Posts Tagged ‘ Pakistan ’

U.S. Outs Pakistan

Friday, September 23rd, 2011
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

Adm. Mike MullenTop U.S. officials this week accused Pakistan of abetting a terrorist group responsible for attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The bombshell here isn’t Pakistani duplicity—that’s old news—but the Obama administration’s decision to go public. It means Washington finally has run out of patience with our supposed “ally.”

The U.S. complaint centers on the Haqqani network, an Afghan terrorist group holed up in Pakistan’s North Waziristan region. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress that the network is “a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency.” He said the ISI helped Haqqani operatives carry out a truck bomb attack that wounded more than 70 U.S. and NATO troops on Sept. 11, as well as a suicide assault on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.

The ISI’s ties to Haqqani network date back to the anti-Soviet jihad and subsequent Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. Apparently, the ISI sees no reason to sever those ties just because the Haqqanis are now killing U.S. and NATO forces instead of Russians. As Mullen explained, the ISI sees the network as a valuable “proxy” that can give Pakistan leverage in Afghanistan, especially after U.S. forces have gone home. There’s another somewhat more sinister explanation: many in the ISI and army hierarchy share an ideological affinity with Islamic terror groups that target both Afghanistan and India.

So is Pakistan really an enemy masquerading as a friend? The situation is complicated because Pakistan has cooperated with the United States in targeting al Qaeda and the Taliban, even as its army rebuffs our pleas to expel the Haqqanis from North Waziristan.

The blunt testimony by Mullen and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta signals the end of several years of “quiet diplomacy” aimed at getting Pakistan to make a clean break with jihadi terrorism. Outing the ISI may put more pressure on a weak civilian government. However, the Pakistani government is not only looking over its shoulder at the powerful security branches, but also at a public strongly opposed to U.S. infringements of Pakistani sovereignty.

On the other hand, Americans are entitled to ask what we have to show for the $20 billion in U.S. aid sent to Pakistan over the last decade. Last year, Congress approved $1.7 billion for economic aid for Pakistan, and $2.7 billion in security aid. At a minimum, we ought to stop trying to bribe a government that is playing us for fools.

With two wars on its hands, maybe the United States can’t afford a total rupture with Pakistan. But we can’t achieve any kind of lasting success in Afghanistan as long as Pakistan provides a safe refuge to the Haqqanis and other insurgents. That’s a genuine dilemma, but at least U.S. leaders have begun to grapple with it honestly.

Policy Brief: How an Afghanistan-Pakistan Study Group Could Help

Thursday, September 15th, 2011
Jordan Tama



Jordan Tama is an assistant professor at American University’s School of International Service and a fellow at the Truman National Security Project.

by Jordan Tama

In June 2011, the House Appropriations Committee unanimously approved an amendment introduced by U.S. Representative Frank Wolf (R-Va.) that would provide $1 million for the establishment of an independent Afghanistan-Pakistan Study Group. The blue-ribbon panel’s charge would be to assess U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and offer recommendations within 120 days.

Could an Afghanistan-Pakistan Commission actually accomplish anything? Although the popular perception is that commission reports achieve little beyond giving publicity to the graybeards that serve on them, my research on over 50 blue-ribbon panels shows that under the right circumstances they can catalyze important policy changes.

At first blush, an Afghanistan-Pakistan Study Group might seem pointless, since President Obama has already decided to implement a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. But beyond the withdrawal of our surge forces much of our policy remains uncertain or undecided.

In particular, it remains unclear how large of a troop presence we will maintain in Afghanistan beyond 2012, how we will seek a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan and deal with the Taliban if they gain ground as we pull out, and, as relations with Pakistan remain tumultuous in the wake of the Bin Laden assassination, how the U.S. will craft a comprehensive, stable policy toward Islamabad that best serves national interests over the long term.

Read the entire brief.

