Posts Tagged ‘ Palestine ’

Obama’s Two Most Pro-Israel Speeches You Haven’t Heard About

Sunday, May 29th, 2011
Josh Block



Josh Block is a senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, a partner in Davis-Block LLC (a strategic consulting and public affairs company he co-founded with Lanny Davis), and a fellow at the Truman National Security Project. He was previously the spokesman for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and for the State Department's U.S. Agency for International Development during the Clinton Administration.

by Josh Block

Football, they say, is a game of inches.  So too, is Middle East peace making — both figuratively, and in some cases quite literally.  President Obama was reminded of that last week when his comments about terms of reference for future Israel-Palestinian peace negotiations provoked a significant public debate, and in some cases, a furious reaction.

Many Republicans – some acting out of purely political motives – and many Democrats, myself included – acting out of genuine concern – reacted quickly and negatively when President Obama adopted as American policy on Israeli-Palestinian peace talks what had previously been described by this Administration as a “Palestinian goal”– that is, a Palestinian state “based on the 1967 lines, with mutually agreed swaps.”

In the view of some, including the White House, that statement was not new U.S. policy.  Those views assert that negative reactions suggesting otherwise “misrepresented” the president’s statement, or perhaps more importantly, his intended meaning.

But as we know, when it comes to issues about Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict, nuance matters.  This is a place where inches count.

Reaction to that one passage in the “Winds of Change” address, and the media’s almost singular focus on the matter, overshadowed what was one of the most important and impressive speeches of President Obama’s tenure. And in the end it was only a handful of missing words, representing real-world American commitments that were at the heart of the commotion.

There was so much to celebrate in his address: From the soaring and inspiring vision of a boundless future of prosperity for billions of people across the Middle East who have never known freedom, to the impressive and important commitments to Israel’s security, and to America’s determination to stand up for its values and interests in defeating efforts to isolate and delegitimize Israel at the United Nations and beyond.

In fact, an address that was billed as a landmark speech about change in the Arab world was one of the President’s most impressive and pro-Israel addresses of his presidency.

But you’d probably never know that. And that’s a shame.

By saying that an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal should be based on the 1967-lines with mutually agreed swaps, but omitting the next key phrase – “that take into account demographic changes and realities on the ground” – it was by just a few inches that the president missed the goal line of putting his statement in line with a half century of his predecessors.

It was the vagueness of his remarks, and the omission of a key few words, which necessarily go hand-in-hand, that caused so much alarm.

The truncated phrase was treated with great significance, because this Administration has consistently declined to affirm the validity of a 2004 official letter of commitments from President Bush on behalf of the United States to the Prime Minister in Israel, in which among other key commitments, the U.S. reaffirmed its promise to ensure that Israel would have “defensible borders” distinct from the 1967 lines that would accommodate demographic changes and reality on the ground – ie, major Israeli population centers in the  West Bank.

Furthermore, despite the president’s repeated calls for a Jewish State, he has yet to embrace the position taken and assurance provided by Presidents Clinton and Bush that under any final peace accord, the refugee question will be addressed within the borders of a Palestinian State, and not Israel.

Had the Obama Administration previously embraced that letter and those critical U.S. promises, there would have been not nearly the outcry.

But that inexplicable breakdown, seeming to call into question America’s commitment to assurances made in writing by an American president to the State of Israel, codified by Congress, and endorsed in the Clinton Parameters of January 2001, laid the groundwork for the stinging reaction to the President’s incomplete reference to the ’67 lines.

In that context, like Tonto to the Lone Ranger, the Israelis were left asking, ‘What do you mean by swaps, Kimosabe?’

A few days later, President Obama gave another speech on the Middle East, this time even more pro-Israel, but once again, you may not know that, either.

Among the important things President Obama made clear in his second address on the Middle East at the AIPAC policy conference, was that, indeed, he agreed with his predecessors, Presidents Bush and Clinton, that any changes on the ground in a peace agreement must reflect today’s demographic realities and Israel’s unique security needs.  His statements on that matter put him firmly in-line with American leaders going back to the 1960s, when President Johnson first established America’s policy that no one could expect Israel to go back to its indefensible 1949/1967 lines.

Why does that matter?  History and perspective, of course. Consider the Israeli perspective: In the 1967 Six-Day War, in which Israel survived a miraculous third attempt by a combined force of Arab armies to ‘drive the Jews into the sea’, the nascent Jewish state made important territorial gains.

