Posts Tagged ‘ Navy ’

Gates Demands Open Seas in South Asia in Rebuff to Chinese Anti-Access Strategy

Wednesday, October 13th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates used his turn at the podium at a conference of Asian defense ministers yesterday to insist on “freedom of navigation” in international waters, a sharp rebuke to Beijing’s creeping attempts to control the South and East China Seas. China’s recent clashes with Vietnam and Japan over shipping issues highlights Beijing’s intention to assert a sphere of maritime influence.

Regional dominance is a top priority on China’s long-term plate as a part of an “anti-access/area denial” strategy. Though it may not be able to compete with, say, the U.S. Navy in a straight-up force-on-force battle, by “owning” waters off its coasts, China can make Washington think twice about getting involved in, say, a conflict over Taiwan.

PPI has an in-depth look at China’s “anti-access/area denial” strategy thanks to Naval War College Professor Mike Chase. We released Chase’s paper on the topic just last week, which makes for timely reading following Gates’ trip. Click here to read it, and here’s a synopsis:

  • How and why did China’s approach shift in this new direction?
  • What are the most potent anti-access and area denial capabilities in Beijing’s arsenal?
  • And what are the implications for U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region?

Chase concludes:

Beijing responded by increasing its defense budget, deploying conventional ballistic missiles across from Taiwan and working on a variety of capabilities intended to target American aircraft carriers. In short, Beijing embraced technologies designed to limit America’s access to critical battlefield areas.
[...]
An AA/AD strategy has limits. Though AA/AD raises the barrier on a decision to use force, once a decision to use force is made, China could not count on prevailing quickly or at low cost.

Then, he offers the following recommendations for U.S. policymakers:

  1. Developing new military capabilities like long-range carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicles and new operational concepts like “Air Sea Battle”—an emerging concept that the military is studying to sustain power-projection in AA/AD environments.
  2. Ongoing diplomatic attention to decreasing tensions within the U.S.-Sino relationship over the Taiwan and South China Sea issues.
  3. Increased attention to the global commons of cyber and space. America must continue to develop defensive and offensive capabilities to ensure network continuity in case of an information offensive, and practice operating without the full range of cyber and space assets.
  4. Sensitivity to China’s sensitivities. Perhaps most important, attempts to strengthen deterrence must be carefully calibrated so that they will not inadvertently fuel China’s worst fears about U.S. intentions, which would only risk further exacerbating the mutual strategic suspicion that is already threatening to make one of the most important bilateral in the world a rocky one.

Photo credit: U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison

Secretary Gates, Defense Spending and Ship Building

Friday, May 7th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

In a little-covered address this week at the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition in Maryland, Secretary of Defense Bob Gates stopped just short of ripping defense contractors a new one. Of course, Gates was diplomatic in his admonishment, but the message was clear: we have to be smarter about defense spending, particularly when it comes to the Navy:

These [spending] issues invariably bring up debates over so-called “gaps” between stated requirements and current platforms — be they ships, aircraft, or anything else.  More often than not, the solution offered is either more of what we already have or modernized versions of preexisting capabilities.  This approach ignores the fact that we face diverse adversaries with finite resources that consequently force them to come at the U.S. in unconventional and innovative ways.  The more relevant gap we risk creating is one between capabilities we are pursuing and those that are actually needed in the real world of tomorrow.

Considering that, the Department must continually adjust its future plans as the strategic environment evolves. …

[W]e have to accept some hard realities.  American taxpayers and the Congress are rightfully worried about the deficit.  At the same time, the Department of Defense’s track record as a steward of taxpayer dollars leaves much to be desired. …

[I]t is important to remember that, as the wars recede, money will be required to reset the Army and Marine Corps, which have borne the brunt of the conflicts.  And there will continue to be long-term – and inviolable – costs associated with taking care of our troops and their families.  In other words, I do not foresee any significant increases in top-line of the shipbuilding budget beyond current assumptions.  At the end of the day, we have to ask whether the nation can really afford a Navy that relies on $3 to 6 billion destroyers, $7 billion submarines, and $11 billion carriers.

Talking tough on spending has been a theme for Gates.  While much of the problems he identifies will continue to exist for years, beginning this conversation is a critical signal that will eventually — think decades — change the way the Pentagon does business. He knows this, and he also knows that this idea won’t be solved on his watch. But if he doesn’t start talking about it, who will?

If you’re looking for a good suggestion about how to buy weapons more sensibly, read Jordan Tama’s excellent Memo to the New President, where he calls for a BRAC-style commission to propose a weapons budget each year.

Gates’ whole speech is worth a read, so check it out here.

Photo credit: http://www.flickr.com/photos/smwalton73/ / CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: A Pragmatic Progressive Argument for Repeal

Monday, March 8th, 2010
Kyle Bailey



Kyle Bailey is the former chief operating officer and interim executive director of the National Stonewall Democrats. He is chair of the Young Democrats of America LGBT Caucus and a participant in the 2010 New Leaders Council Institute-Atlanta.

by Kyle Bailey

In the 1990’s, pragmatic progressives led the way in reinventing government. Under the leadership of President Clinton, wasteful spending was cut from the federal budget and new cost-effective strategies were implemented that reduced inefficiencies. However, for all our achievements in the ‘90’s, some of the reforms enacted during those years were less than successful. Today, pragmatic progressives must own up to past mistakes and propose fixes to outdated, ineffective and costly policies. Among those failed reforms is “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT).

