Posts Tagged ‘ Kim Jong-Il ’

China’s Free Rider Syndrome

Tuesday, November 30th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

There may be no method in North Korea’s madness, but the world’s response to its episodic outrages has settled into a familiar pattern. It’s a dangerous pattern, and one likely to recur as long as China keeps enabling Pyongyang’s belligerent behavior.

First comes an utterly unprovoked attack on South Korea. Seoul reacts angrily and threatens unspecified consequences. Washington firmly backs its ally, and solicits global censure of North Korean aggression. The Chinese, however, decline to assign blame and instead urge resumption of direct talks with Pyongyang. South Korea eventually backs away from confrontation, on the perfectly rational premise that living with the North’s occasional spasms of violence is preferable to an all-out war that would devastate both countries.

The latest crisis began last week when the North shelled a South Korean island. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak called the attack, which killed two civilians and wounded 16, a “crime against humanity” and warned that Seoul would not tolerate a direct attack on its soil. The United States dispatched an aircraft carrier, the George Washington, while China called, irrelevantly, for a resumption of the long defunct six-party talks aimed at dismantling the North’s nuclear weapons program. And yesterday, Seoul moved to dampen war fever by canceling live-fire artillery drills on the stricken island.

Essentially the same cycle played out last spring, when North Korea sunk a South Korean patrol boat, the Cheonan, killing all 46 sailors aboard. Pyongyang paid no price for this act of war, either.

Pyongyang’s behavior may look like a classic case of winning through intimidation, except that it’s not clear what it gains from such brutal tactics. The North is as isolated and poverty-stricken as ever, and, with dictator Kim Jong il preparing to hand off power to his son, no relief is in sight for its thoroughly regimented society.

One explanation is that the regime from time to time must manufacture external threats to justify the extreme sacrifices it demands of its people. Another is that its assaults are part of an elaborate shake-down racket meant to get the world’s attention – along with bribes for good behavior.  Except that it seems to be having the opposite effect. Last week’s shelling, along with the Cheonan incident, have driven the final nail in the coffin of the South’s “sunshine policy” of economic and humanitarian aid to the North. Nor is Washington eager to reward Pyongyang’s bellicose conduct by rushing back into the six-party talks.

This latest outrage throws a spotlight on China’s role as North Korea’s enabler. Not only does Beijing shield Pyongyang from the consequences of its disruptive behavior, it also helps to keep the regime afloat by supplying fuel and other economic assistance. Perhaps it’s too facile to assume – as Republicans like John McCain and Lindsay Graham do – that China can bring the mercurial Kim regime to heal just by threatening to shut down oil shipments or cross-border trade. But is it really too much to ask of China that it at least not cover up the North’s crimes and collude in its ludicrous lies?

Beijing wants very badly to be accorded the respect that its growing wealth and power implies. It wants a seat at the table where global decisions are made. Yet on issue after issue, China is proving to be a free rider. Beijing takes maximum advantage of an open world economy while contributing little to strengthening the system that has made it rich. Instead, it pursues a mercantilist policy that creates enormous imbalances in world trade and investment flows, while keeping its currency artificially high to make discourage imports from the U.S. and elsewhere. Instead of trying to tamp down tensions on the Korea peninsula, it feeds them by shielding its delinquent ward in Pyongyang from accountability. Instead of throwing its weight behind international efforts to restrain rogue regimes from Khartoum to Tehran, it seeks commercial advantage while hiding behind the supposedly sacrosanct principle of non-interference in other nation’s internal affairs.

China’s amoral and selfish behavior increasingly engenders doubt and fear, not respect. Its failure to accept the responsibilities that accompany its growing power undermines global cooperation and stability. It’s time for the Obama administration to move China’s free-riding to the center of its engagement with Beijing.

Photo credit: Kok Leng Yeo

Obligatory World Cup Interlude

Friday, July 2nd, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

I’m not that much of a soccer fan. I don’t follow a club team, though by proxy, I suppose my obsessed Liverpool-loving Swedish best-bud Eric Sundstrom would claim me for his side.

