Posts Tagged ‘ Obama ’

Marshall in The Hill: Obama Reduced to Tactical Maneuvering

Tuesday, September 27th, 2011
The Progressive Policy Institute





by The Progressive Policy Institute

PPI President Will Marshall has an opinion piece in The Hill today. Check it out here:

President Obama’s plan to raise taxes on the rich has liberals brimming with excitement. Finally, a Democrat who fights back against the plutocracy!

Given the steady erosion of his personal approval rating this year, it’s little wonder that Obama’s tax initiative is having a tonic effect on his demoralized base. Substantively, it’s a frontal assault on the GOP’s anti-tax fundamentalism, which unquestionably has become the chief obstacle to solving the nation’s fiscal crisis.

Such merits aside, however, Obama’s gambit is distressingly tactical. While his new deficit-reduction plan advances boldly on the revenue front, it retreats on entitlement reforms the president has previously endorsed. It thus falls short of the “grand bargain” every serious observer knows will have to be struck to control the debt.

What’s more, the populist mantle sits on Obama like an ill-fitting suit — it just doesn’t jibe with his essentially rational and equable persona.

Unlike the Washington commentariat, the public isn’t all that interested in Obama’s repositioning(s) along the political spectrum. Against monolithic GOP opposition, it doesn’t matter whether Obama shifts to the center or feints to the left. What Americans want is the man a solid majority of them voted for — a leader who can rise above today’s polarization and rally the country behind a convincing vision for solving the nation’s structural problems and recapturing America’s economic mojo.

Read the rest of it by clicking here.

Photo credit: Justin Sloan

Why America Needs a New Deal for Labor and Business

Tuesday, September 6th, 2011
The Progressive Policy Institute





by The Progressive Policy Institute

Just before Labor Day, PPI’s President Will Marshall had an opinion piece in The Atlantic, in which he proposed reorienting the relationship of organized labor. Rather than adversaries, they should be partners. Here’s an excerpt:

President Obama is cobbling together a new jobs package for September, but it won’t be enough to revive the economy. Instead of offering another grab-bag of micro-initiatives, the administration needs to embrace a different model for growth that stimulates production rather than consumption, saving rather than borrowing and exports rather than imports.

This strategy emphasizes investment in the nation’s physical, human and knowledge capital–infrastructure, skilled workers and new technology. That’s a better way to raise U.S. wages and living standards than a new jolt of fiscal stimulus.

Getting consumers spending again will boost demand, but much of it will leak overseas via rising imports, stimulating foreign rather than U.S. production. In a world awash with cheap labor, where technology gaps are narrowing rapidly, a wealthy society like ours can thrive only by speeding the pace of economic innovation and capturing its value in jobs that stay in America.

The shift from a consumer-oriented to a producer-centered society won’t happen without a new partnership between labor and business–and a shift in outlook among workers themselves. Organized or not, U.S. workers should think of themselves first and foremost as producers rather than consumers. They have a compelling interest in keeping the companies they work for competitive, and in supporting a new economic policy framework that enables investment, entrepreneurship and domestic production. This reality points to new relations between workers and companies, and new political alliances.

A GRAND BARGAIN FOR LABOR

In the post-war compact of the 1950s and 1960s, workers offered loyalty and labor offered peace to companies in return for stable jobs with decent pay and benefits. But the deal between labor and capital changed as globalization took hold. Workers gave up job security; in return, they got low consumer prices and access to easy credit. Despite access to cheap foreign goods, however, real incomes fell for most households, as real wages dropped and job growth in most parts of the private sector virtually disappeared. Easy credit was used to fund consumption rather than investment in human capital.

Now, at a time when America’s economic preeminence cannot be taken for granted, the interests of workers are converging with those of companies, foreign and domestic, that want to invest in the U.S. economy. In a new compact for competitiveness, workers would pay more attention to innovation, workplace flexibility and productivity gains. Companies would invest more in upgrading workers’ skills, help them balance the pressures of work and family, and pay them middle class wages and benefits.

Two unions are pointing the way toward such a bargain: the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the Communications Workers of America (CWA).

Read the rest by clicking here to find out how. Read Marshall’s full policy briefing on the subject by clicking here.

Strategic diplomacy needed on Israel

Wednesday, August 24th, 2011
Josh Block



Josh Block is a senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, a partner in Davis-Block LLC (a strategic consulting and public affairs company he co-founded with Lanny Davis), and a fellow at the Truman National Security Project. He was previously the spokesman for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and for the State Department's U.S. Agency for International Development during the Clinton Administration.

by Josh Block

PPI Senior Fellow Josh Block writes in Politico:

Seven months ago, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed strong U.S. opposition to the Palestinians’ unilateral statehood bid at the United Nations. One month ago, Congress threatened to cut off U.S. aid for the Palestinian Authority if it carried on. Yet President Mahmoud Abbas is still moving full-speed ahead to September with his U.N. initiative.

The Obama administration and Congress have rightfully taken a firm stance against unilateral recognition of a Palestinian State. But with every sign indicating that the Palestinian leadership won’t be changing course, it’s time for the White House to assert a more active approach to blunt the potential impact of this collision.

The United States must begin a vigorous public effort to lobby other countries, large and small, to oppose the Palestinian effort and join President Barack Obama in pressuring the PA to call it off. Acting decisively now, we can persuade the Palestinians not to press ahead with this damaging course – which undermines our quest for peace and risks anti-Israel terrorism and violence on the Palestinian side, when carelessly raised hopes are dashed.