Mandated by Congress in the 1994 Defense Authorization Act and signed into law by President Clinton, the DADT policy targets for expulsion from the armed services those who have a propensity for, display behavior associated with, or commit acts of homosexuality. It’s important to note that DADT prevented baseless initiation of investigation into a service member’s orientation, which the military’s former policy allowed, and was, in fact, the compromise policy that emerged from President Clinton’s original proposal to allow gays to serve openly in the military.

Opinions and conjecture aside about this compromise in 1993, DADT is plainly in need of repeal now — and support for such a move is rock solid. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen and former Secretary of State General Colin Powell have recently joined other active and retired high-ranking military and Defense Department officials in calling for its end.

The support for repeal among military brass underscores the pragmatic value of doing away with the policy. For one thing, the policy has inarguably done harm to our national security efforts. Under DADT, almost 800 “mission-critical” troops have been discharged in the last five years, including at least 59 Arabic and nine Farsi linguists. These unnecessary discharges create additional challenges and risks for our brave young men and women on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In addition, our military continues to face an overall recruiting crisis. DADT unnecessarily limits the pool of potential recruits, including some of the best and brightest young minds we need to win the war on terror and run our military in the decades to come. According to recent estimates, some 4,000 service members each year choose not to re-enlist because of the policy, and 41,000 gay and bisexual men might choose to enlist or re-enlist if the policy were repealed.

Under DADT, more than 13,500 gay soldiers have lost their jobs and medical, educational and other benefits. Many of those discharged are young Americans who enrolled with the promise of a college education and a better life. Others given the boot have served for decades and have lost more than a job — their entire careers have been wiped out, too, because of their sexual orientation.

And then there’s the financial downside of the policy. It costs up to $43,000 to replace a discharged service member. Add at least $150,000 more to that figure for officers and $1,000,000 for Navy and Air Force pilots. If you consider inflation and the cost of additional required training for service members to fight the war on terror, you can imagine the average price tag on this policy has increased — and will continue to increase — significantly over time.

With 75 percent of Americans, including 64 percent of Republicans, calling for an end to DADT, the political risk to overturning this policy is minimal. In fact, when one considers the size of the pro-equality voting bloc, which includes an overwhelming majority of young Americans, one could argue the benefits greatly outweigh the costs of action on this reform.

Rather than approaching DADT as strictly a cultural or social issue — which is how our conservative opposition would like to define it to inject homophobia in the debate and divide Americans — progressives should also frame DADT as a matter of national security, civil service and fiscal responsibility. Taking up this policy challenge under these terms would reflect our progressive values and “third way” approach — to cut wasteful government spending, focus our national security to fight global terrorism and the wars of the 21st century, reduce unemployment and reward work, and promote national service.

Why Does the Country Need an Air Force?

Monday, March 1st, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Okay, okay… simmer down there. Before you go accusing me of being a commie-loving freedom-hater, I’m not asking that question. But General Norton Schwartz, the Air Force’s Chief of Staff, is. He continues in the WaPo, “This is our year to look up and out…to ask big questions. Who are we? What are we doing for the nation’s defense?…Where is this grand institution headed?”

Just think about the gravity of those questions. The Air Forces’ FY2011 budget slides in at $170.8 billion, and if the AF’s top general is asking those types of existential questions, I’ll wager that there are quite a few nerves fraying down on contractor’s row in Crystal City.

At the end of the day, they’re good questions. Greg Jaffe’s article frames the tension right now in terms of the “old” Air Force (one whose hierarchy is predicated on daring pilots risking their lives in dog-fights) versus the “new” Air Force (that trains pilots to sit in air-conditioned trailers in Nevada and pilot drones in Afghanistan) as they are involved in America’s current military deployments.

It’s a fascinating juxtaposition to be sure, but I don’t think the article fully captures what’s at stake here. Instead, these questions cut to definitions of basic mission and competency. The Air Force will tell you that it has six core competencies: “air and space superiority; global attack; rapid global mobility; precision engagement; information superiority; agile combat support; and core values.” In the interest of brevity, I won’t get into a full discussion of each here, but rather direct you to the Air Forces’ whizbang of a website. However, if you read through the varying definitions of each core competency, it’s readily apparently why Gen. Schwartz is asking these questions. The USAF dominates the skies and no other country’s air wing could hope to compete with America’s for another 25 years. So “air superiority”? Check. “Global attack”? Ditto. “Combat Support”? Yup. On top of that, it’s not entirely clear whether the AF should be charged with missions like “information superiority” (that doesn’t fly, does it?) or “global mobility” (after all, you can move more stuff on the Navy’s back).

No better example of the AF’s mission conundrum might be the F-22 fighter jet, canceled last year. The F-22 was designed during the Cold War and designed to engage principally in air-to-air combat against a large nation-state air force. Tellingly, not a single one has flown over Iraq or Afghanistan since 2001. Since we already own 187 of them, we aren’t using them in our current deployments, and there isn’t a single air force out there that stands a chance of challenging the USAF’s “air superiority,” we didn’t need to buy any more. Gen. Schwartz and AF Secretary Michael Donley agreed.

It doesn’t seem anyone has great answer to these pressing questions, and I sure don’t either. But if Gen. Schwartz is willing to ask them, the public dialogue over the next year should be fascinating.