Posts Tagged ‘ Terrorism ’

Will the Tax Compromise Stick?

Friday, December 10th, 2010
Ed Kilgore



Ed Kilgore is a PPI senior fellow, as well as managing editor of The Democratic Strategist, an online forum.

by Ed Kilgore

It’s been one of those weeks in Washington.  Just a few days ago, it appeared the tax deal between the president and Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell had broken the lame-duck session logjam, resolving the stickiest problem and paving the way for late-session action on issues like DADT and START.

Now votes on the tax deal have been pushed into next week amidst a resolution of disapproval by House Democrats, and the DADT repeal has lost a key Senate floor vote once again.

It’s hard to say whether the President’s very early signals that he’d be willing to strike a deal to avoid the expiration of Bush’s tax cuts made the ultimate liberal backlash more understandable or puzzling.  The only surprises in the final deal were the inclusion of a payroll tax holiday, the one stimulative proposal with significant support in both parties; extension of the enhanced EITC and child tax credits created in the 2009 stimulus package, a total concession to Democrats; and revisions in the resurrected federal estate tax—which didn’t exist in this calendar year—to create lower rates and higher exclusions than was the case before the Bush tax cuts first took place.

Some progressives (though not many) profess to oppose the payroll tax holiday on grounds that it’s part of a collateral attack on Social Security.  Some also express moral outrage over the proposed estate tax concessions, pointing out (quite properly) that they will have zero positive impact on investment and growth.  But the main complaint is that Obama never really went to the mats to defend the consensus Democratic opposition to high-end Bush tax cuts and their extension, and the main beef seems to be retroactive as much as prospective.

The tax-deal rebellion reflects gradually building liberal anger towards the Obama administration on topics ranging from the public option in health care to the unwillingness to pursue prosecution of Bush administration figures over civil liberties violations and treatment of terrorism suspects; the expansion of the U.S. troop commitment in Afghanistan; and above all, the President’s continuing protestations of bipartisanship.  Furious injunctions to the president to “fight” for progressive principles, regardless of the legislative consequences, have spread far beyond the blogosphere to a wide array of congressional Democrats.

What’s unclear at the moment is whether the House Democratic action represented just a symbolic measure that won’t get in the way of House approval of the tax deal next week, or a more serious protest that will require some sort of modifications in the package that progressives can claim as a trophy.  The latter contingency, of course, will give conservative Republicans a new excuse to walk away from the package and try to impose their own tax policies in the next Congress with their enhanced numbers.

In any event, the intra-Democratic rhetoric has grown so strong that it’s revived the immediate-post-election chattering classes talk about a primary challenge to Obama in 2012, with journalist Robert Kuttner being the most outspoken about dumping Obama lest he become the “Democrats’ Hoover,” and with anyone who defends the tax deal getting a lot of heat as a sell-out.

The most certain thing about the tax deal is that it has obliterated the attention that was being given to the Bowles-Simpson commission report and a variety of other deficit reduction proposals, even as the two parties appeared poised to approve measures that would create added deficits in the neighborhood of a trillion dollars.   The lack of resistance (so far) by Tea Party Movement figures is as good a sign as any that its alleged total focus on debts and deficits is, like that of the Republican Party it dominates, a mirage that quickly fades once high-end tax cuts are on the table.

In other words, deficit-talk seems most useful in Washington as a way for partisans to excoriate their opponents’ priorities—i.e., the Democratic resistance to “entitlement reform” and the Republican resistance to progressive taxation and restrained defense spending.  Actual concern on the topic, however, is harder to find, even at the end of a year where it’s rarely out of the headlines.

Overreactions to Terrorism Weaken Us

Tuesday, September 14th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Two good essays in the last few days reflect on America’s overreaction to terrorism. Ted Koppel, who in addition to having amazing hair, is one of this country’s most under-appreciated journalists. He writes:

Perhaps bin Laden foresaw some of these outcomes when he launched his 9/11 operation from Taliban-secured bases in Afghanistan. Since nations targeted by terrorist groups routinely abandon some of their cherished principles, he may also have foreseen something along the lines of Abu Ghraib, “black sites,” extraordinary rendition and even the prison at Guantanamo Bay. But in these and many other developments, bin Laden needed our unwitting collaboration, and we have provided it — more than $1 trillion spent on two wars, more than 5,000 of our troops killed, tens of thousands of Iraqis and Afghans dead. Our military is so overstretched that defense contracting — for everything from interrogation to security to the gathering of intelligence — is one of our few growth industries. …

If bin Laden did not foresee all this, then he quickly came to understand it. In a 2004 video message, he boasted about leading America on the path to self-destruction. “All we have to do is send two mujaheddin . . . to raise a small piece of cloth on which is written ‘al-Qaeda’ in order to make the generals race there, to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses.”

Fareed Zakaria, whose hair is less awesome but still pretty good, brings up the same issue:

This campaign to spread a sense of imminent danger has fueled a climate of fear and anger. It has created suspicions about U.S. Muslims — who are more assimilated than in any other country in the world. Ironically, this is precisely the intent of terrorism. Bin Laden knew he could never weaken America directly, even if he blew up a dozen buildings or ships. But he could provoke an overreaction by which America weakened itself.

Both are spot on and quickly shift the question to how to avoid overreacting.  Since much of the overreaction is born from political posturing (witness Pete Hoekstra’s bizarre comments in the wake of the Christmas Day attempt), it’s going to be tough.  How is any leader supposed to dismiss a charge that he’s not doing enough to keep the country safe?