The city of Jerusalem, after 19 years of Jordanian rule that suppressed freedom of worship for Jews and Christians, was liberated and reunified. The West Bank, known for millennia and in the Old Testament as Judea and Samaria, was brought back into contact with the rest of Israel. The Golan Heights, for years a launching pad from which the Syrian army terrorized Israeli towns, was won in an epic and heroic battle. And the Sinai Desert and Gaza Strip, soon to be offered to Egypt in exchange for peace, were conquered.

Like the Sun rises, Russia and other Arab allies at the United Nations pressed their condemnations of Jewish State.  In a typically hypocritical move targeting Israel, some in the world body demanded that for the first time in history land won in a defensive war be fully returned to the aggressors.

The United States – defending its ally Israel, our interests in the region, and basic fairness – rejected that approach. Our elected leaders understood that it was the very indefensible boundaries of 1949/67 encouraged Arab aggression and dreams of destroying the Jewish State and the Jewish People.  The United States understood that Israel could not ever be expected or pressured to go back to what became know as ‘the Auschwitz borders.’ That is why America fought so hard to ensure that UN Resolution 242 specifically did not force Israel had to relinquish all of the land it had captured in its war of self-defense, did not force Israel back to indefensible borders and need not exchange territory in a one-to-one ratio.

That is the diplomatic tradition many feared the president was undermining, at a time when Israel is under threat from a genocidal Hezbollah to the north, an unstable Egypt and Syria to its south and northeast, and a Hamas/Fatah unity government that seems ready to abandon the peace process on multiple fronts. The Palestinians rushed to enshrine the president’s position as new preconditions for talks.

But they’re likely to be disappointed. The president made it clear during his second AIPAC speech that he is aligned with those decades of American diplomacy stretching back to the U.S. stand on UNSC 242. That is precisely the diplomatic tradition that the President embraced during his AIPAC speech, a clarification that – again – has been under-appreciated by some.

Perhaps realizing that his first remarks were incomplete and left an impression he had not intended, President Obama, in his speech to AIPAC, built on the pro-Israel foundation of his Winds of Change Address, not only completing the thought he’d begun the prior week, but expanding on several themes in praise-worthy ways.

President Obama powerfully restated in emphatic and unmistakable terms how strenuously the United States will oppose Palestinian efforts to attain unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state in the absence of peace and an end to all claims.  This clear leadership stance, and the president’s forceful denunciation of efforts to delegitimatize and isolate Israel are deeply appreciated and underscore the President’s commitment to safeguarding the Jewish state.

Notable was the President’s statement that Israel cannot be expected to negotiate with Hamas, which he rightly called a terrorist organization.  His explicit call once again for the Iranian proxy to meet the quartet conditions – recognizing Israel and its right to exist, renouncing violence, and accepting prior agreements between the PA and Israel, was fundamentally important, and ensures that Hamas must fundamentally change, or else remain a pariah.

The President also explicitly signaled his support for a long-term, but not permanent, Israeli military and security presence in the Jordan Valley.   This stance is vital, and like his effort to align administration policy with administrations past, is not just commendable, but significant.  And in both speeches, the President stressed not only “ironclad” American support for Israel’s security, but insisted that a future Palestinian state be demilitarized.

His remarks on issues beyond the narrow question of the Israel-Arab dispute are also vitally important – in particular, Iran.  Again, President Obama said clearly and unequivocally that Iran cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons and that it is American policy to prevent them from doing so.

Both speeches were strongly pro-Israel in the broadest sense.  From the President’s vision of a Middle East made up of progressive Arab states more focused on investing in their own human capital and building tolerant, prosperous societies – rather than scapegoating Israel, to his embrace of Israel and its future as a Jewish state with peaceful neighbors, there is much to appreciate.  It’s time to say so.

Photo credit: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Obama’s Perplexing Speech

Friday, May 20th, 2011
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

President ObamaPresident Obama made the cardinal mistake yesterday of stepping on his own message. His “winds of change” speech was supposed to formalize an historic shift in U.S. policy toward the Middle East. Instead, Obama managed to put the spotlight on the one thing in the region that seems impervious to change: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Grabbing the headlines were a set of new principles Obama introduced late in his speech for reframing stalled peace negotiations. His call for Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders drew a swift rebuke from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, with whom Obama meets today at the White House. Merits aside, the controversy over this oddly-timed change in U.S. policy has overshadowed the new doctrine the president meant to announce to the world: America henceforth will back reform and democracy in the region.

