whose effectiveness cannot be judged by the latest headlines, but only under the long arc of history. America’s efforts in Afghanistan may not prove a shining success, but there is sufficient evidence that additional American effort will improve America’s chances for long term safety.

If we are to ensure that a massive threat from al Qaeda is permanently vanquished, this September 11th, President Obama should ask for patience.

Hillary Rebuts the Declinists

Thursday, September 9th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

Among foreign policy mandarins here and abroad, it’s become axiomatic that America must radically downsize its global ambitions to avoid hubris and to match our straitened economic circumstances. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is having none of it.

In a speech this week to the Council on Foreign Relations, Clinton vigorously affirmed the world’s need for, and America’s capacity to provide, strong global leadership. Even in a multipolar world, she argued, no other nation has the unique combination of strengths necessary to organize collective action against common global problems.

And, at a time when moral relativism has crept into U.S. foreign policy discourse in the guise of realism, Clinton was refreshingly unapologetic in pledging U.S. support for the “universal” values of liberal democracy. As she had done in an important speech to the Community of Democracies in Krakow July 3, she noted that authoritarian governments are cracking down on independent civil society organizations, and she pledged U.S. assistance to embattled NGOs.

Clinton’s confident assertion of a “new American moment” is in striking contrast to narrative of U.S. decline now fashionable among global elites. The story goes something like this:

As the Cold War ended, the U.S. found itself the last superpower standing, its system of democratic capitalism triumphant — and quickly succumbed to hubris. It intervened in conflicts all over the globe, rashly plunged into unnecessary wars, drank the elixir of free market ideology, and in general overestimated its ability to shape events and impose its will on others. Now we are overextended and facing a global backlash against U.S. imperialist pretensions.

What’s more, we’re broke and can no longer afford to maintain our old position as global hegemon. Meanwhile, economic dynamism has shifted eastward, and the rapid growth of China, India and others is fundamentally altering the world’s balance of power.

All this Spenglerian gloom points to an inescapable conclusion: America must retrench strategically. This entails defining our interests more narrowly, shrinking our military, ceasing to lecture others about democracy, and shedding the too-costly burdens of global leadership.

Clinton instead argued essentially for updating the liberal internationalist vision for today’s interconnected world. She stressed the need for America to once again be the chief “architect” of cooperative institutions, at both the regional and global level, for providing mutual security and prosperity, tackling underdevelopment and climate change, and defending human rights (with her customary special emphasis on women’s equality). Through such interlacing institutions, she said, the burden of providing “public goods” could be spread more broadly.

She also widened the definition of the Obama administration’s policy of “engagement.” In addition to engaging adversaries and rivals diplomatically, she stressed her determination to engage directly with the people and foreign publics in general.

Less convincing was her account of U.S. efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear program. Our engagement with China and Russia, she said, paid real political dividends when the U.S. Security Council last spring passed, “the strongest and most comprehensive set of sanctions ever on Iran. ”

True, but Iran’s continued intransigence suggests the limits of multilateral diplomacy more than its effectiveness. The underlying assumption that Tehran is eager to be welcomed back into the world community overlooks the regime’s self-conception as a revolutionary Islamist theocracy and challenger of the international status quo.

In a curious omission, Clinton had little to say about terrorism amid all the architectural metaphors. While al Qaeda may be holed up in Pakistan, its ideology has spread to affiliates in Iraq and, more recently, in Somalia and Yemen, where the gruesome pattern of suicide attacks and mass murder of civilians is more and more evident.

Containing this ideological contagion is of critical importance to the United States and to its vision of a world order upheld by a growing network of liberal democratic institutions. Let’s hope we hear more from the Administration on this subject soon.

A Timeline: Obama and Iraq

Tuesday, August 31st, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Just after President finishes his Oval Office speech on Iraq (and because they’re somewhat linked, Afghanistan), you may flip to your favorite cable news channel and listen to your favorite talking head or two banter on about the war’s history.  In an effort to set the record straight, here’s a quick guide to Barack Obama’s political history with Iraq (and by extension Afghanistan). If you want to a more detailed timeline, you can click over to the Washington Post, which has a good interactive map and timeline.  Or you can check out my new favorite site, LetMeGoogleThatForYou.com.

Here’s the bottom line: After reading just about ever single speech Obama has given on Iraq since 2002, he has been remarkably consistent for a politician.

He opposed the war, while being explicit that he’s comfortable with the use of force. He’s been steadfast that Bush was screwing around in Iraq while he should have been concentrating in Afghanistan.  Hence, this administration’s current policy is the continuation of Obama’s thinking since 2002.

However, once we were in Iraq, he recognized America’s ongoing national security concerns, and sought to promote debate on striking the balance between responsibility, national interest, and political reality.  Even though Obama opposed the surge, it was not because he was uncomfortable with using force, but because he felt that the threat of removing US troops would force political cooperation amongst Iraqi governing stakeholders.