Part of the solution is understanding the terrorist threat, and how successful our defensive measures will realistically be.  Zakaria’s column again hits the mark:  “[We] are not 100 percent safe, nor will we ever be. Open societies and modern technology combine to create a permanent danger.”

And while it is possible to contain the threat, permanently eliminating it is a long term project that must address terrorism’s root causes.  Beginning that national dialogue is a key to promote this understanding, which in turn, will calibrate more measured responses to terrorism.

Sustaining A New Dawn in Iraq

Thursday, September 9th, 2010
Joe Rice



Joe Rice is a Colonel in the US Army Reserve and has served four tours in Iraq. The views reflected are his own.

by Joe Rice

The Iraq War ended on August 31st. Did anyone notice?

You can be forgiven if you didn’t. Wars of the 21st century aren’t really marked with start and end dates. Such are the battlefields of counter-insurgency and of the struggle against terrorism.

But August 31st was still an important day. It did, in fact, begin a New Dawn — the name of the new American operation in Iraq.

The 50,000 US troops that are still in Iraq today, and tens of thousands more embassy staff, civilian officials, and security contractors are, beginning on September 1, 2010, part of Operation New Dawn. That is still quite a presence, but the change in terminology is more than symbolic.

We are still fighting battles in Iraq, and the Iraqi people are still bearing the brunt of the struggle to bring peace and stability to their country. But now U.S. forces are solely trainers and advisors.

But a more important role is not reflected in such titles. Simply having a U.S. presence brings peace to many Iraqis, and causes the more nefarious actors to proceed with caution. This is critical as the various factions continue to develop their ability to work together within the political system, and not outside of it.

But Iraqis are on a deadline. Unless Iraq requests a renegotiation of the Security Framework Agreement, all U.S. forces are required to leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. Yes, the embassy staff and an unknown number of private security contractors will remain, but the calming – and I do mean calming – influence of U.S. military forces will be gone.

Once the Iraqis finally form a new government from the elections that were held in March, our nation must be prepared to consider – at the request of the Iraqi government – a continued presence of U.S. military forces. Somewhere around 15-20,000 will likely be required to continue to help professionalize the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Police, and the officials that provide guidance and oversight to the Iraqi Security Forces.

Regardless of a potential Iraqi request for a continued U.S. military presence, we must expand the relationships between the American and the Iraqi peoples. It is not the military presence that builds the strongest lasting relationships, it is the person to person contact. That’s why the U.S. State Department must expand cultural and professional exchange programs, as they did to the newly emerging democracies of Eastern Europe following the Cold War. Doing so is not only in the best interests of the Iraqi people, but is also in the best interests of the United States. If Iraq is isolated, among other things, Iran’s influence is likely to increase.

Specifically, the State Department should support independent groups such as Sister Cities International in their efforts to facilitate vibrant cultural and educational programs between U.S. and Iraqi communities. To continue the professionalization of Iraqi Police, the State Department should facilitate the partnership of law enforcement agencies in the United States with those in Iraq.

This is hardly a new concept: Such efforts between the militaries of Eastern Europe and U.S. State National Guards are similar in scope and have been an unqualified success. Similar programs have been successful for nearly 20 years, helping developing countries with technical skills, human rights, and strengthened civilian oversight.

Given the many lives and the amount of money that the United States sacrificed during Operation Iraqi Freedom, we should make these small but crucial investments in Operation New Dawn.

Joe Rice is a Colonel in the US Army Reserve and has served four tours in Iraq. The views reflected are his own.

Hillary Rebuts the Declinists

Thursday, September 9th, 2010
Will Marshall



Will Marshall is the president of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Will Marshall

Among foreign policy mandarins here and abroad, it’s become axiomatic that America must radically downsize its global ambitions to avoid hubris and to match our straitened economic circumstances. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is having none of it.

In a speech this week to the Council on Foreign Relations, Clinton vigorously affirmed the world’s need for, and America’s capacity to provide, strong global leadership. Even in a multipolar world, she argued, no other nation has the unique combination of strengths necessary to organize collective action against common global problems.

And, at a time when moral relativism has crept into U.S. foreign policy discourse in the guise of realism, Clinton was refreshingly unapologetic in pledging U.S. support for the “universal” values of liberal democracy. As she had done in an important speech to the Community of Democracies in Krakow July 3, she noted that authoritarian governments are cracking down on independent civil society organizations, and she pledged U.S. assistance to embattled NGOs.

Clinton’s confident assertion of a “new American moment” is in striking contrast to narrative of U.S. decline now fashionable among global elites. The story goes something like this:

As the Cold War ended, the U.S. found itself the last superpower standing, its system of democratic capitalism triumphant — and quickly succumbed to hubris. It intervened in conflicts all over the globe, rashly plunged into unnecessary wars, drank the elixir of free market ideology, and in general overestimated its ability to shape events and impose its will on others. Now we are overextended and facing a global backlash against U.S. imperialist pretensions.

What’s more, we’re broke and can no longer afford to maintain our old position as global hegemon. Meanwhile, economic dynamism has shifted eastward, and the rapid growth of China, India and others is fundamentally altering the world’s balance of power.

All this Spenglerian gloom points to an inescapable conclusion: America must retrench strategically. This entails defining our interests more narrowly, shrinking our military, ceasing to lecture others about democracy, and shedding the too-costly burdens of global leadership.