Conservatives predictably have hailed this as no change at all, merely a restatement of George W. Bush’s “freedom agenda” for the Middle East. But there’s a crucial difference: the impetus for economic and political change in the region is now coming from the ground up – from its long-suffering people, not from Washington. In fact, by defusing tensions between the United States and the Muslim world, Obama probably made it easier for indigenous movements seeking freedom and democracy to arise in the region.

The Arab revolt is widely seen as legitimate because it is not, in fact, an American project.  Obama made clear in his speech that Washington is catching up to events in the Middle East, not leading them.

It’s odd that no one in the White House thought to apply the same lesson to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. If the parties to the conflict aren’t themselves motivated to make peace, no amount of outside pressure from the United States, nor any set of innovative “parameters” for negotiations imported from Washington will break the deadlock.

Unfortunately, the flap over Obama’s apparent revision of long-standing U.S. policy toward the conflict reinforces the myth – fostered by Arab dictators and the many U.S. Middle East experts who have invested their careers in peace processing – that Israeli occupation of Arab lands is the region’s core “problem.” Yet the region’s long-suffering people are writing a new narrative that focuses not on Israel, but on the corrupt and despotic rulers who have smothered their aspirations for individual dignity, economic opportunity, and self-determination.

In aligning U.S. policy with these aspirations, Obama ended the bankrupt policy of propping up friendly autocrats. He also restored the missing “d” in his strategic trinity of defense, diplomacy and development – democracy.

The president reaffirmed his view that Muammar Qaddafi must go, and he had suitably harsh words for Iran’s clerical dictatorship, which is intensifying its repression to keep an increasingly restive society under wraps. For consistency’s sake, Obama insisted that pro-U.S. rulers in Yemen and Bahrain share power and respect minority rights, respectively. These, however, are easy cases – too easy. Obama said not a word about the difficult problem of managing U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia, which for good reason feels deeply threatened by the uprisings sweeping the region.

Obama also struck a jarringly false note in urging Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad to “lead the transition, or get out of the way.” This formulation reflects the weirdly persistent illusion among U.S. policy makers that Assad, who inherited his dictatorship, can somehow be transformed into an agent of democratic reform. In many ways, Assad is worse than his father. He turned Syria into a prime transit point for suicide terrorists en route to kill Americans and civilians in Iraq; he has subverted democracy in Lebanon and funneled arms to Hezbollah and Hamas; and, he has made Syria a virtual satrap of Iran. The administration has announced sanctions on Assad and other Syrian leaders responsible for the bloody crack-down on demonstrators, but America’s interests clearly lie with regime change in Damascus.

Despite such qualms, Obama’s speech at last has aligned America’s values with its long-run interests in the political and economic modernization of the wider Middle East. It’s a shame, though, that this strategic pivot has been obscured by a perplexing and ill-timed attempt to resuscitate Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

Back to Jaw Jaw in the Middle East

Monday, August 23rd, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

It took a lot of arm-twisting, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced last week that Israel and the Palestinians have agreed to return to the bargaining table. The Obama administration’s faith in the power of diplomacy, which some consider misplaced, is about to face its sternest test.

It’s not hard to find grounds for pessimism. For one thing, Palestinian President President Mahmoud Abbas agreed to participate only under heavy U.S. pressure. He had to give up his demand that Israel continue the freeze on settlements as a precondition for talks, though the “Quartet” (the U.S., Europe, Russia and the United Nations) cooked up a face-saving declaration last Friday.

The agenda for negotiations has been left intentionally vague, so as to give neither side a pretext for refusing to participate. Somehow, the dynamic of face-to-face talks itself is supposed to lead to a peace deal over the next 12 months. Yet there’s been little change in the internal political realities – the West Bank/Gaza split and Netanyahu’s dependence on right-wing coalition partners to govern – that have made this such an unpropitious time for a comprehensive peace settlement.

The operative theory here seems to be that U.S. can more effectively pressure both sides to make concessions – through “bridging proposals” – in the context of direct negotiations. For example, Netanyahu will more likely extend the moratorium on new settlements, lest he be accused of scuttling the talks. U.S. officials also believe that Netanyahu’s hard-liner credentials will make it easier for him to sell a skeptical Israeli public on any deal reached with the Palestinians.

It’s also widely assumed that Abbas needs to demonstrate that his relative moderation and support for a two-state solution can deliver concrete benefits to Palestinians. But if Yassir Arafat, who presided over a more unified Palestinian authority couldn’t bring himself to embrace a two-state deal, its hard to see how a far weaker Abbas can, especially with Hamas looking over his shoulder.

