Posts Tagged ‘ New Economy ’

New Manufacturing Data Show Weaker Factory Recovery, Deeper Recession

Monday, May 16th, 2011
Michael Mandel



Michael Mandel is the chief economic strategist at the Progressive Policy Institute and the founder of Visible Economy LLC, a New York-based news and education company.

by Michael Mandel

There’s been a lot of happy talk recently about the revival of U.S. manufacturing .  According to an article in the New York Times,  “manufacturing has been one of the surprising pillars of the recovery. “  In a Forbes.com column entitled “Manufacturing Stages A Comeback,”  well-known geographer Joel Kotkin talks about “the revival of the country’s long distressed industrial sector.”  The Economist writes that “against all the odds, American factories are coming back to life.”*

Truly, I’d like to believe in the revival of manufacturing as much as the next person. Manufacturing, in the broadest sense,  is an essential part of the U.S. economy, and any good news would be welcome.

Unfortunately,  the latest figures do not back up the cheerful rhetoric.

Newly-released data suggest that the manufacturing recession was deeper than previously thought, and the factory recovery has been weaker. On May 13 the Census Bureau issued revised numbers for factory shipments,  incorporating the results of the 2009 Annual Survey of Manufacturers.  The chart belows shows the comparison between the original data and the revised data (three-month moving averages):

The decline in shipments from the second quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009 is now 25%, rather than 22%. And the current level of shipments in the first quarter of 2011 is now 9% below the second quarter of 2008, rather than only 5%. In other words, the new data shows that factory shipments, in dollars, are still well below their peak level.

The manufacturing recovery looks even more  tepid when we adjust shipments for changes in price.   Here are real shipments in manufacturing, deflated by the appropriate producer price indexes.**

Now that hardly looks like a recovery at all, does it?  Real shipments plummeted 22% from the peak in the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009.  As of the first quarter of 2011, real shipments are still 15% below their peak.  To put it another way,  manufacturers have made back only about one-third of the decline from the financial crisis.

And while U.S. manufacturers have struggled, imports have coming roaring back.  Here’s a comparison of real imports (data taken directly from this Census table) and real U.S. factory shipments (my construction, using Census and BLS data).

This chart shows that imports have recovered far faster and more completely than domestic manufacturing.   Goods imports, adjusted  for inflation, are only about 1% below their peak.  That’s according to the official data. If we factored in the import price bias, we would see that real imports are likely above their peak (I’ll do that in a different post).

In other words,   this so-called  ’revival of U.S. manufacturing’ seems to involve losing even more ground to imports.  That doesn’t strike me as much of a revival.

 

P.S. Oh, oh, what about all those manufacturing jobs that Obama’s economists are so proud of? This chart plots aggregate hours of manufacturing workers against aggregate hours in the private sector overall (the last point is the average for the three months ending April 2011).

What we see is that the decline in hours in manufacturing was deeper than the rest of the private sector, and the recovery has really not made up that much ground. Over the past year, aggregate hours in the private sector have risen 2.3%, while aggregate hours in manufacturing have risen 2.9%.  That’s not much of a difference. In fact, probably the best we can say is that manufacturing has not held back the overall recovery.

*An important exception to the happy talk has been the recent report from the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, entitled The Case for a National Manufacturing Strategy.

**For those of you interested in technical details,  I used the producer price indexes for 2-digit manufacturing industries, as reported by the BLS.  Could these estimates be improved on? Probably–but they are good enough to get the overall picture.

Crossposted from Mandel on Innovation and Growth.

Progress Report: Revisiting “Rules of the Road” for a New Economy

Tuesday, May 4th, 2010
Robert Atkinson



Dr. Robert D. Atkinson is the founder and president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, and the author of The Past and Future of America’s Economy: Long Waves of Innovation That Power Cycles of Growth (Edward Elgar, 2005).

by Robert Atkinson

I know you’re not supposed to tout your own work on blogs, but for this, my inaugural post for Progressive Fix, I can’t resist.