Throughout his campaign, he stayed on message about bringing the war to a “responsible conclusion” a pledge that he has largely fulfilled.

The future is murky: Violence may return to haunt Iraq as the remaining troops are pulled out over the next 17 months (as George Bush’s 2008 SOFA dictates).   While a new Iraq government may request that continued presence of American forces past the 2011 deadline, it is dubious whether Obama, in the midst of a re-election bid, would reopen such a divisive arguement, particularly as America’s national security interests seem long-since secured.

Here are the details:

October 2, 2002: On the eve of a Congressional resolution authorizing President George Bush to use force in Iraq, Illinois State Senator Barack Obama gives a speech at a Chicago Anti-War Rally. Here’s what he said:

Let me begin by saying that although this has been billed as an anti-war rally, I stand before you as someone who is not opposed to war in all circumstances. …

After September 11th… I supported this [Bush] Administration’s pledge to hunt down and root out those who would slaughter innocents in the name of intolerance. … I don’t oppose all wars. What I am opposed to is a dumb war.

October 12, 2004: In a debate for his Illinois Senate seat against Republican Alan Keyes, Obama said this of Iraq and Afghanistan:

Ambassador Keyes and I agree on one thing, and that is that the War on Terror has to be

vigorously fought. Where we part company is how to fight it, because I think Afghanistan in fact was not a preemptive war, it was a war launched directly against those who were responsible for 9-11. Iraq was a preemptive war based on faulty evidence. … Now, us having gone in there, I do think we now have a deep national security interest in making certain that Iraq is stable. If is it not stable, not only are we going to have a humanitarian crisis, I think we are also going to have a huge national security problem on our ands—because, ironically, it has become a hotbed of terrorists consequence, in part, of our incursion there.

November 22, 2005. A speech to the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations found Obama in a reflective mood:

What do we want to accomplish now that we are in Iraq, and what is possible to accomplish? What kind of actions can we take to ensure not only a safe and stable Iraq, but that will also preserve our capacity to rebuild Afghanistan, isolate and apprehend terrorist cells, preserve our long-term military readiness, and devote the resources needed to shore up our homeland security?

[G]iven the enormous stakes in Iraq, I believe that those of us who are involved in shaping our national security policies should do what we believe is right, not merely what is politically expedient….

But I believe that, having waged a war that has unleashed daily carnage and uncertainty in Iraq, we have to manage our exit in a responsible way – with the hope of leaving a stable foundation for the future, but at the very least taking care not to plunge the country into an even deeper and, perhaps, irreparable crisis.

January 9, 2006. Senator Obama podcast following a trip to Baghdad:

I think the general view was that we were in such a delicate situation right now and that there was so little institutional capacity on the part of the Iraqi government, that a full military withdrawal at this point would probably result in significant civil war and potentially hundreds of thousands of deaths.

January 25, 2006. Senator Obama podcast following post-trip meeting with George Bush:

I believe we need to bring our troops home as quickly as possible, but to do so in a way that does not precipitate all out civil war in Iraq.

On February 22, 2006, the Sumarra Mosque, one of the holiest sites in Shiite Islam, is bombed.  The repercussions set off a spiral of increasing violence that many call a civil war.

June 26, 2006. Senator Obama floor statement on Iraq following proposed Kerry Amendment, which called for redeployment of troops.

I would like nothing more than to support the Kerry Amendment; to bring our brave troops home on a date certain, and spare the American people more pain, suffering and sorrow.

But having visited Iraq, I’m also acutely aware that a precipitous withdrawal of our troops, driven by Congressional edict rather than the realities on the ground, will not undo the mistakes made by this Administration. It could compound them. …

I do not believe that setting a date certain for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops is the best approach to achieving, in a methodical and responsible way, the three basic goals that should drive our Iraq policy: that is, 1) stabilizing Iraq and giving the factions within Iraq the space they need to forge a political settlement; 2) containing and ultimately defeating the insurgency in Iraq; and 3) bringing our troops safely home.

I cannot support the Kerry Amendment. Instead, I am a cosponsor of the Levin amendment, which gives us the best opportunity to find this balance between our need to begin a phase-down and our need to help stabilize Iraq.

November 20, 2006. Senator Obama speaks to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs:

The President should announce to the Iraqi people that our policy will include a gradual and substantial reduction in U.S. forces. He should then work with our military commanders to map out the best plan for such a redeployment and determine precise levels and dates. … [I]t could be suspended if at any point U.S. commanders believe that a further reduction would put American troops in danger. …

Perhaps most importantly, some of these troops could be redeployed to Afghanistan, where our lack of focus and commitment of resources has led to an increasing deterioration of the security situation there. The President’s decision to go to war in Iraq has had disastrous consequences for Afghanistan — we have seen a fierce Taliban offensive, a spike in terrorist attacks, and a narcotrafficking problem spiral out of control.