Clinton instead argued essentially for updating the liberal internationalist vision for today’s interconnected world. She stressed the need for America to once again be the chief “architect” of cooperative institutions, at both the regional and global level, for providing mutual security and prosperity, tackling underdevelopment and climate change, and defending human rights (with her customary special emphasis on women’s equality). Through such interlacing institutions, she said, the burden of providing “public goods” could be spread more broadly.

She also widened the definition of the Obama administration’s policy of “engagement.” In addition to engaging adversaries and rivals diplomatically, she stressed her determination to engage directly with the people and foreign publics in general.

Less convincing was her account of U.S. efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear program. Our engagement with China and Russia, she said, paid real political dividends when the U.S. Security Council last spring passed, “the strongest and most comprehensive set of sanctions ever on Iran. ”

True, but Iran’s continued intransigence suggests the limits of multilateral diplomacy more than its effectiveness. The underlying assumption that Tehran is eager to be welcomed back into the world community overlooks the regime’s self-conception as a revolutionary Islamist theocracy and challenger of the international status quo.

In a curious omission, Clinton had little to say about terrorism amid all the architectural metaphors. While al Qaeda may be holed up in Pakistan, its ideology has spread to affiliates in Iraq and, more recently, in Somalia and Yemen, where the gruesome pattern of suicide attacks and mass murder of civilians is more and more evident.

Containing this ideological contagion is of critical importance to the United States and to its vision of a world order upheld by a growing network of liberal democratic institutions. Let’s hope we hear more from the Administration on this subject soon.

Terrorism, Material Support and the First Amendment

Tuesday, July 6th, 2010
Matthew Dahl



Matt Dahl is a judicial clerk in Virginia and writes about national security law on his blog. The views expressed here are his own.

by Matthew Dahl

There is no freedom more sacrosanct in the U.S. legal system than the First Amendment right to free speech. The First Amendment protects speech that a lot of people may find offensive: pornography, violent movies, even hate speech. The Supreme Court is fiercely protective of the right, and does not hesitate to strike down any law that encroaches on it. However, on June 21, the Supreme Court departed from that stance when it handed down its decision in a case challenging maybe the most important anti-terrorism law in the U.S. arsenal.

The case, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, concerned a federal law commonly referred to as the “material support” statute. The law criminalizes a range of activities aimed at helping terrorist groups. The plaintiffs in the case are a collection of groups and individuals who sued the federal government to declare the “material support” statute unconstitutional as it applies to their activities with respect to two known terrorist organizations. In this specific instance, the plaintiffs wanted to provide money, legal aid, and political advocacy for two groups that the secretary of state declared to be terrorist organizations. One of their central arguments was that criminalizing its ability to advocate for those organizations was an unconstitutional restriction of their First Amendment rights.

In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court sided with the government saying that the statute did not unconstitutionally impinge on the plaintiffs’ right to free speech. The crux of the Court’s 36-page opinion is this: The nature of the acts of terrorist organizations is so nefarious that support in any form, even when the support goes towards legal activities, is an illegal act that Congress can constitutionally regulate. The Court did identify advocacy that is “entirely independent” of a terrorist organization as permissible under the statute, but that any assistance directed at or by a specific terrorist organization or organizations is illegal.

In support of its stance that the statute does not encroach on the right to free speech, the Court paints a convincing picture of how the statute promotes a compelling governmental interest to fight terrorism and how the plaintiffs’ proposed action may help a terrorist organization further its illegal objectives. The opinion points out that supporting legal activities can free up an organization’s resources, allowing it to direct those resources towards planning and carrying out acts of terrorism. Providing legal advice or political advocacy can also help legitimize an organization, making it easier to recruit members and raise funds.

The Court lays out a logical and convincing argument as to why activities like those proposed by the plaintiffs in this case should be restricted; but what are all the different types of activities that could be considered to materially support terrorism? For example, what if Hamas wanted to sue someone or was being sued and they wanted to hire an American law firm? Besides the obvious fact that providing legal assistance to a terrorist organization would be a public relations nightmare for an American law firm, such an act, like the legal assistance that plaintiffs in this case proposed to provide, also appears to be illegal.

The Court’s bottom line here is that terrorist organizations do not segregate their legitimate activities from their criminal ones. Any money that they raise through legitimate channels is likely to go towards supporting violence. The same goes for political or legal aid. While the Court’s rationale is solid, it seems that there will likely be future arguments over what kinds of actions the “material support” statute actually proscribes and what degree of connection someone must have with a terrorist organization for their advocacy actions to be considered illegal.

Photo credit: Jeff Kubina’s Photostream

Six Things to Watch with Petraeus in Afghanistan

Thursday, June 24th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Now that Gen. McChrystal is about to add “(ret.)” after his name, let’s examine the implications of the transition to Gen. Petraeus.

The Washington Post story quotes an unnamed White House official saying of the transition: “It’s as seamless as it could be, not only in terms of operations but also because you put someone in who’s widely respected. No one is going to doubt that he’s the right guy for the job.”
A relatively smooth transition, to be sure, but with an emphasis on the relatively. Here’s a look at five areas where the change in command might create a bit of unease.

Political expectations: Petraeus is God, at least if you ask most elected officials on the Hill. Yes, he was the architect of the “surge” in Iraq, and the “surge” was part of the reason that violence decreased in that country. The massive increase in troops helped, but the strategy change, the Sons of Iraq’s change of allegiance and a six-month cease-fire called by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr were all critical.