When PPI established its New Economy Task Force 11 years ago, its first product was a pamphlet entitled “Rules of the Road: Governing Principles for the New Economy.” In Internet time, 11 years is a lifetime. But that short but powerful statement still holds up — and, I would argue, is just as relevant today as it was in 1999. This seems as good a time as any to revisit what we said and take stock of how far — or not — we’ve come.

The pamphlet started off with this statement:

The U.S. economy has undergone a profound structural transformation in the last decade and a half. The information technology revolution has expanded well beyond the cutting-edge high-tech sector. It has shaken the very foundations of the old industrial and occupational order, redefined the rules of entrepreneurship and competition, and created an increasingly global marketplace for a myriad of new goods and services.

I would venture to say that it’s even truer today than when we first wrote it. The introduction went on to state:

Yet while economic reality is fundamentally changing, much of our public policy framework remains rooted in the past. This mismatch between public policy and economic reality is not sustainable. … On one side of the political spectrum, policymakers advocate across-the-board tax cuts, a dramatically reduced role for government, and elimination of social regulations. … On the other side of the political spectrum, policymakers advocate increased spending on top-down social programs geared toward income redistribution, coupled with a focus on command-and-control regulation through bureaucratic institutions, ignoring just how entrepreneurial, fast moving, and flexible our economy has become. Furthermore, resistance from both ends of the political spectrum to open trade, global integration, and technological and organizational change threatens to slow the economic changes that hold great potential to yield higher standards of living for American workers

After 11 years, while some progress has been made, all too often policy-makers still view economic and technology challenges through either of these lenses. And those resistant to change, whether groups advocating for strict regulations on “network neutrality” and “Internet privacy,” or restrictions on globalization and trade, continue to be active, if not more so.

How Far Have We Traveled?

The guide offered 10 key rules to policy-makers to encourage an innovation-driven economy. How have we done on those prescriptions? Let’s go down the list:

Rule #1: Spur Innovation to Raise Living Standards

….Because innovation and change are disruptive, they tend to spark strong political demands to insulate affected segments of the economy and slow down economic change. Such demands, while understandable, inherently deny opportunities to less politically powerful interests in the guise of “protecting” those with clout. As a result, to effectively promote growth in the New Economy, government must facilitate, rather than resist, the processes of economic change and modernization as these changes create new opportunities and increased incomes for all Americans.

Unfortunately, the urge to protect the status quo is powerful, as Washington still shows little appetite for upsetting it by enabling or promoting innovation.

Rule #2: Expand the Winners’ Circle

Ensuring that the benefits of innovation and change are spread broadly will require that all Americans, including those not yet engaged in or benefitting from the New Economy, have access to the tools and resources they need to get ahead and stay ahead.

We’ve made some progress here, not the least of which was expanding health care coverage to more Americans (though the effects of reform won’t be felt for years). But more needs to be done, particularly in areas like unemployment insurance reform and better access to lifelong learning.

Rule #3: Invest in Knowledge and Skills

To spur innovation and equip citizens to win in the New Economy, government should invest more in the knowledge infrastructure of the 21st century: world class education, training and life-long learning, science, technology, technology standards, and other intangible public goods. These are the essential drivers of economic progress today.

Not many in Washington would disagree. But it’s a different matter altogether to muster the political will to increase investments in these areas, particularly when it means cutting old economy spending, such as agricultural subsidies.

Rule #4: Grow the Net

The Internet is a critical component of the emerging digital economy. …The information technology revolution is transforming virtually all industries and is central to increased economic efficiency and productivity, higher standards of living, and greater personal empowerment.

Governments must avoid policies and regulations that would inhibit the growth of the Internet or slow progress by protecting business interests threatened by the digitization of the economy. Policymakers should craft a legal and regulatory framework that supports the widespread growth of the Internet and high-speed “broadband” telecommunications, in such areas as taxation, encryption, privacy, digital signatures, telecommunications regulation, and industry regulation (in banking, insurance, and securities, for example).