The good news is that the administration has plenty of opportunities to speak out. Last week, a delegation of 18 Washington-based ambassadors from four continents took part in a fact-finding mission to Israel and the West Bank. They were not from major international players but smaller countries like Albania and Macedonia in the Balkans and St. Lucia and Grenada in the Caribbean.

The administration should start by inviting these 18 ambassadors to the White House and directly appealing that their countries vote against the Palestinian bid. In this game by numbers, the smaller countries—which account for a sizable portion of the U.N. General Assembly—can make a meaningful difference.

This can underscore for the Palestinians and the international community the peace is the goal — not just statehood — and there are no short cuts to negotiation.

Read the rest at Politico here.

Score One for NATO

Tuesday, August 23rd, 2011
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

Libyan rebels—the “rats” as Muammar Qaddafi calls them—are closing in on the eccentric dictator. Although a hundred things could go wrong in post-Qaddafi Libya, Americans should always welcome a tyrant’s fall.

Rather than ponder what comes next, the ever-parochial U.S. media is fixated on whether Qaddafi’s ouster will boost President Obama’s sagging poll ratings. Thus do all those ordinary Libyans who gave and risked their lives to liberate themselves get reduced to bit players in Washington’s never ending political melodrama.

Obama deserves some credit for lending a hand, but he wasn’t the instigator of the Libyan intervention. That honor goes to France and Britain, who were most determined to prevent Qaddafi from carrying out threats to obliterate regime opponents. Already mired in two wars, the United States was happy to fall in behind its allies, and after some opening salvos, content itself with mainly providing logistical support.

So credit NATO as well as the rebels if Qaddafi is toppled or flees. Assuming Libya does not dissolve into Iraq-style chaos, either outcome would be a big morale boost to an alliance that hasn’t gotten much respect lately. NATO’s decision to enforce a “no fly, no drive” zone in Libya was widely panned as ineffectual, a half measure that would make Europeans feel good but only prolong the violence and end at best in stalemate. On the other side, non-interventionists of the left and right complained that NATO has used its U.N. mandate to protect civilians as cover for waging an offensive war on the regime.

Well, that’s true—NATO’s real, if undeclared, goal has been regime change. Airstrikes on regime ground forces first stopped Qaddafi’s drive on the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, and have played a critical role in the rebels’ counterattack since then. A heavy NATO bombardment paved the way for their dramatic entry into Tripoli over the weekend. Maybe the Chinese or Russians are scandalized by NATO’s loose construction of the U.N. resolution, but strictly playing defense would undoubtedly have led to more bloodshed.

NATO’s success may or may not breathe new life into the creaky old alliance, which suffers from a cloudy rationale and steep cuts in European defense spending. It would, however, challenge assumptions about the supposed folly of using limited force in situations where the strategic stakes don’t justify “all-in” intervention. Foreign policy realists recoil at the idea of limited war— recall the Powell Doctrine, which says go in big or don’t go in at all—but in fact such interventions have become the norm since the end of World War II. None of the NATO allies has a compelling strategic interest in what happens in Libya, but there as elsewhere a strong humanitarian case for intervention could be made.

If Libya turns out well, it will be another step toward entrenching the “responsibility to protect” as a new global norm. But isn’t this a slippery slope? If limited war worked to prevent massacres in Libya, don’t we have a moral obligation to intervene next in Syria, whose thuggish dictator has killed close to 2,000 civilians over the last five months?

Well, no. International politics, like domestic politics, is the art of the possible. Each case is unique and requires its own careful balancing of prudential and moral considerations. Given Libya’s relative backwardness and Qaddafi’s political isolation, the risks of Western military intervention there are less than in Syria. Call it opportunism if you like, but it beats the perverse logic of denying anyone help because we can’t help everyone.

The most persuasive objections to the Libyan intervention have always turned on the question of what comes after Qaddafi. Have we opened the door to radical Islamists, as many U.S. conservatives fear? Can the National Transitional Council (NTC) established by the rebels last February, and united mostly by hatred of Qaddafi, sustain the support of a fragmented, tribal society? Will a rural country without a large, educated middle class be able to establish a stable, representative and effective government?

We’ll see. But having abetted the NTC’s victory, the NATO allies should have considerable leverage over the course of events there, especially if they are willing to follow military with economic and political support. In any event, Qaddafi’s imminent fall will likely invigorate the Arab spring and encourage a tougher regional and international response to Syrian dictator Basher al Asad’s depredations in Syria.

That alone would be a solid return on NATO’s modest investment in helping Libyans free themselves from a mad tyrant.

Photo credit: Defence Images

Balanced Budget Amendment: A Gimmicky Disaster-in-Waiting.

Tuesday, July 19th, 2011
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

By refusing to budge on tax revenues, House Republicans have blown a rare chance to get Democrats to swallow trillions of dollars in federal budget cuts. As New York Times columnist David Brooks notes in a shrewd piece today, cuts of such magnitude would have provoked a rancorous split between President Obama and liberals.

Instead, Republicans have opted for ideological purity, including today’s purely symbolic vote on a balanced budget amendment that isn’t going anywhere.

The Balanced Budget Amendment (BBA) is an almost perfect embodiment of the contemporary GOP’s gimmicky approach to governing. It’s an uncomplicated way to convey toughness, and it allows conservatives to drape themselves in the mantle of fiscal responsibility without taking the heat for cutting specific programs. And like many of the faux solutions to which Republicans seem fatally attracted, it would damage our economy.

