Posts Tagged ‘ Osama bin Laden ’

How Dangerous is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?

Wednesday, August 25th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

I pity journalists on the terrorism beat.  Take Greg Miller and Peter Finn’s piece in the Washington Post this morning, entitled “CIA sees increased threat in Yemen,” referring to the al Qaeda splinter group called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (or AQAP). The journalists’ challenge is to quantify the scale and immediacy of the “threat”, an amorphous term that implies danger, yet remains extraordinarily difficult to quantify.

The story, based on analysis from the CIA, describes AQAP as the “most urgent threat to U.S. Security.”  It’s critical to properly categorize the threat because left undefined, the average American’s basis of comparison for a terrorism is the devastation of September 11th.  Hell, I spent five years trying to brief relatively high-ranking Pentagon officials on this stuff, and 9/11 was their point of departure too.  Nuance is important in defining terrorist threat – without it, government officials tend to over-react, going into CYA-mode (that’d be “cover your ass”) that guards against today’s headline rather than the overall, long-term picture.

Of course, part of the problem is that the CIA source in the article is only willing to go so far with the information he/she provides – sufficing at such vague quotes as “increased threat” and “on the upswing” while pointing to evidence of the group’s prowess that we already have:  the Christmas Day plot and radical cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi’s increasing activity.  Give away more, and the source could  end up busted.

So what are we talking about here?  Does the “increased threat” mean AQAP can pull off a massive terrorist attack on American soil? How far from its base in Yemen can the network reach?  Is it a threat to American only interests in the Middle East region? Is the network confined to smaller attacks? Civilian or military targets? What?

As the article asserts, AQAP may now be more dangerous that Osama Bin Laden’s war-ravaged and hiding clique, but that’s a dangerous comparison to make.  The United States has dedicated nearly ten years to degrading al Qaeda’s core group, and AQAP’s relative strength – and the resources dedicated to combatting them – should be understood within that context.

And that’s why in absolute terms, I wouldn’t lose sleep over AQAP launching a massive, 9/11-style attack against the United States just yet.  That’s because the terrorist threat is measured by marriage of a group’s intentions plus its capabilities: AQAP may really, really want to strike New York (intent), but hasn’t yet developed the operational expertise of training, financing, internal security, and logistics (capabilities) to succeed.

Currently, I’d assess that AQAP  has the intentions and capabilities to threaten American security in two ways: First, we’re likely to see a continuation of small attempts against public targets in the U.S.,  in the mold of the Christmas Day attempt.  These attacks will be launched by single operatives that have plausible cover and legit paperwork to slip over the American border.  However, coordinating a massive terrorist attack with many operatives against thousands of Americans continues to remain several years off.

Second, the group likely does pose a threat to American interests in Yemen or the broader region.  The 10th anniversary of the USS COLE bombing is upon us, which serves as a fitting reminder that Bin Laden’s al Qaeda has successfully executed complex terrorist attacks against hardened American targets in Yemen before.  But until AQAP pulls off an attack of this nature – like an embassy bombing akin to the 1998 attacks in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam – I can only assess that the group’s ability to project power will remain confined to the region.

In sum, AQAP remains one to watch.  The intelligence community is right to be concerned about the group’s apparently amassing capabilities, but keep in mind that terrorist attacks are often a building-block process: a group must crawl before it can walk, and walk before it can run.

Right now, AQAP seems to be taking its first few steps.  The IC seems to recognize that, and will be working hard to knock it back on all fours.

Photo credit: eesti’s photostream

Boehner Still Struggling with National Security

Wednesday, May 19th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

John Boehner at Press ConferenceHow’s this for nerve? At a press conference on May 6, Republican Minority Leader Rep. John Boehner of Ohio accused the Obama administration of relying on “luck” to keep America safe. But Boehner’s own recipe for national security is based on even less. Rather than engage the White House in a constructive dialogue on how best to protect the nation, Boehner chose to throw political rotten tomatoes. His gamesmanship is a disturbing reminder that the House minority leader cares more about winning elections than keeping the country safe.

Amazingly, Boehner chose to lob his rhetorical garbage in the wake of the successful manhunt for would-be Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad. Ignoring the incredibly efficient work of America’s defense, security, and law enforcement agencies, Boehner charged the administration with operating “without a real, comprehensive plan to confront and defeat the terrorist threat.”