In January 2007, George Bush announced ‘the Surge’, which Obama opposed. Here’s a video. Here’s what Obama said in a Senate floor statement:

The President’s decision to move forward with this escalation anyway, despite all evidence and military advice to the contrary, is the terrible consequence of the decision to give him the broad, open-ended authority to wage this war back in 2002…. I cannot in good conscience support this escalation.

Drawing down our troops in Iraq will put pressure on Iraqis to arrive at the political settlement that is needed and allow us to redeploy additional troops in Afghanistan… My plan would couple this phased redeployment with an enhanced effort to train Iraqi security forces.

As the political narrative tells us, “the surge worked.” However, if you dig a little deeper, you’ll find that three events really helped bring about a de-escalation in violence in Iraq in 2007.  Read this op-ed from my friend Michael Kleinman on what really happened.

October 2, 2007.  Early in the presidential campaign, Senator Obama pledges to bring home troops within 16 months of taking office:

I will begin to remove our troops from Iraq immediately. I will remove one or two brigades a month and get all of our combat troops out of Iraq within 16 months. The only troops I will keep in Iraq will perform the limited missions of protecting our diplomats and carrying out targeted strikes on Al Qaeda.

November 19, 2008. Just before leaving office, George Bush negotiates a new Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government.  It calls for US troops to be out of Iraq’s cities and towns by mid-2009 and out of the country altogether by the end of 2011.  Read the entire SOFA here.  Obama’s campaign timeline is more-or-less in line with Bush’s.

January 21, 2009. Just after taking office, President Obama met with military leaders and asked them to draw up a 16-month withdrawal plan from Iraq.

February 27, 2009. Obama tells Congressional leaders that he’s planning to pull all combat troops out of Iraq by August 2010. That 19 month time-line is three longer than his campaign promise. He tells lawmakers that he intends to keep 35,000-50,000 non-combat forces in the country for training and force protection. Some Democratic Congressional members are upset at the remaining forces; Generals Petraeus and Odierno are supportive.

August 25, 2010: U.S. troop numbers in Iraq at 49,700.

photo credit: U.S. Army’s photostream

4419

Thursday, August 19th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

4,419. That’s the number of Americans who have died in Iraq since the 2003 invasion, according to the Pentagon. Tens of thousands more have been wounded, maimed, or traumatized in various ways. And although it’s hard to get an accurate count, it’s likely that more than 100,000 Iraqis have perished.

As U.S. troops head home ahead of President Obama’s Sept. 1 deadline for ending major combat operations in Iraq, it’s worth asking: What did all this sacrifice achieve?

No dispassionate observer can doubt that Iraq, the United States, and the rest of the world are well to be rid of Saddam Hussein, one of history’s worst tyrants. He continually menaced his neighbors, invading two of them (Iran and Kuwait) and launching missiles at a third (Israel). At home, the paranoid dictator presided over a nightmarish police state in which anyone suspected of disloyalty – including school children – were abducted, tortured and murdered by the regime’s vast security apparatus. All told, the Iraqi dictator was responsible for the death of nearly two million people. He was Iraq’s weapon of mass destruction.

It took U.S. troops to free Iraqis from Saddam’s sadistic grip. Despite the many blunders the Bush administration committed following the invasion, that act of liberation is to America’s everlasting credit.

Now it remains to be seen what Iraqis will make of it. It’s easy to be pessimistic. Terrorist acts, though down, are still almost a daily occurrence. Sectarian rivalries have abated somewhat, but still seethe under the surface and could yet fracture the country. Five months after its last elections, Iraqi politicians seem paralyzed, unable to agree on a new government.

But if Iraqi democracy is a mess, even a messy politics is preferable to no democracy at all, as James Traub has argued Slowly, fitfully, a brutalized people have begun to take control of their own destiny. The United States, which will keep an “overwatch” force of 50,000 in the country for another year, still has considerable influence. There’s a reasonable chance that Iraq could continue to evolve into the Arab world’s first functioning democracy.

But even if you grant that the United States has accomplished much in Iraq, many Americans, and not just critics of the war, still wonder whether it was worth the cost. That’s a very different question, and one we’re likely to be debating long after the last U.S. soldier has left Iraq.

On Gibbs v. the “Professional Left”

Friday, August 13th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

I returned yesterday from an overseas vacation to find Washington embroiled in furious controversy over Robert Gibbs’s gibes at the “professional left.” Somehow, the shock waves from this momentous development had failed to register in Corsica, which may be a gorgeous, sun-splashed rock in the Mediterranean, but is hopelessly apathetic about U.S. politics.

