Posts Tagged ‘ TGV ’

British Deal Shows Private Investment Demand for High-Speed Rail

Wednesday, December 1st, 2010
Mark Reutter



PPI Fellow Mark Reutter is the former editor of Railroad History and author of Making Steel: Sparrows Point and the Rise and Ruin of American Industrial Might (2005, rev. ed.).

by Mark Reutter

This week, the British government will formalize an agreement with two Canadian pension funds with enormous implications for passenger train development in the United States. In return for the right to operate a high-speed rail line linking London with the Channel Tunnel for 30 years, the Ontario teachers and municipal employee pension funds have agreed to pay the UK government $3.4 billion.

The sale not only represents a big vote of market confidence in the future of high-speed rail, but points to a route for building and operating new train lines in the U.S.

In the wake of the equities meltdown, U.S. pension funds are seeking “safe havens” to invest, while states and the federal government are looking for ways to build expensive rail infrastructure in the face of record budget deficits.

Here’s a solution: Structure high-speed rail projects to attract pension funds and other institutional investors through operating concessions and other long-term cash-generating instruments.

Making Money While Generating Jobs

Consider the $133 billion Florida State Board of Administration, currently winding down its loss-generating equities portfolio and concentrating on core fixed income.

If the Florida State pension fund invested just 3 percent of its portfolio in the state’s high-speed rail line, that would generate $4 billion. That’s enough to cover both the $500 million shortfall in the high-speed segment between Tampa and Orlando (the Obama administration has already allocated $2.05 billion for this project) and the state’s portion of a Miami-Orlando route with excellent ridership potential.

Similarly, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) has adopted a new investment policy with a targeted 3 percent allocation of assets, or about $7 billion, in infrastructure.

The proposed bullet train between Los Angeles and San Francisco is expected to generate as much as $3 billion in profits by 2030. By allocating some of its funds to the $40 billion rail project, CalPERS could enjoy a stable return while providing the Golden State with an enormous job-generating public work.

Other institutional investors, such as labor unions, could be attracted to rail partnerships and concessions that diversify their pension portfolios while providing direct economic benefits to their members.

Such new-style financing would require a marketplace with transparent trading and timely data, amounting to a new source of opportunity for the investment community. In a sense, Wall Street could come full circle to its origins as the exchange place for European capital seeking profit in American railway construction in the 19th century.

High Level of Investor Interest

Back to the Brits, it is crucial to note that the $3.4 billion interest in High Speed-1, the London-Channel link, exceeded the highest hopes of David Cameron’s coalition government, which inherited the initiative from Gordon Brown’s Labor government.

In the words of one commentator, the asset sale “came as a pleasant surprise” to observers who believed the UK government “would have to settle for knock-down prices” because of the world recession.

The auction also attracted many more bidders than expected. The Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System and Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, allied with Borealis Infrastructure, beat a long list of potential buyers, including insurance giant Allianz and investment bank Morgan Stanley.

Borealis already operates the Detroit River freight rail tunnel between the U.S. and Canada on behalf of the pension funds. The Borealis group will receive a revenue stream from access charges paid by train companies using HS-1. In return, it will be responsible for preserving the line as a high-speed railway and to periodically improve track and structures to state-of-the-art standards.

Eurostar fields trains between London and Paris and London and Brussels. Deutsche Bahn, the German rail carrier, has announced plans to operate from London to Frankfurt and London to Amsterdam.

In addition to these services, the Borealis group has the right to sell access to other passenger carriers and to develop freight traffic.

Setting a Monetary Value on High Speed

The British approach marks a turning point. Prior to now, high-speed lines, such as France’s TGV and Spain’s AVE, were built and operated by government or government-directed entities. The profits or losses from high-speed trains were part of the financial profile of the larger rail systems.

Nearly all experts agree that fast trains earn higher per-mile revenues than conventional-speed trains and substantially more than commuter and branch-line services.

The British concession puts a monetary value on high-speed rail that can serve as a basis for a market in future railway concessions and stock sales in equipment and infrastructure-building companies.

HS-1 was one of the most expensive rail projects in the world due to extensive bridging, tunneling and station construction. Opened in November 2007, the 68-mile line cost $8.3 billion.

The concession sale returns 40 percent of the build cost to the British treasury. When the concession ends in 2040, the railway will revert back to the government, which expects to re-bid the property for an equal or higher price.

By this means, HS-1 will continue to return a dividend to taxpayers and, over the course of its 150-year-plus lifecycle, repay its construction cost, probably several times over.

This prospect differs from the scary scenario presented by U.S. critics (including the Republican governor-elects of Wisconsin and Ohio) who charge that high-speed rail is a money pit requiring long-term government subsidies to operate.

Summing up the rap against rail as “high-speed pork,” Washington Post columnist Robert J. Samuelson recently complained, “If private investors concurred [that fast rail was profitable], they’d be clamoring to commit funds; they aren’t.”

The high-speed chase by investors for High Speed-1 shows just how off track these critics are.

photo credit: Jason Pier

How America Led, and Lost, the High-Speed Rail Race

Wednesday, March 31st, 2010
Mark Reutter



PPI Fellow Mark Reutter is the former editor of Railroad History and author of Making Steel: Sparrows Point and the Rise and Ruin of American Industrial Might (2005, rev. ed.).

by Mark Reutter

How did America get to where it is today, a country with the slowest and most threadbare intercity passenger rail service of any advanced nation?

Not so very long ago, we were not in this humiliating position. In fact, we operated trains that amazed and impressed the rest of the world. These trains were called streamliners, and their very names – Silver Meteor, Flying Yankee, Rocky Mountain Rocket, Denver Zephyr – connoted speed and luxury. In the period between 1935 and 1950, the 10 fastest scheduled passenger trains in the world were all U.S. streamliners.