 

Assessing the Afghanistan Surge

Thursday, December 16th, 2010
Jordan Michael Smith



Jordan Michael Smith is writing a book on U.S.-Israeli relations. He’s written for The Atlantic, The Boston Globe and Foreign Policy

by Jordan Michael Smith

The Obama administration released its Afghanistan review this morning, and while everyone will be digging through it for truths and obfuscations, it’s worth simply comparing the review’s conclusions to President Obama’s “Terms Sheet” he dictated at the outset of his Afghanistan surge. Obama’s six-page terms sheet, first revealed and released in Bob Woodward’s book Obama’s Wars, calls for measuring progress in Afghanistan by answering questions in related to governance, Pakistan, training of Afghan forces, and international support. Let’s look at the new review and compare it to some parts of the old one, shall we?

  1. The new review concludes that “the momentum achieved by the Taliban in recent years has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in some key areas, although these gains remain fragile and reversible.”
    The initial review, however, called for “reversing the Taliban’s momentum” everywhere, not merely arresting it in some places (my italics). Small word change, big difference.
  2. The new review says that “We are also supporting Afghanistan’s efforts to better improve national and sub-national governance, and to build institutions with increased transparency and accountability to reduce corruption – key steps in sustaining the Afghan government.”
    The initial review had specific benchmarks to measure governance progress: Has President Karzai made merit-based appointments in the areas most essential to our mission? Has the Afghan government begun to implement an effective reintegration/reconciliation program?  The new review is silent on these critical matters.
  3. The new review holds that Afghanistan forces “have exceeded ANSF growth targets, implemented an expanded array of programs to improve the quality and institutional capacity of the ANSF, and sharply improved their training effectiveness.”
    The initial review called for “accelerated ANSF growth while improving quality.” On this score, the U.S. is doing quite well, according to what was released today.
  4. The new review argues that “Emphasis must continue to be placed on the development of Afghan-led security and governance within areas that have been a focus of military operations.”
    The initial review insisted that we needed to establish “a program to transfer responsibility from ISAF to ANSF province by province.” No mention in the new document of what has been achieved, only on what must still be done.

Despite the negative balance sheet, on these and other scores, today’s review is cautiously optimistic. We are making progress, however fragile and recent. “Most important, al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership in Pakistan is weaker and under more sustained pressure than at any other point since it fled Afghanistan in 2001,” Obama’s new review argues. Reviewing the first assessment, however, reminds us that weakening al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan was not the primary goal. Perhaps it should have been.

Photo Credit: Truthout

Discussing the Future of U.S.-China Relations

Tuesday, December 14th, 2010
Lee Drutman



Lee Drutman is a senior fellow and the managing editor for the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Lee Drutman

Watch a video of the event on C-SPAN

Next month, Chinese President Hu Jintao will be visiting Washington and Defense Secretary Gates will be visiting Beijing. Though the U.S. and China have had their disagreements of late – over North Korea, over human rights, over currency valuations – both have much more to gain from cooperation than conflict.

Such was the general consensus at a PPI Event today entitled, “China’s Choice: Regional Bully or Global Stakeholder?” The event featured: The Honorable Chris Coons, U.S. Senator (D-Del.), Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; The Honorable Wallace “Chip” Gregson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Harvard University; James Fallows, The Atlantic Magazine; Michael Chase, Naval War College.

Sen. Coons kicked off the event by relating the experiences of a newly elected Senator who had spent the last several months on the campaign trail listening to the ordinary Americans’ trepidations about China.

“I’ve seen and heard the growing frustrations of average Americans, and their perceptions, or misperceptions, about the rise of China,” Coons said. “Americans are deeply concerned we’ve lost our economic and manufacturing edge and Washington has taken its eye off the ball.”

But Coons also registered an optimistic note: “I don’t view it as a zero-sum game. China’s rise does not have to mean the decline of America.” The Senator expressed hope that the U.S. and China could overcome the short-term impasses over such issues as trade and intellectual property and could have a “long-term harmonious relationship”

Assistant Secretary Gregson followed Coons with a similar hope. “Together,” he said, “the U.S. and China can build a new century of global prosperity, and the time to begin is now…both countries have a great deal to gain from cooperation.”

Gregson highlighted the importance of the Pacific region, which is home to 15 of the world’s 20 largest ports, including nine in China. Five of the world’s seven largest standing armies (China, North Korea, South Korea, India, and Pakistan) are there as well. “China sits at a fulcrum,” said Gregson.