In some ways Washington has embraced this message. The inclusion of billions of dollars for support for the smart grid, health IT and broadband in the stimulus package was a key step in the right direction. On the other hand, the growing interest in regulating the Internet — such as overly restrictive net neutrality and privacy regulations — suggests that we have gone in the wrong direction.

Rule #5: Let Markets Set Prices

In the old economy, government often regulated prices when national markets were dominated by oligopolies or monopolies. In those cases, the economic costs of government intervention were manageable, and sometimes necessary. But in the new, more competitive global economy, distorted prices are much more likely lead to economically inefficient decisions by consumers and producers and to unfair, politically driven resource allocation. Therefore, in the absence of clear market failures, markets, not governments, should set prices of privately provided goods and services.

It’s still hard for many policy-makers to embrace this rule, but it’s as valid today as it was a decade ago.

Rule #6: Open Regulated Markets to Competition

Economists have long acknowledged that competition keeps prices down. The New Economy creates another critical reason for competition: competition drives innovation, and ultimately provides the greatest benefits to consumers and citizens. Of course, government must continue to provide common-sense health, safety, and environmental regulations. However, government should move away from regulating economic competition among firms and instead promote competition … Through minimalist, yet consistent rules, public policy should also ensure that consumers have the information they need to make educated choices and provide a backstop to protect consumers and citizens from abuse in markets.

Like rule # 5, it’s hard for some policy-makers to resist intervention to regulate competition. We see it most clearly in telecommunications, where some still argue that more government-enforced competition is needed.

Rule #7: Let Competing Technologies Compete

Technological innovation has now become central to addressing a wide range of public policy goals, including better health care, environmental protection, a renewed defense base, improved education and training, and reinvented government. For example, technology provides doctors and patients with state-of- the-art health information systems that improve the quality of care. Similarly, new generations of cleaner technologies can dramatically reduce pollution generated by industrial processes. … We should look for technology-enabled solutions to public problems, but not so that today’s winners are frozen in place at the expense of tomorrow’s innovators.

Amen. While government does need to target technology areas (e.g., clean energy, IT, robotics, etc.), it shouldn’t pick specific technologies within those sectors.

Rule #8: Empower People With Information

In the old economy, information was a scarce resource to which few outside of large corporations and governments had access. In the New Economy, constant innovations in ever-lower-cost information technologies have enabled increasingly ubiquitous access to information, giving individuals greater power to make informed choices. Governments should encourage and take advantage of this trend to address a broad array of public policy questions by ensuring that all Americans have the information they need as consumers and citizens.

Progress on this front: The recently announced National Broadband Plan, for example, takes a number of important steps in this direction.

Rule #9:Demand High-Performance Government

Government should become as fast, responsive, and flexible as the economy and society with which it interacts. The new model of governing should be decentralized, non-bureaucratic, catalytic, results-oriented, and empowering. …

When designing solutions to compelling public concerns, such as reducing industrial pollution or delivering world-class public education, government should hold organizations and individuals accountable for meeting goals, while allowing them flexibility to achieve those goals. In many cases, industry self-regulation can achieve public policy goals in ways that are more flexible and cost effective than traditional command-and-control regulation, while also enabling technological innovation.

Procedurally, governments should use information technologies to fundamentally reengineer government and provide a wide array of services through digital electronic means to increase efficiency, cut costs, and improve service. Digitizing government is the next step in re-engineering government.

Washington may give lip service to #9, but when the rubber hits the road, much is still the same. Perhaps the main area of progress is using IT to transform government, but even here a great deal remains to be done.

Rule #10: Replace Bureaucracies With Networks

In the old economy, bureaucracy was how we addressed many major public policy problems. In the New Economy, we must rely on a host of new public-private partnerships and alliances.