Nonetheless, it’s axiomatic in U.S. diplomatic circles that it’s always better to have the two sides talking than not. The absence of hope for a political solution leaves the field to the radical rejectionists: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran.

Maybe so, but two large doubts hang over the coming talks. First, it’s not clear, for either Netanyahu or Abbas, that perpetuating the status quo, for all its frustrations, is a riskier course than making difficult concessions on territory, refugees, the status of Jerusalem and other traditional sticking points. Second, it’s not evident that either leader, even if he thought such risks worth taking, could forge a domestic consensus for a peace deal. So why shove them together now?

The answer may have more to do with America’s efforts to combat radicalism and violent extremism in the region than any profound yearning for peace among Israelis and Palestinians. If so, it’s going to be a long year.

Photo credit: bulletsburning’s photostream

Israel’s National Mindset

Thursday, July 15th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

“Is America really Israel’s ally? You think so? We’re not so sure.” An Israeli Defense Force reservist said this to me during a post-dinner drink on a deck overlooking the captivating Sea of Galilee last week.

My response was curt — “You better start believing it. Otherwise, you’re screwed.” Okay, perhaps that wasn’t terribly “PC” and perhaps my tone did little to convince him. After all, my reservist friend wasn’t particularly predisposed towards diplomatic nuance — he opposed any peace deal whatsoever.

However, the sentiment he expressed — that Israel is alone, that it has been abandoned and that it can only count on itself — is deeply embedded in Israel’s national psyche. I’m not here to argue whether this world-view is correct, but like it or not, it’s important to recognize that it exists, and that it lies at the heart of many Israeli foreign policy decisions.

It was hardly just one IDF reservist that tingled my spidey-sense. A top-level Israeli ex-peace negotiator was even more explicit: “Are we paranoid? Yes.” The IDF soldier based along the “blue line” separating Israel and Lebanon believed what UNIFIL — the UN’s peacekeeping force along the border — was doing “is not sufficient” to protect Israel.

The former peace negotiator went on to recount a meeting with a well-known European newspaper’s editorial board. When the board asked what the Israeli government disliked about the newspaper’s writing style, he responded succinctly: “To be sure comma,” a phrase that typically starts the sentence that ends with, “Israel has the right to defend itself.”

That caveat –“To be sure, Israel has the right to defend itself” – is standard fare among American and European opinion columns that go on to criticize Israeli actions. From his perspective, that disclaim glosses over the threats Israel lives under — international terrorist groups in southern Lebanon and Gaza bent on firing rockets and sending suicide bombers into his country, coupled with the stress of a perpetually unstable region, and Iran’s repeated threats of Israeli destruction. His point was: that in Washington, London or Paris, it’s easy to discount the seriousness (would it really make sense for Iran to attack?), scale and immediacy of these threats as these cities don’t live under them every day.

But in Israeli eyes, these threats loom larger. That’s what drove Israel’s unapologetic heavy hand in the 2nd Lebanon War, in Operation Cast Lead, and during the flotilla incident when so many Palestinian civilians were killed in the fighting. Israel is prepared to endure the resulting international condemnation, because civilian causalities and a soiled reputation are lesser evils when compared with looming national security threats, “It’s us or them, and I’d rather it be them. We can’t count on anyone else, so we’ll do it ourselves.”

In short, Israel is banking on military victories to create the appearance of invincibility. Israel reasons that, if the Arab countries believe they can defeat Israel militarily, why then would the Arabs be interested in a peace agreement. Yet that sentiment lands Israel in a catch-22 — if Israel appears militarily invincible, then why negotiate peace? The answer is, of course, that the longer conflict drags on, the higher the cost of appearing invincible will be — in lives, resources, and reputation.

Israel shouldn’t be given a pass for its heavy-handed actions, particularly ones that needlessly take the lives of innocent civilian bystanders. But understanding Israel’s conflicted inner-monologue is a critical component in brokering a lasting peace.

Photo credit: Hoyasmeg’s Photostream

Israeli Settlements in the West Bank: An Explainer

Tuesday, July 13th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Last Thursday morning, I was perched and staring at Tel Aviv in the distance to my left, Haifa to my right, and the vast Mediterranean Sea that seemed to separate them. My crow’s nest view was from a lookout point from the Israeli settlement of Alfei Menashe, which is situated clearly inside the West Bank and guarded by the controversial barrier that separates Israel from the Palestinian territories (I had to chose my words carefully there — the Israelis call it a “security fence” and the Palestinians have far less PC terms for it. In the name of impartiality, I’ll go with “controversial barrier.”)