A balanced budget amendment would handcuff the federal government in times of emergency. Backers say the rule could be waived during recessions, but it’s never clear until after when recessions begin and end. Since most of the states have balanced budget mandates, only Washington can spend at the right time and on a scale sufficient to exert counter-cyclical pressure during downturns. The federal government’s superior resources and borrowing capacity make it in effect the nation’s fiscal reserve.

Republicans almost rammed through a BBA in 1997. In the years that followed, the Clinton administration produced balanced budgets the old-fashioned way, by cutting actual programs and making trade-offs among competing public priorities.

Nonetheless, House Republicans once again claim that only a Constitutional amendment can force Congress to do its fiscal duty. Their “Cut, Cap and Balance” plan not only would bar budget deficits, but would also limit federal spending to 18% of economic output, two points below the average of the past several decades.

In other words, it would force massively disruptive cuts in all federal spending, from Medicare and Social Security to the Pentagon and domestic programs. Not even Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan, the GOP’s uber fiscal hawk, goes this far.

At the same time, the proposed amendment would make it well-nigh impossible to raise taxes, which would require a two-thirds vote in the House and the Senate. It’s a formula for rigidity at best and fiscal paralysis at worst. It would invite judicial interference in a power the Constitution unambiguously delegates to Congress – the power of the purse – and narrow the scope of democratic decision-making.

So why are House Republicans pushing it now? Because they know that, in the end, at least some House Republicans will have to vote to raise the debt limit to avert an economic calamity. They want the political cover of having voted for a “permanent” solution to the debt crisis – the BBA – to shield them from the Tea Party’s wrath.

Senate Democrats of course aren’t about to let Republicans write their economic ideology into the nation’s fundamental law, and President Obama has threatened a veto. Still, it’d be a relief if Republicans could find ways to score political points with their base that don’t injure our economy — either by plunging the nation into default, or enshrining archaic notions of a feeble national government in the U.S. Constitution.

Photo Credit: Common Pixels

Obama’s Two Most Pro-Israel Speeches You Haven’t Heard About

Sunday, May 29th, 2011
Josh Block



Josh Block is a senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, a partner in Davis-Block LLC (a strategic consulting and public affairs company he co-founded with Lanny Davis), and a fellow at the Truman National Security Project. He was previously the spokesman for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and for the State Department's U.S. Agency for International Development during the Clinton Administration.

by Josh Block

Football, they say, is a game of inches.  So too, is Middle East peace making — both figuratively, and in some cases quite literally.  President Obama was reminded of that last week when his comments about terms of reference for future Israel-Palestinian peace negotiations provoked a significant public debate, and in some cases, a furious reaction.

Many Republicans – some acting out of purely political motives – and many Democrats, myself included – acting out of genuine concern – reacted quickly and negatively when President Obama adopted as American policy on Israeli-Palestinian peace talks what had previously been described by this Administration as a “Palestinian goal”– that is, a Palestinian state “based on the 1967 lines, with mutually agreed swaps.”

In the view of some, including the White House, that statement was not new U.S. policy.  Those views assert that negative reactions suggesting otherwise “misrepresented” the president’s statement, or perhaps more importantly, his intended meaning.

But as we know, when it comes to issues about Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict, nuance matters.  This is a place where inches count.

Reaction to that one passage in the “Winds of Change” address, and the media’s almost singular focus on the matter, overshadowed what was one of the most important and impressive speeches of President Obama’s tenure. And in the end it was only a handful of missing words, representing real-world American commitments that were at the heart of the commotion.

There was so much to celebrate in his address: From the soaring and inspiring vision of a boundless future of prosperity for billions of people across the Middle East who have never known freedom, to the impressive and important commitments to Israel’s security, and to America’s determination to stand up for its values and interests in defeating efforts to isolate and delegitimize Israel at the United Nations and beyond.

In fact, an address that was billed as a landmark speech about change in the Arab world was one of the President’s most impressive and pro-Israel addresses of his presidency.

But you’d probably never know that. And that’s a shame.

By saying that an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal should be based on the 1967-lines with mutually agreed swaps, but omitting the next key phrase – “that take into account demographic changes and realities on the ground” – it was by just a few inches that the president missed the goal line of putting his statement in line with a half century of his predecessors.

It was the vagueness of his remarks, and the omission of a key few words, which necessarily go hand-in-hand, that caused so much alarm.

The truncated phrase was treated with great significance, because this Administration has consistently declined to affirm the validity of a 2004 official letter of commitments from President Bush on behalf of the United States to the Prime Minister in Israel, in which among other key commitments, the U.S. reaffirmed its promise to ensure that Israel would have “defensible borders” distinct from the 1967 lines that would accommodate demographic changes and reality on the ground – ie, major Israeli population centers in the  West Bank.

Furthermore, despite the president’s repeated calls for a Jewish State, he has yet to embrace the position taken and assurance provided by Presidents Clinton and Bush that under any final peace accord, the refugee question will be addressed within the borders of a Palestinian State, and not Israel.

Had the Obama Administration previously embraced that letter and those critical U.S. promises, there would have been not nearly the outcry.

But that inexplicable breakdown, seeming to call into question America’s commitment to assurances made in writing by an American president to the State of Israel, codified by Congress, and endorsed in the Clinton Parameters of January 2001, laid the groundwork for the stinging reaction to the President’s incomplete reference to the ’67 lines.

In that context, like Tonto to the Lone Ranger, the Israelis were left asking, ‘What do you mean by swaps, Kimosabe?’

A few days later, President Obama gave another speech on the Middle East, this time even more pro-Israel, but once again, you may not know that, either.