But I love the World Cup.

To put this in perspective, my World Cup love pales in comparison to my Notre Dame football obsession, an illness that transforms the otherwise mild-mannered, level-headed gentleman I consider myself into a stark-raving lunatic on 12 Saturdays in the fall. (It’s bad. I drop F-bombs in front of eight-year-olds; I now know myself well-enough to warn their parents.) My Notre Dame addiction allows me to speak the same language as my soccer-loving brethren. Read Nick Hornby’s Fever Pitch (a great memoir about his love of English club Arsenal that was translated into “American” in a horrible film with Drew Barrymore and Jimmy Fallon about the Red Sox), and you see where I’m coming from.

The soccer affair started in France, like all wonderfully cliched romances. I did an internship outside of Paris in 1998, the summer between my junior and senior year of college. When I arrived that May, I was only vaguely aware that the planet’s greatest competition/festival was about to kick off underneath my nose. A naively conceived, cellphone-less attempt to meet with Kate Sullivan, the only other American I knew in Paris that summer, on the Champs Elysees in the wake France’s 3-0 victory over South Africa turned out to be as fun as it was initially frustrating. The spontaneous gathering of 400,000 French football nutters made our rendezvous, er, challenging.

Suffice it to say that the combination of good sport, a month-long French national fete, and what I would discover to be World Cup’s intriguing ties to politics, demographics and diplomacy had me hooked.

Frank Foer’s How Soccer Explains the World and Soccernomics by Simon Kuper and Stefan Syzmanski can explain. This year’s tournament hasn’t disappointed, and the star has been North Korea. Seriously, who else would have paid 1,000 Chinese fans to travel to South Africa and cheer for Pyongyang? This was after Kim Jong-Il made the disasterous decision to air his country’s match against Portgual. We joked that the 7-0 public drubbing that must have landed the team in a concentration camp for “re-education.” I fear that may be closer to reality than we’re comfortable with.

Dictators struggle with such a broad, uncontrollably open international stage. Pyongyang was playing with fire — what if self-exiled protestors exploited the opportunity to beam their grievances back home? Iran routinely blocks soccer broadcasts out of such fears. And it was shocking to me that last year’s qualifier between Egypt and Algeria had to be moved to neutral Sudan due to violence against the Algerians in Egypt. Can’t Hosni Mubarak extend his police-state’s writ to football crowd-control? Or is he letting Egyptian hooligans blow off steam that would be otherwise targeted at him?

Then there was the “most politically charged game in the world,” that occurred during that amazing French summer of 1998: USA vs. Iran. Here’s a taste:

Iranian-born Mehrdad Masoudi was a FIFA media officer for the match but, given the diplomatic and security issues surrounding the game in Lyon, his responsibilities were far more wide-ranging.

“One of the first problems was that Iran were team B and the USA were team A,” explains Masoudi. “According to FIFA regulations team B should walk towards team A for the pre-match handshakes, but Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei gave express orders that the Iranian team must not walk towards the Americans.”

Masoudi eventually negotiated a compromise which saw the Americans walk towards the Iranians…

Iran won, 2-1, but the game wasn’t all lost from the American side: “We did more in 90 minutes than the politicians did in 20 years,” said U.S. defender Jeff Agoos at the time.

That’s it. I revel in the split-second excitement of a well-struck goal, and appreciate the enduring frustration of so, so many near-misses. But the World Cup’s true allure is how it means so much more, to so many billions of people, beyond just the final score. That just happens to be why Notre Dame means so much too.

How to Handle North Korea

Wednesday, June 16th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

Loss of the CheonanThe following is an excerpt from Will Marshall’s column in today’s U.S. News & World Report:

Engagement with North Korea has been a bust—at least in South Korea’s eyes. In sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan, the regime in Pyongyang also torpedoed the South’s “sunshine policy” of humanitarian aid and economic investment in the North. Let’s hope the incident also shatters some illusions in Washington.