The Assistant Secretary outlined the three pillars of the U.S. approach to China:

  1. An effort to sustain and strengthen bilateral cooperation;
  2. An effort to strengthen relations with other Asian allies;
  3. And that a rising China should abide by global norms and international laws.

He noted that China’s military build-up, which has often been less than transparent, has raised real concerns. “This type of military build-up far exceeds China’s defensive needs,” he said. “We call upon China to become more transparent. We are not asking for an unreasonable degree of disclosure. Just enough to allow all parties to avoid miscalculation.”

Professor Nye, author of a new book entitled The Future of Power (about how power is transitioning from the West to the East, and from state to non-state actors), spent a few minutes musing on a question he posed: “Can the rise of China be peaceful?”

Referencing Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War and the rise of Germany in the early 20th Century, Nye noted that the rise of a new power often provokes fear from rivals, and “if we fear too much it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.” Referencing FDR, Nye argued the more apt position to take with China was that “the greatest thing we should fear is fear itself.”

“There is a rise in Chinese power, but a mistake to over-estimate it,” said Nye. “The size of China’s economy and our economy may be equal in size by 2030, but they will not be equal in composition, and per capita income will only be 1/3 of our per capita income.”

Fallows, who spent four years living in China and has written about his experiences in Postcards from Tomorrow Square: Reports from China (and is writing another book about China), argued that in most respects, the fundamental arrangement and consensus between the U.S. and China has been remarkably stable for the last 30 years: It’s better to work together than as enemies; China’s prosperity need not be at the direct expense of the United States; and there are going to be real disagreements.

As for America’s perceived sense of decline in the face of a rising China, “The central thing here is that the issues that matter to America’s viability have nothing to do with China,” said Fallows. “They would be identical if China did not exist. The greatest concerns are the functionality of the political system.”

Chase, who has written three memos on China’s military for PPI, noted that one of the challenging things about assessing China’s military prowess is that the military hasn’t been involved in a hot war since 1979 (Vietnam). Chase recommended a path of working with China as well as building up our military capacity to match China’s possible threats.

The event concluded with a question about climate change, which will probably be the most pressing challenge that the U.S. and China will have to solve. Nye noted that China has now surpassed the U.S. in greenhouse gas emissions. Fallows put it simply: “There is either a collaborative strategy of the U.S. and China, or no hope at all.”

What a “Responsible Transition” in Afghanistan Should Look Like

Friday, December 10th, 2010
Jordan Michael Smith



Jordan Michael Smith is writing a book on U.S.-Israeli relations. He’s written for The Atlantic, The Boston Globe and Foreign Policy

by Jordan Michael Smith

The Center for New American Security (CNAS) just released a new report on the way forward in Afghanistan. As the report’s title indicates, “Responsible Transition” calls for the United States to hand over responsibility for security to the Afghans over the next few years. The plan involves leaving 25-35,000 U.S. troops behind to defeat Afghanistan, with the rest withdrawn by 2014. “Responsible Transition” also calls for America to put more pressure on Pakistan to crack down on extremists.

CNAS’s plan to scale down the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is a wise one, recognizing as it does that “all options are likely to be suboptimal” but a long-term nation-building project is particularly suboptimal. But it seems wishful thinking that more pressure on Pakistan coming from the Obama administration will do what nine years of pressure haven’t already: convince Pakistan to expel the Taliban and any other troublemakers from its territory. As long as Pakistan knows we need it more than it needs us, it can take U.S. money while doing little.

Moreover, as Michael Cohen points out, CNAS’s report entirely sidesteps the thorny issue of talking with the Taliban. This is a key issue, since the Taliban have deep roots in the Pashtun community. Any long-term peace is going to have to include elements of the Taliban, as the administration sometimes seems to realize.

A more realistic plan would be something along the lines of what the Afghanistan Study Group and the Center for American Progress have recommended. Encouraging political reconciliation must be at the forefront of U.S.’s strategy going forward, not simply an afterthought. Military operations will have to take a backseat to diplomacy and politics if long-term progress is going to be made. Deal-making will have to include bargains with the Taliban, unsavoury though that prospect is. There simply is no other way to bring a modicum of stability to the troubled region unless the Taliban are made a part of some power-sharing agreement.