If you’re really interested in learning the entire story of how Iraq’s civil war was tamed, read The Gamble by Tom Ricks. In it, Ricks quotes a Petraeus colleague (and I’m paraphrasing from memory) as saying, “David is the best general in the United States military. But he’s not as good as he thinks he is.” It’s like Favre to the Vikings. He’s still really, really good. But he’ll never be as good as in Green Bay.

Keep this in mind because, as Ricks says on his blog this morning, “Afghanistan 2010 may be an even tougher nut than Iraq 2007. … Our biggest problem in Afghanistan is the government we are supporting there, and it isn’t clear to me what Petraeus can do about that.”

Mission: Counterinsurgency theory and practice is Petraeus’ bag, so don’t expect that to change. Bear in mind that COIN is a strategy, not an outcome. It ends with some sort of negotiated peace, and it’s unclear if Petraeus has the same threshold for potential discussions with the Taliban as McChrystal. There has been American resistance to the idea (as there should be) of reconciling with any of the Taliban’s upper eschelon, but would Petraeus draw the line slightly differently than McChrystal?

Relations with Eikenberry: It became clear that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, was playing second fiddle to McChrystal, who had established a clear working relationship with Karzai. During Petraeus’ time in Iraq, he may have held more sway than then-Ambassador Ryan Crocker, but they were an inseparable team that appeared together constantly. Petraeus, who is as much of a diplomat as a solider, will work to forge a better relationship with Eikenberry and turn this operation into a true civilian-military effort.

Relations with Karzai: Karzai very publicly lobbied for McChrystal to stay, and by many accounts, the two were on the same page (at least professionally). Is it possible that they were too close? Will Petraeus do a better job using America’s isolated points of leverage to extract more from the Afghan government?

Relations with Pakistan: This quote says it all:

McChrystal also played a key role in improving Kabul’s rocky relationship with Islamabad.

Yet Petraeus probably has as much, if not more, clout in Islamabad. He was an early proponent of a regional strategy that prioritized improving relations with Pakistan in hopes of persuading it to target the Afghan Taliban fighters who use Pakistani hideouts to plot attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Petraeus has visited Pakistan numerous times, delivering assurances that the U.S. troop buildup in Afghanistan would not spill over into Pakistan, visiting Pakistani paramilitary forces in the northwestern city of Peshawar and regularly praising Pakistan’s fight against its domestic Taliban.

“There’s a complete understanding of each other’s situation,” a senior Pakistani military official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “He’s not a stranger.”

Troops on the ground: There’s been no shortage of troops in Afghanistan who voiced their displeasure with McChrystal’s restrictions on the use of force. Think of it this way: you’re an 18-year-old Marine, –and you’ve become a trained killer and sent to a war zone. But your commanding general seems like he’s telling you not to do the job you’ve been trained for. Many of the troops’ quotes imply a certain amount of lost respect for McChrystal. Petraeus will have to work to explain the mission and win them over to a “mission first” mentality. Training stateside should also be adjusted accordingly.

Petraeus is the consummate pro, and he’ll no doubt do his best in an incredibly challenging environment with far-from-certain results. My take is that this transition will be as smooth as one could hope.

Photo credit: Jon-Phillip Sheridan’s Photostream

Book Review: The Flight of the Intellectuals by Paul Berman

Tuesday, June 8th, 2010
Elbert Ventura



Elbert Ventura is the managing editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas. He formerly served as the managing editor of the Progressive Policy Institute.

by Elbert Ventura

Paul Berman may be our most romantic public intellectual. His prose, febrile and epigrammatic, can be intoxicatingly lyrical. He doesn’t so much make arguments as launch crusades. He is a careful scholar, building his cases with close reading and creative exegesis, but the cool erudition barely conceals the hot idealism. “Let us be for the freedom of others,” read the last line of Terror and Liberalism, his most widely read book. Details, word choices and footnotes matter, but it is the sweeping idea that animates his work.

It’s fitting that the cover design for his latest book, The Flight of the Intellectuals, features a Minimalist array of lines, black and white. For those are the terms in which Berman thinks. It’s what makes the arrival of each new Berman book an event – you expect lines to be drawn, challenges issued. It’s also what can get him in trouble.

The Flight of the Intellectuals is a book-length elaboration of a long essay Berman wrote for The New Republic in 2007 about the Islamic philosopher Tariq Ramadan. What’s gotten Berman riled up is the admiring reception Western intelligentsia has given Ramadan, who is viewed by many as the leading reformist voice for Muslims today. Ramadan has urged Muslims in the West to participate in the social and cultural life of their new homes instead of turning inward. But to Berman, the attention he has won is undeserved, even odious. For beneath the veneer of moderation Berman spies ghosts of extremism past and present.

The first third of The Flight of the Intellectuals is vintage Berman, as he traces Ramadan’s genealogical and ideological roots. What he finds is a questionable birthright. “Tariq Ramadan is nothing if not a son, a brother, a grandson and even a great-grandson – family relations that appear to shape everything he writes and does, and that certainly shape how other people perceive what he writes and does,” he opens the second chapter. Ramadan’s grandfather was Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. His father, Said Ramadan, was al-Banna’s secretary, also a major figure in the Brotherhood. In the Brotherhood, Berman sees a wellspring of dangerous ideas: the imposition of Islamic law, the utopian restoration of the Caliphate, the cult of jihad, the veneration of martyrdom.