Rather than acting as the sole funder and manager of bureaucratic programs, New Economy governments need to co-invest and collaborate with other organizations — networks of companies, universities, non-profit community organizations, churches, and other civic organizations — to achieve a wide range of public policy goals.

Yet public policy has only begun to explore the potential of bottom-up, decentralized networks assuming the lead role in solving pressing societal problems. Government needs to co-invest in these efforts and foster continuous learning through the sharing of best- practice lessons. Most importantly, the collaborative network model requires government to relax its often overly rigid bureaucratic program controls and instead rely on incentives, information sharing, competition, and accountability to achieve policy goals.

Of the 10 rules, this last one may be the hardest for policy-makers to embrace. The legacy of government bureaucracy and “programs” as the solution to our problems — rather than government-enabled networks — is so deeply held that new approaches are not even considered in many cases.

More than a decade since we first published these rules, it’s clear that many of our prescriptions remain unheeded. Whether or not you embrace the term “New Economy” is not the point. The U.S. economy is fundamentally different than it was two decades ago. To pretend that it hasn’t changed, and to continue ignoring the shifting landscape, will consign us to economic stagnation. That rules of the road issued in 1999 remain relevant today underscores just how little progress was made in the 2000s, and how much work needs to be done to fully bring America into the 21st century.  Policy makers and stakeholders from across the political spectrum need to move beyond the talking points from another generation and embrace policies based on today’s realities.

The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Progressive Policy Institute.

A Nation of Startups

Thursday, April 8th, 2010
Dane Stangler



Dane Stangler is research manager at the Kauffman Foundation.

by Dane Stangler

A distinct sense of unease permeates the traditional spirit of American optimism. The unemployment rate appears stuck at 9.7 percent, and many project that it will fall to around only eight percent by 2012 and to perhaps five percent by the middle of the decade. Disquiet over jobs is joined by a vague fear that the U.S. has lost its edge in innovation: our companies are losing ground to emerging market competitors and our students are falling behind their peers in other countries. In a recent post, Michael Mandel put these two concerns together, saying our jobs crisis is simultaneously an innovation crisis.

In response, a common impulse in Washington has been to call on the federal government to somehow solve both problems together, whether by creating “green” jobs, directing more money into research and development, or, most distressingly, provoking a trade war with China. Yet the real solution to both crises — the way to create more jobs and innovation — is right in front of us: startups. As New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman wrote recently: “Good-paying jobs don’t come from bailouts. They come from startups.”

Americans start new companies at one of the highest rates in the world, a pace that has been consistent for nearly 30 years. This steady stream of new companies was responsible for nearly all net job creation over that period of time, and many of those startups introduced new innovations into the economy, whether personal computers (Apple), productivity-enhancing software (Microsoft), 24-hour news (CNN), biotechnology (Genentech) or web browsers (Netscape).

The empirical evidence on the importance of startups is compelling, but not everyone is buying it. Responding to Friedman, for example, Dean Baker wrote:

Friedman’s conclusion about the special importance of new firms is utter nonsense. The claim that most net new jobs came from new firms conceals the fact that existing firms added tens of millions of jobs in this 25-year-period. Of course existing firms also lost tens of millions of jobs. We can say that the net job creation for existing firms was zero, but if we did not have an environment that was conducive for the job adders to grow (how many jobs did Microsoft, Apple, and Intel create after their first 5 years of existence?), then existing firms would have lost tens of millions more jobs.

There are basically two ways to look at job creation in the economy: gross and net. Large existing companies hire thousands of people each year, but they also see thousands of people leave. Gross job inflows and outflows in the American economy are enormous, an indicator of the ongoing reallocation of resources that drives economic growth. At the end of the day, however, if we want to keep pace with an expanding labor force (new entrants) and a changing economy (the rise and fall of sectors and companies), what matters is net job creation. It would be little consolation if we had 100 people looking for jobs, and large company ABC hired those 100 people but also fired 100 different people.