It’s a positive sign that the gang at CNAS recognizes that a sizable U.S. footprint in Afghanistan is unsustainable. As the strongest boosters of large-scale counterinsurgency approaches, CNAS has an important role to play in forming a strategy that focuses primarily–and eventually, exclusively–on preventing terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland. That should always be the top priority. When the Obama administration releases its Afghanistan review next week, let’s hope it agrees.

What China’s Strong Arm Tactics Don’t Buy

Thursday, December 9th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Beijing has arm-twisted nineteen countries to not send representatives to tomorrow’s Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Oslo.  At issue is the honoree, Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese political prisoner whose views on human rights and democracy don’t jive particularly with the Chinese Communist Party’s.  Imagine that.

On the surface, Beijing’s deft deployment of “soft power” seems impressive: to keep nineteen countries from attending supporting democratic movements is impressive. “Soft power,” as Harvard professor Joe Nye explains in an October Washington Quarterly article, is an area where Beijing is just coming into its own.

But Nye also points out that Chinese soft power has limits:

It is not easy for governments to sell their country’s charm if their narrative is inconsistent with domestic realities. In that dimension, except for its economic success, China still has a long way to go.

Such is the case with the Nobel event.  Let’s examine the nineteen no-shows, and their political and press rankings from 2009 by Freedom House, the NGO that tracks these sorts of things:

Country Political Status Freedom of the press status
Afghanistan Not Free Not Free
China Not Free Not Free
Colombia Partly Free Partly Free
Cuba Not Free Not Free
Egypt Not Free Partly Free
Iran Not Free Not Free
Iraq Not Free Not Free
Morocco Partly Free Not Free
Pakistan Partly Free Not Free
Russia Not Free Not Free
Saudi Arabia Not Free Not Free
Serbia Free Partly Free
Sudan Not Free Not Free
The Philippines Partly Free Partly Free
Tunisia Not Free Not Free
Ukraine Free Partly Free
Venezuela Partly Free Not Free
Vietnam Not Free Not Free

Yikes.  Only two unfettered “free”’s in the lot. In other words, as Nye acutely observes: ‘[I]f the authoritarian growth model produces soft power for China in authoritarian countries, it does not produce attraction in democratic countries. In other words, what attracts in Caracas may repel in Paris.”  How spot-on.

And if you’re interested in hearing it straight from the horse’s mouth, come see Joseph Nye, Under Secretary Michele Flournoy, Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) and a host of others talk about these issues at a PPI panel discussion on China, next Tuesday, December 14th in DC.  Click here to see the invite and RSVP.

Photo credit: Adam

RIP Steve Solarz

Tuesday, November 30th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

The democratic cause lost an eloquent and effective champion yesterday when former Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.) succumbed to cancer at age 70.

Over nine terms in the House of Representatives, Steve distinguished himself as one of that body’s preeminent spokesman on international affairs. He understood that the foundational principle of a liberal foreign policy – what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. called its “fighting faith” – is implacable opposition to tyranny. And he applied that principle with unswerving consistency, backing Eastern Europe’s bid for freedom from its Soviet overlord, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and democratic reformers challenging pro-American autocrats in the Phillipines and South Korea.

We at PPI drew inspiration from Steve and were proud to count him as a friend and sometime contributor to our work. See his chapter in our 2006 book, With All Our Might, in which he argued presciently that Pakistan is the pivotal battleground in America’s fight against al Qaeda and Islamist extremism in general.

Finally Steve was a staunch backer of the National Endowment of Democracy, serving on its Board and receiving its Democracy Service Medal in 2001.

Losing Patience in Pakistan

Wednesday, October 27th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

At last, some good news from Afghanistan: The New York Times reported last week that U.S. and Afghan forces are “routing” the Taliban in Kandahar province. In the northwest, Special Operations forces and air strikes have taken a heavy toll on insurgent commanders and “shadow governors,” according to The Washington Post.