In Tariq Ramadan, Berman sees that strain of Islamism. He hears Ramadan’s calls for rationalism, universal values and a more modern Islam, but picks out discordant notes in the background of Ramadan’s thought. Take women’s rights. Berman homes in on Ramadan’s refusal, in a televised debate with then-French Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy, to condemn the Islamist practice of stoning women who commit adultery, calling instead for a more modest “moratorium.” Berman also flags Ramadan for his past statements on Jews: For instance, Ramadan in 2003 published an essay accusing six “French Jewish intellectuals” (one, in fact, was not Jewish) of abandoning their universalist principles in championing Israel – a thesis that Berman rightly lashes him for. No less troublesome for Berman is Ramadan’s whitewashing of his forefathers’ record. In Ramadan’s telling, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood is a “man of democratic temperament…committed to rational judgment and scientific truth…a peaceful man, patient and practical,” Berman recounts with raised brow.

The Lonely Rebel

Berman contrasts the adulation of Ramadan by Western intellectuals with their shabby treatment of another controversial voice: Ayaan Hirsi Ali. The Somali-born writer’s story has been rehearsed countless times: flight from a forced marriage, asylum in the Netherlands, renunciation of Islam, death threats from Muslim fanatics. Along the way, Hirsi Ali has established a reputation as a scorched-earth critic of Islam. It has earned her the adoration of the American right – and suspicion from the left, which sees her Islam-or-enlightenment stand as unhelpful.

Berman is at his most indignant here. Dubbing Hirsi Ali a “rebel soul,” he denounces the left for turning its back on someone whom he considers a true liberal voice emerged from the Islamist wasteland. Berman is appalled that Hirsi Ali, who has to travel with bodyguards because she has been marked for death by Islamists, cannot find succor in the same intelligentsia that once circled their wagons for Salman Rushdie. And it’s not just Hirsi Ali: Berman ends his book with a litany of liberals who have dared to challenge Islamist fascism and have seen their lives threatened for it. “Salman Rushdie has metastasized into an entire social class,” he writes. Where are the liberal intellectuals to defend them?

That, as the title suggests, is what Berman’s book is really about. Joining Ramadan in the crosshairs are Ian Buruma and Timothy Garton Ash, two champions of Ramadan, both critics of Hirsi Ali. But they also stand in for an entire intellectual cohort, one that Berman now finds suffering from a loss of nerve. “[I]n recounting these quarrels, I have, by the logic of my own narrative, ended up trotting out the dread word courage. This may be the heart of the matter,” he writes.

The particulars of Berman’s case against Ramadan seem, at times, to be a stretch. He gets across the point that Ramadan is a slippery figure – but others have already noted that. Upgrading the charge from slippery to sinister requires some heavy lifting and much hair-splitting on Berman’s part. All too often, Berman mistakes telling footnotes, vague wordings and conspicuous omissions for smoking guns. It’s an impressive prosecutorial performance, but it’s not enough to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Berman’s book amounts to something else: a radical’s attack on a squishy moderate. For Berman, Ramadan, who modulates his rhetoric depending on his audience, is the kind of ally we don’t need. Pick a side, stand your ground – the ambiguous, the pragmatic, the double-talkers need not apply. Berman dismisses the defense of Ramadan by intellectuals: that he is a valuable critic of Islam from within. And indeed, his indignation at Ramadan’s hedging about Islam’s problems can be contagious – you occasionally find yourself shaking your head (if not quite your fist).

Berman and Liberalism

But Berman’s exacting outlook is ultimately problematic. Hirsi Ali, strident and surrounded by bodyguards, is the model warrior in his war of ideas. It’s a needlessly steep standard – and a counterproductive one. Living under fatwa may be testimony to a critic’s courage, but that’s not the same as a critic’s effectiveness. If the true goal is to modernize Islam and promote liberalism, an effective critique, not just an angry one, is necessary. Berman’s impatience and his insistence on choosing sides get in the way of a clear-eyed assessment of what we need to win the war of ideas: courage, yes, and anger even, but also reason, canniness and humility.

In the years since 9/11, Berman has emerged as one of our foremost liberal hawks. He has been frequently lumped with Peter Beinart (The Good Fight), and Beinart in turn has harked back to the liberals of the Americans for Democratic Action and the anti-Communist left – Niebuhr’s liberals – as his and his intellectual allies’ forebears. But that’s not quite where Berman’s thought takes you. All you need is a minute with Berman’s urgent and certain prose to realize that there is little skepticism here and none of the ironic disposition. He is less a liberal of the Niebuhr variety than a lefty in the mold of an Irving Howe. In his words one feels the force of conviction of the Old Left, the romance of the battle, the thrill of the lonely stand. Indeed, The Flight of the Intellectuals recalls a similar challenge to the intellectual class: Howe’s “The Age of Conformity.” Like Howe, Berman sees himself as an observer and critic of the liberal intellectuals. Replace “conformity” with “cowardice,” and you have Berman’s updated critique of liberalism gone soft.

Berman’s is a necessary voice, but it’s a voice that can only be fruitful in equipoise with the skeptical one of Niebuhrian liberalism. Berman’s untrammeled moralism can leave us stranded (literally) in the dunes of endless desert. But liberal doubt can also lead us down an equally dangerous path of moral complacency and atrophy. What is Berman to liberalism and liberalism to Berman? Each in the end keeps the other honest.