But clearly Boehner doesn’t have a clue of just how hard the administration has been working. Earlier this year, the Department of Defense issued its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). And in a few weeks, the White House will release its National Security Strategy. This may come as a shock to Boehner, but the QDR — led by Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, a Republican himself — and the National Security Strategy actually are the administration’s “comprehensive plans”.

Maybe Boehner missed it because he was too busy coming up with his own “plan.” Boehner actually did convene something called the National Security Solutions Group, a caucus of 18 Republicans that was supposed to develop solutions to the current and future threats.” But to date, Boehner’s clique looks more like political theater than substantive intellect — it hasn’t issued a single new idea. And the QDR makes Boehner’s group look out-of-date, insufficient, and redundant anyway.

Perhaps Boehner failed to offer security ideas at his press conference because he lacked the confidence that any of his own might actually work. With a national security track record like Boehner’s, he probably calculated that it would be best to insult and run, rather that defend the policies he has supported in the past.

Exhibit A of Boehner’s policy stinkers? Invading Iraq.

Since that one didn’t turn out to be the cakewalk that Boehner, Dick Cheney, and George W. Bush originally planned, it’s understandable why he might be gun shy about forwarding new ideas. Indeed, Boehner remains so obsessed by Iraq that his website — as of this writing — continues to insist that Iraq, not Osama Bin Laden’s home in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, is “the central front of a global war [on terror].” Never mind that al Qaeda only came to Iraq after America did.

Then there’s Boehner’s odd belief that the administration’s decision to reorient missile defense — a policy supported by Secretary Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — comes at the expense of America’s allies. So how do those allies actually feel? Just fine, it turns out. Take it from Radoslaw Sikorski, Poland’s Foreign Minister, who said in the first week of May that “Polish-American relations are solid” and that Poland “rather like[s] the new version better than the previous one” of missile defense.

Boehner also sided with Dick Cheney in endorsing torture. General David Petraeus had a different view, saying torture was “neither useful nor necessary” and calling on America to “occupy the moral high ground.”

The fact is that John Boehner has been consistently wrong about which policies keep America safe. He’s reckless and out-of-touch with the national security landscape of the 21st century and more concerned with winning elections than stopping terrorism. His catcalls at the Obama administration only distract attention from the serious national security challenges America continues to face.

John Boehner is right that we need more than luck to defeat terrorism. We need national leaders to rise above empty rhetoric to protect the country in a bi-partisan manner. Unfortunately, Boehner is not acting like one of those leaders.

Photo credit: republicanconference / CC BY-NC 2.0

Two More Scooped Up in Zazi Case. Where Are Progressives?

Friday, February 26th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Two men who were already in custody, Adis Medunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay, were charged (along with Najibullah Zazi) in a plot to attack New York’s subway system. The plot was derailed by federal agents back in September, just days before it was set to be executed.

Details of the plot continued to emerge at the previously scheduled hearing for the two men Thursday when Jeffrey Knox, the assistant U.S. attorney, strongly implied that Medunjanin and Ahmedzay were two of the operatives in the “three coordinated suicide-bombing attacks on Manhattan subways during rush hour.” Knox added that the plot was undertaken at the direct command of al Qaeda’s central leadership. That’s a heavy charge, and I’m normally skeptical of prosecutors making grandiose assertions to attract press attention. But — bin Laden’s direction or no — the fact remains that this was a very real plot with very real consequences.

After three significant arrests, I’ll restate the question I asked the other day: Where are progressives on this one? Yet again, we have a large-scale terrorist plot against a major American target that was successfully thwarted due to the good work and cooperation of our law enforcement and intelligence communities. The civilian court system has already gotten one guilty plea out of the ringleader (Zazi), and he’s continuing to provide intelligence. Progressives should be pounding their chests about a strong victory against a ruthless enemy.

But instead, as Greg Sargent at The Plum Line quotes one Democratic strategist saying, “We’re behaving like the President has a 30% approval rating. On these [national security] issues, Democrats inherently believe no one will believe our arguments” (a quote that admittedly was made before the Zazi guilty plea, though the sentiment still applies).

It’s time to snap out of it. I argued before that progressives have to respond to conservative attacks (if they’re brazen enough to criticize the Zazi case…wait a minute, I forgot who we’re dealing with here — of course they’re brazen enough), not on policy grounds, but with forceful rhetoric. National security is an emotional issue for Americans, not a policy one. Using the Zazi case to show our strength and smarts to contrast conservatives recklessness is an argument that continues to resonate. We’ve got great ammo — let’s use it.