These tactical gains are impressive. But they also spotlight the weakest link in our strategic chain, and no, it’s not Afghanistan’s mercurial leader, Hamid Karzai, or the corrupt and feckless central government. It’s Pakistan.

President Obama’s surge seems to be taking hold, but coalition forces can’t break the insurgency’s back as long as Pakistan continues to provide a sanctuary for the Taliban and allied terrorist groups.

Aided by better intelligence and a highly accurate new mobile rocket, in addition to more troops, coalition forces have successfully targeted Taliban leaders and driven insurgents from strongholds they have long held in Kandahar. The onslaught apparently has demoralized some Taliban foot soldiers, who are said to resent their high command for urging them to stand and fight from the relative safety of Pakistan.

U.S. officials say they are under no illusion of crushing the insurgency altogether, but they hope that, by inflicting heavy losses, they can turn the tide and induce top Taliban leaders to enter into peace negotiations with the Afghan government.

But there’s a problem: insurgent leaders are slipping over the border to Pakistan, where they can regroup for new attacks, or simply wait for NATO forces to leave. Says Gen. David Petraeus, “There is quite relentless pressure. It forces them on the run. But again, if you don’t take away the safe haven, it doesn’t have a lasting effect.”

And the Quetta Shura, whose leader, Mullah Omar, was so hospitable to al Qaeda when the Taliban ran Afghanistation, continues to orchestrate and finance the insurgency from Pakistan with impunity. If the United States and NATO are to permanently weaken the Taliban and force them to the negotiating table, that has to change.

Zalmay Khalilzad, a former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, argues that Pakistan’s double game threatens to prolong America’s costly intervention. On the one hand, Pakistan is an indispensible partner: it supplies the main supply routes for coalition forces, and tacitly colludes with drone strikes against al Qaeda and Taliban targets. On the other, Pakistan gives sanctuary not only to the Quetta Shura and but also the notorious Haqqani terrorist network, whose ties with Pakistani intelligence go back to the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s military leaders, he says, “believe that our current surge will be the last push before we begin a face-saving troop drawdown next July. They are confident that if they continue to frustrate our military and political strategy – even actively impede reconciliation between Kabul and Taliban groups willing to make peace – pro-Pakistani forces will have the upper hand in Afghanistan after the United States departs.”

Khalilzad is right: the United States can’t allow our supposed ally to subvert our strategic goals in Afghanistan. Yet just last week, the administration announced a new $2 billion military aid package to Pakistan. This comes on top of a five-year, $7.5 billion civilian aid package for Pakistan approved last year.

This is the kind of thing that gives engagement a bad name. We need a more challenging approach: The United States should demand that Pakistan break decisively with Islamist terrorist groups and not allow its territory to be used as a staging point for attacks on its neighbor. If Pakistan refuses, we should target insurgent havens anyway and freeze aid. If it complies, we should make a long-term commitment to strengthening Pakistan’s economic and governing institutions, and to mediating regional conflicts.

U.S. officials have been reluctant to put too much pressure on Pakistan to act against the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban leadership. They don’t want to undermine the democratically elected government of President Asi Ali Zardari, or risk alienating Pakistan’s military and intelligence services, which are cooperating in the U.S. campaign against al Qaeda.  But Pakistan already has demonstrated the military ability to reclaim tribal areas when it suited its purpose.  Up until now, Pakistan has tried to have it both ways: help America fight al Qaeda, while retaining ties to terrorist groups to influence future events in Afghanistan (and to keep the pot boiling in Kashmir). Such ambivalence collides with America’s strategic interest, and it’s time for Pakistan to choose.

How to Prosecute an American Jihadist

Thursday, October 14th, 2010
Matthew Dahl



Matt Dahl is a judicial clerk in Virginia and writes about national security law on his blog. The views expressed here are his own.

by Matthew Dahl

How should the United States handle the case of an American citizen encouraging jihadist-style violence against his countrymen?  It’s easy for the US to launch Predator drone strikes against foreign al Qaeda members in holed up in Pakistan, but what legal precautions are necessary when other Americans are in the Predator’s crosshairs?  This is the twisted legal issue at the heart Anwar al-Aulaqi, the American cleric based in Yemen who has served as the ideological inspiration behind the Ft. Hood and Christmas Day attacks (amongst others).