Among the important things President Obama made clear in his second address on the Middle East at the AIPAC policy conference, was that, indeed, he agreed with his predecessors, Presidents Bush and Clinton, that any changes on the ground in a peace agreement must reflect today’s demographic realities and Israel’s unique security needs.  His statements on that matter put him firmly in-line with American leaders going back to the 1960s, when President Johnson first established America’s policy that no one could expect Israel to go back to its indefensible 1949/1967 lines.

Why does that matter?  History and perspective, of course. Consider the Israeli perspective: In the 1967 Six-Day War, in which Israel survived a miraculous third attempt by a combined force of Arab armies to ‘drive the Jews into the sea’, the nascent Jewish state made important territorial gains.

The city of Jerusalem, after 19 years of Jordanian rule that suppressed freedom of worship for Jews and Christians, was liberated and reunified. The West Bank, known for millennia and in the Old Testament as Judea and Samaria, was brought back into contact with the rest of Israel. The Golan Heights, for years a launching pad from which the Syrian army terrorized Israeli towns, was won in an epic and heroic battle. And the Sinai Desert and Gaza Strip, soon to be offered to Egypt in exchange for peace, were conquered.

Like the Sun rises, Russia and other Arab allies at the United Nations pressed their condemnations of Jewish State.  In a typically hypocritical move targeting Israel, some in the world body demanded that for the first time in history land won in a defensive war be fully returned to the aggressors.

The United States – defending its ally Israel, our interests in the region, and basic fairness – rejected that approach. Our elected leaders understood that it was the very indefensible boundaries of 1949/67 encouraged Arab aggression and dreams of destroying the Jewish State and the Jewish People.  The United States understood that Israel could not ever be expected or pressured to go back to what became know as ‘the Auschwitz borders.’ That is why America fought so hard to ensure that UN Resolution 242 specifically did not force Israel had to relinquish all of the land it had captured in its war of self-defense, did not force Israel back to indefensible borders and need not exchange territory in a one-to-one ratio.

That is the diplomatic tradition many feared the president was undermining, at a time when Israel is under threat from a genocidal Hezbollah to the north, an unstable Egypt and Syria to its south and northeast, and a Hamas/Fatah unity government that seems ready to abandon the peace process on multiple fronts. The Palestinians rushed to enshrine the president’s position as new preconditions for talks.

But they’re likely to be disappointed. The president made it clear during his second AIPAC speech that he is aligned with those decades of American diplomacy stretching back to the U.S. stand on UNSC 242. That is precisely the diplomatic tradition that the President embraced during his AIPAC speech, a clarification that – again – has been under-appreciated by some.

Perhaps realizing that his first remarks were incomplete and left an impression he had not intended, President Obama, in his speech to AIPAC, built on the pro-Israel foundation of his Winds of Change Address, not only completing the thought he’d begun the prior week, but expanding on several themes in praise-worthy ways.

President Obama powerfully restated in emphatic and unmistakable terms how strenuously the United States will oppose Palestinian efforts to attain unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state in the absence of peace and an end to all claims.  This clear leadership stance, and the president’s forceful denunciation of efforts to delegitimatize and isolate Israel are deeply appreciated and underscore the President’s commitment to safeguarding the Jewish state.

Notable was the President’s statement that Israel cannot be expected to negotiate with Hamas, which he rightly called a terrorist organization.  His explicit call once again for the Iranian proxy to meet the quartet conditions – recognizing Israel and its right to exist, renouncing violence, and accepting prior agreements between the PA and Israel, was fundamentally important, and ensures that Hamas must fundamentally change, or else remain a pariah.

The President also explicitly signaled his support for a long-term, but not permanent, Israeli military and security presence in the Jordan Valley.   This stance is vital, and like his effort to align administration policy with administrations past, is not just commendable, but significant.  And in both speeches, the President stressed not only “ironclad” American support for Israel’s security, but insisted that a future Palestinian state be demilitarized.

His remarks on issues beyond the narrow question of the Israel-Arab dispute are also vitally important – in particular, Iran.  Again, President Obama said clearly and unequivocally that Iran cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons and that it is American policy to prevent them from doing so.

Both speeches were strongly pro-Israel in the broadest sense.  From the President’s vision of a Middle East made up of progressive Arab states more focused on investing in their own human capital and building tolerant, prosperous societies – rather than scapegoating Israel, to his embrace of Israel and its future as a Jewish state with peaceful neighbors, there is much to appreciate.  It’s time to say so.

Photo credit: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Wingnut Watch: Debt-Ceiling Deniers, Hostage-Takers and the 2012 Field

Tuesday, May 24th, 2011
Ed Kilgore



Ed Kilgore is a PPI senior fellow, as well as managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, an online forum.

by Ed Kilgore

It’s happened so quickly that its significance may have been obscured, but one of the biggest recent developments in Wingnut World has been the rapid devolution of conservative opinion on the pending debt limit crisis–from demands for hard-line negotiations to outright rejection of negotiations at all, often supplemented by claims that the government doesn’t need new debt authority anyway.

This last phenomenon, which Jonathan Chait and others have been calling “debt-ceiling denialism,” is spreading like kudzu since it was first notably articulated by Sen. Pat Toomey (R-PA) in a January column in the Wall Street Journal.  There are different forms of the argument, but the common threads are the claim that the federal government can prioritize the use of revenues in a way that avoids debt default, and the complaint that the whole issue has been manufactured by Democrats to avoid big spending cuts.  Toomey attracted 100 House members and 22 Senators to his “Full Faith and Credit Act” legislation that would supposedly avoid a default by forcing debt payments to the top of the spending priority list.