Fortunately for slackers like me, Washington’s chattering class is too busy for vacations. And cable TV never rests, keeping the vital discourse of democracy going even as Americans frolic heedlessly on beaches, lakes and mountains. Well, the fun’s over for me, so I might as well wade into the fray between the frazzled White House Press Secretary and his netroots tormentors.

For starters, it’s hard not to feel some sympathy to Gibbs, for whom watching cable TV is an occupational hazard. Too much of a bad thing, is, well, bad and it’s only human for Gibbs to vent about the ideological purism of talk show anchors and lefty bloggers who imagine that most Americans are pining for a full-throated liberal avenger in the White House. Real-life politics is nothing like The West Wing.

And Democrats might as well have it out now, the summer of their economic discontent, rather than, say, in October on the eve of the midterm. One truly silly argument is that Gibb’s criticisms of the administration’s “base” could alienate them and cause them to stay home on election day. In the first place, netroots types aren’t really the Democratic Party’s base.

They are a subset of liberals, who are themselves outnumbered by moderates and conservatives in the party. And they love to be attacked, because it validates their rather inflated sense of political self-importance. The worst thing you can do to the netroots is to ignore them.

In fact, every Democratic President in recent memory has been flayed by the hard left for lapses from orthodoxy. That is especially true of Franklin Roosevelt, the President many of today’s disappointed liberals say they wish Obama would be more like.

Like Obama, FDR was called a tool of Wall Street, a trimmer, an opportunist. He was bitterly assailed for trying to rescue and restore the free enterprise system rather than replacing it with central economic planning.

This drove leading liberal New Dealers like Rexford Tugwell and Harold Ickes to distraction. Here’s Tugwell:

“They [FDR’s liberal critics] are like Chinese warriors who decide battles, not by fighting, but by desertion…They rush to the aid of any liberal victor, and then proceed to stab him in the back when he fails to perform the mental impossibility of subscribing unconditionally to their dozen or more conflicting principles.” (Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, 414)

And Ickes had some equally choice words for the perfectabilian demands of his fellow liberals:

“That so-called liberals spend so much time trying to expose fellow liberals to the sneering scorn of those who delight to have their attention called to clay feet…I get very tired of the smug self-satisfaction, the holier-than-thou attitude, the sneering meticulousness of men and women with whose outlook on economic and social questions I often regretfully find myself in accord. It seems to be a fact that a reformer would rather hold up to ridicule another reformer because of some newly discovered fly speck than he would to clean out Tammany Hall. Sometimes even the fly speck is imaginary.” (Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, 413-414)

Gibbs has a point when he says that liberals undervalue Obama’s major political achievements. On the big matters that really count – the breakthrough on universal health care, the financial regulatory bill, getting out of Iraq on time, and placing liberal women on the Supreme Court (including the Court’s first Hispanic member) – Obama unquestionably has moved the needle in a progressive direction. But if history is any guide, it won’t matter – he’s still going to get pilloried by the congenitally insatiable left for something (For failing to close Gitmo, or embrace gay marriage, or demand amnesty for immigrants, etc.)

The fundamental problem with the left’s carping about Obama is the underlying assumption that their views are shared by a majority of the country: If only he would fight harder for structural transformations in American life, the latent progressive majority would spring into being and rally behind him!

This is sheer fantasy. If the country has moved in any direction over the past two years, it is to the center, and perhaps even the center right (excepting Republicans, who have surged lemming-like off the ideological cliff). What liberals see as overly tepid moves to restructure and stimulate the economy a healthy chunk of the increasingly cranky electorate, especially independences, see as overweening government intrusion.

The party’s leftists are obviously within their rights to criticize Obama when they think he deviates from the true path, just as centrists and conservatives are. And the dialectic between the President’s essential political pragmatism and left-wing fundamentalists is probably a healthy thing. It could force Obama to articulate more clearly the overarching philosophical framework that informs a Presidency that otherwise seems to proceed on the logic of serial pragmatism.

But ultimately, left leaning Democrats aren’t going to find a better horse to ride. And the more they flog Obama, the worse Democrats are likely to do this November.

Time To End Supplemental Budgeting

Wednesday, June 30th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

The House has taken up a $30 billion supplemental appropriations bill to fund Afghanistan. However, the bill has ballooned to over $70 billon as the Democratic leadership has had to slather on non-defense appropriations to attract the votes of more progressive caucus members frustrated with nine years of slow progress in Afghanistan. There’s a $10 billion education jobs fund, $18 billion in Department of Energy loan guarantees, and $500 million for border patrol. This bill has turned the old guns vs. butter argument into a fight about guns and butter.