Many people prefer the (ostensible) comfort of big, established companies to the unpredictability of startups. Sure enough, while new companies create thousands of jobs each year, they also destroy thousands of jobs, whether through their effect on existing firms or through failure. (Roughly a third of new firms close in their first two years.) But these firms are important, too, in that they provide one of the few sources for big companies to draw on in adding jobs: in many cases a big company can only add net jobs by acquiring a new firm.

In addition to jobs, startups are an important source of innovation for the economy, responsible for a disproportionate share of breakthroughs. Big companies inevitably become locked into a cycle of quarterly earnings and long-term investments, leaving little room to pursue fringe ideas. Startups have the freedom to explore ideas at the frontier and succeed (or fail) in commercializing them.

This is not to say that large, established companies are unimportant. Far from it — the U.S. economy derives important strength from the symbiosis between startups and big firms. But if policy drifts too far in protecting big companies (whether through bailouts or certain types of regulation), it could suppress the number of startups. Just as importantly, should policymakers choose to focus on promoting entrepreneurship, it’s not clear that we can pick and choose certain sectors. The high-technology companies mentioned above garner much of the attention, but we see plenty of new firms emerge from seemingly mundane sectors such as retail and restaurants. We should reserve judgment on the types of startups we wish to see: every new company represents a source of renewal for the economy.

None of this means that startups represent the saving grace of the American economy; there is no silver bullet solution, to be sure. But, just as plainly, economic recovery will not happen without them. To begin creating our economic future, we need to start more new companies.

Photo credit: http://www.flickr.com/photos/philgyford/ / CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

The Clinton Boom Was Real — Then Bush Happened

Thursday, January 7th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

Most progressives were happy to say goodbye to the “aughts,” as dismal a decade as America has endured since the snake-bitten 1970s. But they may be surprised to learn that the U.S. economy’s poor performance on George W. Bush’s watch was actually Bill Clinton’s fault.

So says Michael Lind, who rang in a new year with a retrospective blast on Salon this week against the “New Democrat” policies of the 1990s.

If you lived through the Clinton years, you might recall them as flush times. Some basic facts: The economy grew briskly, creating 18 million new jobs; rapid innovation, especially in information technology and online commerce, bred new businesses and helped to raise productivity in old ones; unemployment stayed low despite a steady influx of immigrants and women coming off welfare rolls; markets rose as the percentage of Americans owning stock jumped 50 percent; homeownership reached a record high (nearly 70 percent); the poverty rate shrank significantly; and the United States ran budget surpluses for the first time in three decades.

Not bad, right? Well, as reimagined by Lind, the 1990s were another “lost decade,” just like the Bush years, with their successive dot.com and housing bubbles, regressive tax breaks, zooming federal deficits and of course, the grand finale – the near-meltdown of U.S. financial markets in the fall of 2008 along with the worst recession since 1982. If the comparison seems, well, strained, no matter. Lind’s real target is what he calls the myth of the “New Economy,” an illusion conjured by Clintonites (PPI comes in for honorable mention here) to justify “neoliberal” policies.

Breaking Down the New Economy

Specifically, Lind takes issue with New Democrats’ claims that the IT revolution helped to spur more robust productivity growth. This is not a terribly controversial point among economists. For example, a 2003 review of over 50 scholarly studies (PDF) by Jason Dedrick, Vijay Guraxani and Kenneth L. Kraemer (cited in Rob Atkinson’s 2007 report “Digital Prosperity“) reached this conclusion: “At both the firm and the country level, greater investment in IT is associated with greater productivity growth.”

It’s true that economist Michael Mandel, a PPI friend and prominent advocate of innovation-centered growth, has argued that U.S. productivity gains after 1998 were overstated. But the fact remains that labor productivity, which grew at an average of only 1.46 percent per year between 1973 and 1995, grew to nearly three percent annually afterwards. That spurt helped to produce the prosperity of the second half of the 1990s, a period which saw incomes grow in a “picket fence” pattern, meaning that all segments of the population saw roughly equal advances. For those years, at least, relative wage inequality narrowed.