Short of explicit denial that a real breaching of the debt limit would be a bad thing, other conservatives (including presidential candidates Tim Pawlenty, Michele Bachmann and Herman Cain) take the parallel position of opposing any increase in the debt limit on grounds that spending (without, of course, any tax increases) should be cut enough to make the increase unnecessary.

The usual reaction in Washington to this sort of talk is to dismiss it as tactical positioning for the “deal” that will ultimately be cut—as “hostage-taking” aimed at maximizing the “ransom.”  Perhaps that’s exactly what it was initially.  But at some point, arguments that the hostage’s life is worth nothing, or worse yet, that the ransom can be earned precisely by killing the hostage, undermine the very idea of a deal, particularly when refusing to negotiate with Democrats is a posture that conservatives value as an end in itself anyway.   Indeed, the trend in conservative rhetoric on this subject is to accuse Democrats of hostage-taking by their adamant refusal to accept vast spending reductions.  It’s a dangerous gambit, made even more tempting to Republicans by the fact that debt limit increases are perpetually unpopular among the overwhelming percentage of Americans who have no real idea of the merits of either side of the dispute.

The key question is the extent to which the GOP’s business elites forcefully push back and demand a more reasonable attitude before things get out of hand.  That’s particularly urgent since debt-limit deniers and hard-liners alike are getting into the habit of arguing that financial markets care more about spending reductions than any hypothetical default on the debt.  Moreover, debt-limit ultras are also playing with fire by systematically eliminating any incentive for the Obama administration or congressional Democrats to make concessions to a credible negotiating partner.  Why offer a ransom when the hostage-takers no longer seem to care what you offer?  Better to just send in the SWAT team and take your chances.

Meanwhile, the last week offered more news in the shaping of the 2012 Republican presidential nomination field: Mitch Daniels disappointed his Beltway cheerleading squad by deciding against a run; Newt Gingrich imploded his long-shot campaign with a series of disastrous remarks and revelations; and Tim Pawlenty and Herman Cain formally announced candidacies.

Assessments of the impact of Daniels’ non-candidacy vary according to perspective.  Some think it will lead Establishment Republicans to make a last-ditch effort to find another savior such as Gov. Chris Christie (R-NJ) or even Jeb Bush. And if that fails, to resign themselves to the existing field and get behind Romney, Pawlenty, or Huntsman (though the last option remains implausible because his path to the nomination remains extremely difficult).  Others combine the Daniels and Huckabee withdrawals and suggest the weak field will produce a big opening for a southern Tea Party conservative with deep pockets like Rick Perry.  Both Establishment types and fans of a late entry are beginning to burrow away to undermine the credibility of the Iowa Caucuses as the essential starting-point for the real campaign (for the latter camp, it’s in part because competing in Iowa requires competing in the state party Straw Poll that is held this August).

Though the Gingrich implosion has interested the conservative commentariat less than Daniels’ decision–for the good reason that very few observers considered the Newster viable in the first place–its long-term significance should not be underestimated: it proved once again that ideological purity is the preeminent demand of conservatives for GOP presidential candidates.  If nothing else, the incident will make it very difficult for other candidates to distance themselves from Paul Ryan’s politically perilous Medicare proposals.  But it should also serve as a dashboard idiot light to Mitt Romney warning him that his hopes of being forgiven for his health care heresy may not be terribly realistic.

Failing the “Right Side of History” Test in Bahrain?

Tuesday, March 22nd, 2011
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Though it would be fair to say Obama administration has struggled to keep pace with the groundswell of popular protest from Morocco to Yemen, the White House’s rhetoric and actions have thus far enshrined it on the proverbial “right side of history.” That is, through the lens of historical scholarship, the president’s course of action in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya will be judged as just in the face of non-democratic and violent forces.

Then there’s Bahrain.

The small island nation — home to a non-democratic Sunni ruling family and allied with the U.S. as host to the Navy’s 5th Fleet — has had a steady stream of pro-democracy demonstrations since January. While paying lip service to Shi’ite Bahrainis’ grievances, last week the royals called in Saudi and Emirate military muscle to quash a popular uprising before it gained steam. Pearl Square — the protesters’ main gathering place — was shut down immediately after the foreign troops’ arrival; at least eight people have been killed and dozens are reported missing.

As it stands, the Obama administration runs a serious risk of ending up on the wrong side of history in Bahrain. Until the weekend, the administration had said and done comparatively much less than the multiple statements on Egypt, issuing just one quiet statement from a (relatively) lowly National Security Council spokesman. Secretary Clinton reiterated the original statement on Saturday, saying:

We have made clear that security alone cannot resolve the challenges facing Bahrain… Violence is not and cannot be the answer. A political process is. We have raised our concerns about the current measures directly with Bahraini officials and will continue to do so.

Fair enough — sounds good enough, right? But whereas statements regarding Tunisia and Egypt, as well as the UN resolution and subsequent military action on Libya outpaced events (if barely), the White House’s attention to Bahrain may be too little, too late.

Are the U.S. Navy base and Saudi/ Emirate support for the Libyan situation complicating factors in America’s flat-footed response? Of course. But rather than sitting on its hands, the White House would do well to channel former Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel’s mantra — never let a crisis go to waste — and use the opportunity to start reorienting American policy that corrects over 30 years of an inherently unstable Faustian bargain with Arab despots. I’ll pass on the specifics of “how” for now, but getting on the right side of history in Bahrain through tougher and earlier public diplomacy is a good start if the protest movement beats the odds and rekindles itself.