The bottom line is Democrats’ left flank is fed up with tough but “must have” votes on issues they view as too centrist (a health care bill minus the public option, multiple war appropriations). But this bill’s incentives are wholly inappropriate: Spending $10 billion on education-related jobs may be a worthy expenditure when considered separately, but it has no business in a defense bill. The Republicans, of course, are having a field day — they’ve exposed the Democratic split by threatening to pull potentially vital support of war-funding unless the bill is stripped “clean” of non-defense expenditures.

The good news is that there is a magic bullet, and it would solve a lot more than political bickering: End the practice of supplemental budgeting. Beyond politics, having just a single, unified defense budget would force trade-offs in a defense spending culture that has run wild in the last 10 years.

Here how supplementals work. Every year since 9/11, we’ve had essentially two or three defense budgets. This year, we’ve had three: a baseline defense budget appropriation of approximately $549 billion, a $159 billion “overseas contingency operations” (i.e., mostly Afghanistan and Iraq) budget and the current supplemental request of $30 billion (which includes several tens of billions for non-defense items discussed above).

The dirty secret is that even many of Pentagon’s “emergency war appropriations” have nothing to do with our current wars. Take the F-22, for example. Before Secretary Gates won last year’s fight to cap production of the F-22, lawmakers inserted $600 million to buy additional planes in the 2009 “emergency supplemental” after the money was shut out of the baseline 2009 budget. This happened even though not one of the 183 F-22s already owned by the U.S. military had flown a single mission over Iraq or Afghanistan. That doesn’t sound like an emergency spending necessity, does it?

Having three budgets is like having three strikes in a baseball at-bat — you have the luxury to swing and miss twice. Projects that don’t make the baseline DoD budget (strike one!) can be considered in either of the additional supplementals (strike two! strike three!) before they’re “out.”

Ending the supplementals would be like giving the batter just one strike. By combining all defense spending into one (larger) appropriation each year, the batter has just one swing — miss the first time, that’s it. The practice would force Congress to make hard choices that prioritize the war-fighter. Who wants to be the representative that adds defense pork to a bill at the expense of our fighting soldiers’ needs? And with no hope of getting additional money later in the year, it would begin to create a culture of efficiency and discipline in spending priorities.

Ultimately, Afghanistan will be funded. Having a single defense budget minimizes divisive political bickering and prioritizes the war-fighter. That’s a real win-win.

Six Things to Watch with Petraeus in Afghanistan

Thursday, June 24th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Now that Gen. McChrystal is about to add “(ret.)” after his name, let’s examine the implications of the transition to Gen. Petraeus.

The Washington Post story quotes an unnamed White House official saying of the transition: “It’s as seamless as it could be, not only in terms of operations but also because you put someone in who’s widely respected. No one is going to doubt that he’s the right guy for the job.”
A relatively smooth transition, to be sure, but with an emphasis on the relatively. Here’s a look at five areas where the change in command might create a bit of unease.

Political expectations: Petraeus is God, at least if you ask most elected officials on the Hill. Yes, he was the architect of the “surge” in Iraq, and the “surge” was part of the reason that violence decreased in that country. The massive increase in troops helped, but the strategy change, the Sons of Iraq’s change of allegiance and a six-month cease-fire called by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr were all critical.

If you’re really interested in learning the entire story of how Iraq’s civil war was tamed, read The Gamble by Tom Ricks. In it, Ricks quotes a Petraeus colleague (and I’m paraphrasing from memory) as saying, “David is the best general in the United States military. But he’s not as good as he thinks he is.” It’s like Favre to the Vikings. He’s still really, really good. But he’ll never be as good as in Green Bay.

Keep this in mind because, as Ricks says on his blog this morning, “Afghanistan 2010 may be an even tougher nut than Iraq 2007. … Our biggest problem in Afghanistan is the government we are supporting there, and it isn’t clear to me what Petraeus can do about that.”

Mission: Counterinsurgency theory and practice is Petraeus’ bag, so don’t expect that to change. Bear in mind that COIN is a strategy, not an outcome. It ends with some sort of negotiated peace, and it’s unclear if Petraeus has the same threshold for potential discussions with the Taliban as McChrystal. There has been American resistance to the idea (as there should be) of reconciling with any of the Taliban’s upper eschelon, but would Petraeus draw the line slightly differently than McChrystal?

Relations with Eikenberry: It became clear that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, was playing second fiddle to McChrystal, who had established a clear working relationship with Karzai. During Petraeus’ time in Iraq, he may have held more sway than then-Ambassador Ryan Crocker, but they were an inseparable team that appeared together constantly. Petraeus, who is as much of a diplomat as a solider, will work to forge a better relationship with Eikenberry and turn this operation into a true civilian-military effort.

Relations with Karzai: Karzai very publicly lobbied for McChrystal to stay, and by many accounts, the two were on the same page (at least professionally). Is it possible that they were too close? Will Petraeus do a better job using America’s isolated points of leverage to extract more from the Afghan government?