Back in January, the government added Anwar al-Aulaqi  to a “kill list” that authorized the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command to target him with lethal action. In August, the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a suit seeking to stop the US government from lethally targeting Anwar al-Aulaqi. This case was filed on behalf of al-Aulaqui’s father, on the grounds that al-Aulaqui is an American citizen.  And furthermore, the complaint argues, the executive branch decision to place him on the “kill list” without judicial oversight allegedly violates his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.

The government has filed a brief seeking to dismiss the case on several grounds: That al-Aulaqi’s father is not the proper party to file the suit (only al-Aulaqi can); that the judicial system has no power to second-guess the executive branch on this call; and that arguing this might expose top secret information.

The government’s arguments are solid.  And to be clear: there is no doubt that al-Aulaqi poses a threat to national security by promoting violence against Americans.

However, there are important practical and legal issues here: Many would argue that the federal government cannot simply kill an American citizen without regard to the citizen’s Constitutional rights, which have no greater value to a citizen than when they protect him from his government’s ability to take his life.   Further, as the complaint notes, the decision to place al-Aulaqi on the kill list was made with no judicial process at all.

What to do? Should there be a special process to deal with a dangerous jihadist inspirer like al-Aulaqi?

Yes.  The legal framework for the process could be partially adopted from national security litigation procedures that already exist, such as the Guantanamo Bay habeas corpus cases. The process should be as expedited as quickly possible, and should require the government to show a judge that a person poses an imminent threat to the national security of the United States.  It should also have to prove that it has exhausted all other means of resolving the situation and that lethal action is the only viable option left.  The hearing can be closed off to the public so that classified information will be protected.

Providing the accused with some form of representation is difficult because those like al-Aulaqi will be inaccessible, hiding in a foreign country. But an attorney representing the target’s interests should be present to make sure that the process is balanced.  This could be done with military JAG officers or through a stable of civilian attorneys with top secret clearances.

Photo credit: Clyde Robinson

Blair: Fight Extremist Narrative

Friday, October 8th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

Some Democrats tune out Tony Blair not only because he backed the invasion of Iraq, but because he committed the unpardonable sin of articulating the case for war far more convincingly than George W. Bush.

That’s too bad, because Britain’s ex-prime minister has some important things to say about the conflict formerly known as the “war on terror.” On this issue, in fact, the Obama administration could use a dose of Blairite clarity and candor.

Blair was in New York this week to accept the “Scholar-Statesman” award from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. In his acceptance speech, he argued that the United States and the “civilized world” must combat not just al Qaeda, but also the extremist ideology that inspired the 9/11 attacks:

“I do not think it is possible to defeat the extremism without defeating the narrative that nurtures it. And there’s the rub. The practitioners of the extremism are small in number. The adherents of the narrative stretch far broader into parts of mainstream thinking.”

This inconvenient truth highlights a critical vacuum in U.S. counterterrorism policy. While the Obama administration has ramped up the military campaign to oust al Qaeda from Afghanistan (and pound its sanctuaries in Pakistan), it has been less successful in checking the spread of the Islamist doctrine, which casts Muslims as victims of western oppression and disrespect.

Blair believes western efforts to blunt the force of the extremist narrative by apologizing for policies, such as support for Israel, are counterproductive. They undercut rather than fortify the position of Muslim moderates, and they provoke a backlash from western publics against what’s seen as pandering to extremists.

Although he was too diplomatic to say so, Blair’s call for confronting the extremist narrative head-on challenges current U.S. policy.

President Obama has wisely retired the “war on terror” language he inherited from his predecessor. As Reza Aslan has noted, Bush’s relentlessly martial rhetoric lent credence to the idea that the United States was locked in a “cosmic war” with Islam. By narrowing the focus to al Qaeda (and its Taliban protectors in Afghanistan), Obama has sought to reassure both foreign and domestic audiences that the United States is drawing careful distinctions and not making unnecessary enemies.