South Korean President Lee Myung Bak said the attack, which killed 46 sailors, has awakened South Koreans to “the reality that the nation faces the most belligerent regime in the world.” Seoul moved swiftly to seal the border, freeze trade, ban North Korean ships from its territorial waters, and designate the North as its archenemy. Bak’s militant response, however, seems to have rattled many South Koreans. Instead of rallying around the government, voters last week handed his Grand National Party a stinging defeat in local and regional elections. The prosperous South may no longer believe that Pyongyang can be tamed by economic blandishments, but young Koreans especially want to defuse the crisis.

The Obama administration is standing in solidarity with South Korea and pressing China to support new United Nations sanctions against North Korea. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was recently in Seoul, where she reaffirmed the U.S. policy of “strategic patience.” Officials traveling with her said there will be no push to restart nuclear disarmament talks. “What we’re focused on is changing North Korean behavior,” the Washington Post quoted one official as saying.

Patience, no doubt, is a virtue in dealing with North Korea’s volatile dictator, Kim Jong Il. But it is not a policy. The United States has been trying to change the regime’s behavior since the Cold War ended, with little to show for it. Despite periodic bouts of U.S. engagement, multilateral diplomacy, and economic assistance, things have gotten worse. North Korea has developed and tested nuclear bombs, aided Syria’s clandestine nuclear program, sold missiles to Iran, and run a counterfeit-dollar racket, all while starving millions of its own people.

So what should be the strategic aim of U.S. policy toward North Korea?

Some foreign policy “realists” seem to believe that, if only the United States and its international partners can cobble together the right mix of economic incentives and diplomatic pressure, Pyongyang will eventually come to its senses. But North Korea offers a perfect illustration of realism’s blind spot—its inability to grasp the connection between the nature of regimes and their external conduct.

Read the full column at U.S. News & World Report.

Photo credit: US Army Korea – IMCOM

Did North Korea Execute a Government Official?

Friday, March 19th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Reports of just how warped the North Korean regime is occasionally filter out to the broader world from time to time. This dispatch in the New York Times has got to be one of the more grotesque stories we’ve heard in a while:

North Korea has arrested and possibly executed its top financial official as it struggles to contain chaos set off by its botched attempt to halt inflation through a radical currency revaluation, according to news reports Thursday in South Korea.

[…]

Mr. Pak “was executed at a firing range in Pyongyang on the trumped-up charges of being an antirevolutionary element as public sentiments worsened over the failure of the currency reform,” reported the South Korean news agency Yonhap, quoting unnamed sources in North Korea.

Here’s where Mr. Pak screwed up:

In late November, North Korea suddenly told its people that it would introduce new banknotes, ordering them to turn in their old bills for new ones at a rate of 100 to 1. It also put a cap on how much old money they could swap for the new currency.

The shock measure was meant to arrest runaway inflation and crack down on illegal markets in the socialist state. But it only aggravated the food crisis, creating shortages and soaring prices, and reportedly led to isolated but highly unusual outbursts of protest in the totalitarian state.

I should note that Mr. Pak’s execution hasn’t been confirmed. But if it is, this is really serious stuff that the U.S. can’t ignore. When it comes to the internal machinations of a completely isolated society like North Korea, the West often writes off these kinds of stories. “They’re nuts,” you can almost hear a few desk officers in Foggy Bottom exclaim as they throw their hands in the air, “What are we supposed to do with this?”

But sooner or later during the Obama administration, the West will sit down with North Korea. The temptation is often to focus only on the nuclear issue, because it is obviously the most pressing concern for American national security. However, it’s critical that Western negotiators engage Pyongyang on human rights as well — if nothing else (and here’ s the cynic in me), asking hard questions about Mr. Pak’s disappearance creates diplomatic openings on other fronts, and will create incentives for the North Koreans to give ground elsewhere. And if we’re lucky, raising the issue might just protect Mr. Pak’s successor, too.