Wingnut Watch: Confused Obama-haters

Monday, March 21st, 2011
Ed Kilgore



Ed Kilgore is a PPI senior fellow, as well as managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, an online forum.

by Ed Kilgore

Recent events in Libya have left conservative Obama-haters a bit confused. Up until this week, conservative gabbers frequently took easy shots at the president for inaction on Libya; you didn’t have the sort of divisions on the Right often seen during the Egyptian crisis, when some (notably John Bolton) defended Mubarak as a stout U.S. ally and many others warned that Egyptians rebels were or would eventually be dominated by radical jihadists. Qaddafi has no conservative fans.

In the wake of the administration’s support for a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force in Libya, and the robust U.S. participation in the first stages of the multinational military campaign, virtually no conservatives have gone so far as to praise Obama, other than backhanded “better late than never” comments. The prevalent sentiment is that the administration has demonstrated its fatal weakness once again by flip-flopping into an internationally led and insufficiently clear military commitment, too late to secure a rebel victory. Among the 2012 presidential possibilities, no one has even bothered to make the ritualistic “salute the flag” gestures of vague support owed a current commander-in-chief by prospective future commanders-in-chief.

One very specific and highly characteristic right-wing complaint has been that Obama sought sanction for military action from the United Nations but not from the current conservative power lode, Congress. A Washington Times editorial went so far as to call it “Obama’s illegal war:”

The president cannot be seen as a mere instrument of the United Nations, which would relegate the U.S. Constitution to second-class status behind the U.N. Charter. If U.S. troops are going to be put in harm’s way, the authority must come from elected representatives in Washington, not from a bunch of international bureaucrats hanging out in Turtle Bay.

The editorial (like many other conservative commentaries on Libya) stressed George W. Bush’s pursuit of congressional approval before launching the Iraq War. They seem to have forgotten how long the Bush White House resisted this step, or the arguments Bush’s defenders never stopped making that congressional approval was unnecessary in light of the president’s inherent national security powers.

If the Libya intervention devolves into a difficult passage wherein Qaddafi is stopped from destroying the rebels yet cannot be dislodged from control of much of the country, you can infallibly expect many conservatives to default to their traditional claim that liberals like Obama always increase the risk associated with military interventions by using insufficient force and worrying about the opinions of Europeans and Muslims.

Ironically, the Libya crisis comes at a time when the longstanding Republican united front favoring ever-expanding military commitments and ever-rising defense spending is showing some cracks. Last week probable 2012 presidential candidate Haley Barbour made a speech in Iowa calling for greater scrutiny of the defense budget as part of an overall deficit reduction effort, and also suggested he might favor winding down troop levels in Afghanistan because of an insufficiently clear mission.

While Barbour may back down on this provocative message, it could well blow open a long-implicit conflict between the GOP’s Tea Party rhetoric on federal spending and the party’s long pro-defense-spending posture, often posited as the glue that held economic and social conservatives in harness. Last summer Sarah Palin made some noise about convincing the Tea Folk to explicitly place defense spending off-limits to cuts. And for the most part, conservative appropriations and budget schemes have let the Pentagon alone, aside from a disputed acceptance of the elimination of weapon systems the Pentagon itself no longer wants. Certainly the Ron Paul/Rand Paul wing of the GOP has long been eager to pare back overseas commitments as a matter of isolationist principle as much as fiscal probity. But Barbour is the most prominent Conservative Establishment figure to drop hints in this direction.

It was almost certainly no coincidence that immediately after Barbour’s speech in Iowa, Tim Pawlenty told an audience in South Carolina that he didn’t favor defense cuts, and also didn’t favor any troop draw downs in Afghanistan unless they were asked for by Gen. David Petraeus. And then predictably, neo-con pundit William Kristol poured gasoline on the embers of the dispute with a column entitled, “T-Paw Versus Hee-Haw,” a not very subtle dig at Barbour’s Boss Hawg reputation, compounded by additional insults:

This is a) childish, b) slightly offensive, and c) raises the question of how much time Barbour has spent at the Pentagon—apart from time spent lobbying for defense contractors or foreign governments.

Nasty as it was, this is probably a pale echo of the kind of pounding Barbour will receive from other precincts of the conservative movement if he persists in talking about treating defense like other forms of federal spending or cutting short the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan. It will be interesting to see what other proto-candidates for president say if this suddenly evolves from being the Great Unmentionable among conservative posing as maximum deficit hawks, into a regular topic on the campaign trail. Mitt Romney has long sought to make toughness on foreign-policy-and-defense issues his calling card for 2012, and Newt Gingrich is clearly preparing to depict himself as a visionary Churchillian figure determined to defend America from the Islamic hordes. So this could turn into a white-hot fight pretty quickly, unless Barbour shuts up about defense spending and goes back to savaging Medicaid and offering to remake the U.S. economy to resemble Mississippi’s.

Why Dems Are Doing Worse in Some States than Others: It’s Race, Not the Economy

Tuesday, March 15th, 2011
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

In 2008, Democrats enjoyed a solid advantage in partisan identification. By 2010, that advantage had largely evaporated. As I detailed in a previous post, in every state, the Democratic partisan ID advantage has declined, and by an average of nine percentage points.

But the decline has not been equal across the nation. In fact, there is a good deal of variation in the change in Democratic identification across states, ranging from a ranging from a drop of 22.2 percent in New Hampshire (from +13.2% to -9.0%) to a drop of just 1.6 percent in Mississippi (see this table for state-by-state numbers).

Why should these changes vary so much from state to state? Are there demographics that might explain this?