So far, so good. But even if we demolished what’s left of al Qaeda tomorrow, our problems wouldn’t be over. Its ideology already has migrated to affiliates in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and elsewhere, which have adopted the same gruesome tactics of suicide bombers and mass casualty attack. And while their victims are mostly Muslims, as Blair noted, too many in the Muslim world seem sympathetic to their narrative of victimhood, if not their methods.

This ambivalence was captured perfectly by one of a group of Somalians from Virginia captured in Pakistan. He said, in effect, we’re not terrorists, we’re jihadists come to help our fellow Muslims defend themselves against western aggression.

So Tony Blair is, as the Brits say, spot on. To reduce the threat of terrorist attacks, the United States must wage a two-track fight. One is the military campaign to disrupt and destroy al Qaeda. The other should be a “whole of government” effort to counter the extremist narrative. I’ll have more to say in future posts about its key elements, but it starts by engaging directly with Muslim publics and by firmly rejecting the false premises of the extremist story.

Photo credit: Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Explaining the Europe Terror Alert

Tuesday, October 5th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

When the US State Department issued a terror alert for European travel this week, it raised the inevitable questions: Should I travel to Europe?  Where should I avoid?  Is this thing really serious?

To make sense of this alert, a history lesson is in order.

This history lesson takes us back to Christmas, 1988 in Frankfurt, West Germany. Back in the days before the classified interwebs, information didn’t flow particularly quickly between US government entities.  Photocopying and physical circulation were standard practices.  So, when something big came up, specific information might not be widely distributed.  Government workers weren’t exactly Tweeting it to one another on SIPRnet (the SECRET-level USG computer network).  It’s hard to believe, but back in the day, everyone didn’t know everything about each other all the time.

In the days before the holiday, the U.S. consulate in Frankfurt received vague threat information about a potential terrorist attack targeting American citizens.  The information didn’t state much, other than that the strike would emanate from Germany or possibly London.  The Regional Security Officer posted the threat information on a public bulletin board in the consulate, and many American government workers changed their Christmas travel plans.

As you’ve probably figured out by now, the travel warning turned out to be credible – the Lockerbie bombing of December 21, 1988 killed 190 American citizens, 270 total, traveling from London to JFK airport.  The flight had originated in Frankfurt, where the bomb was originally smuggled aboard.

While it was of course good that certain American government employees had avoided the catastrophe, a policy problem arose.  In short, there was a double standard in place:  Americans (and their families) who happened to work for the government in Frankfurt as everything from intelligence officers to economic advisors to custodians avoided the tragedy due only to their preferential position.  Americans elsewhere in Europe, whether in government or not, weren’t warned.

The resulting “No Double Standard” policy emerged.  Generally, it says that when the U.S. government receives what it deems credible threat information, it has a duty to alert all Americans, not just those who work for the government.  The State Department alert issued about travel to Europe over the weekend fulfills the “No Double Standard” requirement.

So, does this mean that the current intelligence is as specific as that which preceded the Lockerbie bombing?  No.  However, it does mean that the government has credible, but possibly vague, information about a possible attack.

What does “credible” mean, then?  Media reports indicate that the information was gleaned from an individual detained in Pakistan.  Based on his access to information, officials have assessed that his reporting likely contains a grain of truth – that a group of operatives is interested in conducting a Mumbai-style attack in Europe.

However, they do not know when, where, or – quite critically – how developed the plot is or whether the alleged plotters have the operational capability to pull something off.  Authorities just believe their source is telling the truth.

Issuing the alert also puts potential plotters on their heels – European security services’ guard is raised and targets will be harder to access, which might just dissuade an attack in the first place.

Bottom line is that U.S. and European governments have vague but credible information about a discussion of a terrorist plot.  Whether the alleged plotters are serious and capable of executing it is likely yet to be determined.  Issuing the alert is a legal requirement designed to raise awareness among the public at large, not necessarily an indication that a terrorist attack is certain to occur.