One of the great racetracks of this period was the New York Central Railroad’s four-track mainline between Buffalo and Cleveland. Paging through an old timetable, I counted 42 daily passenger trains running on this line in the 1940s. Such trains as the Commodore Vanderbilt, Fifth Avenue Special and the extra-fare choice of tycoons and Hollywood starlets, The 20th Century Limited, routinely topped 90 miles per hour on straightaways and averaged 60-65 mph, including station stops.

The 187 miles between Buffalo and Cleveland were covered in 3 hours then. Today, the sole passenger train traveling this route, Amtrak’s Lake Shore Limited, takes 3½ hours, if (and this is a big if) the train is on schedule.

The Rise and Fall of American Rail

What differentiated our streamliners from contemporary trains in Europe and Asia was advanced technology. American railroads and equipment suppliers had not only pioneered the diesel-electric locomotive in the 1930s – a quantum leap over from the old steam locomotive – but introduced lightweight cars with better wheel sets, couplers, braking systems and lower centers of gravity to negotiate curves at higher speeds.

The interiors of these streamliners abounded in creature comforts – wide double-paned windows, recessed fluorescent lighting, luxurious reclining seats and the first air-conditioning found in any commercial transport.

Streamliners attracted customers by the carload. In fact, they made money. Wall Street consultants Coverdale & Colpitts surveyed 58 streamliners in 1948 and found that they grossed $98 million and netted $48 million after out-of-pocket costs, for a return of 49 percent.*

And then almost as quickly as the streamliner era flourished, it ended. There were a number of reasons for the rapid decline of rail passenger service, but the overwhelming factor was the explosion of government funding for new highways and airports. In 1956, Dwight Eisenhower signed the Interstate and Defense Highways Act. First estimated to cost $27 billion, the Interstate system took more than 30 years and $200 billion to complete. At the same time, state and local governments bankrolled airport construction, while Washington subsidized air carriers by fixing artificially high rates for U.S. airmail contracts.

The twin impact of airways and roadways was devastating on American railroads, which, after all, were private companies that paid property taxes and ticket taxes on their operations. For example, between 1956 and 1969, a total of 28,800 miles of interstate highways were opened to traffic. In the same period, 59,400 miles of railroad were taken out of passenger service.

From 2,500 daily intercity trains in 1954 (that’s excluding commuter service), fewer than 500 trains were left when the National Railroad Passenger Corp., or Amtrak, took over intercity rail service in 1971. Outside of the Boston-Washington Northeast Corridor, America’s passenger train had virtually disappeared.

American Technology Goes Abroad

So carelessly tossed away by our policymakers and politicians, the American streamliner did not simply die during those dismal decades of the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, it rose from the ashes as its key technological features moved overseas, welcomed by a visionary group of railroaders.

An all-electric test train ordered by Louis Armand, head of the French national railway, shattered world records with 208-mph speeds in March 1955. This achievement proved the capacity of rail equipment using overhead electricity for propulsion to operate far above 100 mph on a sustained basis.

The French experiments inspired Japan’s Minister of Transport Shinhi Sogo. In 1956, the same year that President Eisenhower signed the Interstate Highways Act, Sogo began planning a rail line without sharp curves or up and down grades that would permit streamlined, all-electric trains to run at extremely high speeds with utmost safety

To operate the Shinkansen, or “New Trunk Line,” between Tokyo and Osaka, Sogo actively imported technology from America, including the two-axle trucks of the Budd Manufacturing Co. and dynamic braking pioneered by General Motors’ Electro-Motive Division. To top it off, the Japan ordered the most advanced computer used outside of military applications (built by yet another American company, Bendix) to operate the line’s signal and dispatching systems.

Remarkably, the U.S. government gave Japan foreign aid – money purportedly going to an underdeveloped country – to build a rail infrastructure far superior to our own. Opened in time for the Tokyo Olympics in 1964, the first Shinkansen train traveled at a maximum of 125 mph. The latest-generation Shinkansen runs at 188 mph, and its ancestor is in a museum.

Japan wasn’t alone. After developing moderately high-speed trains on mixed freight-and-passenger lines, France opened Europe’s first all-new railroad between Paris and Lyon in 1981. This route featured the now-famous TGVs, or “Trains of Great Speed.” Six thousand of 20,000 rail miles in France are now covered by TGV trains. High-speed service has expanded into Belgium, Germany, Holland, Italy, Switzerland and Spain in Europe and in China, South Korea and Taiwan in Asia.

Playing Catch-Up

Compared to these developments, we’re still in the horse-and-buggy stage. Amtrak’s self-declared high-speed line, the Northeast Corridor, does not even qualify as high speed by world standards. The Acela Express is designed for 150 mph, but only goes that fast for about 25 miles in Rhode Island.

Overall, Acela trains average only 67 mph between Boston and New York. South of New York, Acela operates at an average of 77 mph and can’t go faster than 125 mph anywhere because the overhead electric wires are obsolete and can slip off the train’s pantographs at higher speeds.

This is what happens when you starve a business for 60 years. It becomes stunted. Our passenger rail system is stunted today not because of some inevitable law of economics or natural outgrowth of competition. It’s stunted because of longstanding government policy that thoughtlessly, absentmindedly, let some wonderful American-made technology slip away.

This piece is an excerpt from Mark Reutter’s keynote address at the High-Speed Rail Summit last week in Erie, Pa.

* “Streamliners Earn More Than Ever,” Railway Age, March 4, 1950.