Relations with Pakistan: This quote says it all:

McChrystal also played a key role in improving Kabul’s rocky relationship with Islamabad.

Yet Petraeus probably has as much, if not more, clout in Islamabad. He was an early proponent of a regional strategy that prioritized improving relations with Pakistan in hopes of persuading it to target the Afghan Taliban fighters who use Pakistani hideouts to plot attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Petraeus has visited Pakistan numerous times, delivering assurances that the U.S. troop buildup in Afghanistan would not spill over into Pakistan, visiting Pakistani paramilitary forces in the northwestern city of Peshawar and regularly praising Pakistan’s fight against its domestic Taliban.

“There’s a complete understanding of each other’s situation,” a senior Pakistani military official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “He’s not a stranger.”

Troops on the ground: There’s been no shortage of troops in Afghanistan who voiced their displeasure with McChrystal’s restrictions on the use of force. Think of it this way: you’re an 18-year-old Marine, –and you’ve become a trained killer and sent to a war zone. But your commanding general seems like he’s telling you not to do the job you’ve been trained for. Many of the troops’ quotes imply a certain amount of lost respect for McChrystal. Petraeus will have to work to explain the mission and win them over to a “mission first” mentality. Training stateside should also be adjusted accordingly.

Petraeus is the consummate pro, and he’ll no doubt do his best in an incredibly challenging environment with far-from-certain results. My take is that this transition will be as smooth as one could hope.

Photo credit: Jon-Phillip Sheridan’s Photostream

A Progressive Lesson from Reagan (Seriously)

Wednesday, June 9th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Peter Beinart has a must-read in the latest Foreign Policy on the mythology of Ronald Reagan — and the conservative movement that keeps perpetuating it.

As someone whose first job in D.C. was interning at a lobby firm that had — no kidding — a framed portrait of St. Ron in every office, I relish lines that tether President Reagan back to his terrestrial home, such as:

During his presidency, Reagan repeatedly invoked the prospect of an alien invasion as a reason for the United States and the Soviet Union to overcome their differences. Whenever he did, [National Security Adviser Colin] Powell would mutter, “Here come the little green men.”

That’s some delicious red meat right there.

But if we focus there — and Reagan haters are apt to do just that — we miss the real lesson. Beinart might douse ice water on the conservative narrative of Reagan, but he makes a strong case for the lesson that Obama can and should learn from The Great Communicator:

Reagan’s political genius lay in recognizing that what Americans wanted was a president who exorcised the ghost of the Vietnam War without fighting another Vietnam.

Americans loved Reagan’s foreign policy for the same reason they loved the 1985 blockbuster Rambo, in which the muscle-bound hero returns to Vietnam, kicks some communist butt, and no Americans die. Reagan’s liberal critics often accused him of reviving the chest-thumping spirit that had led to Vietnam. But they were wrong. For Reagan, chest-thumping was in large measure a substitute for a new Vietnam, a way of accommodating the restraints on U.S. power while still boosting American morale.

[...]

Obama can, and should, be Reaganesque in his effort to project great strength at low risk. That means understanding that America’s foreign-policy debates are often cultural debates in disguise.

Reagan was a master of symbolic acts — like awarding the Medal of Honor to overlooked Vietnam hero Roy Benavidez — that made Americans feel as though they were exorcising Vietnam’s ghost without refighting the war. Obama must be equally shrewd at a time when he has no choice but to retreat from Iraq and eventually Afghanistan. That means more than ritual incantations about flag and country; it means rhetorically challenging those who unfairly attack the United States. From a purely foreign-policy perspective, publicly confronting Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez when they malign the United States, or calling out universities that ban military recruiters from campus, might seem useless. But for U.S. presidents, there is no pure foreign-policy perspective; being effective in the world requires domestic support. [emphases added]

If Democrats are going to close the ever-elusive national security gap and strongly defend what I’ve called a sterling record on national security, they’re going to have to swallow some pride and steal one from the Gipper.

Photo credit: Fresh Conservative’s Photostream

Israel Must Learn to Eat Soup with a Knife

Monday, June 7th, 2010
Rachel Kleinfeld



Rachel Kleinfeld is the CEO of the Truman National Security Project.

by Rachel Kleinfeld

I love Israel. From the golden light that falls across the stones of Jerusalem to the banh mi sandwiches made by Vietnamese refugees welcomed by an empathetic Prime Minister Begin, Israel has a beauty and history I hold dear. Keeping this state, and this liberal tradition, safe is why it is so important that Israel understand the depth – and the cause – of its failure last week.

Israel’s leaders lack a fundamental understanding of the threats of the 21st century, or the type of power it takes to quell them. And by misunderstanding, they are endangering their country’s very existence.