Israel Must Learn to Eat Soup with a Knife

Monday, June 7th, 2010
Rachel Kleinfeld



Rachel Kleinfeld is the CEO of the Truman National Security Project.

by Rachel Kleinfeld

I love Israel. From the golden light that falls across the stones of Jerusalem to the banh mi sandwiches made by Vietnamese refugees welcomed by an empathetic Prime Minister Begin, Israel has a beauty and history I hold dear. Keeping this state, and this liberal tradition, safe is why it is so important that Israel understand the depth – and the cause – of its failure last week.

Israel’s leaders lack a fundamental understanding of the threats of the 21st century, or the type of power it takes to quell them. And by misunderstanding, they are endangering their country’s very existence.

Power matters – particularly for a small state like Israel, with an array of real enemies. For many years, Israel has used two primary levers of power. Its immense military might gives it the power to physically destroy its enemies, from bombing Iraq’s nuclear reactor to routing the armies of attacking Arab states. Meanwhile, its friendship with the U.S. augments its armed prowess with the power of an alliance that provides crucial financial support and contains potential threats from countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

But in the 21st century, military power isn’t what it once was. Israel is rarely going to face “clean fights” against armies of clearly identified enemies marching across the desert. Instead, it is going to confront the messy realities of modern, non-state-based warfare. The Turkish organization that sponsored last week’s flotilla had ties to al-Qaeda. A number of individuals aboard were connected to Hamas and other violent organizations. But the boat was also full of peace activists, international diplomats and other well-intentioned individuals who served as (perhaps unwitting) human shields for these more nefarious groups. The smorgasbord of causes on that flotilla was not accidental: it is de rigueur among smart insurgent groups worldwide.

Insurgents know what Israel, apparently, does not. Using military means against unarmed opponents is not only wrong, it also strengthens the insurgents’ cause, inflames their supporters, motivates donors and garners great press.

A flotilla of cell-phone-carrying, Twitter- and Facebook-posting activists can ignite the 24-hour news cycle and get their version of events in front of world public opinion long before any country can muster its sclerotic bureaucratic organs. By the time the state responds, the narrative has already been set. Israel becomes the British fighting Gandhi, or the National Guard turning their hoses on Southern civil rights protesters. We know who won those battles.

Fine, many might snort. Israel may lose the weak-kneed support of the so-called “international community” but it is more important to stop real threats decisively. After all, Israel has had to put up with some international hand-wringing for its military actions in the past. But by bombing Iraq’s Osirik reactor, Syria’s blossoming nuclear reactor or the grounded Egyptian Air Force in 1967, it averted real threats that otherwise could have knocked it out of existence.

Force is still a useful, necessary deterrent against military threats from other countries. Threats from terrorist organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah and others that mix humanitarianism and populist appeals with violence are no less real, but as Israel learned in its ill-conceived 2006 war in Lebanon, force doesn’t work as well against them. As America’s own counterinsurgency manual states, insurgents met with force alone simply melt back into the population, their ranks augmented by new converts and their bank accounts brimming with funds from new supporters. The insurgents then live to fight long wars of attrition that sap their enemies physically, mentally and spiritually.

It is that last category that Israel must pay particular attention to, because it risks losing its other lever of power. As Peter Beinart pointed out in a much-quoted story in the New York Review of Books, young American Jews identify with Israel insofar as it lives up to its founding values. They want to support the state that took in the Vietnamese boat people, not the state that mines Palestinian olive groves. Fighting insurgent wars largely through force necessarily leads Israel to violate the spirit of its own humanitarian founding – and to alienate the supporters in America it needs for its survival.

Victory against insurgents requires a new perspective and new tools. As T.E. Lawrence explained, one must “learn to eat soup with a knife.” George W. Bush didn’t understand counterinsurgency, and his failure allowed the insurgent threat in Iraq and Afghanistan to grow and metastasize. Now, Israel’s leaders must master the signature threat of the 21st century. Its hammer worked well against the state-based threats it faced during the first 50 years of its existence. But Israel had better find other options in its toolkit if it is to quell the threats it faces today.

Photo credit: Lilachd’s Photostream

Progressives: Own the National Security Debate! Please!

Thursday, June 3rd, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

If you read the conclusion of today’s Democracy Corps/Third Way poll analysis, one thing becomes abundantly clear: Democrats remain disturbingly not confident talking about national security.

[M]any Democrats seem relatively silent about the accomplishments of the Obama administration and their party on national security. Though a few are stressing the administration’s efforts on the new START treaty and nuclear proliferation, fewer still seem to be stressing the administration’s accomplishments regarding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, efforts to strengthen the military, and steps to combat terrorism. The survey strongly suggests progressives should speak out forcefully on these issues, and remind voters of the contrasts between those relative successes and the failures the country witnessed under eight years of Bush-Cheney. [emphasis added]

When the president scores 53 percent approval even after two significant domestic terrorist attempts in the last six months, that’s a strong statement. Even the last few months have seen a significant 10-point shift — moderates have changed allegiances and now trust Democrats more than Republicans on national security by six points.

Progressives need to own the national security narrative, a message I’ve tried to hammer home repeatedly over the last several months. Here’s an excerpt from a piece I wrote back in April for Roll Call:

[T]he Obama administration has quietly put together a sterling record on national security. So why are Democrats so down in the dumps? As one party strategist put it, Democrats “are behaving like the president has a 30 percent approval rating. On these [security] issues, Democrats inherently believe that no one will believe our arguments.”
There’s plenty for progressives to cheer. … Progressives stand for strong, smart security policy. Obama has terrorists in retreat and American prestige on the rise. Democrats need to begin owning their successes if the American public is to give credit where it’s due.