As it turns out, the only statistically significant predictor of the decline in democratic partisan affiliation advantage is the percentage of white people in the state. Surprisingly, the state economy (at least as measured by unemployment rate or change in unemployment rate) doesn’t seem to matter.

Unemployment

Let’s begin with the unemployment rate, since a good deal of the analysis around the 2010 election was an “it’s the economy stupid” story: voters blamed Democrats for high unemployment, and voted Republican to express their anger and frustration.

Yet, what’s remarkable about this scatterplot (above) is that the story doesn’t hold up. If anything, the relationship seems to be slightly opposite what the conventional wisdom would lead us to expect: the Democrats appear to have lost more support in states that have relatively lower unemployment rates. However, it is not statistically significant.

Still, it’s possible that what matters is not the absolute unemployment rate, but rather the change. Yet, once again, the scatterplot (below) shows that this is not the case. The more unemployment dropped between November 2008 and November 2010, the less the average decline in Dems’ partisan ID advantage. Though the relationship is actually stronger than above, it is still not a statistically significant one.

These numbers just don’t fit with the story of voters turning against Democrats for a failing economy. Take Nevada: Unemployment jumped from 8.0 percent to 14.3 percent, yet Democrats partisan ID declined by only; Similarly, California: Unemployment goes up from 8.4 percent to 12.4 percent.

On the other side, consider New Hampshire: Unemployment goes up from 4.3 percent to 5.4 percent (both among the lowest in the nation), but Democrats lose 22.2 percentage points in partisan ID advantage; Or South Dakota: Enemployment up from just 3.4 percent to just 4.5 percent, but the Dem partisan ID advantage falls up 10.4 percent.

Manufacturing

Another possibility is that what matters is the economic make-up of the economy, and in particular, perhaps states that rely disproportionately on manufacturing are more likely to have a lot of anxious voters, since manufacturing is a dying industry. But if we plot the decline in Democratic partisan ID and the manufacturing as share of the state GDP, there is no relationship.

Seniors

Another possibility is that Democrats are losing out in states with more seniors, since senior citizens are reportedly turning against Democrats. A scatter-plot shows a clear relationship, though not quite a statistically significant one (but close!). Generally, the more seniors in a state, the more Democrats have lost in their partisan ID advantage. However, the number of seniors explains only three percent of the variation in the Democratic vote share decline.

Whites

Finally, we come to the share of white voters. Here we have a consistent pattern, and one that is statistically significant (and explains 13 percent of the state-level variation). For every ten percent increase in white voters as a share of the electorate, the predicted decline in Democratic ID advantage is almost one full percentage point (the one outlier in the lower left is Hawaii, which is highly Asian. Without that outlier, the relationship would be even stronger).

This re-emphasizes the problems that Democrats seem to be having with white voters. (Democrats have not enjoyed parity with Republicans among white voters in 20 years, but 2010 was especially bad, with white voters breaking 62-to-38 for Republicans in the mid-term elections.)

This explains why the Democratic decline in diverse states like California (47 percent white) and Nevada (66 percent white) is less than in lily-white states like South Dakota (90 percent white) and New Hampshire (95 percent white), even though California and Nevada have much higher levels of unemployment.

These results exist regardless of economic circumstances (these findings are robust even in a statistical model that controls for all the other possible factors discussed).

Conclusions

The brief summary of this analysis is that race may matter more than the economy for  why voters have been identifying more and more as Republicans for the last two years.

Of course, there are obvious caveats to this interpretation, most significantly the fact that I am playing around with state-level data, as opposed to individual-level data.

But the patterns are discouraging for Obama and the Democrats. Much prognostication has argued that the number one factor for 2012 will be the unemployment rate, because historically, the unemployment rate has been a very strong predictor of whether the incumbent party wins or not. This analysis suggests that something else is going on as well. Democrats are having a hard time with seniors and particularly white voters, and it’s not just a story about the state of the economy.  Democrats ignore these scatterplots at their peril.

Update: I’ve written a response to some of the comments entitled “Am I a Race-Baiter?”

Obama Gets His Comeuppance For Failing the Lobbying Purity Test

Friday, February 25th, 2011
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

If you search through the White House visitor logs, you can find me. In fact, I’ve been to the Obama White House twice (though I seem to have two records for the same visit). Let me explain: A good friend of mine worked at CEQ for a while. Once, she took some friends on a tour of the White House. Once, we went to see the Christmastime decorations at the East Wing. However, if I had visited this friend at her office, which was not the White House but instead at Jackson Place, there’d be no trace of me in the White House visitor logs.

Yesterday, Politico ran a story noting this fact and insinuating that lobbying meetings were intentionally being moved to Jackson Place, or to the nearby Caribou Coffee on 17th Street, just so that they wouldn’t show up in the visitor logs. Many bloggers, especially those on the right have jumped all over Obama for this supposed hypocrisy. The ever-clever Michelle Malkin triumphantly rhymed: “Obama lied, transparency died.” Common Cause asked Obama to disclose every meeting regardless of where it occurs.

Now, I really don’t know if the Administration moved meetings off-campus so that they didn’t show up in the visitor logs. It seems to me like a silly thing to do. I’m trying to imagine what visitor would be so terrible that his or her presence in the visitor logs would be an instant scandal. I can’t. Based on what I know about the scarcity of space in the White House, I’m willing to buy the rationale that meetings were held elsewhere just because that’s where space could be found.

But I can see why people in the White House might be unnecessarily sensitive about who they are meeting with. The problem is that from Day One, when the Administration placed a ban on registered lobbyists serving in the White House, it tried to place itself somehow above and beyond the influence of lobbyists.