Power matters – particularly for a small state like Israel, with an array of real enemies. For many years, Israel has used two primary levers of power. Its immense military might gives it the power to physically destroy its enemies, from bombing Iraq’s nuclear reactor to routing the armies of attacking Arab states. Meanwhile, its friendship with the U.S. augments its armed prowess with the power of an alliance that provides crucial financial support and contains potential threats from countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

But in the 21st century, military power isn’t what it once was. Israel is rarely going to face “clean fights” against armies of clearly identified enemies marching across the desert. Instead, it is going to confront the messy realities of modern, non-state-based warfare. The Turkish organization that sponsored last week’s flotilla had ties to al-Qaeda. A number of individuals aboard were connected to Hamas and other violent organizations. But the boat was also full of peace activists, international diplomats and other well-intentioned individuals who served as (perhaps unwitting) human shields for these more nefarious groups. The smorgasbord of causes on that flotilla was not accidental: it is de rigueur among smart insurgent groups worldwide.

Insurgents know what Israel, apparently, does not. Using military means against unarmed opponents is not only wrong, it also strengthens the insurgents’ cause, inflames their supporters, motivates donors and garners great press.

A flotilla of cell-phone-carrying, Twitter- and Facebook-posting activists can ignite the 24-hour news cycle and get their version of events in front of world public opinion long before any country can muster its sclerotic bureaucratic organs. By the time the state responds, the narrative has already been set. Israel becomes the British fighting Gandhi, or the National Guard turning their hoses on Southern civil rights protesters. We know who won those battles.

Fine, many might snort. Israel may lose the weak-kneed support of the so-called “international community” but it is more important to stop real threats decisively. After all, Israel has had to put up with some international hand-wringing for its military actions in the past. But by bombing Iraq’s Osirik reactor, Syria’s blossoming nuclear reactor or the grounded Egyptian Air Force in 1967, it averted real threats that otherwise could have knocked it out of existence.

Force is still a useful, necessary deterrent against military threats from other countries. Threats from terrorist organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah and others that mix humanitarianism and populist appeals with violence are no less real, but as Israel learned in its ill-conceived 2006 war in Lebanon, force doesn’t work as well against them. As America’s own counterinsurgency manual states, insurgents met with force alone simply melt back into the population, their ranks augmented by new converts and their bank accounts brimming with funds from new supporters. The insurgents then live to fight long wars of attrition that sap their enemies physically, mentally and spiritually.

It is that last category that Israel must pay particular attention to, because it risks losing its other lever of power. As Peter Beinart pointed out in a much-quoted story in the New York Review of Books, young American Jews identify with Israel insofar as it lives up to its founding values. They want to support the state that took in the Vietnamese boat people, not the state that mines Palestinian olive groves. Fighting insurgent wars largely through force necessarily leads Israel to violate the spirit of its own humanitarian founding – and to alienate the supporters in America it needs for its survival.

Victory against insurgents requires a new perspective and new tools. As T.E. Lawrence explained, one must “learn to eat soup with a knife.” George W. Bush didn’t understand counterinsurgency, and his failure allowed the insurgent threat in Iraq and Afghanistan to grow and metastasize. Now, Israel’s leaders must master the signature threat of the 21st century. Its hammer worked well against the state-based threats it faced during the first 50 years of its existence. But Israel had better find other options in its toolkit if it is to quell the threats it faces today.

Photo credit: Lilachd’s Photostream

Progressives: Own the National Security Debate! Please!

Thursday, June 3rd, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

If you read the conclusion of today’s Democracy Corps/Third Way poll analysis, one thing becomes abundantly clear: Democrats remain disturbingly not confident talking about national security.

[M]any Democrats seem relatively silent about the accomplishments of the Obama administration and their party on national security. Though a few are stressing the administration’s efforts on the new START treaty and nuclear proliferation, fewer still seem to be stressing the administration’s accomplishments regarding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, efforts to strengthen the military, and steps to combat terrorism. The survey strongly suggests progressives should speak out forcefully on these issues, and remind voters of the contrasts between those relative successes and the failures the country witnessed under eight years of Bush-Cheney. [emphasis added]

When the president scores 53 percent approval even after two significant domestic terrorist attempts in the last six months, that’s a strong statement. Even the last few months have seen a significant 10-point shift — moderates have changed allegiances and now trust Democrats more than Republicans on national security by six points.

Progressives need to own the national security narrative, a message I’ve tried to hammer home repeatedly over the last several months. Here’s an excerpt from a piece I wrote back in April for Roll Call:

[T]he Obama administration has quietly put together a sterling record on national security. So why are Democrats so down in the dumps? As one party strategist put it, Democrats “are behaving like the president has a 30 percent approval rating. On these [security] issues, Democrats inherently believe that no one will believe our arguments.”
There’s plenty for progressives to cheer. … Progressives stand for strong, smart security policy. Obama has terrorists in retreat and American prestige on the rise. Democrats need to begin owning their successes if the American public is to give credit where it’s due.