Photo credit: http://www.flickr.com/photos/99887786@N00/ / CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Is the New Bin Laden Tape Really Him?

Monday, January 25th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Nerd alert: My brother Bob and I have a long-standing competition to identify anonymous celebrity voice-overs on TV ads (and we’re pretty good — picking out Gene Hackman shilling for Lowes is amateur hour), but I don’t claim to ID celeb voices for a living. That’s why I can’t definitively say that the recently released Bin Laden tape isn’t him, but I suspect there’s a decent chance that it just might not be.

Last January, Bin Laden released a 22-minute tape on the eve of the Obama inauguration about everything from Israel to the economic crisis. The long-winded diatribe, replete with OBL’s standard Koranic references, was standard fare from al Qaeda’s chief taco. His tapes of May and March 2008 were also 22 minutes. That’s a far cry from this week’s version, which barely clocks in at 22 words (actually 144, but you get my drift), according to the Middle East Media Research Institute’s transcript.

Second, keep in mind that al Qaeda’s senior leadership has always had its eye on the big prize — the spectacular attack that generates either genuine fear or awe for its daring size, scale, or target. In 1998, they leveled two American embassies simultaneously; in 2000 they struck at the heart of the American military by blowing a massive hole in the side of an American Navy destroyer; and 9/11 speaks for itself. Even AQ’s latest significant attempt at a large-scale operation – the multi-flight Heathrow plot in 2006 – was an impressive feat of imagination. But in this tape, a man claiming to be Bin Laden embraces not a spectacular success that improves upon complex and sickeningly impressive plots, but a complete failure of an attempt that he likely had nothing to do with.

Then again, maybe even notable failures at small operations are enough these days. It’s possible that the combination of a tighter American safety net and the embarrassing overreaction of the pundit class has convinced AQ that small-fry attacks are sufficient to carry AQ’s fundraising and recruiting goals in the current climate. So if this was really OBL on the tape, it would signal a major degradation of AQ’s modus operandi and attack capabilities.

But the irregularity continues to bug me — it doesn’t make sense that Bin Laden would essentially admit al Qaeda is a shell of its former self. That’s why I keep thinking someone might be masquerading as the big man. By tying the Christmas Day attempt to Bin Laden, the real perpetrators of the plot — al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula — could gin up money and recruits in its aftermath.

It would be a serious scandal within Islamic extremist circles if the CIA came out in the next 24 hours and declared the tape fake, so I have to imagine that even uppity terrorists aren’t that stupid. Then again, perhaps the CIA should consider floating a trial balloon about the tape’s “questionable authenticity” just to see what sort of reaction it generates.

Understanding the Threat from al Qaeda

Monday, November 16th, 2009
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

At first glance, it seems like an obvious call: al Qaeda hasn’t attacked the U.S. in over eight years, so why endanger more American lives and spend billions to fend off a group that’s on the ropes?

Or, even for many who believe al Qaeda continues to pose a threat, it’s hardly obvious why the Obama administration is considering Gen. McChrystal’s request of 40,000 more troops for Afghanistan. After all, the terrorist group has withered to maybe 100 members, most of whom are across the border in Pakistan. Shouldn’t a counterterrorism strategy that disrupts plots as they develop be enough?

A friend who works in Hollywood once told me that movie producers emphasize that the audience should understand exactly what’s at stake throughout the picture. In the Afghan security drama, the audience — the American public — has long since been lost and bored by the plot. Who can blame them? Think of all the twists and turns that have diverted their attention over the last eight years: Iraq, Hurricane Katrina, a torture debate, Gitmo, wiretaps, and, of course, Afghanistan, among many other factors, have all desensitized, frustrated, or angered much of the country to the point that many are sick of thinking about national security. If George McGovern dusted off his presidential campaign slogan, “Come Home, America,” and ran this year, he might fare better than last time.

That’s why as the White House contemplates its choice for strategy and resources in Afghanistan, it’s crucial that Americans become reacquainted with what’s still at stake.

A Loss of Urgency

Right now, it’s true that al Qaeda’s senior leadership — the only one of the many different “al Qaeda” groups worldwide that has a serious interest in attacking the U.S. — probably doesn’t have the capability to plan and execute a devastating 9/11-style terrorist attack. Al Qaeda’s core leadership remains intact, but after eight years of pounding by American and NATO forces, it’s highly questionable whether Osama Bin Laden’s intimate cadre could today mount an intricate logistical and financial campaign necessary for a large-scale operation half a world away.