But as anybody who has spent any time in Washington knows, lobbyists are part of the policymaking fabric in this town, like it or not. To try to govern without at least getting their input and occasional buy-in is simply impossible. There are reasons to be concerned about their influence and power, but simply demonizing them as to-be-avoided-at-all-costs is not helpful, and almost certainly counter-productive.

In many ways, Obama has held himself to a standard that was far beyond reach. Of course he wasn’t going to rid Washington of special interests. But that’s politics. Everybody comes to Washington to change the way business is done. Nobody is ever powerful/foolhardy enough to do so.

One of the reasons that Obama was able to make White House visitor logs public is because the Secret Service keeps close track of everyone going in and out of the White House. When I’ve visited, somebody had to see my ID and check me in. What I can glean from yesterday’s press conference transcript is that this puts me into something called the “the WAVES system.” And when you’ve got an electronic database, it’s easy to make it public. And there’s no reason not to do so.

Maybe meeting disclosure should extend to Jackson Place. Maybe it should extend to Caribou Coffee. Should it extend to every phone call? Every kid’s soccer game an administration staffer attends where lobbyists might have kids playing as well? Where do you draw the line?  Washington is in many respects one big social network. And lobbyists, the majority of whom once worked in government, are part of that network.

I suppose what Obama should have said from the beginning was that he was doing the best he can. He was going to make White House visitor logs public because the White House belongs to everyone, and everyone should know who is visiting. But that he also recognized that the White House is not a compound on a hill, and that disclosing visitor logs is not going to capture all the conversations he or anyone on his staff ever has with an interested party. Moreover, he could have also said that he valued the inputs of everyone, be they lobbyists or not. And that he and his staff had enough integrity, thank you very much, to cut through the self-serving BS of lobbyists.

But instead, Obama succumbed to the familiar politics of purity and moralizing when it came to lobbyists. This moment of gotcha journalism, I suppose is his comeuppance. When you hold yourself to unrealistic standards, it’s bound to come sooner or later.

Small Spending Cuts’ Big Impact on America in the Middle East

Wednesday, February 23rd, 2011
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Will Marshall and Jim Arkedis

Now is the winter of discontent for Middle East dictators. A great political awakening is roiling the region – which makes this exactly the wrong moment to weaken America’s ability to help people struggling to free themselves.

House Republicans, however, are determined to do just that. Oblivious to the growing democratic ferment in the Muslim world, they voted last week to cut funding for U.S. diplomacy and assistance by some $4.4 billion, along with a haircut for the National Endowment for Democracy (or NED, and full disclosure: Will Marshall is a member of NED’s board). Although it usually flies under policy-makers’ radar, the NED is America’s premier instrument for assisting democratic transitions in long-closed societies.

To be fair, President Obama’s new budget proposes an even deeper cut (12 percent versus the GOP’s six percent) in the NED’s already miniscule $118 million budget, though it wouldn’t take effect until next year.

These changes were tucked deep in the giant, $61 billion package of 2011 spending reductions the House approved last week in a frenzy of misplaced fiscal probity. We hope the Senate doesn’t overlook them as it tries to salvage something sensible from the House package and continue funding the federal government. If you want to establish your bona fides as a resolute budget cutter and enemy of big deficits, domestic spending isn’t the place to look for serious savings. The real money is in the big middle class entitlement programs and in tax expenditures, backdoor spending programs that cost the federal government over $1 trillion a year.

We are fiscal hawks, but these untimely cuts in democracy assistance illustrate the perfect folly of trying to balance the budget on the back of domestic discretionary spending, which accounts for only 13 percent of total federal outlays. They are too small to make an appreciable dent in America’s $1.6 trillion deficit, but they would curtail our ability to support the spread of America’s democratic ideals in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The NED was established in 1983 under the bipartisan auspices of Ronald Reagan and Democratic Rep. Dante Fascell of Florida. They believed the United States needed a non-official way to lend a helping hand to homegrown reformers. Funneling support through a non-government entity like the NED rather than the State Department or USAID makes it hard for autocrats to tar recipients as tools of American policy.

Since its inception, NED has backed virtually every significant struggle for freedom in the world. It helped ease democratic political transitions in Poland, Chile, South Africa, Nigeria and Russia. Crucially, it nurtures political dissidents from Burma to Cuba, including Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo in China, as well as countless lesser-known but equally courageous champions of human rights and democracy.

The NED and its core institutes are active in the Middle East and North Africa, although its nearly $22 million in annual grants to the region now seems wholly inadequate. In Egypt, for example, its micro-grants support youth participation in government, workers’ rights and – presciently, in light of the crucial role Twitter and Facebook played in drawing crowds to Cairo’s Tahrir square – digital media workshops for young people. In Yemen, another flash point, the NED supports young entrepreneurs and helps human rights and women’s empowerment groups build capacity.

Facing a snap vote in just six months, Egypt is ill-prepared for a democratic transition. It has no organized opposition parties and its civic groups, non-governmental organizations, and democratic institutions are—to be generous—underdeveloped. This is no time to be denying U.S. policy-makers the tools they need to help. But seeding the ground for democracy in the Middle East is a long game. Whatever the outcome in Egypt, we need a sustained and strengthened effort to help local reformers throughout the region put in place the building blocks of an independent civil society and functioning democracy.

That is the NED’s mission, and it needs more resources, not fewer. If our political leaders really want to show they are serious about whittling down America’s monstrous debts, they ought to follow Willie Sutton’s advice and go where the money is.