The Democracy Corps/Third Way analysis offers solid, straightforward recommendations. These are hardly liberal fantasy — they’re pragmatic, progressive ways to emphasize what has been a successful beginning on national security that will translate into electoral gains.

  • Speak in stronger terms about anti-terror efforts.
  • Stress efforts to support and strengthen the military.
  • Emphasize successful attempts toward greater international cooperation.
  • Emphasize domestic and economic renewal as an element of national strength.
  • Provide a contrast to the Bush-Cheney administration.

Two quick comments on the specifics of the recommendations. First, on the economy “as an element of national strength,” we’re now wondering less why the White House put such a strong emphasis on precisely that point in last week’s National Security Strategy. And on that final point, John Boehner’s been going around claiming that the administration’s counterterrorism successes have been “lucky,” an argument that the survey says falls flat with voters. I’d offer my evisceration of Boehner here (it was fun to write, so please check it out).

Top 10 Pragmatic Progressive Ideas from the National Security Strategy

Friday, May 28th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Since copies of the Obama administration’s new National Security Strategy began to circulate, there’s been a lot of cheering about how different from Bush’s it is. And true, it is. That’s made clear in the letter from the president on the document’s first page. And my hunch is that people stop there — you get your headline, and you run with it, not bothering to read the rest of the document.

Well, guess what? I just cozied up with a chicken sandwich, a Diet Coke and a bag of chips and read the whole enchilada.

It’s long and at times unwieldy. I understand, for example, that “spending taxpayer’s dollars wisely” is important, but not sure the White House should be compelled to include it in the strategy text. But that’s indicative of Obama’s style — when you seek input from everyone, you’ll tend to end up with a longer list.

But after digging through the document, it’s worth pointing out the specifics of how the strategy has a distinctly pragmatic progressive outlook. With that, here are the top 10 examples:

1. It reaffirms that America’s values are the source of its power, and that American exceptionalism endures:

[T]he work to build a stronger foundation for our leadership within our borders recognizes that the most effective way for the United States of America to promote our values is to live them. America’s commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are essential sources of our strength and influence in the world.  America has always been a beacon to the peoples of the world when we ensure that the light of America’s example burns bright.

2. It prioritizes terrorism, Iraq, and Afghanistan while weighing them in the context of the 21st century’s other threats:

[T]hese wars—and our global efforts to successfully counter violent extremism—are only one element of our strategic environment and cannot define America’s engagement with the world. Terrorism is one of many threats that are more consequential in a global age. The gravest danger to the American people and global security continues to come from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. The space and cyberspace capabilities that power our daily lives and military operations are vulnerable to disruption and attack. Dependence upon fossil fuels constrains our options and pollutes our environment. Climate change and pandemic disease threaten the security of regions and the health and safety of the American people.

3. America will only be secure if all government agencies coordinate effectively:

To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same. … We are improving the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly. We are also improving coordinated planning and policymaking and must build our capacity in key areas where we fall short.

4. It is comfortable with, but prudent about, the use of force:

While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction. When force is necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.

5. It’s tough as nails on al Qaeda:

[W]e reject the notion that al-Qa’ida represents any religious authority. They are not religious leaders, they are killers; and neither Islam nor any other religion condones the slaughter of innocents.

6. It advocates the responsible, measured pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons:

As long as any nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.

7. The Obama administration trusts the UN:

We are enhancing our coordination with the U.N. and its agencies. We need a U.N. capable of fulfilling its founding purpose — maintaining international peace and security, promoting global cooperation, and advancing human rights. To this end, we are paying our bills. We are intensifying efforts with partners on and outside the U.N. Security Council to ensure timely, robust, and credible Council action to address threats to peace and security.

8. “Democracy promotion” — a term that became identified with the Bush administration — isn’t a dirty phrase:

The United States supports the expansion of democracy and human rights abroad because governments that respect these values are more just, peaceful, and legitimate. We also do so because their success abroad fosters an environment that supports America’s national interests.

9. The United States’ security is closely linked to clean energy:

As long as we are dependent on fossil fuels, we need to ensure the security and free flow of global energy resources. But without significant and timely adjustments, our energy dependence will continue to undermine our security and prosperity. This will leave us vulnerable to energy supply disruptions and manipulation and to changes in the environment on an unprecedented scale.  The United States has a window of opportunity to lead in the development of clean energy technology.

10. It calls on politicians to stop being ridiculous and put country above politics:

Throughout the Cold War, even as there were intense disagreements about certain courses of action, there remained a belief that America’s political leaders shared common goals, even if they differed about how to reach them. In today’s political environment, due to the actions of both parties that sense of common purpose is at times lacking in our national security dialogue. This division places the United States at a strategic disadvantage.