Yet rather than give Clinton credit for economic results in the years when his policies actually were in force, Lind invokes the poor performance of the 2000s to condemn the policies of the 1990s. George W. Bush, arguably the worst economic manager since Herbert Hoover, is oddly absent from this revisionist fable.

And what about all the money gushing into the United States during the ‘90s from foreign investors? In Lind’s telling, New Democrats naively assumed that money was chasing higher returns, when in reality foreign lenders were trying to drive up the dollar’s value to make their country’s goods more competitive. Currency manipulation, especially by China, is obviously a problem today. But in the 1990s, the U.S. was not only innovating furiously, it was also growing faster than Europe and Japan, making it a natural magnet for foreign investment.

Finally, Lind challenges the notion that skills gaps are related to wage inequality. There are reams of economic studies showing strong positive returns to educational attainment.  (For an excellent discussion, see chapter eight in Creating an Opportunity Society, by Ron Haskins and Isabel Sawhill.) He is probably right that skills disparities alone don’t account for the growth in income inequality over the last several decades, but it seems perverse to argue that Clinton and his allies, as well as President Obama, are mistaken in wanting to see more Americans attend college.

Blaming the New Dems for GOP Sins

As a quick perusal of our website will confirm, PPI in the latter part of the 1990s published a raft of reports that a) documented the rise in relative inequality and b) proposed an array of innovative policies aimed at “expanding the winners’ circle” to include more working Americans. And perhaps Lind has forgotten that Clinton, in his first budget, raised taxes on the wealthy to restore progressivity and thus reduce after-tax inequality. He also got Congress to pass a massive expansion of the “work bonus” (earned income tax credit) for low-wage workers.

The causes of inequality are a subject of lively dispute among economists, but Lind is not hobbled by doubts. The reasons, he asserts, are to be found in the decline of unions, an eroding minimum wage, and unskilled immigrants. Yet by his own account, inequality really took off in the 1970s, when unions were relatively strong. (Plus, it’s strange to blame Democratic policies for growing inequality since 1980, since Democrats controlled the White House for only eight of those 28 years). Moreover, it should be obvious that falling union membership is the consequence, not the cause, of a massive shift in the U.S. employment base from manufacturing to services.

Because it affects only a small proportion of workers (including lots of kids working at part-time jobs), the minimum wage is a slender reed on which to hang the revival of good, middle-class wages in America. And there’s scant evidence to support Lind’s claim that immigration, legal or otherwise, has exerted significant downward pressure on native workers’ wages. The tide of unskilled immigration does have an impact on workers who don’t graduate from high school, but not a very large one.

The problem with Lind’s attempted deconstruction of the “New Economy” narrative is that it ignores a whole herd of elephants in the room, namely big structural changes in what U.S. firms do and how work is organized. Consider this description by Rob Shapiro, a key architect of the Clinton economic policies:

For the first time ever, U.S. businesses have been investing more in the development and use of ideas and other intangible assets than in physical assets of property, plant and equipment. Moreover, most of the value the economy now produces comes from those intangible assets. In 1984, the book value of the 150 largest U.S. companies—what their physical assets would bring on the open market—accounted for 75 percent of their stock market value; by 2005, it was equal to just 36 percent of the their market capitalization. The idea-based economy has gone from metaphor to reality.

We are left at last with the question of motive. Why is Lind so intent on rewriting the history of the most successful Democratic president in our lifetime, and raising doubts about the economic competence of the first majority-vote winning Democrat – Barack Obama — in the White House since LBJ?

Some progressives find it hard to forgive Bill Clinton for forcing them to acknowledge past mistakes. But failing to recognize your own successes may be even worse.

This item is cross-posted on Salon.