Photo credit:  Daniel Horacio Agostini

9/11, Nine Years Later: The Internet, the Koran, and the Need for Vocal Moderates

Friday, September 10th, 2010
Rachel Kleinfeld



Rachel Kleinfeld is the CEO of the Truman National Security Project.

by Rachel Kleinfeld

On September 11, 2001, I had just arrived in Bucharest for dissertation research. I was conducting an interview when the planes hit. As I ran around the city, trying to find a television with news in English to learn what was happening, a Turkish worker noticed my Jewish visage, stopped me in the street, and told me that the Jews had done it. The conspiracy theory only gained ground. A week later, as I walked to Bucharest’s old synagogue for Rosh Hashana services, I was harassed for the terrorist attack multiple times by passers-by.

Again it is Rosh Hashana, and again, September 11 looms – this time, with the backdrop of Koran-burning and anger at plans for a mosque.  As we step into a new year, I wonder what, if anything, has been learned. Prejudice against Muslims has grown in America.  We even have our own bin Laden – a Florida pastor who has decided that God wants him to burn the holy book of the Islamic “infidels.”

Did I just say that – comparing a pastor ekeing out a living selling furniture on e-bay, to the mastermind terrorist?  Yes. The pastor knows that his act will bring about the deaths of scores, if not hundreds or thousands, in sectarian violence from Afghanistan to Africa. The ripple effects will be felt in violence against Christian missionaries who have lived among the Afghan people for decades. It will be seen in violence against Christian communities living along the violent belt that marks the split between Christian and Muslim Africa. And it will be felt by the innocent Muslims who are caught in the inevitable backlash.

Twenty years ago, this would not have happened. A pastor leading a flock of fifty could indeed have decided to burn Korans – but no one would have known, outside, perhaps, of his townspeople. The internet’s ability to super-empower individuals, to spread YouTube videos to millions instantaneously, to fan the flames of a 24 hour news cycle hungry for controversy, has allowed a single man with the tiniest of pulpits to receive direct messages from the President of the United States and the General in charge of a distant theater of war. It is the same phenomenon that allowed Osama bin Laden to gain an international following while camped in Sudan, Afghanistan, and the borderlands of Pakistan.

The new media reality is not something we yet know how to handle. How can a country be responsible for every action of every person within its borders – when a single ideologue can catch fire and affect the deepest fibers of our foreign policy?  How can our leaders communicate when the same words are heard in radically different ways by voters at home and listeners abroad – and yet both listen to the same speeches?

But at least we, as a foreign policy community, are talking about what to do in this new media reality. There are other cultural shifts we are not acknowledging. One of the most significant is that we are living through another period of worldwide religious revival. Across all major religions, numbers are growing, and intensity of belief is deepening. The anomie and confusion of modern life pushes some to slow food and organic gardening, others to deepen their faith and intensify their search for a higher order. The effects of this spiritual revival are being felt in country after country, from America to Turkey. This deepening of faith causes fights within religions as much as between them. Ironically, if there is a clash of civilizations, Jones, the Florida pastor, and bin Laden would actually have more in common than the moderates within both Islam and Christianity.

But there is a crucial difference. Christian pastors from around the world have denounced Jones, loudly. He has received personal calls from the heads of other Christian groups—as well as the head of the former church he founded in Germany –  asking him not to desecrate the Koran. Our countries’ political leaders have spoken against his actions in the most public of fora – and so have those within his faith. There are terrific Muslim organizations that also condemn violence within their religion. They need to be helped by those within their faith. They need to be joined by politicians and others within Islam, who are the only ones with standing to effectively speak against the violence in their own ranks. The difference in tone and denunciation between Jones and bin Laden is striking – and disturbing, nine years after 9/11.

As a Jew, I have my own tribe, my own faith and beliefs. But as a Jew with a particularly Jewish-looking mug, I know enough to be worried by increasing religiosity that is married to increasing intolerance. The internet is super-empowering the world’s most intolerant leaders, and as the current religious revival continues, this trend is only going to get worse. It is going to continue to be a particular problem in Islam, until moderates feel strongly enough to speak out just as unequivocally and publicly as Christians are condemning Jones. It’s time we, as a foreign policy community, look this reality in the eye, and address it directly.

Photo credit: rutty’s photostream