Israeli settlements in the West Bank have been a lightening rod for criticism and division. The major settlement push took hold under Menachem Begin, Israel’s prime minister from 1977-83, who supported Israeli construction in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a way to consolidate Israel’s territorial gains in 1967′s Six Day War. In the present context, they’ve become a key issue as the Israelis and Palestinians negotiate peace — as Israelis continue to build new settlements or expand existing ones, it appears as though Israel’s government is interested only in tightening its grip on Palestinian territories, not giving them back.

Construction in and around Israeli settlements came to the forefront in George W. Bush’s 2003 “Roadmap for Peace,” which called for a “freeze on settlement expansion.” Ariel Sharon, Israeli prime minister at the time, suggested that such a freeze was impossible due to the need for settlers to build new houses and start families. The issue has remained controversial ever since.

Occasionally, this family issue has been falsely referred to as “natural settlement growth.” In reality, “natural growth” is completely different. Here’s how it works:  legal Israeli settlements are allotted a certain municipal boundary, but construction initially takes place on a small percentage of the designated land. “Natural growth” means that over time, the settlement expands to these full territorial boundaries. As construction continues, particularly for settlements deep on the West Bank, it certainly does look like an Israeli land grab.

In November, the Netanyahu government announced a 10-month moratorium on settlement construction, with an exemption for East Jerusalem. It’s due to be lifted in September.

The latest flare-up occurred during Vice President Joe Biden’s trip to Israel in March when the Israeli Interior Ministry announced the approval of construction of 1,600 new apartments in East Jerusalem. (NB: The Interior Ministry is headed by right-wing Shas Party member Eli Yishai, a rival to PM Netanyahu. The Interior Ministry’s announcement was likely designed to embarrasse Netanyahu during Biden’s visit.)

So, how do we sort this out? What’s the real concern with settlements, and how is the issue leveraged for political posturing?

The first thing to note is that certain settlement construction is more important (worrying) than others. Growth should only be highly controversial in settlement areas that will, one day, certainly be evacuated and turned over to Palestinian control.

If you look at a map of the West Bank, this includes the row of small settlements along the spine of the Jordan River and all those scattered in a seemingly random pattern throughout the heart of the territory. Jewish inhabitants in these locations number anywhere from a handful to a few thousand, and Israeli governments (yes, even those lead by Bibi) realize that they will not be part of Israel after a peace deal. Construction here in any form is unacceptable.

The biggest problem in this regard is Ariel, a settlement some ten miles behind the 1949 Green Line border. With about 80,000 Jewish residents living in relatively new apartment blocks that extend to its full municipal boundaries, both sides acknowledge moving them is probably more trouble than it’s worth. That’s why “new” construction in a place like Ariel technically isn’t that controversial–Ariel’s boundaries are firm, so construction won’t expand Ariel’s reach into the West Bank.  Most likely, Ariel will be walled off as a non-contiguous part of Israel (with some sort of a land-bridge to the “mainland”), just like Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia. Or Alaska from the US. Furthermore, a Palestinian state will be compensated with land elsewhere for Ariel.

Moreover, construction in many — though not all — of the settlements in East Jerusalem is less of a big deal than it seems. Certain settlements, like Alfei Menashe in the first paragraph of this post, will very likely become part of Israel in a peace deal. Settlements in Jerusalem, like the Gilo settlement in the city’s south, may indeed be over the Green Line, but it, like Ariel, is a well-developed community that has been considered a regular Jerusalem suburb for decades. It’s clear to both sides that Alfei Menashe and Gilo — communities that have reached their allotted territorial capacity and have no more room for “natural growth”– will become permanent parts of Israel in a peace deal, and, critically, that the Palestinian state will be compensated with land elsewhere.

In other words, continued construction in a place like Gilo is controversial only because it is symbolic and plays well in the media. In reality, building a new apartment block right in the middle of a settlement technically violates the general construction “freeze,” but in reality isn’t a strategic expansion. Even so, Vice President Biden must severely object to these letter-of-the-law violations because they smack of Israeli tone-deafness to this political sensitivity.

That means that when we hear of construction in settlements, we have to be careful to separate the acceptable-but-tone-deaf construction from the strategically unacceptable. Greater understanding of the strategic and tactical realities of settlements would help diffuse an intense public sensitivity to a highly complex issue.