One can’t blame Americans for thinking that the stakes aren’t particularly high. America feels relatively secure today, and some complacency may have set in.

But as Steve Coll first suggested in Ghost Wars, his history of intelligence services in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it’s helpful to think of America as a soccer goalie defending against Team al Qaeda. It’s possible to pitch shut-out after shut-out for several games in a row, but no matter how good the goalie is, at some point, he’s bound to let one through.

To build on Coll’s metaphor, al Qaeda, unfortunately, is prepared for a long season. One of al Qaeda’s under-appreciated strengths is its patience. Bin Laden’s modus operandi is that it’s better to do nothing than to try and fail. Al Qaeda took five years to plan the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, two years for 2000’s U.S.S. Cole attack, and another two for 9/11. Plot development time would no doubt be much longer today.

That’s why al Qaeda is effectively sitting on the sidelines in Pakistan. It has been pinned down by the American and NATO presence in Afghanistan and is biding its time, hoping that the Taliban can retake control of Afghanistan and re-open the playing field.

A Plan to Defeat — Not Delay — Terrorism

Gen. McChrystal’s plan is a proposal to keep them off the field for good. Instead of worrying about disrupting plots as American intelligence learns of them, McChrystal’s strategy, if successful, would permanently deny al Qaeda a chance to slip one past the goalie by forever taking away the safe haven it needs to plot a massive terrorist operation.

Some question the links between al Qaeda and the Taliban, wondering whether, should the Taliban return to power in Afghanistan, it would necessarily facilitate al Qaeda’s return. But in an essay in Foreign Affairs, Barbara Elias provides a convincing rebuttal: “If key Taliban officials behaved as representatives of a government seeking to maintain control of their territory, they would have given up al Qaeda in the fall of 2001, just as Pakistan supposedly agreed to give up the Taliban. Why would they turn against al Qaeda now if they didn’t then?”

As I argued in an article for Foreign Policy, al Qaeda needs a safe haven along the Afghan-Pakistan border to have any hope of conducting a massive terrorist attack against the U.S. The Obama administration and European leaders may never be able to fully defend against a Madrid- or London-style attack, but America can defend against another 9/11 by denying al Qaeda the cover it needs to conceive, plan, train for, and execute a terrorist plot.

There’s no question that Gen. McChrystal’s request is a bitter pill to swallow as the administration asks for billions more to finish off a distant enemy seemingly on its last legs. It is tempting to wager that America will remain secure even if the Taliban retake parts of Afghanistan by keeping al Qaeda off balance with less expensive Special Forces raids and targeted air strikes.

That roll of the dice isn’t worth it. If al Qaeda regroups and re-grows by implanting itself in Afghan territory, it would establish itself anew as a serious security threat to the U.S. And if it were able to launch another 9/11-style attack, the White House — regardless of its occupant — would be back at square one, making new decisions about thousands more American lives and hundreds of billions fresh dollars. It’s not an attractive option, but on the whole, it makes more sense to swallow the castor oil and adopt Gen. McChrystal’s recommendations. They offer the best chance of permanently quashing the al Qaeda threat.

That’s what’s at stake.

Bin Laden’s Cleric Condemns Ft. Hood Shootings

Monday, November 16th, 2009
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Danger Room has a great scoop.

Salman Al-Awdah, a Saudi cleric who played an influential role in Osama Bin Laden’s early radicalism, called the Fort Hood shootings “irrational” and an “empty thought.” Al-Awdah said, “Incidents [such as the Ft. Hood shootings] have bad consequences, and undoubtedly this man might have a psychological problem; he may be a psychiatrist but he [also] might have had psychological distress.”

Though Bin Laden had once described Al-Awdah as his “ideal personality,” the cleric has somewhat moderated his stance recently, having condemned 9/11 even while subsequently signing a 2004 letter that called for jihad against U.S. forces in Iraq.

It’s a notable differentiation. In the past, Al-Awdah has distanced himself from terrorism targeting civilians, while endorsing military ones.  Even though Ft. Hood was technically not in the field of battle, many of its soldiers were headed out to Iraq or Afghanistan, or just returning home. You’d think Al-Awdah would view them as culpable as forces in a war zone.

I’ve written previously that I don’t believe Ft. Hood was terrorism. That Al-Awdah passed on an opportunity to legitimize the attack — instead emphasizing Nidal Hassan’s mental illness — only underscores my analysis.