The Democracy Corps/Third Way analysis offers solid, straightforward recommendations. These are hardly liberal fantasy — they’re pragmatic, progressive ways to emphasize what has been a successful beginning on national security that will translate into electoral gains.

  • Speak in stronger terms about anti-terror efforts.
  • Stress efforts to support and strengthen the military.
  • Emphasize successful attempts toward greater international cooperation.
  • Emphasize domestic and economic renewal as an element of national strength.
  • Provide a contrast to the Bush-Cheney administration.

Two quick comments on the specifics of the recommendations. First, on the economy “as an element of national strength,” we’re now wondering less why the White House put such a strong emphasis on precisely that point in last week’s National Security Strategy. And on that final point, John Boehner’s been going around claiming that the administration’s counterterrorism successes have been “lucky,” an argument that the survey says falls flat with voters. I’d offer my evisceration of Boehner here (it was fun to write, so please check it out).

Top 10 Pragmatic Progressive Ideas from the National Security Strategy

Friday, May 28th, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

Since copies of the Obama administration’s new National Security Strategy began to circulate, there’s been a lot of cheering about how different from Bush’s it is. And true, it is. That’s made clear in the letter from the president on the document’s first page. And my hunch is that people stop there — you get your headline, and you run with it, not bothering to read the rest of the document.

Well, guess what? I just cozied up with a chicken sandwich, a Diet Coke and a bag of chips and read the whole enchilada.

It’s long and at times unwieldy. I understand, for example, that “spending taxpayer’s dollars wisely” is important, but not sure the White House should be compelled to include it in the strategy text. But that’s indicative of Obama’s style — when you seek input from everyone, you’ll tend to end up with a longer list.

But after digging through the document, it’s worth pointing out the specifics of how the strategy has a distinctly pragmatic progressive outlook. With that, here are the top 10 examples:

1. It reaffirms that America’s values are the source of its power, and that American exceptionalism endures:

[T]he work to build a stronger foundation for our leadership within our borders recognizes that the most effective way for the United States of America to promote our values is to live them. America’s commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are essential sources of our strength and influence in the world.  America has always been a beacon to the peoples of the world when we ensure that the light of America’s example burns bright.

2. It prioritizes terrorism, Iraq, and Afghanistan while weighing them in the context of the 21st century’s other threats:

[T]hese wars—and our global efforts to successfully counter violent extremism—are only one element of our strategic environment and cannot define America’s engagement with the world. Terrorism is one of many threats that are more consequential in a global age. The gravest danger to the American people and global security continues to come from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. The space and cyberspace capabilities that power our daily lives and military operations are vulnerable to disruption and attack. Dependence upon fossil fuels constrains our options and pollutes our environment. Climate change and pandemic disease threaten the security of regions and the health and safety of the American people.

3. America will only be secure if all government agencies coordinate effectively:

To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same. … We are improving the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly. We are also improving coordinated planning and policymaking and must build our capacity in key areas where we fall short.

4. It is comfortable with, but prudent about, the use of force:

While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction. When force is necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.

5. It’s tough as nails on al Qaeda:

[W]e reject the notion that al-Qa’ida represents any religious authority. They are not religious leaders, they are killers; and neither Islam nor any other religion condones the slaughter of innocents.

6. It advocates the responsible, measured pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons:

As long as any nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.

7. The Obama administration trusts the UN:

We are enhancing our coordination with the U.N. and its agencies. We need a U.N. capable of fulfilling its founding purpose — maintaining international peace and security, promoting global cooperation, and advancing human rights. To this end, we are paying our bills. We are intensifying efforts with partners on and outside the U.N. Security Council to ensure timely, robust, and credible Council action to address threats to peace and security.

8. “Democracy promotion” — a term that became identified with the Bush administration — isn’t a dirty phrase:

The United States supports the expansion of democracy and human rights abroad because governments that respect these values are more just, peaceful, and legitimate. We also do so because their success abroad fosters an environment that supports America’s national interests.

9. The United States’ security is closely linked to clean energy:

As long as we are dependent on fossil fuels, we need to ensure the security and free flow of global energy resources. But without significant and timely adjustments, our energy dependence will continue to undermine our security and prosperity. This will leave us vulnerable to energy supply disruptions and manipulation and to changes in the environment on an unprecedented scale.  The United States has a window of opportunity to lead in the development of clean energy technology.

10. It calls on politicians to stop being ridiculous and put country above politics:

Throughout the Cold War, even as there were intense disagreements about certain courses of action, there remained a belief that America’s political leaders shared common goals, even if they differed about how to reach them. In today’s political environment, due to the actions of both parties that sense of common purpose is at times lacking in our national security dialogue. This division places the United States at a strategic disadvantage.

Bagram Detainee Case Likely Headed to the High Court

Thursday, May 27th, 2010
Matthew Dahl



Matt Dahl is a judicial clerk in Virginia and writes about national security law on his blog. The views expressed here are his own.

by Matthew Dahl

In 2008, the Supreme Court decided that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay had the constitutional right to challenge the legality of their detention. Thus ended the question of whether all detainees in the fight against terrorism had a right to habeas corpus, right? As with all complex legal questions, the answer is never that simple.

The federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia added to the complexity of the habeas corpus issue when it ruled last Friday on a case filed by three detainees being held at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Bagram is not only the largest American military base in Afghanistan, it also serves as a major detention center for those taken prisoner there, and allegedly holds some prisoners captured in other countries as well. In an opinion by Chief Judge David Sentelle, a Reagan appointee, the court found that the constitutional right of habeas corpus does not extend to detainees being held at the base.

The court made three central determinations in its decision. First, it found that the current procedure used at Bagram to deal with the detainees is even worse than the procedure that was used at Gitmo, which the Supreme Court found to be unconstitutional. The procedures at Gitmo, referred to as Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), did not allow detainees access to an attorney and severely restricted a detainee’s right to present evidence on his behalf or rebut evidence by the government. The court in this case found that the procedures at Bagram, called Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Boards (UECRBs), were even less sufficient than the CSRTs, and found that this factor initially favored giving Bagram detainees habeas corpus.

But despite that finding, the court found that two other factors weighed against granting the right. It concluded that Bagram is in fact different from Gitmo because the U.S. does not intend Bagram to be a permanent base similar to Gitmo, which has been operating for over a hundred years. More importantly, it found that giving Bagram detainees the right to habeas corpus could adversely affect the military’s ability to carry out operations in Afghanistan.

It is true that giving the detainees at Bagram the right to habeas corpus could cause a host of problems. It would require giving the detainees access to attorneys, and creating that system could eat up badly needed military assets. Also, Bagram detainees whose detentions were invalidated would most likely be released inside Afghanistan. This could put enemy fighters directly back on to the battlefield.

However, as the D.C. Court of Appeals admits, the fact still remains that the Bagram detainees are being held without constitutionally sufficient procedures available to them. If the U.S. is going to operate a prison where habeas corpus does not apply, what is to stop it from shipping all future terrorist detainees to Bagram to avoid giving them the right?

That’s why this case is on a beeline to the Supreme Court. While the Court has disagreed with the D.C. Court of Appeals on detainee cases, it is far from clear how it will come out on this issue. One factor making it hard to predict is that the Court’s makeup will be different from when it decided its last major detainee case with the addition of Justice Sotomayor and – almost certainly – Elena Kagan.

In its last major detainee case, the Court split down ideological lines, with Justice Kennedy writing the opinion and siding with the more liberal justices. It is likely that Justice Sotomayor, as part of the liberal bloc, would vote for extending habeas corpus to the Bagram detainees. Similarly, soon-to-be Justice Kagan would almost certainly be in favor of extending the right to Bagram detainees — in 2005, while dean of Harvard Law School, she joined in a letter with three other law school deans stating that detainees should be allowed access to federal courts for review of procedures such as CSRTs and UECRBs.

That said, neither are very experienced with national security cases, so one can’t say for sure how each will vote. Another factor making it difficult to predict the outcome is the fact that Bagram and Gitmo are situated differently. Both are active military bases, but Bagram is operating in a theater of war. Allowing detainees at Bagram to engage in the habeas corpus process could affect the military’s war effort in Afghanistan, a fact that could sway one or more of the liberal justices to the other side.

The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Progressive Policy Institute.

Photo Credit: U.S. Army Africa’s Photostream

Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence, Resigns

Friday, May 21st, 2010
Jim Arkedis



Jim Arkedis is the director of PPI's National Security Project.

by Jim Arkedis

It would be easy to draw a straight line between the alleged “intelligence failures” of the last six months and Dennis Blair’s resignation. Let in the Underwear Bomber and the Times Square bomber, and heads should roll, right?

Well, not so fast my friend.

Any alleged failing on Blair’s part is a minor reason for his departure. If Faisal Shahzad was the reason, we’d have expected Mark Leiter — head of the National Counter Terrorism Center, NCTC, which falls under the DNI’s purview — to go first.

Blair left because of power, authority and personality conflicts with the White House. More specifically, the DNI position has little power or authority, and Blair got outmaneuvered personally by savvy bureaucratic operators like CIA Director Leon Panetta and White House counter terrorism advisor John Brennan.

Politico reported on Blair’s struggles back in January:

“One reality is Blair is really not political; he is really not good on the Hill,” said one former counterterrorism official. “He doesn’t know how to build coalitions on the Hill. He is really just out there swimming on his own, and he is not doing a very good job for the people who might have pushed expanding the DNI’s power to get behind him on this.”

On the one issue where Blair really chose to take a stand — appointing Chiefs of Station at CIA offices abroad — the White House sided with Panetta. And then there’s the big elephant in the room — budget authority.

Despite being the nominal Director of all 16 US intelligence agencies, the DNI doesn’t control their individual budgets or personnel, except for those under NCTC. That’s a big problem, causing the “boss” to be subject to the machinations of his de facto subordinates. Sure, the DNI has the authority to facilitate collaboration between those individual agencies, but if those agencies’ heads retain enough authority to run their own little fiefdoms, that creates uncomfortable tensions. And Blair didn’t seem politically savvy enough to navigate that mine field.

So, on the personality front, Blair, though a highly respected professional, seems to have been a bit of a fish out of water in this job. Then again, is the DNI job too small a fish in a big ocean?

Defining the DNI’s role from a budgetary point of view should be the next intelligence community reform.

Photo credit: Robert Huffstutter / CC BY-NC 2.0